chevron-down Created with Sketch Beta.

The Tax Lawyer

The Tax Lawyer: Winter 2022

Corporate Tax Integration: Past, Present, and Future

Christopher Henry Hanna

Summary

  • Article discusses how to obtain the support of corporate America and policymakers and addresses a gap in existing proposals and the academic literature.
  • Keys for corporate America: financial accounting and interaction between financial accounting and the tax laws.
  • Key for policymakers: economic growth, capital investment, and the labor force.
  • By addressing the concerns of corporate America and policymakers, this Article proposes a business tax system that could garner the support of tax scholars, policymakers, and corporate America, all without sacrificing revenue.
Corporate Tax Integration: Past, Present, and Future
MirageC via Getty Images

Jump to:

Abstract

For many years, tax scholars have advocated, and policymakers have considered, integrating the two levels of tax on corporate earnings—a tax imposed once at the corporate level and a second time at the shareholder level. The resulting integration—a single level of tax on corporate earnings—would be a business tax system achieving greater equity and efficiency in taxing corporate earnings. For much of the time, however, corporate America has opposed, or at best been lukewarm to, the idea of corporate tax integration. In addition, policymakers have been hesitant to fully support corporate integration.

This Article discusses how to obtain the support of corporate America and policymakers and addresses a gap in existing proposals and the academic literature. The key for corporate America is financial accounting and addressing corporate America’s near obsession with the interaction between financial accounting and the tax laws. For policymakers, the keys are economic growth, capital investment, and the labor force. By addressing the concerns of corporate America and policymakers, this Article proposes a business tax system that could garner the support of tax scholars, policymakers, and corporate America, all without sacrificing revenue.

A group of about 50 tax directors from many of the largest U.S. companies are sitting in a conference room at the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Washington, D.C. The tables are arranged in a rectangular pattern with the tax directors sitting on the outside of the tables. They are listening to a Republican staffer from the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, who is discussing integration of the individual and corporate tax systems.

Republican Staffer: “As many of you may be aware, in December 2014, our staff issued a report in which we devoted about 100 pages to corporate integration—namely, that the earnings of a corporation should be subject to only a single level of tax and, in addition, the tax treatment of debt and equity should be brought into alignment.”

Some of the tax directors are listening politely to the staffer, while others are looking down, checking for messages on their Blackberries or iPhones.

Republican Staffer: “In our report, we discuss eight different methods of integration. However, more recently, we have settled on one method, which we believe may be the ideal method of integrating the individual and corporate-level taxes. That method is the dividends-paid deduction coupled with a withholding tax, which is designed to address tax-exempt and foreign shareholders.”

The staffer continues and makes a statement that seems to capture the attention of almost everyone in the room.

Republican Staffer: “There are a number of important aspects of the dividends-paid deduction. One is the financial accounting benefit.”

The tax directors who were listening politely are now focused intently on the staffer’s comments. Those tax directors checking their messages now look up, attempting to take in the comments of the staffer.

Republican Staffer continues: “Under current FASB rules, the dividends-paid deduction would create a permanent difference for financial accounting. As a result, it would lower a company’s effective tax rate, increase its net income, and increase its earnings per share. The other major methods of corporate integration have no financial accounting impact on the company.”

The tax directors nod, almost in unison, when the staffer discusses the importance of the financial accounting benefit of a dividends-paid deduction. After the presentation, a number of tax directors approach the staffer and ask how soon a dividends-paid deduction could be enacted and how corporate America could assist in its enactment.

I. Introduction

In the years leading up to the most recent tax reform effort, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, signed into law on December 22, 2017, by President Donald J. Trump, there was a lot of discussion among policymakers as to reforming the tax Code. On the individual side, there was very little agreement on what form tax reform should take. For example, some policymakers wanted to eliminate a number of exclusions, deductions, and credits, thereby broadening the income tax base, and coupling that with a reduction in the individual statutory tax rates. Others wanted to shift the tax system to a consumption-based tax system through, for example, enactment of a value-added tax or an exemption from the tax base for income derived from capital. Some policymakers wanted simply to retain the current individual income tax system, particularly after the enactment of a higher individual statutory tax rate as part of the fiscal cliff deal in early 2013.

While there was little agreement on the individual side, there seemed to be near unanimous agreement on the business side that the 35% top statutory corporate tax rate was too high and needed to be significantly reduced. There also seemed to be widespread agreement that the current international tax system needed to be substantially reformed. Although there was widespread agreement in corporate America and among policymakers to reduce the corporate tax rate and reform the international tax system, there was very little movement in doing so. As a result, business tax reform was at a standstill for a number of years.

Corporate integration, which is the concept of integrating the individual- and corporate-level tax systems into one system (if structured properly), seemed as if it could help break the business tax reform logjam in a bipartisan manner. However, as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which was enacted by Republicans as part of the budget reconciliation process with no Democratic input or votes, Congress reduced the corporate tax rate from a top rate of 35% to a flat rate of 21%—a 40% reduction. In addition, Congress substantially reformed the U.S. international tax system, creating a hybrid between a territorial and a worldwide, no-deferral system. Although corporate integration was a substantial part of the discussion leading up to the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, given the 14-percentage point reduction in the corporate tax rate and a substantially revised U.S. international tax system, integration ideas simply fell by the wayside.

With the November 2020 election of Joseph Biden as president and majority control of both the House and the Senate in the hands of the Democrats, major changes to both the corporate and U.S. international tax systems are expected. Some of the expected changes include an increase in the corporate tax rate, an increase in the tax rate on dividends and capital gains, and a shift of the U.S. international tax system more towards a worldwide, no-deferral system. Such changes, which would make the United States a bit of an outlier in certain areas when compared to the other member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), would increase the relevance and importance of corporate integration.

Corporate integration has been discussed by tax scholars and policymakers for many years. It has been strongly supported by both groups; however, corporate America has been traditionally lukewarm to corporate integration. This Article argues that, if structured properly, corporate America could support corporate integration. With the backing of both corporate America and policymakers on both sides of the aisle, corporate integration could be enacted, achieving many of the goals of sound tax policy.

Part II gives an introduction and some background on corporate integration. Part III provides a brief history of corporate integration proposals. Part IV explains how corporate integration achieved through a (partial) dividends-paid deduction could get the backing of corporate America and the entire business community. Part V explains how policymakers could, on a bipartisan basis, support corporate integration and, thereby, achieve meaningful business tax reform.

II. What Is Corporate Integration?

The United States has what is generally referred to as a classical system of taxing corporate earnings. The earnings of a corporation are taxed first at the corporate level. Then, when the corporation distributes the earnings to its shareholders in the form of a dividend, the earnings are taxed a second time at the shareholder level. For many years, the U.S. Treasury Department, the organized tax bar, and other interested parties have advanced a number of proposals to integrate the individual and corporate level of taxes so that corporate earnings are subject to only a single level of tax.

Eliminating the two-tier tax system would reduce or eliminate at least four distortions to economic and financial choices: (1) the incentive to invest in noncorporate businesses rather than corporate businesses, (2) the incentive to finance corporations with debt rather than equity, (3) the incentive to either retain or distribute earnings depending on the relationship among the corporation, the shareholder, and the capital gains tax rates, and (4) the incentive to distribute earnings in a manner to avoid or significantly reduce a second level of tax, such as payments giving rise to deductions or stock repurchases that give rise to basis recovery and capital gains.

Under an integrated system, the earnings of a corporation would only be subject to a single level of tax—either at the corporate level or at the shareholder level. In addition, under some methods of corporate integration, the tax treatment of debt and equity would be brought into alignment. Under current law, interest on debt is deductible, with some limitations, while dividends paid to shareholders are not. Equalizing the tax treatment of debt and equity could involve allowing a corporation to deduct dividends or disallowing a deduction for a corporation’s interest expense.

In December 2014, the Republican staff of the United States Senate Finance Committee released a 340-page report on comprehensive tax reform. A large portion of the report was devoted to corporate integration. As a result of the report, there was a resurgence of interest in corporate integration among tax scholars, corporate America, and even among some policymakers. Unfortunately, with the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in December 2017, interest in corporate integration subsided.

Tax scholars have been proposing corporate integration for many years. In addition, some administrations have shown interest in corporate integration, including the Carter, Reagan, Bush 41, and Bush 43 Administrations. The business community, however, has traditionally not shown a lot of interest in corporate integration. The lack of interest by the business community may be one reason why corporate integration has never been fully implemented. In fact, in 2016, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), then chair of the Senate Finance Committee, stated: “[T]here is a graveyard near the White House full of prior [corporate] integration proposals.” But corporate integration, if done properly, can garner the backing of the business community.

With regard to policymakers, in recent times there has been a huge emphasis on tax reform generating economic growth, capital investment, and jobs. This may have been due, in part, to the adoption of dynamic scoring in the House of Representatives in 2015. From 2003 to 2014, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) was required by House Rule XIII(3)(h)(2) to provide a macroeconomic impact analysis of all tax legislation reported by the Ways and Means Committee. In most cases, the expected effects were so minor that the JCT only provided a brief statement. On January 6, 2015, the House modified its rules requiring the use of dynamic scoring for the estimates of “major legislation,” which was defined to be any bill with a gross positive or negative revenue impact in any year in excess of 0.25% of gross domestic product (GDP). The new rule required a single point estimate (i.e., one figure) within the budget window of the revenue effect due to the macroeconomic response to the proposed legislation. A qualitative analysis was also required for the 20-year period after the budget window.

A bill could also be deemed major legislation by the chair of the Ways and Means Committee (for tax bills) or the chair of the Budget Committee (for spending bills scored by the Congressional Budget Office). In spring 2015, a similar rule was approved by both the House and the Senate in Congress’s joint budget resolution. As a result, 2015 was the first year that dynamic estimates had to be used in budget scoring (and not just as supplemental information). Although the House, in 2019, removed all requirements related to macroeconomic analysis and dynamic scoring, policymakers are still very focused on the impact on economic growth, capital investment, and jobs in any tax reform proposal. And, if control of the House changes in the near future, the requirement of macroeconomic analysis and dynamic scoring may be restored.

The last tax reform in 2017 was accomplished strictly along party lines. Republicans drafted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act and passed it without a single Democratic vote in either the House or the Senate. The Biden Administration is proposing tax reform that may also be done strictly along party lines. Corporate integration could bring the parties together and achieve, at least in part, bipartisan business tax reform.

III. Brief History of Corporate Integration

In 1909, Congress enacted a corporate income tax and, four years later, an individual income tax. As a result, beginning in 1913, both corporations and individuals were subject to income taxes. Congress minimized the risk of double taxation of corporate earnings by excluding dividends from the normal tax on individual income.

In 1936, Congress enacted a dual or split-rate corporate income tax. Distributed corporate income (i.e., corporate income paid out as dividends) was taxed at rates ranging from 8 to 15%, and undistributed corporate income (i.e., corporate retained earnings) was subject to an additional surtax with rates ranging from 7 to 27%. The split-rate system, was a form of corporate integration, with the additional surtax on undistributed corporate income encouraging a substantial increase in dividend payouts. In 1938, the undistributed corporate income surtax was repealed.

During the 1950s and 1960s, there was very modest corporate integration. In the early to mid-1970s, serious interest began to surface with regard to integrating the individual and corporate-level taxes in the United States. The Treasury Department took the lead by stressing the need for integrating the individual and corporate taxes to keep pace with many foreign countries that had integrated their tax systems. Treasury noted the many benefits of integration including, eliminating the bias in favor of debt, improving the efficiency of capital allocation, making the capital markets more competitive, lessening the tension between ordinary income and capital gain, and significantly helping utilities and other industries whose investors rely on a steady stream of dividends.

In 1975, Treasury advanced its proposal for integration, with a combination of two methods. Corporations would deduct approximately half of their dividends (a dividends-paid deduction) and shareholders would be allowed a credit for the income taxes paid by the corporation (a shareholder or imputation credit mechanism).

Two years later, Treasury issued “Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform” proposing full corporate integration by having the income of a corporation flow through to its shareholders. As a result, corporate earnings would be fully taxed to the shareholders at the rates appropriate to each shareholder.

Also, in 1977, the JCT issued a pamphlet addressing the need for greater capital accumulation with a suggestion of integrating the corporate and individual income taxes. The JCT discussed three methods of integration: a shareholder or imputation credit in which the shareholders would claim a credit for the corporate income taxes allocable to the dividends received; a flow-through approach in which all corporate income would flow through to the shareholders along with the corporate income taxes paid that would be creditable by the shareholders; and a dividends-paid deduction in which corporations would deduct any dividends paid to the shareholders.

Later in 1977, the Treasury Department presented a proposal for integrating the individual and corporate income taxes through an imputation credit regime. A portion of the corporate income tax would be treated as a withholding tax on dividends to the individual shareholders who would then be allowed a credit in calculating the shareholder’s tax liability. The Carter Administration ultimately decided not to pursue corporate integration.

During the 1980s, the American Law Institute (ALI) joined the Treasury Department in actively proposing corporate integration. In 1982, the ALI published a Reporter’s Study on corporate distributions. The Reporter’s Study included three proposals, all of which were related to corporate integration: a dividends-paid deduction in an amount not exceeding a statutorily specified rate on newly issued stock; a flat-rate, compensatory withholding tax on nondividend distributions; and a proposal establishing differing tax treatment between direct and portfolio investment by a corporation in the stock of another corporation.

In November 1984, the Treasury Department issued a report advocating a substantial reform of the income tax system. As part of its report, which is generally referred to as Treasury I, Treasury proposed relief for the double taxation of corporate earnings through a dividends-paid deduction. However, Treasury limited the deduction to 50% of the dividends paid, based on revenue concerns.

In May 1985, President Ronald Reagan submitted to the Congress a revised version of the Treasury report generally referred to as Treasury II. In the report, the amount of the dividends-paid deduction was reduced from 50% (in Treasury I) to only 10% of the dividends paid, again based on revenue concerns.

In December 1985, the House of Representatives passed the Tax Reform Act of 1985. As part of its bill, the House included a ten percent dividends-paid deduction (like Treasury II) but phased it in over ten years. The House’s dividends-paid deduction proposal was not enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.

In June 1989, the ALI issued a supplemental study to its 1982 corporate tax study proposing a dividends-paid deduction but only with respect to corporate equity acquired after the date of enactment (new equity). The ALI’s reasoning in limiting the dividends-paid deduction to new equity was that the capital markets had already discounted the price of pre-enactment corporate equity (old equity) to reflect the two levels of taxation of corporate earnings.

In January 1992, the Treasury Department published a report on integrating the individual and corporate tax systems noting that “most trading partners of the United States have integrated their corporate tax systems so as to tax business income only once.” In its report, Treasury did not endorse any specific integration proposal but discussed in detail four prototypes to achieve integration: a dividend-exclusion prototype, a shareholder allocation prototype, a comprehensive business income tax prototype, and an imputation credit prototype. In December 1992, Treasury issued a supplemental report to its integration study recommending that Congress enact the dividend-exclusion prototype to integrate the individual and corporate tax systems.

In March 1993, the ALI published an extensive report on corporate integration proposing an imputation credit prototype to alleviate double taxation. In essence, the ALI proposal would convert the corporate income tax into a withholding tax with respect to income distributed to shareholders.

In May 2003, Congress passed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. As part of the Act, Congress provided “preferential” tax treatment for dividend income thereby achieving partial corporate integration. Most types of dividend income would be taxed the same as net capital gain. The preferential tax treatment for dividend income was scheduled to expire at the end of 2008 but was extended and finally made permanent by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.

In 2005, the Bush Administration established a tax advisory panel on tax reform, and four years later, the Obama Administration established a similar tax reform panel. The Bush Administration panel, called the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, recommended two options that would integrate the individual and corporate-level taxes. Under the first option, which the panel called the Simplified Income Tax Plan, all dividends paid by U.S. corporations out of domestic earnings would be excluded from the shareholder’s gross income and 75% of the capital gains on the sale of stock of U.S. corporations would be excluded from gross income. Under the second option, which the panel called the Growth and Investment Tax Plan, a uniform tax would apply to a business’s cash flow with no deductions for interest or dividends. At the individual shareholder level, a flat rate tax of 15% would apply to dividends, interest, and capital gains.

The Obama Administration panel, called the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, issued its report in 2010 on tax reform options noting that one option to achieving tax neutrality with respect to the organizational form of business is through integration. The board gave as an example the imputation credit method of achieving integration, noting that a number of OECD countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Mexico, have used such a system.

In December 2014, the Republican staff of the Senate Finance Committee issued a report entitled, “Comprehensive Tax Reform for 2015 and Beyond.” In the report, the staff devoted over 100 pages to corporate integration, detailing eight different methods of integration, including the dividends-paid deduction, the dividend-exclusion method, and the shareholder-credit method. The Republican staff’s report generated a significant amount of interest in corporate integration.

In 2016, the Senate Finance Committee held two hearings on corporate integration—the first one focusing on the dividends-paid deduction and the second one on the differing tax treatment of debt and equity. Some of the witnesses included leading tax scholars advocating for a dividends-paid deduction, including Professors Michael Graetz, Alvin Warren, and Bret Wells, as well as a leading tax practitioner, John McDonald.

IV. Getting Corporate America and the Business Community on Board

Any business tax reform proposal has to get the backing of the business community to have much of a chance of enactment. The business community can be divided into the corporate world (e.g., C corporations) and the pass-through world (e.g., partnerships, S corporations, and sole proprietorships). The corporate world, in turn, can be subdivided into nonpublicly traded and publicly traded corporations. One reason why corporate America has been lukewarm on the idea of corporate integration may be due to the lack of a tax benefit to the corporation under most integration proposals. For example, under the dividend-exclusion method, a shareholder that receives a dividend from a corporation excludes the dividend from gross income. Most, if not all, shareholders would like this result. However, there is no direct tax benefit to the corporation under the dividend-exclusion method. Similarly, under the shareholder-credit method, a shareholder that receives a dividend also receives a credit for corporate taxes paid by the corporation. Again, most if not all shareholders would like the shareholder-credit method since it alleviates much of the tax owed by the shareholder upon receipt of the dividend. However, the corporation receives no direct tax benefit.

In contrast to the dividend-exclusion method and the shareholder-credit method, under the dividends-paid deduction, a corporation receives a tax benefit from deducting a dividend. The tax benefit increases the corporation’s cash flow. For nonpublicly traded corporations, cash flow is probably the single most important financial indicator. Of the 1.6 million C corporations currently in existence, about 4,000 are publicly traded. For the nonpublicly traded C corporations, the double tax of corporate earnings is of great concern to many of them. Many of the nonpublicly traded C corporations eliminate the double taxation through deductible payments, typically salary, to the shareholder/officers of the corporation. But the compensation must be reasonable, and any excessive compensation can be recharacterized as a dividend resulting in double taxation. In addition, when the shareholders sell the C corporation, double tax can result, which has given rise to the use of personal goodwill in an attempt to alleviate the double taxation. A dividends-paid deduction could reduce the two levels of taxation of corporate earnings, while also giving a cash-flow benefit to the corporation.

For publicly traded corporations, the financial accounting treatment is critically important—in many cases, more important than the tax treatment. In the past, there seems to have been little thought given to the financial accounting consequences of corporate integration. This is understandable, as the importance of financial accounting to publicly traded corporations seems to have increased in more recent times. Under some integration proposals, the corporation’s financial accounting consequences are not directly affected by corporate integration. However, the dividends-paid deduction can provide a financial accounting benefit, which is important for publicly traded corporations.

A. Background on Financial Accounting

One of the keys to getting the attention and support of much of corporate America with respect to any business tax reform is an appreciation for its financial accounting treatment. A publicly traded corporation “is required to compute its income for financial accounting purposes each year in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. The resulting income figure is referred to as pretax financial income or pretax book income (PTBI).” The corporation will also compute its income tax expense for the year, which is subtracted from pretax financial income, resulting in the corporation’s net income. In addition, a corporation’s income is subject to taxation by federal, most state, and several local taxing authorities. As a result, a corporation must also compute its income for tax purposes in accordance with the applicable tax statutes and regulations of these various jurisdictions. The resulting income figure is referred to as taxable income. In almost all cases, a corporation’s taxable income will differ from its pretax financial income. In fact, the determinations of taxable income for these various jurisdictions almost always differ from each other and also from pretax financial income. These differences primarily reflect the different objectives behind the various taxing authorities and the accounting rules.

The tax rules are designed to provide equitable and efficient determination of tax liability and subsequent collection of revenue, and also to provide incentives for corporations and individuals to engage in a particular activity based upon the priorities and revenue needs of the various taxing authorities. The financial accounting rules are designed to paint a picture of the corporation’s operations that is consistent in its measurement on both an annual basis and across entities such that creditors, shareholders, management, and any other properly interested persons can evaluate the absolute and relative performance of the corporation. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has written:

The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity. Those decisions involve buying, selling, or holding equity and debt instruments and providing or settling loans and other forms of credit.

While the rules for determining pretax financial income are fairly rigorous and based upon underlying economic assumptions and principles, the various taxing authorities have promulgated laws and regulations for determining taxable income that do not necessarily follow rules grounded on the economic theories of financial reporting but, rather, may be based on political, social, or economic objectives. In addition, the difference between a corporation’s taxable income and its pretax financial income may be due to tax planning strategies engaged in by the corporation, resulting in lower taxable income relative to pretax financial income.

Numerous items create differences between taxable income and pretax financial income. Some of these differences are permanent differences and others are temporary differences (sometimes referred to as timing differences). Permanent differences are (1) items that enter into pretax financial income but never into taxable income or (2) items that enter into taxable income but never into pretax financial income. As a result, these items create a difference between pretax financial income and taxable income that will not reverse over time (i.e., they are permanent differences). FASB has not specifically defined permanent differences; however, FASB has written:

Some events do not have tax consequences. Certain revenues are exempt from taxation and certain expenses are not deductible. In some tax jurisdictions, for example, interest earned on certain municipal obligations is not taxable and fines are not deductible.

Temporary differences are generally (1) items that enter into pretax financial income earlier than when the item enters into taxable income or (2) items that enter into taxable income earlier than when the item enters into pretax financial income. As a result, pretax financial income is different from taxable income in the year in which the temporary difference arises. In a subsequent year(s), when the item giving rise to the temporary difference reverses, an offsetting difference is created between pretax financial income and taxable income. As a result, these items create a difference between taxable income and pretax financial income that will reverse over time (i.e., they are temporary differences).

B. The Focus of Corporate Management

Before discussing corporate integration in detail, it may be helpful to summarize the financial indicators that are critical to corporate management. The following is the first paragraph of a January 26, 2021, press release from Microsoft:

REDMOND, Wash.—January 26, 2021—Microsoft Corp. today announced the following results for the quarter ended December 31, 2020, as compared to the corresponding period of last fiscal year:

Revenue was $43.1 billion and increased 17%
Operating income was $17.9 billion and increased 29%
Net income was $15.5 billion and increased 33%
Diluted earnings per share was $2.03 and increased 34%

The following are the headline and the first three paragraphs of a CNBC news story on Microsoft earnings:

Microsoft reports 17% revenue growth as cloud business accelerates

Microsoft stock rose as much as 6% in extended trading on Tuesday after the company reported fiscal second-quarter earnings Azure cloud revenue growth and quarterly revenue guidance that exceeded analysts’ expectations.

Here’s how the company did:

  • Earnings: $2.03 per share, adjusted, vs. $1.64 per share as expected by analysts, according to Refinitiv.
  • Revenue: $43.08 billion, vs. $40.18 billion as expected by analysts, according to Refinitiv.

Microsoft revenue grew 17% on an annualized basis, up from 12% growth in the prior quarter, according to a statement.

As a general proposition, which is supported by the Microsoft press release and the CNBC news story, corporate management (and the business community) is extremely focused on the income statement, often called the statement of income or statement of earnings. In business parlance, it is usually referred to as the P&L statement (i.e., profit and loss statement). The income statement is the “report that measures the success of a corporation’s operations for a given period of time.” In looking at the income statement, several key items stand out. First, operating income and net income are viewed as the primary indicator of the performance of corporate management. In its press release, Microsoft reported operating income and net income for the quarter of $17.9 billion and $15.5 billion, respectively, and compared those figures to Microsoft’s operating and net income in the same period a year earlier. In many cases, the board of directors of a publicly traded corporation will focus on the income of the corporation in evaluating the performance of corporate management. Investors and analysts will also look at a company’s operating and net income in evaluating the company’s performance.

Corporate management desires a sufficient amount of income each quarter to try and meet or exceed the expectations of Wall Street so that the market price of the stock will increase. One effect of an increasing stock price is to increase the value, if any, of management’s stock options. Generally, corporations prefer, if possible, to show steady growth each period in operating and net income rather than wild swings in income from period to period.

While corporate management focuses on operating and net income, the financial world generally focuses on a corporation’s earnings per share (EPS). More specifically, EPS is considered to be the most significant business indicator in the financial world. In its press release, Microsoft reported EPS of $2.03 per (diluted) share and compared that figure to Microsoft’s performance a year earlier—an increase of 34%.

A corporation’s basic EPS is equal to its income available to common shareholders (i.e., income from continuing operations (operating income) or net income less dividends on preferred stock) divided by the weighted average number of common shares of its stock outstanding. Its diluted EPS is computed as if all convertible securities (outstanding convertible preferred shares, convertible debentures, stock options, and warrants) were exercised. Because EPS is calculated using the corporation’s net income (and income from continuing operations), both EPS and net income are directly related (i.e., a higher net income will lead to a higher EPS). A corporation must disclose its EPS on the face of its income statement.

A publicly traded corporation must also disclose its effective tax rate reconciliation in the footnotes to its financial statements filed as part of Form 10-K. This disclosure is referred to as the “tax footnote.” Generally, a publicly traded corporation desires that its effective tax rate be comparable to or lower than the industry average. More specifically, a corporation wants a lower effective tax rate than its main competitors. In addition, a publicly traded corporation desires to sustain a low effective tax rate.

The effective tax rate is computed by dividing the corporation’s income tax expense attributable to income from continuing operations by income from continuing operations. The income tax expense includes both current tax expense and deferred tax expense. The deferred tax expense is computed based on a corporation’s temporary differences. Because the tax effects of the temporary differences are included in deferred tax expense, a corporation’s effective tax rate is not affected by temporary differences (unless a rate change takes place).

Publicly traded corporations greatly value permanent differences, which may increase a corporation’s income and its EPS as well as lowering its effective tax rate. In contrast, temporary differences have no immediate impact on a corporation’s income, its EPS, or its effective tax rate. Generally, a temporary difference may provide a transitory cash-flow benefit. As a result, many, if not most, publicly traded corporations place little value on temporary differences.

C. Dividends-Paid Deduction as a Permanent Difference

As a general rule, when a corporation pays a dividend, it does not treat the dividend as an expense for financial accounting purposes, and it does not deduct the dividend for federal income tax purposes. The corporation reduces its retained earnings by the amount of the dividend so that the dividend has no impact on the corporation’s income statement.

The different methods of integration can have a widely different effect on the financial accounting treatment of the corporation. If the dividend-exclusion method of integration is adopted, the corporation’s financial statements should remain unchanged from current law. If, however, the dividends-paid deduction method is adopted, the financial accounting treatment may be quite beneficial to a corporation. FASB has provided that:

The amount allocated to continuing operations is the tax effect of the pretax income or loss from continuing operations that occurred during the year, plus or minus income tax effects of . . . tax-deductible dividends paid to shareholders.

The remainder is allocated to items other than continuing operations in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 740-20-45-12 and 740-20-45-14.

As a result, the dividends-paid deduction creates a permanent difference for the corporation, in that the dividend is deductible for tax purposes but is not an expense for financial accounting purposes. By being a permanent difference, the dividends-paid deduction would decrease a corporation’s effective tax rate. It would also increase the corporation’s cash flow.

To illustrate the financial accounting treatment of the dividends-paid deduction, assume a publicly traded corporation has $1 million of pretax financial income and $1 million of taxable income. The corporation pays a dividend of $300,000. The corporation’s pretax financial income remains unchanged because the dividend is not an expense for financial accounting purposes. The corporation’s taxable income is reduced to $700,000. At a 21% corporate tax rate, the corporation will owe $147,000 in corporate income taxes. The corporation’s effective tax rate is lowered from 21% to 14.7% as a result of the dividends-paid deduction. The dividends-paid deduction creates a permanent difference for financial accounting purposes.

Figure 1, a portion of the information from Lockheed Martin’s 10-K for 2020, illustrates the effect of a dividends-paid deduction on its effective tax rate. Lockheed Martin notes in its 10-K that:

We receive a tax deduction for dividends paid on our common stock held by certain of our defined contribution plans with an employee stock ownership plan feature. The amount of the tax deduction has increased as we increased our dividend over the last three years, partially offset by a decline in the number of shares in these plans.

Figure 1*

Our reconciliation of the 21% U.S. Federal Statutory income tax rate expense for continuing operations is as follows (in millions):
  2020 2019 2018
  Amount Rate Amount Rate Amount Rate
Income tax expense at the U.S. federal statutory tax rate $1,729 21.0% $1,521 21.0% $1,226 21.0%
Foreign derived intangible income deduction (170) (2.1) (122) (1.7) (61) (1.0)
Research and development tax credit (97) (1.2) (148) (2.0) (138) (2.4)
Tax deductible dividends (64) (0.8) (62) (0.9) (59) (1.0)
Excess tax benefits for share-based payment awards (52) (0.6) (63) (0.9) (55) (0.9)
Tax accounting method change (15) (0.2) (61) (1.0)
Deferred tax write-down and transition tax (43) (0.7)
Other, net 1 0.1 (100) (1.3) (17) (0.4)
Income tax expense $1,347 16.4% $1,011 14.0% $792 13.6%

*Lockhead Martin Corp., Annual report (Form 10-K) 89 (Jan. 28, 2021).

One of the concerns with a dividends-paid deduction is the tax treatment of tax-exempt and foreign shareholders. According to a recent study, approximately 30% of all corporate equities is owned by retirement accounts and 40% is owned by foreign shareholders. If a corporation deducts a dividend, then if the shareholder receiving the dividend is tax-exempt or foreign, little or no U.S. tax may be collected on the earnings that the dividend represents. The corporation deducts the dividend, resulting in no corporate income tax on those distributed earnings, and the dividend is received by a tax-exempt shareholder that will not pay any tax on the dividend or a foreign shareholder that may be subject to little or no U.S. tax because of a tax treaty. As a result, a dividends-paid deduction may need to be coupled with a withholding tax on the dividend to address tax-exempt and foreign shareholders resulting in a single level of tax collected on corporate earnings paid out to shareholders in the form of a deductible dividend.

For financial accounting purposes, an issue arises as to whether the withholding tax is an income tax of the corporation and, therefore, should be recorded as corporate income tax expense, or whether it is a withholding tax for the benefit of the shareholder.

Example: Publicly traded corporation has $1 million of pretax financial income, $1 million of taxable income, and is subject to a 25% corporate tax rate. The corporation pays a deductible dividend of $300,000 that is subject to a 25% withholding tax resulting in a $75,000 withholding tax. The corporation’s pretax financial income remains unchanged because the dividend is not an expense for financial accounting purposes. The corporation’s taxable income is reduced to $700,000. At a 25% corporate tax rate, the corporation will owe $175,000 in corporate income taxes. If the withholding tax is for the benefit of the shareholders, then the corporation’s effective tax rate is lowered from 25% to 17.5% as a result of the dividends-paid deduction ($175,000 corporate income taxes divided by $1 million of pretax financial income). If, however, the withholding tax is treated as corporate income tax expense, then the corporation’s effective tax rate remains at 25% even with the dividends-paid deduction ($250,000 corporate income taxes divided by $1 million of pretax financial income).

The financial accounting rules are quite specific on this issue. FASB has written:

b. A withholding tax for the benefit of the recipient of the dividends. A tax that is assessed on an entity based on dividends distributed is, in effect, a withholding tax for the benefit of the recipient of the dividends and is not an income tax if both of the following conditions are met:

1. The tax is payable by the entity if and only if a dividend is distributed to shareholders. The tax does not reduce future income taxes the entity would otherwise pay.

2. Shareholders receiving the dividend are entitled to a tax credit at least equal to the tax paid by the entity and that credit is realizable as a refund or as a reduction of taxes otherwise due, regardless of the tax status of the shareholders.

FASB has also provided some more specific guidance on the financial accounting treatment of a withholding tax. The additional guidance applied to the French integrated tax system as it existed in 1995. FASB wrote:

The French income tax structure is based on the concept of an integrated tax system. The system utilizes a tax credit at the shareholder level to eliminate or mitigate the double taxation that would otherwise apply to a dividend. The tax credit is automatically available to a French shareholder receiving a dividend from a French corporation. The precompute mobilier (or precompte) is a mechanism that provides for the integration of the tax credit to the shareholder with the taxes paid by the corporation. The precompte is a tax paid by the corporation at the time of a dividend distribution that is equal to the difference between a tax based on the regular corporation tax rate applied to the amount of the declared dividend and taxes previously paid by the corporation on the income being distributed. In addition, if a corporation pays a dividend from earnings that have been retained more than five years, the corporation loses the benefit of any taxes previously paid in the computation of the precompte.

D. Pass-Through Entities

The noncorporate business world, often referred to as the pass-through world, favors corporate integration, in large part, as both a defensive measure for large pass-through entities (such as publicly traded partnerships), and for greater flexibility. In its March 17, 2016, letter to Senators Hatch and Wyden and Representatives Brady and Levin, the Parity for Main Street Employers wrote that tax reform should be comprehensive, it should reduce top tax rates for corporations and individuals, and also:

Third, Congress should eliminate the double tax on corporate income by integrating the corporate and individual tax codes. A study by Ernst & Young made clear that the double corporate tax results in less investment, fewer jobs, and lower wages than if all American businesses were subject to a single layer of tax. A key goal of tax reform should be to continue to reduce or eliminate the incidence of the double tax and move towards taxing all business income once.

A number of proposals over the years have required that large pass-through entities be subject to the corporate tax, which would result in two levels of tax of the entity’s earnings. Corporate integration would alleviate the two levels of tax, returning these large pass-through entities to a single level of tax. In addition, a number of start-up businesses and existing pass-through entities often want to be a corporation for many different reasons and may not qualify as an S corporation. Corporate integration would permit these businesses to be a C corporation yet be subject to only a single level of tax.

V. Getting Policymakers on Board

In any business tax reform proposal, there are generally three documents of critical importance to policymakers. First, is the JCT revenue estimate of the business tax reform proposal. A tax reform proposal can be revenue neutral, revenue positive, or a revenue loser over a ten-year budget window. Many policymakers insist that a proposal be revenue neutral measured on a conventional basis. In addition, some policymakers have concerns if the proposal has a “tail” to it, meaning that revenue decreases in the later years of the ten-year budget window, suggesting that revenues may continue to decline in years outside the ten-year budget window.

Figure 2 provides the final line of the JCT revenue estimate of Chairman Camp’s tax reform proposal, the Tax Reform Act of 2014. As the table shows, the JCT estimated the plan to be approximately revenue neutral over the ten-year budget window, actually slightly revenue positive, raising $3.0 billion over that time. There is no tail to the proposal, although some policymakers expressed concern that the proposal had a significant one-time revenue pickup (from deemed repatriation of foreign earnings) to achieve revenue neutrality.

 

Figure 2*

Estimated Revenue Effects of the “Tax Reform Act of 2014”
Fiscal Years 2014-2023
[Billions of Dollars]
  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2014-18 2014-23
Net Total -13.9 47.1 -18.5 6.9 -1.5 -17.2 -3.7 -0.2 11.5 -12.8 23.5 3.0

*Staff of the J. Comm. On Tax’n, Technical Explanation, Estimated Revenue Effects, Distributional Analysis, and Macroeconomic Analysis of the Tax Reform Act of 2014, A Discussion Draft of the Chairman on the House Comm. On Ways and Means to Reform the Internal Revenue Code, JCS-1-14 (2014) at 654.

A second document of critical importance is the JCT analysis of the distribution of the tax burden. If a business tax reform proposal is distributionally neutral, it will generally pass muster with policymakers. If it is slightly more progressive than the current system, that, too, may generally pass muster with most policymakers. But if it is slightly more regressive than current law, that can cause problems, particularly with Democratic lawmakers.

Figure 3 provides the distributional effects of Chairman Camp’s Tax Reform Act of 2014 from the last year (2023) of the ten-year (2014-2023) budget window. As the table shows, the average tax rate for all income categories decreases under the proposal except for the $100,000 to $200,000 income category (average tax rate stays the same) and the $500,000 to $1 million income category (average tax rate increases from 30.7% to 31.2%). Probably, a better measure in analyzing the progressive (or regressive) nature of the proposal is the percent change in federal taxes under the proposal. For all income categories up to the $75,000 to $100,000 income range, the share of federal taxes under the proposal decreases. For example, the $40,000 to $50,000 income category, under then-present law, would pay 3.1% of federal taxes. Under the proposal, this income category would only pay 2.8% of federal taxes. For income categories beginning at $100,000 to $200,000, the percent share of federal taxes increases, suggesting that the proposal is slightly progressive. To illustrate, the highest income category, $1,000,000 and above, under then-present law, would pay 19.6% of federal taxes in 2023. Under the proposal, the highest income category would pay 19.8% of federal taxes. As a result, the proposal is viewed as slightly progressive relative to then-present law.

Figure 3*

Distributional Effects of the "Tax Reform Act of 2014" (1)
Calendar Year 2023
  CHANGE IN FEDERAL TAXES (3) UNDER FEDERAL TAXES (3) UNDER Average Tax Rate (4)
INCOME CATEGORY (2) FEDERAL TAXES (3) PRESENT LAW PROPOSAL Present  
        Law Proposal
  Millions Percent Billions Percent Billions Percent Percent Percent
Less than $10,000.......... -$402 ($0.1) $5.3 0.1% $4.9 0.10% 4.60% 4.30%
$10,000 to $20,000........ -$836 ($0.5) $1.7 0.0% $0.8 0.00% 0.40% 0.20%
$20,000 to $30,000........ -$1,766 ($0.1) $30.4 0.7% $28.7 0.70% 4.20% 3.90%
$30,000 to $40,000........ -$5,222 ($0.1) $62.2 1.4% $56.9 1.30% 7.90% 7.20%
$40,000 to $50,000........ -$15,036 ($0.1) $133.7 3.1% $118.7 2.8% 12.3% 10.9%
$50,000 to $75,000........ -$13,237 ($0.0) $380.5 8.8% $367.3 8.6% 15.0% 14.5%
$75,000 to $100,000...... -$26,767 ($0.1) $436.3 10.1% $409.6 9.6% 17.5% 16.4%
$100,000 to $200,000..... $374 $0.0 $1,270.4 29.3% $1,270.7 29.8% 22.2% 22.2%
$200,000 to $500,000..... -$1,724 ($0.0) $870.6 20.1% $868.9 20.4% 27.7% 27.6%
$500,000 to $1,000,000.. $6,911 $0.0 $288.6 6.7% $295.5 6.9% 30.7% 31.2%
$1,000,000 and over....... -$4,143 ($0.0) $850.5 19.6% $846.4 19.8% 33.4% 33.0%
Total, All Taxpayers....... -$61,845 ($0.0) $4,330.2 100.0% $4,268.3 100.0% 21.1% 20.8%

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

(1)  This distributional analysis includes the following provisions from revenue table JCX-20-14: (i) I. Tax Reform for Individual sections A, B, C.1., C4., D.1., D.2, E.1-E.7., E.9.-E.10., E.12.-E.13., E.15.-E.16., G.2, G.8., G.15.-G.16., G18.-G19.; (ii) II. Alternative Mininum Tax Repeal; (iii) III. Business Tax Reform; (iv) IV. Taxation of Foreign Income; (v) V. Tax Exempt Entities sections A.2.-A.8., C.3., D.1.; and (vi) VII. Excise Taxes sections 1., 2., 4.

(2)  The income concept used to place tax returns into income categories is adjusted gross income (AGI) plus: [1] tax-exempt interest, [2] employer contributions for health plans and life insurance, [3] employer share of FICA tax, [4] worker's compensation, [5] nontaxable Social Security benefits, [6] insurance value of Medicare benefits, [7] alternative minimum tax preference items, [8] individual share of business taxes, and [9] excluded income of U.S. citizens living abroad. Categories are measured at 2013 levels.

(3)  Federal taxes are equal to individual income tax (including the outlay portion of refundable credits), employment tax (attributed to employees), excise taxes (attributed to consumers), and corporate income taxes. The estimates of Federal taxes are preliminary and subject to change. Individuals who are dependents of other taxpayers and taxpayers with negative income are excluded from the analysis.

Does not include indirect effects.

(4)  The average tax rate is equal to Federal taxes descr bed in footnote (3) divided by income described in footnote (2).

The third document of critical importance to policymakers is the JCT macroeconomic analysis of the proposal. The JCT used two, and now three, different macroeconomic models. The models provide estimates of economic growth, capital investment, and private sector employment. If those economic parameters are positive, then the proposal will generally be well-received. In addition, positive economic growth will result in increased revenues, which may be estimated by the JCT.

Figure 4 is Table 3 from the JCT’s macroeconomic analysis of Chairman Camp’s Tax Reform Act of 2014. As shown in the table, using different assumptions regarding labor elasticity and Federal Reserve action, both JCT models show a growth in real GDP relative to then-present law, ranging from 0.1% to 1.6% over the ten-year budget window. The first model, MEG, shows a bit less economic growth relative to the second model, OLG. Under MEG, economic growth ranges from 0.1% to 0.6% over the ten-year budget window. Under OLG, economic growth is estimated at 1.5% to 1.6% over the ten-year budget window. The JCT estimated that the increased economic growth would increase revenues relative to the conventional estimate by $50 billion to $700 billion over the ten-year budget window, depending on which modeling assumptions are used.

Figure 4*

Table 3.–Percent Change in Real GDP Relative to Present Law

   

Fiscal Years

2014–2018

Fiscal Years

2019–2023

Fiscal Years

2014–2023

MEG

High labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.2%

0.2%

0.2%

 

Neutral Fed

0.1%

0.8%

0.5%

Low labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.2%

0.1%

0.1%

 

Neutral Fed

0.1%

0.7%

0.4%

MEG, reduced investment response to taxation of multinationals

High labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.3%

0.3%

0.3%

 

Neutral Fed

0.3%

0.8%

0.6%

OLG

Default IP Elasticities

1.8%

1.4%

1.5%

Reduced IP Elasticities

1.8%

1.4%

1.6%

*Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, Macroeconomic Analysis of the “Tax Reform Act of 2014,” JCX-22-14, at 13 (2014).

Figure 5, also from the JCT macroeconomic analysis, is the percent change in business capital relative to then-present law under the Tax Reform Act of 2014. Most of the models and assumptions result in a negative change in the percent change in business capital. As the JCT noted, “[o]verall, the proposal is expected to increase the cost of capital for domestic firms, thus reducing the incentive for investment in domestic capital stock.” This was a concern to policymakers.

Figure 5*

Table 4.–Percent Change in Business Capital Relative to Present Law

   

Fiscal Years

2014–2018

Fiscal Years

2019–2023

Fiscal Years

2014–2023

MEG

High labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.1%

-1.0%

-0.5%

 

Neutral Fed

0.0%

-0.5%

-0.3%

Low labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.1%

-1.0%

-0.6%

 

Neutral Fed

0.0%

-0.6%

-0.3%

MEG, reduced investment response to taxation of multinationals

High labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.3%

-0.6%

-0.2%

 

Neutral Fed

0.2%

-0.2%

0.0%

OLG

Default IP Elasticities

0.2%

0.0%

0.1%

Reduced IP Elasticities

0.0%

-0.3%

-0.2%

*Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, Macroeconomic Analysis of the “Tax Reform Act of 2014,” JCX-22-14, at 16 (2014).

Figures 6 and 7 show the percent change in labor force participation and private sector employment relative to then-present law under Chairman Camp’s tax reform plan. Chairman Camp’s plan has favorable labor force participation relative to then-present law. It also had a quite favorable change in private sector employment relative to then-present law. Policymakers are always extremely focused on jobs, so a tax reform proposal that increases labor force participation and private sector employment is a huge plus.

Figure 6*

Table 5.–Percent Change in Labor Force Participation Relative to Present Law

   

Fiscal Years

2014–2018

Fiscal Years

2019–2023

Fiscal Years

2014–2023

MEG

High labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.3%

0.4%

0.3%

 

Neutral Fed

0.3%

0.4%

0.3%

Low labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.2%

0.3%

0.3%

 

Neutral Fed

0.2%

0.3%

0.3%

MEG, reduced investment response to taxation of multinationals

High labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.3%

0.4%

0.3%

 

Neutral Fed

0.3%

0.4%

0.3%

OLG

Default IP Elasticities

1.4%

1.3%

1.3%

Reduced IP Elasticities

1.5%

1.5%

1.5%

*Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, Macroeconomic Analysis of the “Tax Reform Act of 2014,” JCX-22-14, at 17 (2014).

Figure 7*

Table 6.–Percent Change in Private Sector Employment Relative to Present Law

   

Fiscal Years

2014–2018

Fiscal Years

2019–2023

Fiscal Years

2014–2023

MEG

High labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.3%

0.6%

0.5%

 

Neutral Fed

0.2%

1.3%

0.7%

Low labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.3%

0.5%

0.4%

 

Neutral Fed

0.2%

1.2%

0.7%

MEG, reduced investment response to taxation of multinationals

High labor elasticity

Aggressive Fed

0.4%

0.6%

0.5%

 

Neutral Fed

0.4%

1.2%

0.8%

OLG

Default IP Elasticities

1.4%

1.3%

1.3%

Reduced IP Elasticities

1.5%

1.5%

1.5%

*Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, Macroeconomic Analysis of the “Tax Reform Act of 2014,” JCX-22-14, at 19 (2014).

Corporate integration, structured as a dividends-paid deduction, can be revenue neutral and distributionally neutral, as well as increasing economic growth, increasing business capital investment, and increasing (very slightly) private sector employment. As a result, it is one of the few business tax reform proposals that can positively hit all the economic parameters. To illustrate the difficulties of doing so, although Chairman Camp’s tax reform plan was revenue neutral in the ten-year budget window, was slightly distributionally progressive, and created positive economic growth and increased private sector employment, it would result in a decrease in business capital investment relative to then-present law.

In 2015 and 2016, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Hatch developed a corporate integration proposal, which utilized a 100% dividends-paid deduction, coupled with a withholding tax on dividends and interest paid by a C corporation on its bonds. The proposal was intended to be revenue neutral. The actual proposal ended up being slightly revenue positive ($42.5 billion) over the ten-year budget window.

In addition, the proposal was distributionally neutral to ever so slightly more progressive. All income categories, with the exception of one, would pay the exact same percentage of federal taxes as then-present law. The one exception was the $75,000 to $100,000 income category that would pay slightly less as a percentage of federal taxes under the proposal. Under then-present law, the $75,000 to $100,000 income category paid 9.0% of federal taxes. Under the proposal, the percentage dropped slightly to 8.9%.

The JCT did a macroeconomic analysis of the corporate integration proposal utilizing three different models: MEG, OLG and Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Growth Model (DSGE). All three models showed an increase in real GDP relative to then-present law over the ten-year budget window. As described by the JCT:

In general, while the proposal reduces direct taxation of corporate profits by allowing for the deduction of dividends paid, it increases direct taxation of dividends for shareholders and of interest on corporate debt for corporate bondholders (and others who lend to corporations) through the withholding proposal. When the reduced taxation of corporate profits arising from eliminating the corporate-level tax on dividends is netted against the increase in direct taxation of dividends, the average after-tax return to corporate profits for shareholders is slightly increased. At the same time, after-tax returns for corporate bondholders are reduced by the proposal, as bondholders do not share in after-tax profits accrued by corporations and withholding increases liability for some bondholders. The proposal is projected to increase investment in business capital in the United States, as well as overall economic activity, as measured by changes in gross domestic product (“GDP”), relative to the present law baseline over the 10-year budget period.

As shown in Figure 8, the JCT provided a table showing the predicted effects of the policy on real GDP relative to the projections under then-present law. Although the increases in economic activity were small, it is important to note that the proposal is slightly revenue positive during the ten-year budget window without any one-time revenue increase, such as revenue from deemed repatriation as in the Camp tax plan. In addition, the JCT estimated that the proposal would generate additional revenue ($70–$100 billion) over the ten-year budget window as a result of the increased economic growth.

Figure 8*

Table 2.–Percent Change in Real GDP Relative to Present Law

   

Fiscal Years

2017–2021

Fiscal Years

2022–2026

Fiscal Years

2017–2026

MEG

Default savings elasticity

-0.1%

0.3%

0.1%

High savings elasticity

-0.1%

0.1%

[1]

OLG

30-year fiscal closing

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

10-yesr fiscal closing

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

Immobile IP

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

DSGE

0.0%

0.1%

0.1%

[1] Indicates an increase of less than 0.1%

*Letter from Joint Comm. on Tax’n to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch (Nov. 18, 2016).

The JCT also estimated that the corporate integration proposal would result in an increase in business capital investment relative to then-present law. As explained by the JCT:

In the MEG model simulations the capital stock is projected to increase in response to this proposal, but the amount of the increase is dependent on the responsiveness of savings to the after-tax return to savings. In the “high savings elasticity” simulation, which increases responsiveness by 25 percent relative to the default assumption, capital stock increases more slowly.

Table 3.–Percent Change in Business Capital Relative to Present Law

   

Fiscal Years

2017–2021

Fiscal Years

2022–2026

Fiscal Years

2017–2026

MEG

Default savings elasticity

[2]

0.8%

0.4%

High savings elasticity

-0.1%

0.1%

[2]

OLG

30-year fiscal closing

0.2%

0.5%

0.4%

10-yesr fiscal closing

0.2%

0.5%

0.4%

Immobile IP

0.2%

0.4%

0.3%

DSGE

0.1%

0.4%

0.2%

[1] Indicates an increase of less than 0.1%.

[2] Indicates a decrease of less than 0.1%.

The OLG simulations predict that the stock of business capital in all production sectors combined increases by about 0.4 percent relative to present law, with a larger increase in the second five years than in the first. . . .

The DSGE model predicts that the stock of capital will rise by 0.2 percent relative to present law with a larger increase in the second five years than in the first.

The JCT also analyzed the effects of corporate integration on labor force participation and private sector employment. With respect to labor force participation, the JCT wrote:

Increased dividend payments can be expected to move some people to higher tax brackets, resulting in a very small increase in the marginal tax rate on wages, which can be expected to reduce the labor force slightly. The increase in the capital stock is projected to result in an increase in the average wage rate by up to 0.1 percent over the budget period, increasing more over time in the MEG and DSGE models, and more in the early years in the OLG model. An increase in wage rates can provide an incentive for some individuals to reduce their labor supply in favor of leisure, but it also increases the marginal return to labor, providing an incentive for individuals to work more. In the MEG and DSGE models, the latter effect leads to a projected increase in labor supply over time.

As to private sector employment, the JCT explained:

By increasing the rate of return on capital as opposed to labor for corporations, the proposal results in a slight reduction in the demand for labor, immediately after implementation. This can be seen more directly in the MEG model simulations, which allows [sic] for involuntary unemployment, creating a gap between labor supply and labor demand. Because the proposal reduces demand for labor, employment is reduced in the early years of the policy as capital stock is gradually built up, despite the small increase in labor force participation in the MEG simulations. Over time, as the initial focus on capital stock accumulation begins to level off, the MEG model projects that businesses will increase hiring to complement the capital stock in increasing output.

Figures 9 and 10 show the changes in labor force participation and private sector employment predicted to result from the proposal.

Figure 9*

Table 4.–Percent Change in Labor Force Participation Relative to Present Law

   

Fiscal Years

2017–2021

Fiscal Years

2022–2026

Fiscal Years

2017–2026

MEG

Default savings elasticity

[1]

0.1%

[1]

High savings elasticity

[1]

[1]

[1]

OLG

30-year fiscal closing

-0.1%

-0.1%

-0.1%

10-yesr fiscal closing

-0.1%

-0.1%

-0.1%

Immobile IP

-0.1%

-0.1%

-0.1%

DSGE

[1]

[1]

[1]

[1] Indicates an increase of less than 0.1%.

*Letter from Joint Comm. on Tax’n to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch (Nov. 18, 2016).

Figure 10*

Percent Change in Private Sector Employment Relative to Present Law

   

Fiscal Years

2017–2021

Fiscal Years

2022–2026

Fiscal Years

2017–2026

MEG

Default savings elasticity

-0.1%

[1]

[2]

High savings elasticity

[2]

[1]

[1]

OLG

30-year fiscal closing

-0.1%

-0.1%

-0.1%

10-yesr fiscal closing

-0.1%

-0.1%

-0.1%

Immobile IP

-0.1%

-0.1%

-0.1%

DSGE

[1]

[1]

[1]

[1] Indicates an increase of less than 0.1%.

[2] Indicates a decrease of less than 0.1%.

*Letter from Joint Comm. on Tax’n to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch (Nov. 18, 2016).

In addition to the JCT documents, policymakers are very focused on a business tax reform proposal that can address some of the most pressing issues in business tax law. One of the most pressing is the corporate tax rate. The Republican members would like to retain the current 21% rate. Many Democratic members would like to raise the rate to at least 25%, with President Biden proposing 28% and at least one prominent Democratic member advocating a return to the 35% rate in effect prior to the 2017 passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.

In the current political environment, a 100% dividends-paid deduction, coupled with a withholding tax on dividends and interest on corporate bonds, would be a tough sell. Under such an approach, a corporation that paid out all of its earnings as dividends to its shareholders would zero out its corporate tax liability. Many members of Congress would not support such a proposal. In addition, corporate America, tax-exempt organizations, and foreign persons would strongly oppose a withholding tax on interest paid or accrued on corporate bonds.

A disallowance of deduction is comparable to allowing a full deduction coupled with a withholding tax. The purpose of a withholding tax on deductible dividends is primarily to address tax-exempt shareholders and foreign shareholders. Therefore, a partial dividends-paid deduction could be enacted without the need for a withholding tax. The percentage of dividends deducted could be set to approximate the dividends that are paid to taxable shareholders (this would partially include foreign shareholders, who are taxed on dividends received from a U.S. corporation, although, in many cases, at a lower tax treaty rate). In addition, a partial dividends-paid deduction could bring the parties together in setting the corporate tax rate, both on a statutory basis and an effective-tax basis. For example, assume the statutory corporate tax rate is increased from 21% to 25%. If that is coupled with a partial dividends-paid deduction, the effective corporate tax rate could be set at or about 21%, which would depend on the amount of dividends a corporation pays each year and the percentage of the dividends-paid deduction. The revenue cost of a partial dividends-paid deduction would be easily offset by the revenue generated by increasing the corporate tax rate by four percentage points (and also by any revenue generated by an increase, if any, in the tax rate on dividends).

Example: US Corporation pays out each year 40% of its free cash flow as dividends to its shareholders. Assume the free cash flow is equal to the book income and taxable income of US Corporation and is $100 for the current year. Under current law, US Corporation will pay $21 ($100 of taxable income times the 21% corporate tax rate) in corporate income taxes for the year. If the corporate tax rate is increased to 25% and a corporation is allowed a 40% dividends-paid deduction, US Corporation will still pay $21 in corporate income taxes for the year. As a result, the statutory corporate tax rate is 25% while the effective corporate tax rate is 21%.

A partial dividends-paid deduction can also alleviate the effective tax rate on global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI). Generally, a CFC’s income falls into one of three categories: (1) Subpart F income, (2) tested income/GILTI, and (3) the residual category. Subpart F income is generally mobile (foreign base company sales or services income) or passive income (foreign personal holding company income) of the CFC. Tested income/GILTI is generally the active foreign business income of the CFC. And the residual category effectively includes the income representing a 10% return on a CFC’s qualified business asset investment.

The Biden Administration is proposing to, in essence, repeal the third category of income and increase the effective tax rate on the second category of income (tested income/GILTI) from 10.5% to 21%. Taxing the active foreign business income of a CFC at such a high rate would make the United States very much an outlier among the OECD countries, which is one reason why Republican members and the business community have opposed such a change. However, a partial dividends-paid deduction would alleviate some of the harshness of doubling the effective tax rate on GILTI.

Example: US Corporation earns $100 of GILTI, which is effectively taxed at 21% (28% corporate tax rate with a 25% deduction for GILTI). Thus, US Corporation will pay $21 in corporate income taxes for the year. If US Corporation pays dividends of $40 during the year and is allowed a 40% dividends-paid deduction, US Corporation will pay $16.52 in corporate income taxes for the year. As a result, the corporate tax rate on GILTI is 21% while the effective GILTI tax rate is 16.52%.

If the corporate tax rate is increased to 25% rather than 28%, then an effective tax rate on GILTI would be 18.75% assuming the Biden Administration’s proposal to tax GILTI at three-fourths of the corporate tax rate is retained.

Example: US Corporation earns $100 of GILTI, which is effectively taxed at 18.75%. Thus, US Corporation will pay $18.75 in corporate income taxes for the year. If US Corporation pays dividends of $40 during the year and is allowed a 40% dividends-paid deduction, US Corporation will pay $14.75 in corporate income taxes for the year. As a result, the corporate tax rate on GILTI is 18.75% while the effective GILTI tax rate is 14.75%, which is very close to the global minimum tax rate agreed to by the G-7 nations.

Under current law, the “all-in” tax rate on corporate earnings is either 36.8% (21% corporate tax rate plus 20% tax rate on dividend income) or 39.8% (21% corporate tax rate plus 23.8% tax rate on dividend income), depending on whether the 3.8% net investment income (NII) tax is included in the calculation. In either case, the rate compares favorably to the top individual tax rate of 37%, which is the applicable top tax rate for individual owners of income earned by pass-through entities, such as sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations.

If the corporate tax rate is increased to 28% and the tax rate on dividend income is also increased, then the all-in tax rate on corporate earnings could rise to 50% or even higher (depending on the tax rate on dividend income and whether the 3.8% NII tax is retained). The current top individual tax rate is 37%, and the Biden Administration has proposed increasing it to 39.6%. The result could be that the all-in corporate tax rate would be ten percentage points (or more) higher than the top individual tax rate. The rate of tax on business income should not depend on the form of business organization. It should be approximately equal whether the business is conducted as a C corporation, sole proprietorship, partnership, or S corporation. A large gap in the different tax rate on business income would distort choice-of-business-entity decisions.

One of the goals of corporate integration is to more closely equalize the tax treatment of debt and equity. In fact, equalizing the tax treatment of debt and equity is arguably at least as important as integrating the two levels of tax on corporate earnings. In general, a corporation may deduct interest on debt while dividends on equity are not deductible. The more favorable tax treatment of debt may lead to greater debt financing relative to equity financing. As part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Congress enacted a limitation on the deductibility of business interest expense for large corporations and partnerships (average annual gross receipts greater than $25 million). Generally, business interest expense is deductible to the extent of the sum of: business interest income, 30% of adjusted taxable income, and floor plan financing interest expense. Any business interest expense disallowed as an interest deduction for the year is carried forward to the next year and is treated as business interest expense paid or accrued in the succeeding year. With a corporation’s business interest expense being, in some cases, partially allowed as a deduction, achieving some measure of parity between debt and equity would seem to lead to a partial deduction of dividends. In addition, with any disallowed business interest expense deduction being allowed as a carryforward to the succeeding year, it appears that a deduction for dividends should be permitted to generate (or be part of) an operating loss for the year that can be carried forward under the net-operating-loss carryforward rules.

VI. Conclusion

Policymakers and tax scholars have advanced a number of business tax reform proposals over the years. And many of them have considerable merit. But a business tax reform proposal must garner the support of both the business community and policymakers to have a realistic chance of enactment. This is where many, if not almost all, of the various business tax reform proposals fall short. Corporate integration, achieved through a partial dividends-paid deduction, can, however, obtain the backing of both the business community and policymakers.

Policymakers look intently at the JCT analysis of any business tax reform proposal. There are generally three critical JCT documents to any proposal: the revenue estimate, the distribution estimate, and the macroeconomic analysis. A negative result from any of these three documents can lead a policymaker to oppose a proposal. But the documents are really just a first step. Policymakers also look to whether the proposal addresses a number of critical issues facing the tax system. For example, does the proposal address the competitiveness of U.S. companies? Does the proposal prevent erosion of the U.S. tax base? In addition, the proposal must survive scrutiny from the various interest groups, such as the retirement-plan community or small businesses. If it can clear all of these hurdles, it has a chance of enactment although, admittedly, any business tax reform proposal will have difficulty gaining bipartisan support in the current highly partisan environment.

    Author