Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law

Introduction

This article discusses noteworthy admiralty and maritime decisions involving seamen, longshoremen, passengers, maritime liens, salvage, marine insurance, marine contracts, limitation of liability, jurisdiction, and other issues that arise in the practice of maritime law. The survey period includes opinions issued by federal and state courts in the United States between October 1, 2022, and September 30, 2023.

Seaman’s Claims

Jones Act Negligence and Unseaworthiness

In In re Verplanck Fire District, the court held a volunteer firefighter who spent 3.8% of his time on a vessel was not a seaman and his negligence claim was barred by state law. Verplanck Fire District (District) provides fire protection, ambulance and EMS services. The majority of assistance is land-based, but the District also owns an approximately twenty-five-foot vessel, MARINE 1, used to perform services in and around the Hudson River. The volunteer firefighter did not take the training to operate the vessel, but completed a boating safety class and responded to accidents on the river. The firefighter was injured on the vessel while responding to a collision when he extended his leg between two vessels to try to push the vessels apart. The firefighter received benefits under the New York’s Volunteer Firefighters Benefit Law (VFBL), and the District filed a limitation action in federal court, seeking to limit its liability to the value of the MARINE 1. The firefighter sought to recover for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness and, alternatively, as a Sieracki seaman and general maritime negligence. The District moved for summary judgment on all claims.

With respect to the claims as a seaman for Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness, the court held that the firefighter’s connection to the vessel was insufficient in both duration and nature because the vessel-related work resulted in 3.8% of his total activities, far below the 30% guideline to satisfy the duration element required in Chandris. Further, in determining whether the firefighter could recover for unseaworthiness as a Sieracki seaman, the court detailed that, under New York law, the relationship of a volunteer firefighter and the District is statutorily defined as that of employer and employee. Consequently, the court held that firefighter was not entitled to recover under Sieracki. Finally, the court considered the District’s argument that firefighter’s claim for maritime negligence was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the New York VFBL. Concluding that the exclusive remedy provision was not preempted by the maritime law, the court held that the maritime negligence claim was barred by the firefighter’s receipt of benefits under the VFBL.

In Cooper v. Vigor Marine, LLC, Plaintiff was injured while employed by IMIA to “perform industrial painting, blasting, cleaning, and other related work” aboard a vessel in port. Plaintiff filed suit against multiple parties, asserting that she was a seaman entitled to damages under the Jones Act because her employer, IMIA, had “actual of constructive knowledge” of the hazard and “failed to exercise reasonable care” resulting in her injury. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.

The court first held that, because the plaintiff alleged that “IMIA” was her employer and listed three entities with the initials “IMIA,” the plaintiff failed to identify with enough specificity which defendant was her employer, as there can only be one Jones Act employer. Additionally, the plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to establish an employer-employee relationship existed beyond stating that she was “in the employ” of an entity.

Second, the court held the plaintiff did not establish that she was a “seaman” pursuant to the two-prong Chandris test. The court reasoned that plaintiff’s “allegations that she performed industrial painting, blasting, cleaning, and other work in a containment while the vessel was in a graving dock fail[ed] to demonstrate that [p]laintiff was a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act” because the complaint did not assert sufficient facts to demonstrate the nature and duration of her employment. Therefore, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Jones Act negligence and maintenance and cure claims, and granted the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to address the issues identified.

Maintenance and Cure

In Flowers v. Magnolia Marine Transport Co., the Eastern District of Louisiana granted an employer’s motion for partial summary judgment in part finding the employer established a McCorpen defense as to the injured seaman’s physical injuries but not for the seaman’s psychological injuries. In this case, plaintiff, a Jones Act seaman, alleged he injured his back, shoulder, and neck when assisting a deckhand out of the water. Plaintiff filed an action against his employer/vessel owner for, inter alia, maintenance and cure benefits. Plaintiff had previously injured his back, shoulder, and neck in multiple car accidents and a work accident before he was hired by defendant. Defendant argued plaintiff intentionally concealed these pre-employment injuries when he was hired and therefore plaintiff’s maintenance and cure claims must be dismissed as a matter of law in accordance with the ruling in McCorpen. First, the court found the concealment prong was satisfied because plaintiff did not disclose his pre-existing injuries on his pre-employment medical questionnaire requesting his medical history. However, the court reasoned plaintiff did not previously experience psychological injuries and therefore did not conceal them when he was hired. The court explained the materiality prong was met based on evidence the pre-existing injuries would have materially impacted the employer’s decision to hire the plaintiff and the fact that questions were asked about plaintiff’s prior medical conditions made the answers material for McCorpen purposes. Finally, the court found, and plaintiff did not dispute, a causal link existed between plaintiff’s pre-existing physical injuries and those alleged in the lawsuit since they were identical in nature. However, the court found the third McCorpen element was not met as to plaintiff’s psychological injuries despite plaintiff admitting the source of his depression was his inability to work before being employed by defendant, because defendant could not prove plaintiff’s psychological injuries were causally linked to any withheld information and there are no records for prior psychological treatment. Accordingly, the court found all three prongs of the McCorpen defense were satisfied as to plaintiff’s physical injuries and dismissed plaintiff’s claims related to maintenance and cure involving his physical injuries but denied defendant’s motion as to plaintiff’s psychological injuries.

Other Issues Affecting Jones Act Seamen

In Pritt v. John Crane Inc., a magistrate judge of the United States District Court for Massachusetts considered the availability of survival remedies under the general maritime law. The Court granted a motion to allow the plaintiff—the widow of a veteran whose death from Mesothelioma was alleged to have been caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products while working aboard a Navy vessel—to file a second amended complaint to pursue these additional damages against the product manufacturer. Breaking with a 2015 decision by another district court of the First Circuit, the magistrate judge found that survival remedies could be pursued under the reasoning that doing so was necessary to avoid creating incongruity whereby plaintiff’s wrongful death damages are recognized but the rights that were afforded to the plaintiff’s husband prior to his death and that she sought to exercise as executrix of his estate are not.

In Meeks v. Hard’s Marine Service, Ltd., the Southern District of Texas found that a seaman who was terminated after complaining about COVID-19 exposure onboard a vessel did not establish a claim under the Seaman’s Protection Act. In this case, plaintiff boarded a vessel to start a two-week shift working as a seaman. Plaintiff discovered that one of the seamen who was leaving the vessel that day showed signs of COVID-19 and at least six of his coworkers had been directly exposed to him on the vessel. Plaintiff expressed his concerns of COVID-19 exposure to his supervisor who allegedly dismissed his concerns and assured him that the coworker did not have COVID-19. Plaintiff later learned that the coworker tested positive. Plaintiff texted his supervisor about his concerns for COVID-19 exposure dockside, fear of retaliation for reporting the issue, and ultimately declined to perform his duties. The supervisor advised the plaintiff that he needed to alert his captain on these issues and clarified why he would or would not fire someone. Plaintiff continued to not perform his duties and was fired on the final day of his shift. Plaintiff brought a retaliation and wrongful termination suit under the Seaman’s Protection Act against his employer alleging he was fired in retaliation for alerting his employer about the sick coworker. In granting the defendant employer’s motion to dismiss, the Magistrate reasoned that the employer took sufficient corrective action to resolve plaintiff’s fear of dockside exposure by allowing the plaintiff to remain on the vessel. The court explained that while there are additional recommendations provided by the Center for Disease Control for COVID-19 exposure, the statute does not demand that every possible measure be taken to correct the condition, only that there is correction of the condition. Further, the court found that plaintiff’s text message conversation to his supervisor was not considered a formal complaint entitled to protection under the statute. Finally, the court clarified that plaintiff did not provide proper notice to the vessel’s owner as required under the statute because plaintiff only reported his concerns to his supervisor and defendant did not own the vessel. Following the court’s dismissal of the action, plaintiff filed a motion to alter the judgement which was similarly denied.

Longshoremen Claims

In In re Ingram Barge Co., the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders granting summary judgment finding that (1) a semi-permanently moored cleaning barge lacked vessel status, (2) an injured barge cleaner was not a seaman under the Jones Act, and (3) the vessel owner did not owe the injured barge cleaner any duty under the Longshore Act. In this case, plaintiff, a barge cleaner, was injured by caustic soda while providing cleaning services for a barge company.

First, in evaluating vessel status, the Fifth Circuit focused its analysis on Lozman and Stewart, explaining that the Supreme Court clarified Stewart in Lozman that “‘the basic difference’ between a vessel’s purpose and a nonvessel’s purpose is whether the watercraft in question ‘was regularly, but not primarily, used (and designed in part to be used) to transport workers and equipment over water.’” The court, in applying Lozman, found that the cleaning barge at issue was not regularly used to transport workers or equipment over water because it was indefinitely attached to land by steel cables, required significant efforts to move, and was stationary at all relevant times. Therefore, the court determined a reasonable observer would not consider the cleaning barge designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water, and as such, the district court did not err in finding that the cleaning barge lacked vessel status at summary judgment.

Next, in analyzing seaman status, the Fifth Circuit evaluated whether the plaintiff had a connection to the barge he was injured on that was substantial in duration and nature using the Sanchez factors. The court found that the first Sanchez factor weighed against seaman status as the plaintiff owed his allegiance to his shoreside employer and not his employer’s customer whose barges he was assigned to clean. The court reasoned the next factor was neutral at best as the only “seagoing” activity plaintiff participated in was allegedly riding the customer’s barges roughly 200 feet between the cleaning barges which was in violation of company policy. The court noted that these short rides hardly subjected plaintiff to the perils of the sea. Finally, the court explained the third factor weighed against plaintiff satisfying the substantial connection requirement as plaintiff’s discrete tasks ended when he finished cleaning his assigned barge and plaintiff’s unsanctioned 200-foot barge rides did not constitute as sailing port to port. As such, the Sanchez factors weighed against plaintiff satisfying the nature element of the substantial connection test. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that plaintiff was not a Jones Act seaman.

Finally, the Fifth Circuit found the barge owner owed no duty under the Longshore Act. The Court identified the main duty at issue was the vessel owner’s turnover duty. The court explained that the barge owner’s turnover duty hinged on the whether the danger was hidden or was instead (1) open and obvious or (2) a danger a reasonably competent stevedore should have anticipated. Here, the court found the danger of the caustic soda was open and obvious because the plaintiff confirmed he saw the caustic soda on the ceiling before he entered the barge and his foreman warned him about the caustic soda before he sprayed the ceiling. As such, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the openness and obviousness of the caustic soda that ultimately injured the plaintiff. The court clarified that the openness and obviousness of the caustic soda on the ceiling negated the barge owner’s turnover duty to warn.

Nystrom v. Khana Marine Ltd. arose under Section 905(b) of the LHWCA after a longshoreman slipped on ice that had blanketed the hold of the vessel he was unloading. The longshoreman filed a negligence claim pursuant to the LHWCA alleging the vessel owner breached two duties—the turnover duty and the active control duty—by failing to “provide a deck free from the hazards of ice despite taking on the affirmative obligation to do so.” The defendant vessel owner filed a motion for summary judgment.

The turnover duty requires a vessel owner to provide to the stevedore the vessel in an acceptable condition and warn the stevedore of any hazards that the vessel owner should reasonably expect. This duty ends when the stevedore begins unloading the vessel, or when the vessel is “turned over” to the stevedore. To determine if the vessel owner exercised reasonable care to meet this duty, the court asked whether “an expert and experienced stevedore working in Dutch Harbor[, Alaska,] would be able to safely work on an icy walking surface.” Although the court recognized that whether a vessel owner and crew exercised reasonable care or acted negligently is usually a question for the trier of fact, the court concluded that the facts definitively established that the crewmembers were removing the ice after the vessel was turned over, and an expert stevedore would be able to navigate the open and obvious icy conditions on a vessel in Dutch Harbor. Thus, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s duty to warn claim.

Under the active control duty, “a vessel must exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries to longshoremen in areas that remain under the active control of the vessel during the stevedoring operations,” or if the crew actively involved itself in the stevedoring operations and negligently injures a longshoreman. The court determined that the record supported an inference that “by breaking up the ice and sweeping it to the side of the hold as the longshore workers worked, the crewmembers exhibited at least concurrent control over the longshore workers’ walking surface and, by extension, the ongoing stevedoring operations.” The court, however, could not determine whether the defendant crewmembers negligently failed to remove the ice that caused plaintiff’s injuries, and so the court did not grant summary judgment for the defendants on the active control duty claim.

In Larrison v. Ocean Beauty Seafoods, LLC, the plaintiff sued the vessel owners for injuries sustained while performing maintenance work aboard a fishing vessel during the vessel’s sea trials. The plaintiff brought claims against the defendants for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure, and under the Longshore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act. The court denied recovery under all three theories because the plaintiff was, at most, an “expectant seaman,” which did not put the plaintiff in the category of “seaman” for purposes of the Jones Act. The plaintiff was hired as an hourly employee by the vessel manager to perform activities related to shipyard repairs with the promise that he would be employed to work on the vessel in the future. At the time of the accident, he was not employed as a crewmember on the vessel acting in furtherance of the vessel’s mission, and therefore was not a seaman.

Plaintiff also asserted that the defendants violated their “turnover duty” by failing to provide a vessel with an operational crane, which required the plaintiff to manually move heavy equipment causing his injury. A vessel owner has a duty to “turn over” its vessel and equipment to stevedores “in such condition that an experienced stevedore can by exercising reasonable care carry on its cargo operations with reasonable care.” The defendants argued that their duty was not to turn over the vessel completely defect-free, but rather to deliver a vessel in a condition “where an experienced longshore worker could reasonably work around defects.” The court agreed with defendants, reasoning that even if the crane was defective, it was the vessel manager who employed the plaintiff that made the unsafe decision to have a single person move the equipment and single-handedly do the work of a hydraulic crane. The court found no genuine issue of fact and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgement dismissing the claims.

Passenger Claims

In Susana v. NY Waterway, the court held that a passenger’s claims arising from a trip and fall on a ferry, while it was moored at the dock, were governed by state law rather than maritime law and the passenger’s inconsistent versions of her fall did not establish fault of the ferry owners. The sixty-seven-year-old passenger, while departing the M/V BROOKLYN ferry, tripped and fell. Her attorney initially alleging that her fall was caused by tripping on black metal locks attached to an HVAC systems that were allegedly left open. During the passenger’s deposition, however, she alleged she fell at the coaming at the bottom of a door. The passenger brought suit against the owners of the ferry in New York state court and the defendants removed the case to federal court based on admiralty and diversity jurisdiction and the defendants moved for summary judgment on the merits. The judge first outlined that the passenger’s fall “is the type of incident that poses such an insignificant effect on maritime commerce that federal admiralty jurisdiction is not implicated,” reasoning the a recreational visitor is not engaged in maritime employment whose injury might endanger the safety of the vessel or risk a collision. Further, the court outlined testimony that the passenger tripped over the coaming did not state a claim for negligence and her tripping over a piece of black metal did not generate a fact question of fault. Further, the judge also found that the passenger’s failure to appear for a second planned medical examination, having missed the first one, was deliberate and issued a sanction of $660.

In Barham v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., the court held that the exculpatory language in Plaintiffs’ passenger and shore excursion tickets barred claims against Royal Caribbean Cruises (RCCL) for injuries or incidents occurring during an off-the-boat excursion. The Plaintiffs were on a cruise in New Zealand for their honeymoon and took an excursion to White Island, “one of the most active volcanos in the world.” During the excursion, the volcano erupted, killing 22 people and injuring 20 others. Included in the injured were the two plaintiffs in this case, both requiring several surgeries in New Zealand and ongoing procedures and care at home in the United States. Because the cruise did not originate in the United States or include a stop in the United States, 46 USC § 30509, which would typically reduce RCCL’s ability to limit its liability as to third-parties, did not apply in the present case. Instead, the liability waiver included in the shore excursions clause was enforceable as written. Plaintiffs attempted to argue that the clause should not be enforceable because they were not lawyers, which failed to sway the court. The physical tickets that the Plaintiffs received as well as the excursion website also included disclaimers of RCCL’s liability for third-party excursions. Notably, the disclaimers included both assumption of the risk clauses and a disclaimer of responsibility, which negated arguments by the plaintiffs that assumption of the risk clauses do not bar recovery but invoke a comparative negligence standard instead. In fact, there was a specific disclaimer of liability for activities occurring off the ship. Ultimately, because the cruise did not originate in or call on a port in the United States, the disclaimer of liability for shore excursions was valid and the Magistrate Judge recommended that the district court grant summary judgment in favor of defendants, RCCL.

In Wiegand v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., the parents of an 18-month-old brought claims against Royal Caribbean Cruises (RCCL) for general negligence, negligent failure to maintain, and negligent failure to warn after their daughter slipped out of her grandfather’s arms and fell through an open window on Deck 11 of a cruise ship to the dock below and died from the fall. The decedent’s grandfather had picked her up in his arms and held her over the guard railing and up to an open window when she fell out of his arms. The decedent’s grandfather pled guilty to negligent homicide in Puerto Rico. RCCL brought a motion for summary judgment on all three negligence counts, and the district court granted it, with plaintiffs appealing to the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded plaintiff’s general negligence and negligent failure to maintain claims to the district court while it affirmed the granting of summary judgment on negligent failure to warn. The appeals court found that there was enough evidence for a reasonable juror to believe that RCCL knew of the risk of children falling through open windows onboard its ships—the testimony of a former security office and the existence of the wooden guard railings. The appeals court also found that there was enough evidence to create a question of fact regarding the foreseeability of the grandfather’s actions. The appeals court upheld that the window was an open and obvious danger and that “a reasonable person in [the grandfather’s] shoes would have known that the window was open and would have appreciated the danger of holding a toddler near an open window 150 feet above the surface.” It will ultimately be up to a jury to determine RCCL’s liability regarding general negligence and a negligent failure to maintain and if that negligence was causative in this matter.

In the Estate of Pankey by Terry-Brown v. Carnival Corp., the representative of the decedent’s estate brought claims for negligence, negligence per se, Death on the High Seas Act, and for the application of Panamanian law through the Death on the High Seas Act. Plaintiff alleged that Carnival’s crew members watched the decedent and the father of her child “engage in verbal and physical altercations,” which they used as part of a comedy show instead of intervening. Following the comedy show, the complaint stated that the decedent and her partner continued to fight on the way to their stateroom and in the middle of the night, the decedent is presumed to have “fallen overboard.” The decedent’s body was never recovered and no further details are known about what led to her “falling” overboard. The court dismissed plaintiff’s negligence per se claims (and claims that the Pennsylvania Rule provided a basis for liability), finding that negligence per se is not its own claim but rather like the Pennsylvania Rule creates a burden shifting presumption. Plaintiff’s DOSHA claim was dismissed because it was duplicative of the negligence claim and because DOSHA does not create a cause of action but rather provides statutory remedies and jurisdiction to the court over deaths at sea. Plaintiff’s attempt to invoke Panamanian law was dismissed because it is preempted by DOSHA. The court also dismissed claims for punitive damages, pre-death pain and suffering, and the individual claims of the estate’s representative, leaving only the claim of negligence to be decided at trial.

Maritime Contracts

In Gladsky v. Frank Scobbo Contractors Inc., the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s award to the vessel owner against the charterer for failure to procure insurance for the oral charter of barge and the charterer’s award against the owner for conversion of the charterer’s property left on the barge. Frank Scobbo Contractors chartered the barge NITE MOVES 11547 owned by Gladsky and Seacoast Marine Services (plaintiffs) without a written agreement. The barge was damaged during the charter, and plaintiffs brought suit in federal court in New York against Frank Scobbo based on breach of an oral charter agreement and maritime bailment. Frank Scobbo filed a counterclaim based on conversion and unjust enrichment. The court awarded $75,000 to plaintiffs and $27,966 to Frank Scobbo. Plaintiffs were awarded damages for defendant’s failure to procure insurance, and that extended to plaintiffs as the chartering party. The court awarded the damages to Frank Scobbo based on plaintiffs’ conversion of property left on the barge at the end of the charter. Both sides appealed, and the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, finding sufficient evidence of the value from defendant’s testimony even though there were no invoices and there was no expert testimony as to the value.

In YS GM Marfin II LLC v. Four Wood Capital Advisors, LLC, the court held that an investment management agreement for ship finance transactions was not a maritime contract. Defendants were engaged to “to provide investment management services with respect to ship finance transactions, loans or leases” under the investment management agreement. Plaintiffs alleged the primary objective of the agreement “relates to maritime commerce, specifically the origination and financing of vessels to be acquired overseas, transported on navigable and international waterways, and ultimately sold for vessel deconstruction.” Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the agreement was not a maritime contract because it did not involve vessel operations. They argued that the agreement was “several steps remote from” a contract to purchase a vessel, which is not a maritime contract. The court ultimately agreed with defendants, reasoning that the objective of the agreement was investment management and not maritime commerce. Concluding that the agreement was not maritime, the court held that the district court lacked admiralty and subject matter jurisdiction.

Marine Insurance

In Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Andersson, a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage under a marine insurance policy with respect to a 2019 grounding, the court addressed the first and second implied warranty of seaworthiness and the policy’s express warranty of seaworthiness after coverage was denied for a lack of up-to-date charts. On the first warranty, the court held that a lack of up-to-date charts for all areas covered by the policy at the time it went into effect did not void the policy at its inception. On the second, it held that no breach of the warranty existed where the vessel did not have charts for the location of its diversion from its planned voyage, the site of the grounding, even where that location was within the area covered by the policy. The court distinguished this case from In re Complaint of Delphinus Maritima, S.A., asserting that the place of the grounding (the Dominican Republic) was not a point of refuge on the vessel’s intended voyage (from Aruba to Sint Maarten), and thus was not a reasonably foreseeable place to end up. On the express warranty of seaworthiness, the court considered that because the warranty requires the vessel to be able to “adequately to perform the particular services required of her on the voyage she undertakes” and the vessel indeed had up-to-date charts for its intended route, there was no breach. An appeal to the First Circuit has been filed.

Maritime Liens

In Stokes v. Belhaven Shipyard & Marina, Inc. the appellant appealed a bankruptcy court decision that found Belhaven Shipyard had a valid maritime lien against his sailboat. The appellant had purchased the 39-foot sailboat in 2019 and dry-docked it for repairs at the Belhaven Shipyard. While dry-docked, the appellant lived on the sailboat and the shipyard provided water, sewage, and electricity. The appellant never paid the shipyard for services. In 2021, the appellant filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. For exemption purposes, the bankruptcy court found that the sailboat was the appellant’s residence. However, in a “turnover order,” the bankruptcy court also found that the shipyard had a valid maritime lien against the sailboat and could retain possession until the lien was paid. The appellant appealed that turnover order.

The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court and upheld the turnover order due to Belhaven Shipyard’s valid maritime lien against the sailboat. “For a party to establish a maritime lien in a vessel: (1) the good or service must qualify as a ‘necessary’; (2) the good or service must have been provided to the vessel; (3) on the order of the owner or agent; and (4) the necessaries must be supplied at a reasonable price.” The district court held that the bankruptcy court correctly established a maritime lien because the shipyard’s services (storage repairs, and utilities) were necessary, and they were provided to the sailboat, upon the appellant’s request, at a reasonable price. The district court also held that an in rem action was not necessary to effectuate the lien because a maritime lien is properly perfected the moment the necessary services are performed. It does not require a creditor to record the lien, obtain possession of the vessel, or file a claim against the ship. Additionally, because the shipyard possessed the sailboat at the time the appellant filed bankruptcy, they were permitted to continue possession as it did not disturb, the “status quo of estate property.”

In Bunker Holdings Ltd. v. Yang Ming Liber. Corp., the plaintiff, Bunker Holdings Ltd., filed an in rem action against the containership the M/V YM Success (the “vessel”) claiming a maritime lien for necessaries for bunkers (fuel) the plaintiff supplied to the vessel. The vessel owner entered into a contract for the bunkers with O.W. Bunker Far East (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. (“OWB”), that provided for delivery of fuel to the vessel. OWB then contracted with the plaintiff to purchase the fuel and supply it to the vessel. OWB then filed for bankruptcy and the plaintiff instituted this action to collect payment via a maritime lien on the vessel.

By statute, to assert a maritime lien for necessaries, the claimant must have provided “necessaries” to a “vessel” “on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner.” Here, the plaintiff met the first two requirements—it supplied fuel to a vessel—but it did not do so at the direction of the vessel owner. The court applied the principle that subcontractors are not entitled to maritime liens “because they had contractual relationships only with the general contractors, and in most cases ‘a general contractor does not have the authority to bind a vessel.’” The vessel owner never established a contractual relationship with the plaintiff to supply bunkers to its vessel. Instead, this case involved two independent transactions, one between the vessel owner and OWB, and a second between OWB and the plaintiff. OWB was not acting as the vessel owner’s agent and lacked authority to bind the vessel when it entered the separate contract with the plaintiff, so its contract with the plaintiff did not give rise to a maritime lien.

Limitation of Liability

In Matter of G&J Fisheries, Inc., the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered a potential claimant’s failure to file a timely claim in a vessel owner’s limitation of liability action. The court held that a potential claimant’s answer filed in response to G&J’s complaint seeking exoneration did not constitute a “claim,” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rule F(4)-(5), which requires claims to be filed within a court-ordered period. Further, it found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the potential claimant leave to file a late claim under an excusable neglect standard, a result supported by the district court’s findings that the potential claimant made no attempt to remedy his failure to file a claim for a full year since the initial filing and that his counsel “were experienced practitioners” in maritime litigation.

In In re Cheramie Marine, L.L.C., the Eastern District of Louisiana granted a motion for partial summary judgment finding a vessel owner and operator was not entitled to limit its liability under the Limitation Act where its vessel allided with a pipeline because its captain fell asleep at the wheel. First, the court found claimants met their burden in proving the vessel owner/operator’s negligence caused the accident because petitioners could not rebut the well-established presumption of fault that arises when a moving vessel strikes a stationary object. The court reasoned the petitioners offered no evidence that it was without fault, that the allision was caused by an issue with the oil platform, or that there was an inevitable accident. As a result, the burden shifted to petitioners to prove that it lacked privity and knowledge of the negligence or unseaworthiness. Claimants argued petitioners failed to train its employees on the proximity alarm systems aboard the vessel that could have alerted the sleeping captain of objects in the vessel’s path. In response, petitioners argued the captains were aware of the alarm systems and chose not to use them. In rejecting petitioners’ argument, the court found the captain’s negligence was not merely an error in navigation because the captain chose not to engage the alarm, even after he recognized that he felt groggy, because he believed the alarm was only for foggy season when the visibility is low. In further support, petitioners’ management were unaware of the alarms on the vessel and failed to train its captains on those alarms or include them in safety policies. The court found that these combined failures indicate that petitioners could have discovered with reasonable diligence that its captains were unprepared to use the alarms on the vessel. As a result, the court explained petitioners could not meet its burden of proving that it did not have constructive knowledge of the negligence at issue.

Next, the court examined if petitioners met their burden in proving that they lacked privity or knowledge of why the captain might have fallen asleep. Claimants argued petitioners failed to train its employees on fatigue management and enforce a 12-hour shift limit. Here, in the 24 hours preceding the incident, the captain worked from midnight to noon, then volunteered to unload groceries from noon to five, then started working again at midnight before the allision at 2:45 a.m. Further, the captain worked 12-hour night shifts 28 days in a row. The court reasoned the captain’s work schedule violated both the 12-hour shift policy imposed by statute as well as petitioners’ own fatigue management policy. The court explained petitioners did not monitor or enforce their fatigue management policy and multiple crew members violated those policies, including the captain at issue on the date of the allision. Accordingly, the court found petitioners could not meet their burden in proving lack of privity or knowledge of why the captain might have fallen asleep. As such, the vessel owner and operator were not entitled to limit its liability.

In In re Live Life Bella Vita LLC, a ship maintenance diver was injured while he was performing maintenance on a vessel. Following the injury, the defendant filed a claim in California state court for damages, and the plaintiff filed the subject case in federal court seeking exoneration from or limitation of their liability to the vessel under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30501, et seq. (“LOLA”). The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the court could not exercise admiralty jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, or, in the alternative, that the court should stay the case pending the resolution of the state court case.

The court held it had admiralty jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims. To establish admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim, the plaintiff must show the tort occurred over navigable waters (the situs test) and the incident had “a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce” and “he general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity” (the nexus test). The situs test was satisfied because the accident occurred off the side of the vessel in the Pacific Ocean. The court reasoned the nexus test was likewise satisfied because the question asks only whether the incident could have a potential impact on maritime commerce, and an injury to a maintenance diver could have a “detrimental effect on maritime commerce, as those incidents can affect whether other vessels are maintained and serviced and can participate in maritime commerce and other activities.” Additionally, the maintenance and repair of vessels is “a traditional maritime activity.”

The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, but found a stay was warranted. A district court may stay a limitation action to allow a claimant to elect a state court venue under the saving to suitors clause if “(a) there is a single claimant to the limitation fund; or (b) there are multiple claimants, but the limitation fund is sufficient to satisfy all claims.” The court reasoned that the damages in the state court action will be determined by the defendant’s economic and non-economic damages. Any “potential and imminent filing of third parties’ claims for indemnity and contribution,” would not affect the amount of damages, and so the court did not take those into consideration. Therefore, the court stayed the limitation action and allowed the defendant to proceed with his state court action.

In Martz v. Horazdovsky, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated two limitation of liability actions in which the lower court held that the respective vessel owners failed to timely initiate a limitation of liability action within six months after receiving a letter from the victim of a maritime accident stating that the victim “the victim might be interested in pursuing litigation against the responsible parties.” The court considered two issues of first impression: (1) whether the six-month statute of limitations in 46 U.S.C. section 30511(a) is a jurisdictional rule, and (2) what constitutes “written notice of a claim” sufficient to start the running of the limitations period. The court held the statute of limitations was not jurisdictional and each victim’s letter was not a “written notice of a claim” starting the six-month clock to file a limitation action.

First, the court considered whether the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional rule such that the lower court in each case properly considered it as a valid basis for dismissing the action. After noting the circuit split on this issue, the Ninth Circuit agreed with those courts that have held the statute is not jurisdictional. So, the untimeliness of a limitation of liability action is a merits issue appropriately raised in a motion for summary judgment.

The court then considered the main issue as to what constitutes “written notice” under the Limitation of Liability Act. To bring a limitation act, the vessel owner must file its action “within 6 months after a claimant gives the owner written notice of a claim.” The written notice of claim “must (1) be in writing, (2) clearly state that the victim intends to bring a claim or claims against the owner, and (3) include at least one claim that is reasonably likely to be covered by the Limitation Act.” The district courts held that notice of “the reasonable possibility of a claim” or a “potential claim” was enough to inform the vessel owner that the claimant intended to seek damages. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, explaining that, while a written letter may be a correct form, the contents of the letter must convey the claimant’s “actual intent” to file a claim against the vessel owner that may exceed the value of the vessel and its freight and for which the vessel owner is allowed to limit its liability under the act. Here, neither claimant’s letter to the vessel owner stated the claimant intended to file suit, demanded anything from the vessel owners, or asserted any entitlement to recovery, but rather only laid out theories of liability and referenced legal concepts, none of which was sufficient to constitute a “written notice of a claim.”

Admiralty Jurisdiction

In Matter of Silver, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded it had admiralty jurisdiction under both the locality and nexus test over claims regarding an explosion at a boatyard that destroyed the vessel and much of the boatyard’s facilities. The district court also addressed the argument that the Limitation of Liability Act provides an independent basis for jurisdiction, agreeing with the well-trodden determination by every other Circuit court to consider the issue: that the Act does not provide jurisdiction over vessel-related torts where admiralty jurisdiction is lacking.

In Thibodeaux v. Bernhard, the court examined whether it had admiralty jurisdiction over a dispute on Lost Lake, an inland body of water that is only accessible through a canal for roughly one-third of the year during crawfish season. In this case, plaintiffs were harvesting crawfish in Lost Lake when defendant, owner of the surrounding property, thwarted their efforts and took their crawfish traps. Plaintiffs’ filed suit in the Western District of Louisiana, invoking admiralty jurisdiction and seeking monetary damages for lost profits and conversion of their crawfish traps under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the district court lacked admiralty jurisdiction because Lost Lake is only seasonally connected with the Atchafalaya River, an arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and therefore cannot form an interconnected highway of commerce. In rejecting defendant’s argument, the district court explained that seasonal accessibility does not preclude admiralty jurisdiction under Fifth Circuit precedent. In support, the district court looked to a nearby body of water, virtually identical to the relevant characteristics of Lost Lake, that was similarly found to be navigable. Next, the district court determined the Lake was accessible for a commercially significant period of time because the Lake’s seasonal accessibility wholly coincides with crawfish season and has been historically crawfished by commercial fishermen. Finally, the district court found that because the Lake is accessible from the Atchafalaya River, which connects to the Gulf to Mexico, the Lake is navigable-in-fact, and therefore, a navigable body of water for purposes of the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction. As such, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

In In re D’Ancona, a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of New York held that the district court lacked admiralty jurisdiction over a death that occurred aboard a moored vessel due to carbon monoxide poisoning. The owner and a passenger of the TALKIN TRASH died from carbon monoxide poisoning from gas that escaped from a broken hose while the vessel was moored in Fire Island, New York. The vessel owner’s estate brought a cause of action in New York state against Town & Country Marina, which had previously taken possession of the vessel to conduct repairs. The passenger on the vessel brought suit against both the vessel owner and Town & Country Marina. The vessel owner’s estate subsequently filed in the Eastern District of New York seeking limitation of vessel owner liability pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512. The vessel owner’s estate subsequently settled with the passenger’s estate, and the vessel owner moved for summary judgement in the limitation action on Town & Country’s claims for contribution and indemnity.

The district court reviewed the Grubart locus and nexus tests to determine if admiralty jurisdiction exists. The court outlined that the incident satisfied the locus or “location” test for admiralty jurisdiction, as the incident took place on a vessel that was moored on navigable waters. The magistrate judge then considered the “nexus” as to whether the possibility of an emergency response when a person is injured on a moored vessel may have the potential to disrupt maritime commerce. She outlined that at least three circuits have relied on the disruptive event of a maritime emergency to sustain admiralty jurisdiction even when the activities on the vessels were recreational. However, she outlined that the danger to shipping from a maritime emergency response may be more significant when the rescue is at sea than when the rescue is at the dock or a pier. She therefore recommended that the action be dismissed for lack of admiralty jurisdiction. However, if admiralty jurisdiction were found to exist, she recommended that the contribution and indemnity claims against the vessel owner’s estate be dismissed in light of the settlement between the vessel owner and the passenger’s estate.

The Third Circuit held in Bunge, S.A. v. ADM International SARL that a London arbitration claim under English Law constituted a prima facie admiralty claim required to support attachment under Rule B of the Supplemental Rules of Admiralty of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Before filing suit in federal district court, Bunge initiated London arbitration for breach of contract. Discontent with the pace of arbitration, Bunge then filed suit in the District Court of Delaware and sought attachment of ADM’s property under Rule B. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that to support a writ of attachment, a party must have a valid prima facie admiralty claim. The Third Circuit then held that for a valid prima facie claim, (1) the claim must be ready for to be adjudicated under the relevant law and (2) the claimholder must have asserted the claim. The Third Circuit analyzed Bunge’s previously brought London arbitration claim against ADM under English Law for the same breach of contract and held it qualified as a prima facie admiralty claim for the purposes of Rule B.

In In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, plaintiffs filed suit as representatives of the estates of passengers who passed away on Lion Air Flight JT 610, which crashed eighteen nautical miles off the coast of Indonesia on October 29, 2018. The plane had experienced mechanical issues almost immediately after takeoff and the pilots attempted to recover normal operations while partially over land before the plane headed offshore and crashed into the sea. On the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the district court rejected one plaintiff’s argument that the Death on the High Sea Act (DOHSA) did not apply because the defendant’s negligence occurred over land and the deceased also suffered some form of injury while the pilots attempted to recover normal flight over land. The district court focused on the text of the pleadings that did not dispute that the deceased suffered a fatal injury on the high seas when the aircraft crashed into the sea. The district court further held the plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims under Illinois law, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act were all preempted by DOHSA. The district court lastly held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial under federal diversity jurisdiction when the sole substantive claim existed under DOHSA. However, the district court granted an interlocutory appeal on the issue of “whether a plaintiff in federal court is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment when the plaintiff’s sole claim arises under DOHSA, and the plaintiff has a concurrent basis for common law jurisdiction (such as diversity).”

Sixty-two people on board, all citizens of Indonesia, died in the crash. Their heirs and beneficiaries brought wrongful death claims and survival actions alleging strict liability and negligence against Boeing, the manufacturer of the aircraft. Originally brought in Illinois, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) transferred those cases to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for centralized pretrial proceedings along with 17 other actions arising from the crash. The plaintiffs challenged the removal on several basis.

In re Air Crash into the Java Sea on January 9, 2021, involved a consolidated lawsuits arising from the 2021 crash of Sriwijaya Air Flight SJY182 into the Java Sea off the coast of Indonesia. Several of the suits had been removed to federal court, and those plaintiffs challenged the court’s jurisdiction. The court held that removal was proper based on admiralty jurisdiction alone. In so finding, the court applied the long-held locality and connection test. In applying the locality test, the court upheld the repeatedly recognized principle that product liability claims based on onshore design and manufacture of products that cause injury on or over navigable water fall within admiralty jurisdiction. However, in this case, the court also held that admiralty jurisdiction is established when material failure of a product (in this case the autothrottle of the airplane) first occurs over land, but persists over water and causes the accident. Therefore, the locality test was independently satisfied in this case, because the alleged wrong occurred at least in part over navigable water. In applying the connection test, the court found that, because the flight was ferrying passengers and cargo from one Indonesian island to another, it was performing actions that a boat would have performed prior to the advent of air travel. Therefore, the flight bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.

In United States v. McKee, a decision stemming from the 2018 duck boat tragedy on Table Rock Lake in the Ozarks that resulted in the death of passengers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court and dismissed the indictment charging the defendants with seaman’s manslaughter and operating a vessel in a grossly negligent manner upon finding that Table Rock Lake is not navigable in fact, and therefore not subject to admiralty jurisdiction. The court reasoned that Table Rock Lake only sustains recreational activity rather than commercial activity, and as a result, admiralty jurisdiction did not apply. Because the statutes criminalizing seaman’s manslaughter and gross negligence in operating a vessel are defined by federal admiralty jurisdiction, dismissal of the indictments was appropriate.

In Paxton as Next Friend of Paxton v. Georgia Power Company, the representative of the decedent’s estate brought state law claims for wrongful death under a negligence theory against Georgia Power after a commercial diver drowned at Oliver Dam which is owned and operated by Georgia Power on the Chattahoochee River. Georgia Power removed the case to federal court on the bases of federal question, federal officer jurisdiction, and admiralty jurisdiction. The Plaintiff sought to remand back to state court. The court found that Georgia Power was entitled to removal based on federal officer jurisdiction because it operated the dam under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), there was a causal connection between the operation of the dam and the decedent’s death, and Georgia Power was asserting a federal defense (preemption). Georgia Power was also entitled to removal based on federal question. The court also addressed if Georgia Power was entitled to removal based on admiralty jurisdiction. The court found that the Chattahoochee, specifically Lake Oliver, was a navigable waterbody and therefore Georgia Power satisfied the location test, however the Defendant failed to show that the death of a commercial diver at a hydroelectric dam was potentially disruptive of maritime commerce. Therefore, while the Defendant had other means by which to justify the removal to federal court, admiralty jurisdiction was not one of them because the decedent’s death was not something that had potential impacts on commercial maritime activities. The court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to remand due to a lack of admiralty jurisdiction and denied the motion to remand based on deferral officer jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction.

Practice, Procedure, and Uniformity

In Christie v. Ingram Barge Company, LLC, plaintiff, a cook aboard defendant’s vessels, sued her former employer for sexual harassment and hostile work environment under Title VII and asserted Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims “arising largely from the same ‘continuous harassment, retaliation, assaults and batteries’ underlying the Title VII claims.” Plaintiff’s complaint included allegations of physical and verbal threats, sexual assaults, and intentional infliction of emotional distress by her co-workers. Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s Jones Act and general maritime law claims on the grounds that Title VII provided the exclusive remedy for sexual harassment claims against an employer and, thus, the maritime claims were preempted by plaintiff’s Title VII claims. The court disagreed and found that plaintiff’s Title VII claims did not preempt her maritime tort claims because plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleged colorable claims for Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness separate and apart from the allegations supporting her Title VII claims.

In Clear Spring Property and Casualty Company v. Arch Nemesis, LLC, the plaintiff, an insurer, filed a declaratory judgment action for insurance coverage related to the sinking of defendant’s, Arch Nemesis, yacht. Plaintiff elected to procced with its declaratory action in admiralty pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(h) and 38(e). Defendant filed counterclaims alleging wrongful denial of insurance coverage, invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332, and requested trial by jury on its counterclaims. Plaintiff moved to strike defendant’s jury demand arguing that plaintiff’s designation of the declaratory action to be in admiralty precluded defendant from obtaining a jury trial. The court weighed plaintiff’s admiralty designation against defendant’s Seventh Amendment jury trial rights and concluded that plaintiff’s admiralty designation did not override defendant’s right to a jury on the facts presented. Thus, plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s jury demand was denied.

In Gulf Island Shipyards, LLC v. Mediterranean Shipping Co. (USA), Inc., the court declined to reconsider its decision on the package limitation defense based on the different versions of the bill of lading submitted by the carrier, condemning the carrier for its premature motion.” MSC moved for reconsideration, arguing that there was no genuine dispute that the MSC Waybill that was filed with its reply brief was the operative version of the Waybill and that version clearly limited recovery to $500 per package. MSC argued that the complete Waybill was not available until the filing of its reply brief, but the court responded that MSC’s story did not “add up.” Specifically, the Waybill differed in various ways, MSC did not attempt to explain the differences, and the court was left unable to opine what shipping documents “were provided to what parties and when.” The court noted that it might turn out that MSC was correct about which Waybill governed, but she could not decide that based on the current evidence. MSC was scolded, stating, “[w]hile MSC complains that the issue could be resolved more efficiently at the summary judgment stage, MSC squandered that opportunity by electing to file a premature motion, which was based entirely on a document that MSC now claims (without any support) to be defunct.” Further, “MSC should not have filed its motion, and wasted the resources of its adversary and this Court until it had done its diligence and obtained the as-issued MSC Waybill. The Court will not give MSC another (unjustified) bite at the apple.”