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September 19, 2019 Feature

Speak for Yourself: The 30(b)(6) Deposition

By Joyce C. Wang, Demetrius Lambrinos, and Meredith L. Murphy

As most federal practitioners are generally aware, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) allows a party to depose a corporation, government agency, or other organization. The rule requires an entity to designate one or more individuals to testify on its behalf if the notice describes the matters for examination with “reasonable particularity,” and it places the burden on the organization to designate individuals reasonably educated to testify on those matters.1 Intended to provide a means for a party to inquire into basic organizational information, depose someone who speaks for the entity, and acquire leads to pursue through other discovery tools, the rule can be extremely useful (albeit burdensome).

Those with experience taking or defending Rule 30(b)(6) depositions understand firsthand the importance of preparation and awareness of how the rule itself works. The stakes are high in Rule 30(b)(6) depositions for corporate deponents because the testimony of its representatives is binding. Nonetheless, when done with care and precision, testimony obtained during a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition can greatly assist either party’s case.

Given the significance and complexity of Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, it is important to understand the legal principles at play as well as the potential pitfalls that can take place in everyday practice. To assist in this endeavor, this article provides guidance concerning the recent case law and proposed changes to this rule that are slated to take effect late next year.

The Rule

Rule (30)(b)(6) applies to depositions of both party and nonparty corporations. For nonparty deponent corporations, the rule requires that the noticing party issue a subpoena.

The rule has two basic requirements. First, the notice must describe with “reasonable particularity” the matters for examination.2 Second, once the organization receives the notice, it must educate the designee to testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization.

Once the corporation has designated a deponent on a particular issue, it becomes “bound” by the designee’s testimony.3 The testimony may be used “for any purpose” at trial, regardless of whether that individual is available to testify.4 When a corporation designates a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent, that witness is authorized to speak for the organization on the specified matters, unlike other employees deposed in the litigation.5 Furthermore, a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition does not foreclose a deposition by any other procedure under the Federal Rules.

Time, place, and notice requirements for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions are governed by case law interpreting the requirements for depositions for corporate employees under Rule 30(b)(1).

Notice Requirements

A Rule 30(b)(6) notice must (1) provide the date, time, and place for taking the deposition; (2) specify the name and address of the entity being deposed; (3) set forth with reasonable particularity the matters for examination; (4) indicate the method by which the testimony will be recorded and whether documents are sought; and (5) be accompanied by a document request or by a formal Rule 34 request for the production of documents. If records are requested, Rule 34(b)(2)(A) requires that the corporate representative must receive at least 30 days’ notice.

Pertinent specifics of these requirements are described in detail below.

Place. The Federal Rules do not address the properplace for a deposition noticed pursuant to Rules 30(a)(1)or 30(b)(6).6 The noticing party may unilaterally choose the deposition location, but that choice is subject to the court’s power to grant a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c)(2).7 Thus, the court has discretion in setting a location and will consider convenience and relative hardships to the parties.8

The analysis for assessing the location of plaintiff depositions is different from that of defendant depositions. Courts ordinarily presume that the plaintiff must be deposed in the judicial district where the action was brought, inasmuch as the plaintiff, in selecting the forum, effectively has consented to participation in legal proceedings.9 To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff must demonstrate that travel to the forum district would be practically impossible or fundamentally unfair.10

Because corporations are more often defendants, rules for deposing corporations have followed “essentially the same scheme” as the rules developed for nonresident defendants.11 Courts have held that defendant deponents located outside the forum district’s subpoena power ordinarily should be deposed near their place of residence, absent “exceptional or unusual circumstances.”12

Based on this logic, a foreign corporation’s Rule 30(b)(6)witness presumptively should be deposed in the district of the corporation’s place of business, “subject to modification, however, where justice requires.”13 Thus, when a dispute arises in connection with the location of a deposition of a foreign corporation, the court makes three inquiries: (1) whether the parties’ claims and contacts with the forum warrant locating the deposition at home or abroad, (2) whether a foreign deposition will offend or infringe that nation’s judicial sovereignty, and (3) whether less expensive and more reasonable alternatives exist.14 As a result, corporate defendants frequently are deposed in places other than the location of the principal place of business, such as in the forum where the action is pending or another location “for the convenience of all parties and in the general interests of judicial economy.”15

Motion for protective order. Federal Rule 26(c) governs the court’s discretion to grant a protective order to “regulate the terms, conditions, time or place of discovery.”16

A protective order should be granted by the court when the moving party establishes “good cause” for the order and when “justice requires [a protective order] to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. . . .”17 To show good cause, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating specific prejudice that will lead to harm if no protective order is granted.18

In the context of protective orders relating to the location of corporate depositions, the court will consider the facts, select the place of examination, and determine what justice requires with regard to payment of expenses and attorney fees.19 Often, the court will order the parties to split the expense of the deposition.20

Reasonable particularity. Unlike a deposition notice pursuant to Rule 30(b)(1) for the deposition of percipient witnesses, the Rule 30(b)(6) notice must describe with reasonable particularity the matters to be examined. The notice must inform the noticed organization of matters that will be inquired about so that the organization can determine the identity and number of people whose presence will be necessary to provide an adequate response.21 These matters must be tied to claims at issue and structured to address questions related to the claims.22

The reasonable particularity standard is “not toothless.”23 The requesting party must designate with “painstaking specificity” areas that will be investigated.24 Broad or generic notices are not sufficient.25 For example, a notice that requested all of the information supporting denial of a complaint was held to lack particularity.26 The test for the level of specificity required is that if the party cannot identify the outer limits of areas of inquiry, compliant designation is not feasible.27 Courts also have cautioned against using the words including but not limited to in the notice because a response to a request with these words “defeats the purpose of requiring the noticing party to delineate categories at all.”28 It is important to be as specific as possible because the deponent has no duty to designate a representative when the deposing party fails to describe matters adequately.29

If a notice is unclear, the best practice is to object immediately and communicate with opposing counsel to eliminate any confusion.30 If this does not alleviate the confusion over the notice, then a party can move for a protective order under Rule (26)(c)(1).31

Notice Boundaries

Limits on number of depositions. A Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is treated differently from other depositions for purposes of the 10-deposition rule. Where a corporation designates multiple representatives to testify regarding the topics set forth in a Rule 30(b)(6)notice, no matter how many topics are included, all designees’ depositions count collectively as one deposition.32 The way in which Rule 30(b)(6) depositions are counted has created some debate because Rule 30(b)(1) depositions are limited to seven hours each.

Noticing a second Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Courts are split regarding whether a party can notice a second Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to the same corporation without leave of the court, but the prevailing view is that leave of the court is required.33

In Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc. v. Signal Composites, Inc., the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Rule 30(a)(2) requires leave before a corporation can be deposed a second time under Rule 30(b)(6).34 There, the defendant sought to renotice a nonparty corporation that had been subpoenaed by the plaintiff over a year earlier. In response, the nonparty corporation moved for a protective order to quash the deposition subpoena, which the trial court granted. The circuit court reasoned that it was not plainly wrong for the district court to quash the subpoena because Rule 30(a)(2)(B), now 30(a)(2)(A)(ii), requires leave of the court if “the deponent has already been deposed in the case.”35

Two district courts in California also have found that parties must seek leave before noticing a second Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.36

Redeposing a Rule 30(b)(6) witness as an individual. Although subsequent 30(b)(6) depositions of the same party presumptively require leave, an individual may be deposed both in his or her personal capacity and as an organizational witness when so designated under Rule 30(b)(6).37 In that situation, leave should not be required to take both depositions, although the extent of the second deposition may be limited under the principles of Rule 26(b)(2) if the questions become unreasonably duplicative.38

Deponent Corporation’s Duties

Upon receipt of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice, the deponent corporation has a duty to designate the witness(es) who will testify; a duty to educate the designated representative(s) on the matters for examination; and, in some cases, a duty to provide documents used to refresh the memory of the witness(es).

Pertinent specifics of these duties, and possible sanctions for not fulfilling them, are described in detail below.

Duty to designate representative. The noticed party has a duty to designate a representative pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). The deponent party can designate one or more representatives, and the designees even can be former employees. However, the corporation may want to avoid designating multiple representatives for the same topic because this may run afoul of the requirement that the representative must respond “fully, completely and unevasively” to questions.39

The selected corporate designee does not have to be the most knowledgeable person concerning the specified matters—and, in fact, does not need any personal knowledge of the matters set out in the Rule 30(b)(6) notice40—as long as he or she is able to provide binding answers on behalf of the corporation. The purpose of the Rule 30(b)(6) witness is to represent the collective knowledge of the corporation. Rule 30(b)(6) designees do not testify as to their personal opinions and beliefs but rather present the corporation’s positions on the topics.41 Because of this, the designated individual may need to review materials such as past depositions, exhibits, corporate records, financial records, design records, sales records, employee files, etc., to become educated enough to speak for the organization. Similarly, the designee may have to meet with people from within the organization or even former directors, officers, and employees in order to become educated on the topics for which the designee has been selected to testify. Further, the designee is not providing only facts but can be examined as to the corporation’s opinions and beliefs.42 The designee is not speaking about the organization but is speaking for it.

The United States v. Taylor court contended, and other courts agree, that this duty to designate and prepare a representative to speak for the corporation in a deposition applies even when “a corporation . . . no longer employs individuals who have memory of a distant event or that such individuals are deceased.”43 Even when corporations argue that they do not have any further knowledge relating to a particular area, courts have ordered that the designee is obligated to appear and testify about what the corporation knows or does not know.44

In response to a Rule 30(b)(6) notice, corporations or their counsel may be tempted to designate a witness who is not very knowledgeable or helpful. However, if the court finds that the witness was so unprepared, nonresponsive, or otherwise unwilling or unable to provide necessary factual information on the specified matters, the corporation may be sanctioned the equivalent of failing to appear. In such circumstances, courts have ordered corporations to redesignate witnesses or designate additional witnesses, and they often impose other sanctions when it appears that the corporation has purposely designated a witness who lacks knowledge or was not properly prepared on the specified matters.45 Other courts, however, have rejected motions to compel additional designees where the original designee provided the best chance of obtaining the information sought and there was no evidence that the corporation acted willfully or in bad faith.46

In selecting an appropriate representative, the corporation should consider the following factors: (1) appearance, presentation, savvy, and intelligence of the designee; (2) existing knowledge that can be helpful or harmful; (3) access of the designee to privileged information; (4) availability and willingness to prepare; (5) testimonial experience; (6) likelihood that the representative will be deposed in a personal capacity; and (7) any paper trail leading back to the designee.47 Because the testimony binds the corporation, the designee is usually a C-level executive.48 The deponent corporation generally will disclose the identity of its designated representative before the deposition.49

Recently proposed amendment to Rule 30(b)(6). The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure published a preliminary draft of a proposed amendment to Rule 30(b)(6) on August 15, 2018.50 The committee held public hearings, and the public comment period is now closed. The amendment, if it is approved by the U.S. Supreme Court and not modified or rejected by Congress, will become effective December 1, 2020. The additional proposed text is provided below:

Before or promptly after the notice or subpoena is served, and continuing as necessary, the serving party and the organization must confer in good faith about the number and description of the matters for examination and the identity of each person the organization will designate to testify. A subpoena must advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make this designation and to confer with the serving party.51

In short, the amendment requires the parties to “confer in good faith” on the scope of the notice and the identity of the corporate representatives. According to the Draft Committee Note, this requirement was prompted by concerns that the current process resulted in “overlong or ambiguously worded lists of matters for examination and inadequately prepared witnesses.”52

The amendment likely will result in very few changes to the manner in which Rule 30(b)(6) notices actually are handled and litigated. Rather, the amendment formalizes many practices in which attorneys practicing in federal court already commonly engage. For example, the serving party is already required to identify the topics for examination with reasonable particularity. Similarly, the responding party is already obligated to produce a witness reasonably educated to testify on each noticed topic. Moreover, although the rules currently do not require the identification of corporate representatives by name in advance of the deposition, many corporations do identify their representatives thus. It is common and the best practice for attorneys to meet and confer on all of these issues prior to the deposition; the proposed rule simply requires it.

That being said, defense and plaintiffs attorneys have both voiced concerns about the proposed amendment. Defense attorneys are concerned that requiring the disclosure of the witnesses’ identities prior to the deposition gives the deposing party the opportunity to prepare questions based on the witnesses’ personal knowledge and background, including their involvement in the underlying lawsuit.53 There is also a concern that such required disclosures infringe on the attorney work product.54 On the other hand, plaintiffs attorneys have a concern that the requirement to meet and confer on the “number and description of the matters for examination” potentially places artificial limits on the scope of the deposition and offers unwarranted protection for corporate defendants.55

Duty to prepare witness. A Rule 30(b)(6) witness who testifies as a representative of the entity “is responsible for providing all the relevant information known or reasonably available to the entity”; and

[i]f the persons designated by the corporation do not possess personal knowledge of the matters set out in the deposition notice, the corporation is obligated to prepare the designees so that they may give knowledgeable and binding answers for the corporation.56

The corporation has an affirmative duty to educate the witness on matters “known or reasonably known” regarding the corporation, even if the information is not centralized within the organization.57 This duty extends to the organization’s subjective beliefs, opinions, and interpretations of documents and events.58 The designee must review reasonably available sources of organizational information (e.g., documents and prior deposition testimony) so that the designee can answer “fully, completely and unevasively.”59

The purpose of this rule is, in large part, to prevent “bandying,” which occurs when a corporation provides a string of employee deponents who disclaim knowledge of deposition topics due to the fact that a different person in the corporation actually possesses that knowledge.60 Failure to comply with the preparation requirements of Rule 30(b)(6) may result in sanctions.61

Sanctions for failure to comply. The noticing party can move for Rule 37 sanctions via a motion to compel if either the deponent corporation fails to appear or the deponent’s answers to matters set forth in the notice are unsatisfactory. However, before a noticing party may file a motion to compel, pursuant to the Central District of California’s Local Rule 37-1, the noticing party must meet and confer with opposing counsel. When a party fails to appear, sanctions may be imposed pursuant to Rule 37(d)(1), even in the absence of a court order.62 A pending motion for a protective order does not excuse the deponent from appearing.63

In a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the corporation’s duties, as outlined above, allow the noticing party to seek sanctions in an expanded set of circumstances. If a corporation produces a witness who lacks sufficient information to answer questions on matters described in the notice, then the noticing party may file a motion to compel and seek reimbursement of expenses incurred in taking the deposition, including attorney fees.64

Issues at the Deposition

The main issues that arise at the deposition itself are (1) the extent to which the noticing party can inquire beyond the scope of the notice or seek information regarding the corporation’s legal positions and (2) the extent to which the deponent’s testimony binds the corporation in future proceedings.

The courts remain split regarding the extent to which the noticing party can inquire beyond the scope of the Rule 30(b)(6) notice at the deposition. The trend in most jurisdictions is that a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is not limited to the matters listed in the notice.

Some courts have held that although the deponent is under no obligation to respond to questions beyond the scope of the notice, counsel may not instruct the designee not to answer.65 In Paparelli v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, the court reasoned that it is not logical for the person most knowledgeable on topic X to be asked questions regarding topic Y.66 The court in Paparelli suggested that the proper way to object when the designee is asked questions beyond scope would be to allow the witness to answer, subject to objection, and then move immediately under Rule 30(d) to limit the scope of the deposition.67

Other courts have been more laissez-faire in allowing questioning beyond the scope of the notice. In King v. Pratt & Whitney, the court held that to limit scope to the contents of the Rule 30(b)(6) notice would be impractical because the noticing party could just renotice the corporation.68 The King court concluded that although Rule 30(b)(6) does not limit the noticing party to asking in-scope questions, the rule only requires that a witness be able to answer in-scope questions; thus, the court noted, the noticing party has no remedy if the witness does not know the answers to out-of-scope questions.69

Counsel for the noticing party should ask questions that seem relevant, even if they are out of scope.70 On the other hand, counsel for the deponent should maintain a record of the designated and undesignated questions and object to the undesignated questions.71 Additionally, counsel for the deponent should tell the designee to answer all questions but to state that he is testifying from personal knowledge if the question is out of scope.72


Rule 30(b)(6) provides the rules for taking the deposition of a corporate entity. Rule 30(b)(6) requires that the notice of deposition to a corporation party be addressed to, and served on, the corporation and set out with reasonable particularity the matters of examination. If the notice seeks documents, or attaches a formal request for documents under Rule 34, the deponent corporation must be given at least 30 days to respond. Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(1), the depositions of corporations generally take place in the principal place of business of the corporation. Once in receipt of the Rule 30(b)(6) notice, the corporate deponent must designate a representative to answer questions on the corporation’s behalf and prepare that representative for the deposition. At the deposition, attorneys may inquire about matters outside of the scope of the deposition notice. However, the answers that the designee provides to those types of questions are generally treated as personal positions akin to Rule 30(b)(1) depositions.

Rule 30(b)(6) is an important rule from the perspectives of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Thus, it is incumbent on all concerned to understand the parameters and implications of the rule. n


1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(B)(6).

2. Id.

3. See Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129202, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2010).

4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(A)(2)–(3).

5. Lapenna v. Upjohn Co., 110 F.R.D. 15, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1986).

6. In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 267 F.R.D. 466, 470 (E.D. Va. 2010).

7. New Medium Techs., LLC v. Barco N.V., 242 F.R.D. 460, 465 (N.D. Ill. 2007).

8. Id.

9. In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 267 F.R.D. at 471; see also 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Miller, Mary Kay Kane & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2112 (2012).

10. In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 267 F.R.D. at 471.

11. Id.

12. Metrex Research Corp. v. United States, 151 F.R.D. 122, 125 (D. Colo. 1993).

13. Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp., 232 F.R.D. 625, 628 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Miller, Mary Kay Kane & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2112, at 84–85 (rev. 1994)).

14. S.E.C. v. Banc de Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 WL 1030862, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2014).

15. Cadent, 232 F.R.D. at 629.

16. Id. at 629 (quoting Pro Billiards Tour Ass’n v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 187 F.R.D. 229, 230 (M.D.N.C. 1999)).

17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

18. Cadent, 232 F.R.D. at 629.

19. 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Miller, Mary Kay Kane & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2112 (rev. 2010).

20. Cadent, 232 F.R.D. at 629–30.

21. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.) v. P.R. Water Res. Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62, 66 (D.P.R. 1981); see also Autoridad de Carreteras y Transportacion v. Transcore Atl., Inc., 319 F.R.D. 422, 438 (D.P.R. 2016).

22. Doe v. Yorkville Plaza Assocs., C.A. No. 92 Civ. 8250, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8683, at *19–20 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Kent Sinclair & Roger P. Fendrich, Discovering Corporate Knowledge and Contentions: Rethinking Rule 30(b)(6) and Alternative Mechanisms, 50 Ala. L. Rev. 651, 662–63 (1999).

23. Howard A. Merten & Paul A. Kessimian, The Pitfalls, Opportunities and Potential Landmines Presented by Federal Rule 30(b)(6), FDCC, 2011, at 11.

24. Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 638 (D. Minn. 2000).

25. Kallis v. Colgate-Palmolive, 231 F.3d 1049, 1057 (7th Cir. 2000).

26. Skladzien v. St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr., C.A. No. 95-1518-MLB, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20621, at *2 (D. Kan. 1996).

27. McBride v. Medicalodges, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 581, 584 (D. Kan. 2008).

28. Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 226 F.R.D. 118, 125 (D.D.C. 2005).

29. Hi-Plains Elevator Mach. v. Mo. Cereal Processors, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).

30. Merten & Kessimian, supra note 23, at 14.

31. Id. Rule 30(b)(6) does not limit the number of topics a noticing party may list in its notice of deposition. In United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356 (M.D.N.C. 1996), for example, the noticing party listed 76 topics, which passed muster with the court.

32. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A) advisory committee’s note on 1993 amendment to rule; Quality Aero Tech., Inc v. Telemetrie Elektronik GmbH, 212 F.R.D. 313, 319 (E.D.N.C. 2002); Burdick v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., C.A. No. 07-4028, 2008 WL 5102851, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2008).

33. Merten & Kessimian, supra note 23, at 12; Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee’s note (explaining that “[a] deposition under Rule 30(b)(6)should, for purposes of this limit, be treated as a single deposition even though more than one person may be designated to testify”); see also McCarty v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 15-CV-210-KHR, 2016 WL 8290151, at *4 (D. Wyo. Sept. 27, 2016).

34. 244 F.3d 189 (1st Cir. 2001).

35. Id.

36. See Burdick, 2008 WL 5102851, at *2 (citing In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., No. 03-C-4576, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17420 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2005); Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc. v. Signal Composites, Inc., 244 F. 3d 189 (1st Cir. 2001)); Zamora v. D’Arrigo Bros. Co. of Cal., C04-00047, 2006 WL 3227870, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2006).

37. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 253 F.R.D. 524, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2008).

38. Provide Commerce, Inc. v. Preferred Commerce, Inc., 2008 WL 360588, *3 (S.D. Fla. 2008); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 cmt.

39. Briddell v. St. Gobian Abrasives, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 57, 59 (D. Mass. 2005).

40. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 253 F.R.D. at 526.

41. See generally Spring Commc’ns L.P. v., 236 F.R.D. 524 (D. Kan. 2006).

42. See, e.g., Lapenna v. Upjohn Co., 110 F.R.D. 15, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (corporate designee may be compelled to testify about corporation’s subjective opinions and beliefs).

43. 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C. 1996); see also Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 70, 75 (D. Neb. 1995) (“If no current employee has sufficient knowledge to provide the requested information, the party is obligated to ‘prepare [one or more witnesses] so that they may give complete, knowledgeable and binding answers.’ ” (quoting Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 126 (M.D.N.C. 1989)).

44. See, e.g., Barron v. Caterpillar, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

45. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(i), 37(d)(3), 37(b)(2); S. Cal. Stroke Rehab. Assocs. v. Nautilus, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76508 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) (ordering defendant to pay costs incurred in preparing sanctions motion and fees associated with taking deposition of Rule 30(b)(6)witness who was not properly prepared and did not have requisite knowledge).

46. Barron, 168 F.R.D. at 178 (designation of an additional corporate designee was unnecessary but allowing plaintiff to conduct further discovery in an effort to obtain information to supplement the witness’s testimony).

47. Merten & Kessimian, supra note 23, at 9.

48. Id. at 10.

49. Schwarzer et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 11:1413a, at 11-180 (Rutter Group 2010).

50. See Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, and Civil Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence (Aug. 2018),

51. Id. at 33–34 (underlining omitted).

52. Id.

53. See Andrew L. Campbell, Proposed Amendment to Rule 30(b)(6) Would Require Parties to Confer on Witness Selection Before Deposition, Faegre Baker Daniels (Jan. 31, 2019),

54. Id.

55. See Ross Todd, Everybody’s Found Something to Hate in Proposed Deposition Rules Changes, Nat’l L.J. (Feb. 14, 2019),

56. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., LLC v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No. 14-CV-1889 JPO JLC, 2015 WL 1728682, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2015) (quoting A.I.A. Holdings, S.A. v. Lehman Bros., No. 97-CV-4978 (LMM)(HBP), 2002 WL 1041356, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2002)).

57. Calzaturfico S.C.A.R.P.A., S.P.A. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 201 F.R.D. 33, 36 (D. Mass. 2001).

58. United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 360 (M.D.N.C. 1996).

59. See Briddell v. St. Gobian Abrasives, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 57, 59 (D. Mass. 2005).

60. See MCI Worldcom Network Serv. v. Atlas Excavating, Inc., No. 02 C 4394, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2736, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2004); Canal Barge Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 98 C 0509, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10097, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2001); Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 148, 152 (D.D.C. 1999); Brazos River Auth. v. GE Ionics, Inc., 439 F.3 416 (5th Cir. 2006).

61. MCI Worldcom Network Serv., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2736, at *6.

62. Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 1993).

63. Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 269 (9th Cir. 1964).

64. See Rule 26(g); United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 363 (M.D.N.C. 1996).

65. Paparelli v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 108 F.R.D. 727, 729 (D. Mass. 1985).

66. Id.

67. Id. at 730–31.

68. 161 F.R.D. 475, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1995),

69. Id.; see also Cal. Found. for Indep. Living Ctrs. v. Cty. of Sacramento, 142 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1046 (E.D. Cal. 2015).

70. Merten & Kessimian, supra note 23, at 4.

71. Id.

72. McLellan Highway Corp. v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25–26 (D. Mass. 2000).

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By Joyce C. Wang, Demetrius Lambrinos, and Meredith L. Murphy

Joyce C. Wang is a founding partner of Carlson, Calladine & Peterson LLP; head of the firm’s cyber coverage practice; and a nationally recognized litigator in the area of insurance coverage and bad faith. For over 30 years, she has represented national and international property and casualty insurers and reinsurers, as well as policyholders, in complex commercial property and casualty insurance disputes. Demetrius Lambrinos is of counsel at Carlson, Calladine & Peterson LLP. Lambrinos has 12 years of substantive experience handling high-stakes commercial litigation across various industries. His work spans numerous practice areas—including antitrust, breach of contract, insurance defense, and class actions—and covers all aspects of cases, from case inception through trial and appeal. Meredith L. Murphy is a senior litigation counsel at FM Global in Johnston, Rhode Island. FM Global is a multinational first-party property insurance carrier that insures more than one-third of the Fortune 100 companies around the world. Murphy manages litigation in North America and Latin America, ranging from insurance coverage disputes to subrogation, bankruptcy, and employment/HR matters. They may be reached, respectively, at [email protected], [email protected], and [email protected].