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November 08, 2023 Feature

Planning for the Plan: Oregon’s Statewide Goal 2

Edward J. Sullivan

This article is dedicated to the life and work of Professor Daniel Mandelker, Il Miglior Fabbro, who inspired the author and so many others to leave the planet better than we found it. Like Professor Mandelker’s academic writings, this paper focuses on the role of comprehensive planning in land-use regulation.

I. Introduction

Among the states, the role of the comprehensive plan as a prerequisite and criterion for land-use regulation is much debated, and the approaches taken by various states are diverse.1 This article explores the approach taken by the State of Oregon to establish the local comprehensive plan as the basis for land-use regulations and actions and advances that approach as model for other states, given its success. As will be seen, that approach began with a state system that had already accepted the primacy of comprehensive planning and that went on to specify the nature of the comprehensive plan and the process to formulate, review, and update that document. The article begins with a summary of that history, including the significant influence of planning pioneer F. Stuart Chapin Jr. The article then discusses the specifics of Oregon Statewide Planning Goal 2 in the evolution of the state’s planning and regulatory processes.

A. Planning in Oregon Between 1919 and 1969

Like most states, Oregon adopted enabling legislation similar to the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 1926, which enabled local governments to zone “in accordance with a comprehensive plan” without further state supervision and which allowed disputes to be taken up in the lower courts.2 However, when it first authorized planning and zoning for cities in 1919, the Oregon Legislature used language similar to that enacted by the New York Legislature for New York City.3 The relationship between city planning and zoning was not considered by Oregon’s appellate courts until 1975 in Baker v. City of Milwaukie, when the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that a city’s adopted plan limited its discretion under its zoning regulations.4 Oregon counties were authorized to plan and zone in 1947, though the planning element was then known as a “development pattern.”5 In 1963, the legislature substituted the words “comprehensive plan” for “development pattern,” making the plan an explicit requirement for land-use regulations.6

B. Planning in Oregon Since 1969

In 1969, the Oregon Legislature departed from the model established by the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act. The state legislature enacted SB 10, requiring all local governments to plan and zone all non-federal lands by December 31, 1971.7 The voters approved the legislation in a referendum, but there was neither time nor funding to reach that objective.

With the adoption of the landmark SB 100 in 1973, the comprehensive plan became the foundation for the Oregon planning system. That legislation required the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) to adopt binding statewide planning goals to be implemented at the local level through comprehensive plans, which themselves were to be binding on land-use regulations and actions by public entities and private persons (except for the federal government).8 The local comprehensive plan became an “impermanent constitution” for development—changeable (with some effort) but binding.9

Supplementing local government enabling legislation, LCDC moved to provide more detail and certainty in the adoption, application, and review of comprehensive plans through the enactment of Statewide Planning Goal 2: Land Use Planning, which sets out as its purpose “[t]o establish a land use planning process and policy framework as a basis for all decision and actions related to use of land and to assure an adequate factual base for such decisions and actions.”10

Central to the Oregon planning system is the requirement for an “adequate factual base” that provides the foundation on which policy choices may be made. Thus, choices to preserve resource lands for farm or forest uses outside urban growth boundaries are made primarily based on soil classifications,11 and adoption of or changes to urban growth boundaries are made based on population projections and land needs,12 rather than unsupported wishes.13

The goal consists of three parts: Planning Requirements, Exceptions, and Use of Guidelines as the pillars of Oregon planning.14 Each of these elements is examined below.

II. Goal 2, Part I—Planning Requirements

Academics do not always agree on the essential elements of an ideal comprehensive plan and planning process.15 The same may be said of regulators.16 Of particular note is the work of F. Stuart Chapin, Jr. and the various editions of his book, Urban Land Use Planning,17 which advances “rational planning,” a methodology that moves away from an intuitive approach to planning and makes use of experts in the physical and social sciences to formulate a comprehensive plan that reflects the integrated input of these fields. This article suggests that certain critical elements of the planning portion of Goal 2 were derived from the second edition of Chapin’s book, published in 1965.18 However, the use of the “rational planning” methodology in the formulation of Goal 2 in 1974 has been criticized for its reliance on top-down expertise and lack of public participation.19

The Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD), the staff for the state’s planning agency, describes the state’s approach to comprehensive planning as follows:

Goal 2 requires each local government in Oregon to have and follow a comprehensive land use plan and implementing regulations. Cities and counties must build their comprehensive plans on a factual base, and follow their plan when making decisions on appropriate zoning. City and county plans must be consistent with one another. Special district and state agency plans and programs must be coordinated with comprehensive plans.

Comprehensive plans must comply with the requirements of each applicable statewide planning goal. The Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) reviewed each city and county comprehensive plan for compliance with the goals, and when LCDC found that the plan, as a whole, was consistent with the goals, the commission “acknowledged,” or approved, the plan. Once a plan is acknowledged, it replaces the statewide planning goals for the purposes of local land use decision-making.

Except for federal and tribal lands, every inch of Oregon is planned and zoned. The comprehensive plan and zoning ordinances are the guiding documents for local government land use decisions. They help create predictable outcomes for the people that live and operate businesses in the community for development of homes, stores, and industries. Comprehensive plans also guide public development—streets, municipal water, sewer, and parks—and conservation of natural resources. . . 20 [?]

Goal 2, alongside other Oregon laws, provides the process for and elements of comprehensive planning. Part I of the goal, viewed against an established legal background that reflects a preexisting state recognition of the value of planning and its primacy over regulatory activity, demonstrates continuing support for planning, as shown below.

1. The obligation to plan

SB 100 built upon the accepted consensus that planning was necessary, whether the plan be termed “well considered” or “comprehensive.” With the passage of SB 100, the obligation to plan (and to do so consistent with statewide planning goals) was established as state policy.21 Cities and counties adopted plans and land use regulations that bound private persons and non-federal public agencies but that were required to include the statewide goals in such plans, thereby carrying out state policies.22

2. Establishment of a uniform process for comprehensive planning

Goal 2 provides for a detailed comprehensive planning process,23 including the following requirements:

a. Identification of issues and problems

While this requirement is discussed in academic literature,24 no cases have addressed it,25 presumably because participants in the planning process raise, and local governments demonstrably consider, significant outstanding issues for discussion and resolution as part of the planning process.

b. Inventories and other factual information for each applicable statewide planning goal

Goal 2 requires local governments to conduct land inventories as a basis for the policies and decisions set forth in the plan but only with regard to those statewide land use goals specifically requiring them, such as those concerning housing, economic development, natural hazards, open spaces, wetlands, and the like.26 Reviewing authorities often defer to the judgment of local governments in the conduct of necessary inventories.27 However, required inventories must be adopted as part of the local comprehensive plan or as a supporting document for that plan.28 If a land-use action involves a change to an inventory that is acknowledged to comply with a goal, then the local government must address the displacement of any inventoried site.29 On the other hand, if new information on an as-yet-not-inventoried Statewide Planning Goal 5 (Natural Resources, Scenic and Historic Areas, and Open Spaces) resource site becomes available, the local government need not amend its inventories until a later date.30 The goals contemplate a stable planning process based on incremental change, which does not require a local government to make “continuous data correction” in its inventories with every plan amendment.31

c. Evaluation of alternative courses of action and ultimate policy choices, taking into consideration social, economic, energy, and environmental needs

Controversies around the application of this requirement typically concern the adequacy of the evaluation of alternatives and policy choices included in the plan or supporting documents.32 The separate elements of this requirement are usually combined in the comparatively few cases that interpret them beyond the bare acknowledgment that alternatives must be considered and choices must be made.33 Several key cases stand out.

A decision by the Oregon Court of Appeals, Nicita v. City of Oregon City, sheds light on the evaluation requirement.34 There, the petitioners contended, inter alia, that the city had failed to include an evaluation of alternative courses of action and ultimate policy choices in the adoption of a stormwater management plan.35 However, the Court read Goal 2’s requirements narrowly, concluding that they apply only to those statewide planning goals that contain equivalent requirements and that Statewide Planning Goal 6 (Air, Water, and Land Resource Quality) did not.36 Speaking specifically to the Goal 2 challenge, the Court explained:

Goal 2 has two main functions: to establish a process and policy framework for decisions and to assure an adequate factual base for those decisions. “[A]n ‘adequate factual base’ is synonymous with the requirement that a decision be supported by substantial evidence.” . . . In elaborating on those objectives, Goal 2, Part I, provides in part that “[a]ll land use plans shall include identification of issues and problems, inventories and other factual information for each applicable statewide planning goal, evaluation of alternative courses of action and ultimate policy choices, taking into consideration social, economic, energy and environmental needs.” That sentence directly relates to the objective of having an “adequate factual base” for decisions.37

In Neuharth v. City of Salem, the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA)38 rejected a challenge to a plan amendment and zone change to accommodate a multi-family development under the “alternative courses of action” element, finding that Goal 2 does not require independent review of specific alternative sites but merely an explanation of why the city chose the subject site over others, which the city in that case provided in its findings.39

In Tipperman v. Union County, the petitioners challenged the county’s future population projections and allocations, which would have formed the basis for the growth of the cities and unincorporated areas within the county.40 The petitioners contended, inter alia, that the county did not evaluate alternative population scenarios under Goal 2 in making the allocations.41 In rejecting the challenge, LUBA distinguished an older case, Gruber v. Lincoln County, which had sustained a challenge on the same ground.42 Gruber involved a county’s choice to plan and zone the rural Olalla Valley to allow for dispersed residential uses on five-acre lots without justifying that choice.43 The Tipperman decision found Gruber of “little assistance” to the petitioners, as the county’s decision and findings in this case were “more than sufficient” to satisfy Goal 2’s “alternative courses of action” requirement.44

LUBA also rejected a Goal 2 challenge on this ground in Columbia Pacific Building Trades Council v. City of Portland.45 That case arose out of a city’s adoption of an ordinance that prohibited new fossil fuel terminals and limited expansion of existing terminals.46 Petitioners claimed, inter alia, that the city had not properly evaluated alternative courses of action under Goal 2.47 LUBA rejected the contention, pointing to the extensive evaluative findings in the record that considered alternatives.48

d. Required information shall be contained in the plan document or in supporting documents, and the plans, supporting documents, and implementation ordinances shall be filed in a public office or other place easily accessible to the public

The first portion of this requirement calls for justification of policy choices with identifiable factual information, while the remaining portion deals with public access to that information. In light of the requirement for an adequate factual base, discussed above, and Oregon’s public records statutes,49 these provisions are relatively uncontroversial, and there has been little litigation on them.50

e. Implementing measures that are consistent with and adequate to carry out plans

As LUBA has noted, “implementation measures” are frequently land-use regulations,51 and it is important to understand the subordinate nature of those measures to the plan.52 Land-use regulations and actions cannot contradict the plan,53 which is a “floor” for subsequent land-use regulations and actions but is not a “ceiling” for those that do not directly contradict the plan.54

f. Each plan and related implementation measure shall be coordinated with the plans of affected governmental units

One of the most demanding features of the Oregon land use system is its insistence on public agency coordination, which is a feature of Goal 2,55 as well as state law.56 From the early days of the system, the state has required notice to, an exchange of information with, and consideration of the concerns of other public agencies (though not necessarily accession to all requests).57

In Rajneesh Travel Corp. v. Wasco County, a rural fire protection district was not given an opportunity to review or make comments on a pending comprehensive-plan amendments that affected it.58 With respect to the statutory and goal requirements for coordination, LUBA said:

We read [these requirements] to place the burden of coordination on the county. To carry out this obligation, the county must at least take steps to invite an exchange of information between the governmental bodies. The record does not show the county made any effort to elicit the views of the district or to engage it in a dialogue about how the proposed amendments might affect the district. . . . [T]he burden on the county to coordinate its plan requires more than a passive reception of comments. . . . If the district had been invited to comment on the proposed amendments, and did so, its input may or may not have been accommodated in the county’s plan amendment. Without the district’s comments, however, the county was not able to balance the needs of the district with other considerations of the county, i.e., to accommodate the needs of all levels of governments, agencies, and citizens.59

State agencies have been largely successful in insisting on such coordination.60 Metro, the planning agency for the Portland region, has been relatively unsuccessful in satisfying the coordination requirement, particularly with respect to regional urban growth boundary changes.61

The coordination requirement has also provided a basis for challenges of a public agency action by other public agencies. Cities have made use of this requirement to challenge actions of counties and regional planning agencies.62 Special districts have also raised the coordination requirement to further their interests, although not always successfully.63 And, in one case, a citizen successfully challenged the actions of a special district that violated this requirement.64

Coordination is mainly procedural, normally requiring little more than notice and active engagement in a discussion of concerns of other public agencies.65 However, that requirement has proved elusive in some cases where the outreach is inadequate66 or an agency is unresponsive.67

g. All land-use plans and implementing ordinances shall be adopted by the governing body after public hearing

This requirement is relatively uncontroversial, as cities, counties, and the regional planning agency, Metro, must already comply under other state law.68

h. All land-use plans and implementation ordinances shall be reviewed and, as needed, revised on a periodic schedule contained in the plan

There are no cases interpreting this requirement, probably because the Oregon legislature has provided, albeit ineffectively, for periodic review of plans and land use regulations and of housing needs for larger urban areas by statute.69

i. Opportunity shall be provided for review and comment by citizens and affected governmental units during preparation, review, and revision of plans and implementation ordinances

This requirement is infrequently controversial. In Manning v. LCDC, the Oregon Court of Appeals, citing this requirement, held that LCDC erred in remanding a periodic review work task to Marion County without allowing landowner to comment during the remand process.70

3. Relationship of the statewide planning goals with other policy objectives

The statewide planning goals are not the only consideration in public agency decisions affecting land use. LUBA and Oregon’s appellate courts have been careful to limit application of the goals to matters that relate to land use, as opposed to, for example, fiscal policy or where state law takes a policy direction at odds with the goals. In State Housing Council v. City of Lake Oswego, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed an LCDC final order dismissing a challenge to the city’s establishment of systems development charges on the grounds that they conflicted with the city’s obligations to accommodate housing under Statewide Planning Goal 10 (Housing), due to their cost impacts.71 The Court rejected that view:

We simply cannot imagine that the legislature intended that all local taxation, budget and fiscal policy had to comply with the statewide planning goals. A county might decide that it will or will not expend money to pave graveled roads. A city might adopt either a very modest or very grandiose budget for acquisition of park land and construction of parks. A city might set sewer and water rates relatively high or relatively low. A school district might adopt a bare-bones budget, or it might decide to build heated swimming pools and indoor tennis courts at all the schools. All of these decisions would affect land use interests like transportation, recreation and the efficient provision of public services. All of these decisions could result in higher or lower fees and taxes, thereby increasing or decreasing the cost of housing. Yet if the legislature contemplated that all of these decisions are exercises of land use planning responsibility that must comply with the goals, there is little or no local government action that is not land use planning.72

However, the inclusion of taxation, budgetary, or fiscal policy matters in a challenged decision does not thereby exempt that decision from review by LUBA if the matter meets the statutory definitions of a “land use decision” or “limited land use decision” or if it has “significant impacts” on land use.73

Conflicts between the goals and other statutory policies played a role in Springer v. LCDC, in which LCDC certified state agency rules and procedures that the petitioners contended were inconsistent with the statewide planning goals.74 LCDC relied on advice from the Attorney General that those rules and procedures were the product of separate legislative action and thereby were not required to be consistent with the goals under the State Housing Council case.75 The Oregon Court of Appeals dryly noted its opinion in the State Housing Council case that “[a]fter detailing the anomalies—or havoc—that any effort to coordinate the two schemes could entail, we stated that ‘the legislature created LCDC to be part of the state government, not to be the state government. . . .’”76

Two cases stemming from various actions taken by the City of Springfield to establish a public facilities plan and apply its provisions in the local comprehensive plan are illustrative of the dichotomy between land-use decisions subject to the goals and those areas carved out from what would otherwise be a land-use decision, if not for statutory exemption. In Home Builders Ass’n v. City of Springfield, the city’s adoption of a public facilities plan, a long-range facility planning document and project list with a methodology for financing these public works projects, was exempted from LUBA’s jurisdiction, as it was declared by statute not to be a “land use decision.”77 The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld LUBA’s dismissal of that case.78 But, in a parallel case involving the same parties, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court dismissal of a challenge to the city’s methodology to determine service needs and project financing on the merits.79

III. Goal 2, Part II—Exceptions

Much, perhaps too much, of the political and legal focus on Goal 2 over the years has been on the exceptions process, which allows for departures from the requirements of a statewide goal that otherwise must be applied.80 There are three types of exceptions.

The first two types of exceptions are increasingly rare and typically apply to lands that were physically developed for or committed to a use not permitted by the goals when the goals first took effect in the mid-1970s.81 The standard for physical development is “demanding.” 82 The cases involving lands that are committed but not developed tend to be older.83 These exceptions are akin to the concepts of “nonconforming use” and “vested rights,” and the cases often deal with the minutia of the nature and extent of the claim against fairly strict standards.84

Most extensively used and most controversial, the third type of exception requires that “[r]easons justify why the state policy embodied in the applicable goals should not apply.”85 The reasons exception is the most demanding of the three types, closely hedged about with a set of complex, interpretive rules and a large body of case law, which has been left largely undisturbed even by legislative changes that have eased Goal 2’s original (1974) requirement that “compelling reasons and facts” demonstrate that it is “not possible to apply” one or more goals.86 This type of exception is not directly based on recognized planning instruments but rather acts like a political and social safety valve to deal with special cases. The 1983 Legislature replaced the 1974 goal language with the following statutory requirements for “reasons exceptions”:

(a) Reasons justify why the state policy embodied in the applicable goals should not apply;

(b) Areas that do not require a new exception cannot reasonably accommodate the use;

(c) The long term environmental, economic, social and energy consequences resulting from the use at the proposed site with measures designed to reduce adverse impacts are not significantly more adverse than would typically result from the same proposal being located in areas requiring a goal exception other than the proposed site; and

(d) The proposed uses are compatible with other adjacent uses or will be so rendered through measures designed to reduce adverse impacts.87

The cases often result in a remand of a local decision, given the exacting standards to be applied, and may involve a residential subdivision adjacent to a rural golf course,88 a claim based on rural market demand,89 a “wine hotel” outside an urban growth boundary,90 a liquid natural gas terminal and associated facilities,91 the use conditions imposed in granting an exception for a rural truck stop,92 and a solar power generation facility.93 However, taking a goal exception is not an impossible task.94 For some, the relative scarcity of exceptions allowed over the decades serves the double purpose of reenforcing existing state policies embodied in the goals and providing a means by which necessary uses that do not meet the goals may be allowed.95 For others, that same scarcity exposes the Goal 2 exceptions process as window dressing used more to signal than to enable flexibility in the application of state land-use policy.96

IV. Goal 2, Part III—Guidelines

As DLCD explains, “Most goals are accompanied by guidelines, which are suggestions about how a goal may be applied. As noted in Goal 2, guidelines are not mandatory.”97 The text of Goal 2, Part III, referring to the guidelines, makes their use clear:

Governmental units shall review the guidelines set forth for the goals and either utilize the guidelines or develop alternative means that will achieve the goals. All land-use plans shall state how the guidelines or alternative means utilized achieve the goals.

Guidelines [] are suggested directions that would aid local governments in activating the mandated goals. They are intended to be instructive, directional and positive, not limiting local government to a single course of action when some other course would achieve the same result. Above all, guidelines are not intended to be a grant of power to the state to carry out zoning from the state level under the guise of guidelines. (Guidelines or the alternative means selected by governmental bodies will be part of the Land Conservation and Development Commission’s process of evaluating plans for compliance with goals.)

The Oregon Court of Appeals most recently reaffirmed the subordinate and non-binding nature of the guidelines in Nicita v. City of Oregon City.98 Goal 2, Guideline C, is titled “Plan Content,” and it has two sections titled “Factual Basis for the Plan” and “Elements of the Plan.” One of the elements that the guideline recommends including in the plan is “[a]pplicable statewide planning goals.” Faced with an argument that the city did not include the text of Goal 6 in its plan, the Court found no goal violation:

As a starting point, nothing in the text of Goal 2, Part III or the guideline for plan content requires that the full text of a goal be restated in a plan or amended plan. Rather, the governmental unit is directed to state how it used the guidelines to achieve the goal or alternative means to achieve the goal. LUBA concluded that the city did that by referencing the mandatory design standards, which in turn also reference applicable municipal code provisions. . . .99

Guidelines play the role of suggesting ways for local governments to demonstrate compliance with state land use goals, but they do not offer any guarantees or “safe harbors” guaranteeing approval if followed.100

V. Conclusion

Goal 2 is essentially a plan for planning. It carries out the statutory direction requiring local governments to undertake comprehensive plans that bind land-use regulations and actions, state and local public agencies, and private landowners. The goal does so in a specific, uniform manner that requires an adequate factual base, choices among competing alternatives, and coordination between local governments, public agencies, and utilities. Those plans must be accessible to the public and reviewed periodically to assure that policies embodied in the statewide planning goals are met, as well as a process for deviating from those policies in appropriate cases. In practice, the goal has had some shortcomings, particularly in not assuring general planning coordination among public agencies,101 in coordinating regional urban growth boundary changes,102 and, most tellingly, in the failure of periodic review.103 Regardless, Goal 2 has been useful in establishing a generally agreed-upon state planning process.

Along with the public participation and the urban growth boundary process goals104 and the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals,105 Goal 2 is Oregon’s most significant contribution to planning theory and law, providing policy direction, recognizing that unique circumstances may require deviation and providing that flexibility within limits. In one sense, Goal 2 mirrors the nature of good planning in that it envisages a system based on fact, on alternatives, on public participation, and on review and revision to develop a rational planning product. Professor Chapin would be proud.


1. From 1991 to 2017, the author (sometimes with others) prepared annual reports to the American Bar Association’s State & Local Government Law Section on the status of the comprehensive plan vis-à-vis land use regulations and actions. The author found three consistent and opposing views on the subject: (1) that the plan was relatively unimportant in light of zoning regulations; (2) that the plan had some weight in determining the validity of land-use regulations and actions; and (3) that the plan was an “impermanent constitution” and a decisive criterion for testing the validity of land-use regulations and actions. See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan & Jennifer M. Bragar, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning Law, 49 Urb. Law. 521 (2017); Edward J. Sullivan & Jennifer M. Bragar, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning, 48 Urb. Law. 615 (2016); Edward J. Sullivan & Jennifer M. Bragar, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning, 47 Urb. Law. 457 (2015). It is safe to say that there is no consensus on the role of the comprehensive plan in American land use law and that there is no consensus on the elements of a plan.

2. See U.S. Dep’t of Com., A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (rev. ed. 1926), This model act was prepared by a “blue ribbon committee” appointed by Herbert Hoover, then U.S. Secretary of Commerce, to provide a means to allow local governments to undertake land-use regulation. Section 7 of the model act provides for a writ of certiorari to challenge quasi-judicial permit decisions of the Board of Adjustment, but it is silent as to zone changes and other local government activities related to land use.

3. See Act of April 20, 1914, ch. 470, § 1, 1914 N.Y. Laws 1943, 1943–44 (adding sections 242-a and 242-b to the Greater New York Charter); Herman Weisman, Zoning Administration in New York City, 2 St. John’s L. Rev. 105, 108–13 (1928). The Weisman article, in its original form, was presented at a seminar on administrative law conducted by Professor Felix Frankfurter at Harvard Law School in the 1926–27 academic year. The enabling legislation instructed the New York City governing body, in formulating its land–use regulations, to give reasonable consideration, inter alia, to “the character of the district, its peculiar suitability for particular uses, the conservation of property values, and the direction of building development in accord with a well considered plan.” This language is substantially the same as that found in Oregon’s initial state enabling legislation for cities. Act of Mar. 4, 1919, ch. 300, § 2, 1919 Or. Laws 539, 539. Unfortunately, New York case law does not require a plan that is separate from the zoning regulations, despite warnings from early planning pioneers that planning and zoning were different exercises. See John R. Nolon, Comprehensive Land Use Planning: Learning How and Where to Grow, 13 Pace L. Rev. 351 (1993),

4. 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded:

[A] comprehensive plan is the controlling land use planning instrument for a city. Upon passage of a comprehensive plan a city assumes a responsibility to effectuate that plan and conform prior conflicting zoning ordinances to it. We further hold that the zoning decisions of a city must be in accord with that plan and a zoning ordinance which allows a more intensive use than that prescribed in the plan must fail.

Id. at 779.

5. Act of Apr. 19, 1947, ch. 537, §§ 3–4, 1947 Or. Laws 948, 949–50. The enabling legislation also provided, inter alia:

The [planning] commission may, for the benefit and welfare of the county, prepare and submit to the governing body of the county drafts of ordinances for the purpose of carrying out the development pattern, . . . including zoning or land use regulations, . . . and the governing body hereby is authorized to adopt such ordinances.

Id. § 6, 1947 Or. Laws at 950.

6. Act of June 24, 1963, ch. 619, §§ 3, 7, 1963 Or. Laws 1295, 1297, 1299 (codified as amended at Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 215.050, .110). Aside from the wording change, the subordinate nature of zoning and other land-use regulations to the comprehensive plan continued.

7. S.B. 10, 1969 Or. Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1969), 1969 Or. Laws, 324; see also Sy Adler, Senate Bill 10, Or. Encyc., (Apr. 15, 2022).

8. Act of May 29, 1973, ch. 80, 1973 Or. Laws 127 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Or. Rev. Stat. ch. 197). Space does not allow the history and details of the Oregon planning system to be set forth here; however, see Edward J. Sullivan, The Quiet Revolution Goes West: The Oregon Planning Program 1961–2011, 45 J. Marshall L. Rev. 357, 365–67 (2012).

9. See Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 L. & Contemp. Probs. 353 (1955).

10. Or. Admin. R. 660-015-0000(2); Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., Goal 2: Land Use Planning, (last visited Nov. 20, 2022).

11. Or. Admin. R.660-015-0000(3); Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., Goal 3: Agricultural Lands, (last visited Nov. 20, 2022); Or. Admin. R.660-015-0000(4); Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., Goal 4: Forest Lands, (last visited Nov. 20, 2022).

12. Or. Admin. R. 660-015-0000(14); Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., Goal 14: Urbanization, (last visited Nov. 20, 2022).

13. However, legal necessity may overcome the need for an adequate factual base on occasion. See Cent. Or. Landwatch v. Deschutes County, LUBA No. 2020-019, 2021 WL 1535669 at *17–20 (Mar. 22, 2021), demonstrating that the legal requirements of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000) may overcome state land use requirements, including those choices based solely on state planning policy.

14. The goal applies not only to the initial acknowledgment of a local plan or land use regulation but also to any amendment of the same. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.240–.250 and 197.610–.625.

15. See, e.g., Elements of a Comprehensive Plan, Cmty. Plan. & Zoning (July 25, 2019),; Eric Damian Kelly, Community Planning: An Introduction to the Comprehensive Plan ch. 3 (2d ed. 2009); Michael Chandler, Ten Steps in Preparing a Comprehensive Plan, Plan. Comm’rs J., Summer 2000, at 9,; The Comprehensive Planning Process, Complete Cmtys. Toolbox, (last visited Oct. 28, 2022).

16. See, e.g., Washington’s statutory provisions for the mandatory elements of a comprehensive plan, Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.070; California’s required elements, Cal. Gov’t Code § 65302; the optional elements for “smart planning” in Iowa, Iowa Code § 18B.2; and the required and optional elements of a plan in Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 163.3177.

17. See Edward J. Kaiser, David R. Godschalk & F. Stuart Chapin, Jr., Urban Land Use Planning 38 fig.2.1 (4th ed. 1995) (detailing the “rational planning” methodology). Chapin was recognized professionally for his role in developing the theory of the “rational plan,” which integrated the social sciences into planning. See Ctr. for Urb. & Reg’l Stud., Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, The First 50 Years (2008),; David R. Godschalk, ACSP Distinguished Educator, 1986: F. Stuart Chapin Jr., 36 J. Plan. Educ. & Rsch. 119 (2016). Chapin’s papers on planning can be found in an open-access collection online. F. Stuart Chapin,, (last visited Oct. 28, 2022). The various editions of Urban Land Use Planning became the “bible” of the “rational plan” movement, which attempted to bring in the expertise of scientific disciplines to land use planning and revolutionized planning practice:

By the 1950s, these largely intuitive methods had evolved into a standard land use planning approach codified in F. Stuart Chapin’s Urban Land Use Planning (Chapin, 1957) and T.J. Kent’s The Urban General Plan (Kent, 1964). This model defined planning as the preparation of a formal document laying out a long-term, comprehensive, and general vision for a community’s future physical development, including public and private uses of land and related public facilities. These plans included a summary of existing and emerging conditions and needs, a statement of planning goals, a 20- or 30-year development plan expressed in map form, and policies for implementing the plan. This conception of planning continues to dominate planning education and practice, as reflected in the fifth edition of Chapin’s text (Berke et al., 2006).

Richard E. Klosterman, Urban Planning: Methods and Technologies, in 24 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 889, 889 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015). Philip R. Berke, a co-author of the fifth edition of Urban Land Use Planning, published in 2006, made the following observations, which appear on the back cover of the fourth edition: “Comprehensive, theoretical and policy driven. A superb source for anyone faced with problems associated with land planning. The definitive book that takes the larger view of community growth, land use and environmental quality. Every planning student and agency should have a well-thumbed copy.” Chapin’s work was declared to be among the hundred most essential planning books of all time. Am. Plan. Ass’n & Ass’n of Coll. & Rsch. Librs., The 100 Essential Books of Planning 3, (last visited Oct. 28, 2022); see also Yuniarti Ulfa, Urban Land Use Planning (Part I), Medium (Oct. 1, 2019),

18. While the 1965 second edition of Urban Land Use Planning does not use the term “rational planning,” it uses that methodology, which is detailed in the fourth edition of the work at p. 38, Figure 2.1. Chapin’s book includes many tools that found their way into Goal 2: inventories to provide an adequate factual base for planning, the concept of coordination, consideration of alternatives, and a process for making ultimate policy choices.

19. See Michael Elliott, History and Theories of Planning: Why Do We Do What We Do? (2017),; Rational Planning Model, Plan. Tank (Aug. 25, 2020), One source of objections to establishment planning and its endorsement of the “rational planning” model was Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), a trenchant criticism of the use of experts, especially by her nemesis, Robert Moses, who held various public positions and greatly influenced public works. See also Lars Kristian Stramrud, Rational Planning and Advocacy Planning: A Comparative Essay (Dec. 15, 2017) (Norwegian Univ. of Life Sciences),; Scott V. Peters, Critique and Alternative to the Rational Planning Model in Planning and Policy Analysis (1991) (Thesis, University of Illinois at Chicago); Rational Comprehensive Theory of Planning, Blogspot: The Env’t (Nov. 13, 2012),; Rational Planning, GeoLearning, (last visited Oct. 28, 2022); Ivis Garcia, Lecture 2 Clip 2 - Criticism of the Rational Planning Model, YouTube (Sept. 4, 2020),; Richard E. Klosterman, Planning Theory Education: A Thirty-Year Review, 31 J. Plan. Educ. & Rsch. 319 (2011) (surveying the rise and waning of the “rational planning” model in planning education).

Chapin’s work, though still influential, has largely been superseded in the planning community by Charles J. Hoch, Linda C. Dalton & Frank S. So, The Practice of Local Government Planning (3d ed. 2000), the “green book” of the International City/County Management Association, which takes into fuller account the political aspects of planning and is less driven by top-down expertise and “right answers,” less auto-oriented, and more oriented to public participation and coordination among public and private parties. The 1968 version of that work was used by James B. Knight, a longtime Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD) employee, and is found in his extensive archive, donated to Portland State University and housed in its Special Collections, hereinafter referred to as the “Knight Collection.” While the “green book” was in circulation in 1974, it does not use the methodology found in the second edition of Chapin’s book or in Goal 2 itself.

In Oregon, criticism of lack of public participation is less pertinent, as LCDC also adopted Goal 1: Citizen Participation, Or. Admin. R. 660-015-000(1); Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., Goal 1: Citizen Participation, (last visited Nov. 20, 2022), which mitigates the impact of a top-down planning practice. Even though Goal 1 is fairly weak, it does represent an accepted state aspiration. See Edward J. Sullivan, Public Participation: Planning’s Conundrum, 43 Zoning & Plan. L. Rep. No. 4 (2020). Policy advocates sometimes decry the failure of public agencies to follow “the will of the people” in adopting local policies or acting on particular permits that concern the goals. Striking a balance between public participation and good planning may be difficult, as Professor Sy Adler points out in recounting a clash between LCDC and Multnomah County over the minimum lot size for agricultural lands; LCDC found that a twenty-acre minimum lot size established by the county was insufficient to meet a statewide planning goal to preserve agricultural lands outside urban growth boundaries. LCDC determined that a twenty-acre minimum lot size could only be accomplished through the exceptions process. Correspondence from Professor Sy Adler, Interim Dean and Professor of Urban Studies and Planning, Portland State Univ. (Oct. 25, 2022) (on file with author). The point is that the public must be consulted and able to participate in planning matters but that even overwhelming opposition to policies embodied in the goals cannot be overcome by local opposition.

20. Goal 2: Land Use Planning, Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., (last visited Oct. 28, 2022). Omitted from this description is the “exceptions process,” which is dealt with below.

21. The state policy for planning is as follows:

In order to ensure the highest possible level of livability in Oregon, it is necessary to provide for properly prepared and coordinated comprehensive plans for cities and counties, regional areas and the state as a whole. These comprehensive plans:

(a) Must be adopted by the appropriate governing body at the local and state levels;

(b) Are expressions of public policy in the form of policy statements, generalized maps and standards and guidelines;

(c) Shall be the basis for more specific rules and land use regulations which implement the policies expressed through the comprehensive plans;

(d) Shall be prepared to assure that all public actions are consistent and coordinated with the policies expressed through the comprehensive plans; and

(e) Shall be regularly reviewed and, if necessary, amended to keep them consistent with the changing needs and desires of the public they are designed to serve.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.010(1). Moreover, cities and counties are required to “[p]repare, adopt, amend and revise comprehensive plans in compliance with goals approved by the commission,” and LCDC is required to issue enforcement orders, inter alia, to require local governments to adopt plans and regulations and take actions to meet the goals. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.175(2)(a), .319–.335. In the Oregon model, the statewide planning goals perform state policy functions and are applicable to both urban and rural uses. By contrast, the Chapin text does not anticipate a state planning mandate or mandatory zoning-planning consistency—a position generally taken by state and local governments at the time—and, instead, focuses on urban planning goals or objectives previously established by the city. Kaiser, Godschalk & Chapin, supra note 17, at 355–59.Chapin’s land use plan is centered on the use of land development and transportation models. Id. at 457–59.

22. See also Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.013.

23. Following adoption of Goal 2, DLCD interpreted the Goal 2 components in a fairly precise manner when reviewing local government plans. Memorandum from James B. Knight, Principle [sic] Goal Components to Be Addressed in Acknowledgment of Compliance Reviews 1–2 (Nov. 18, 1976) (on file with author).

24. The Chapin text recommends a statement of objectives and an assessment of existing conditions and future needs as a beginning point. Kaiser, Godschalk & Chapin, supra note 17, at 359–61. It also suggests three levels of policy review. The first level involves exploratory studies based on population and economic outlooks and results in alternative planning proposals. Those proposals are further examined in a second-level policy review in which detailed studies with economic projections and population forecasts are applied, resulting in preliminary “sketch plans” with alternative plan scenarios for a twenty-five-year period. The third level evaluates those sketch plans through basic surveys, evaluating these alternatives with respect to their land development and transportations models. The result of these evaluations would be the final product—a General Land Use and Transportation Plan. Id. at 361–63, 458–70. Chapin suggests that the general sequence of his proposed planning system “roughly corresponds to the sequence in the chain of land development decisions as they occur in the real world.” Id. at 459 n.2.

25. Since 1973, appellate land use decisions have been generated by two agencies, initially the LCDC and, since 1980, the Land Use Board of Appeals and two courts, the Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court. These decisions have varying degrees of authority, with the Supreme Court’s relatively rare opinions at the top, and all are subject to increasingly frequent changes in state land-use legislation. The paucity of case law is presumably due to the fact that Oregon statutes and case law concerning notice, evidentiary records, findings, standing, and appeals in land-use proceedings of all kinds effectively assure that all participants raise, and that local governments demonstrably consider, significant outstanding issues for discussion and resolution as part of the planning process. Oregon has an administrative and a judicial system of review that applies to land-use matters. Most local and some state government decisions pertaining to land use go to the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), with further review by the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court, while others may be reviewed in the circuit (trial) courts with further appellate review. Sullivan, Quiet Revolution, supra note 8, at 371–72.

26. See Nicita v. City of Oregon City 507 P.3d 804 (Or. Ct. App. 2022), discussed further below. The current text of Oregon’s 19 Statewide Planning Goals can be found at

27. See Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland, 259 P.3d 1007, 1019–21 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (deferring to a city’s conclusion that property qualified for protection under Statewide Planning Goal 5 (Natural Resources, Scenic and Historic Areas, and Open Spaces) due to its riparian corridor values, even though it included non-native vegetation, rev’g on other grounds and remanding 62 Or. LUBA 403 (2011), aff’d, 290 P.3d 803 (Or. 2012). In Gunderson, there was an additional issue as to whether changes in an inventory for one goal (Goal 5) might affect the adequacy of an inventory for another goal (Statewide Planning Goal 9 (Economic Development)). LUBA and the Oregon Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the local government for resolution.

28. A local government may not rely on an unadopted inventory, even if it contains more recent information, to support its decision. See 1000 Friends of Oregon v. City of Dundee, 124 P.3d 1249, 1251–54 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Metro, 26 P.3d 151, 159–62 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); D.S. Parklane Dev., Inc. v. Metro, 994 P.2d 1205, 1217–18 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); Gunderson, 62 Or. LUBA at 413–20; Freedman v. City of Grants Pass, 57 Or. LUBA 385, 390 (2008); Lengkeek v. City of Tangent, 54 Or. LUBA 160, 165–67 (2007); Lengkeek v. City of Tangent, 52 Or. LUBA 509, 513–16 (2006); Lengkeek v. City of Tangent, 50 Or. LUBA 367, 375–80 (2005).

29. The leading case on this issue is Opus Development Corp. v. City of Eugene, which held, “Quasi-judicial changes to acknowledged comprehensive plans or land use regulations that reduce a local government’s supply of industrially designated land must be supported by findings demonstrating the remaining industrially designated land is adequate to satisfy the requirements of Goal 9.” 28 Or. LUBA 670, 691–94 (1995). Goal 9 requires that local governments provide “for at least an adequate supply of sites of suitable sizes, types, locations, and service levels for a variety of industrial and commercial uses consistent with plan policies.” The reclassification of sites to another category reduced the available inventory of industrial and commercial lands and allegedly violated the goal. LUBA remanded that action and did so again in Opus Development Corp. v. City of Eugene, 30 Or. LUBA 360 (1996), aff’d, 918 P.2d 116, 119 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); see also Home Builders Ass’n of Lane Cnty. v. City of Eugene, 41 Or. LUBA 370, 444–48 (2002); Volny v. City of Bend, 37 Or. LUBA 493, 508–11, aff’d, 4 P.3d 768 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); Fogarty v. City of Gresham, 34 Or. LUBA 309, 323–26 (1998). On the other hand, where findings are adequate to demonstrate that the changes will not have any impact on the city’s inventories, no goal violation occurs. See Land Watch of Lane Cnty. v. Lane County, 74 Or. LUBA 76, 81–85 (2016); Shamrock Homes LLC v. City of Springfield, 68 Or. LUBA 1, 15–16 (2013); McDougal Bros. Invs. v. City of Veneta, 59 Or. LUBA 207, 215–17 (2009); Grahn v. City of Newberg, 50 Or. LUBA 221, 221–24 (2005); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. City of Newberg, 49 Or. LUBA 626, 630–33 (2005); Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. City of Portland, 37 Or. LUBA 870, 878–82 (2000); W. Hills Dev. Co. v. Washington County, 37 Or. LUBA 46, 54–59 (1999); Marcott Holdings, Inc. v. City of Tigard, 30 Or. LUBA 101, 116–17 (1995).

30. The leading case for this proposition is Urquhart v. Lane Council of Governments, 721 P.2d 870, 872–73 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). In Urquhart, the petitioner argued that the respondents had an obligation to consider the merits of adding additional property to an acknowledged Goal 5 resource inventory. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that periodic review was the only thing that might have obliged the respondents to amend the inventory. In Johnson v. Jefferson County, the Oregon Court of Appeals noted that LCDC had codified the Urquhart holding in its administrative rules implementing Goal 5 at Or. Admin. R. 660-023-0250(3)(b). 189 P.3d 30 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). In many of the inventory cases that involved Goal 5, the rule resolved those matters. See also Mill Creek Glen Prot. Ass’n v. Umatilla County, 746 P.2d 728, 730 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); Cosner v. Umatilla County, 65 Or. LUBA 9, 23–27 (2012); Or. Nat. Res. Council v. City of Seaside, 29 Or. LUBA 39, 43–45 (1995). The Oregon Legislature dealt with Statewide Planning Goal 10 (Housing) inventories via legislation applicable only to larger cities. See GMK Devs., LLC v. City of Madras, 199 P.3d 882, 885 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). But Goal 9, which in part gave rise to the Opus case, may still require local government attention. See Gunderson, 259 P.3d 1007. An exception to the Urquhart rule arises “if a local government adopts a [post-acknowledgment plan amendment] with the purpose of achieving compliance with rules ‘promulgated [by LCDC] in relevant part after the county’s preexisting plan and ordinance provisions were acknowledged.’” Cent. Or. Landwatch v. Deschutes County, 457 P.3d 369, 372 (Or. Ct. App. 2020) (second alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Dep’t of Transp. v. Douglas County, 967 P.2d 901, 902 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)).

31. GMK Devs., 199 P.3d at 885. GMK Developments involved the adoption of the Madras Urbanization Report, which considered housing needs over twenty- and fifty-year periods, but did not make any changes to existing land allocations or expand the urban growth boundary, the instrument used in the Oregon planning process to contain urban growth and prevent sprawl. While larger cities were required to respond in one or both of those ways pursuant to section 197.296 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, that statute did not apply to Madras, and the court found no obligation for Madras to evaluate future land needs under Goals 2 and 10 (Housing). See also Carson Prop. Appeal, Inc. v. City of Corvallis, 81 Or. LUBA 175, 178–81 (2020) (allowing arguably outdated housing inventories to be used as more recent numbers not included in city plan); Hous. Land Advocs. v. City of Happy Valley, 75 Or. LUBA 227, 235 (2017) (allowing deferral of housing obligations in Portland Region).

32. The Chapin text deals extensively with the evaluation of alternatives in plan preparation. Kaiser, Godschalk & Chapin, supra note 17, at 356–63, 367–69, 458 fig.36, 459–67, 469–70, 475–87. Also note the discussion below on the accompanying requirement that “[t]he required information . . . be contained in the plan document or in supporting documents,” which is implicit in the Chapin model.

33. Some cases deal with whether the evaluation of alternatives and the making of choices must be done in the planning documents themselves. In Opus, the petitioners attempted to extend those requirements so that plans and land use ordinances would have had to make all policy choices upon enactment. 28 Or. LUBA at 685–86. LUBA concluded that plan policies and land use regulations may be ambiguous, subjective, complex, and discretionary unless LCDC’s administrative rules implementing the goals require that they be clear and objective. In Home Builders Ass’n of Lane County v. City of Eugene, LUBA rejected a similar challenge:

A Goal 2 requirement, to which petitioners assign particular significance, is the requirement that “ultimate policy choices” be included in the comprehensive plan. We note that Goal 2 does not dictate the manner in which a local government must make its ultimate policy choices or the form in which the city must express ultimate policy choices. . . . We see no reason why a local government’s ultimate policy choice regarding recreational needs could not just as easily take the form of mandatory and perhaps nonmandatory considerations by which the local government will make individual decisions about whether to acquire, approve or construct particular recreational and open space facilities and projects in the future.

52 Or. LUBA 341, 365–66 (2006); see also Nicita, supra note 26.

34. 507 P.3d 804, 812 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).

35. Id. at 810–11.

36. Id. at 811–12.The court found that the stormwater management plan did in fact “contain an expression of its ultimate water quality policies,” and the court affirmed LUBA’s conclusions that Goal 2 “does not impose obligations independent of other applicable statewide planning goals or criteria,” that “Goal 6 does not allow for alternative course of action,” and that “Goal 6 does not require the city to express ultimate policy choices with respect to water quality” because “[t]hose policy choices are made at the federal and state levels.” Id. at 810–12.

37. Id. at 811 (alterations in original) (quoting 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 259 P.3d 1021, 1038 n.11 (Or. Ct. App. 2011)). Interestingly, the “taking into consideration social, economic, energy and environmental needs” language has not played a role in the application of Goal 2.

38. LUBA is a state administrative agency that reviews most local, and some state, agency decisions pertaining to land use. See Edward J. Sullivan, Reviewing the Reviewer: The Impact of the Land Use Board of Appeals on the Oregon Land Use Program 1979–1999, 36 Willamette L. Rev. 441 (2000).

39. 25 Or. LUBA 267, 272–73 (1993).

40. 44 Or. LUBA 98 (2003).

41. Id. at 101–02.

42. Id. at 103.

43. 2 Or. LUBA 180, 188 (1981). Ordinarily, such a choice would require that the county take an exception to Statewide Planning Goals 3 (Agricultural Lands) or 4 (Forest Lands) either because existing development precluded resource uses or because a compelling justification existed to override those goals. In Gruber, the county had taken an exception to Goal 4. Id. at 184–87. In sustaining the Goal 2 challenge, LUBA added:

We do not suggest that alternative zonings for each area of the county must be articulated to meet Goal 2. We do believe, however, that goal 2 requires some explanation in the record of how the county resolved to choose one zone over another. The plan is replete with policies guiding the county, but we are unable to find any provisions guiding the county in case of conflict in specific zoning applications. Without that mechanism, we cannot determine whether the county has reviewed “alternative courses of action” as required by goal 2 and as demanded by petitioners.

Id. at 188.

44. Tipperman, 44 Or. LUBA at 103. The county’s decision in Tipperman was remanded on other grounds. LUBA also noted that the “alternative courses of action” aspect of Goal 2 was a “very general directive.” Id. (citing Hubenthal v. City of Woodburn, 39 Or. LUBA 20, 30 (2000)).

45. 81 Or. LUBA 683, 717–19 (2020).

46. Id. at *3. The city had previously adopted similar amendments, which were remanded after a lengthy struggle on multiple fronts. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 76 Or. LUBA 15 (2017), rev’d and remanded in part, 412 P.3d 258 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 363 Or. 390 (2018). Those appeals involved, inter alia, Goal 2’s coordination and “adequate factual base” requirements. 76 Or. LUBA at 49–54; 412 P.3d at 268–71. The coordination requirement is discussed below. The “adequate factual base” requirement is discussed above.

47. Columbia Pac., 2020 WL 6544130, at *25. The petitioners also claimed that the decision was not supported by an adequate factual base. Id. at *3–12.

48. Id. at *25–26. LUBA cited its decisions in Hubenthal and Tipperman and concluded that the petitioners’ disagreement with the city council’s ultimate decision was “not a basis for reversal or remand because the city council met its burden to consider alternatives and explain its rationale.” Id. at *26.

49. See Or. Rev. Stat. ch. 192.

50. Although Goal 2 was not mentioned, in Palmer v. Lane County, there was a dispute over whether one or another measure of soils suitable for commercial forestry had been adopted by the county as part of its acknowledged plan. 44 Or. LUBA 334, 338–39 (2003). Because neither standard was shown to be acknowledged by LCDC (though one was found in a working paper that was used to prepare the acknowledged plan), LUBA declined to accept either measure as dispositive.

51. Home Builders Ass’n of Lane Cnty. v. City of Eugene, 52 Or. LUBA 341, 366 (2006); see Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.015(11) (defining “land use regulation”).

52. In 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Metro, the Oregon Court of Appeals noted that Metro (the regional planning agency for the Portland area) used two different sets of numbers when evaluating an urban growth boundary amendment. 26 P.3d 151, 160–61 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). The court determined that planning documents and actions must be consistent under Goal 2, pt. I; that Metro’s planning and regulatory documents did not provide for resolution of those discrepancies; and that Metro cannot impose inconsistent planning requirements on local governments. The court concluded that “[t]his is the type of inconsistent, uncoordinated planning that Goal 2 is intended to prevent.” Id. at 161. The Chapin text does not outright require plan consistency, but it does suggest “land use planning analysis as a basis for overall guidance and economy” in further planning activity and regulatory measures. Kaiser, Godschalk & Chapin, supra note 17, at 361–63, 472–73.

53. In Sahagian v. Columbia County, a county removed a park designation from its land under a statute that provided that proprietary authority. 27 Or. LUBA 592, 595–98 (1994). However, the county did not remove the land from the park inventory in its plan or change the land’s park designation through a post acknowledgment plan amendment. LUBA found that, for planning and land use regulatory purposes, the land use was unchanged. However, challenges to consistency of implementing measures with the comprehensive plan under Goal 2 are likely foreclosed once the plan and those measures are acknowledged.

54. See Home Builders Ass’n, 52 Or. LUBA at 365–66 (requirement to make recreational policy choices does not entail choosing all recreational sites at the same time); Neighbors for Livability v. City of Beaverton, 37 Or. LUBA 408, 414–17, aff’d, 4 P.3d 765, 767 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (the adoption of plan amendments and implementation measures need not be simultaneous); Volny v. City of Bend, 37 Or. LUBA 493, 502–03, aff’d, 4 P.3d 768 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (existing minimum city street standards not inconsistent with new plan standards that could provide wider lanes).

55. The Chapin text does acknowledge the need for communication among public agencies, Kaiser, Godschalk & Chapin, supra note 17, at 359–64, 472–73, but is not as insistent on coordination as Goal 2. Al Burns, a member of DLCD who reviewed plans and land use regulations in acknowledgment proceedings, explains that DLCD staff required coordination agreements among city, county, and special district agencies for acknowledgment requests to be considered complete, even if they were not always implemented. Burns adds:

[These agreements] generally dealt with unincorporated areas within [urban growth boundaries], and whether these lands would be subject to the county or city plan, and under what terms. For nearly adjoining cities coordination agreements were supposed to set future city limits for the urbanizable, unincorporated land. Service boundaries were also supposed to be set between municipalities and special service districts to clarify what government would provide which services where.

Correspondence from Al Burns (Oct. 19, 2022) (on file with author). The requirements for special district and local government coordination are found in Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 195.020–.085. The Portland regional government also has coordination authority but has not always been successful in this endeavor.

56. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.015(5) (defining “coordinated” with respect to plans); id. § 197.180 (requiring state agencies to coordinate their plans, programs, and activities in accordance with the statewide planning goals); id. § 195.025(1) (giving counties limited coordination authority over other local governments and special districts within their boundaries).

57. See Rajneesh Travel Corp. v. Wasco County, 13 Or. LUBA 202 (1985); Twin Rocks Water Dist. v. City of Rockaway, 2 Or. LUBA 36 (1980). In 1000 Friends of Oregon v. City of North Plains, LUBA said:

[T]he obligation to coordinate involves essentially two steps:

1. The makers of the [comprehensive] plan [must engage] in an exchange of information between the planning jurisdiction and affected governmental units, or at least invite such an exchange.

2. The jurisdiction [must use] the information to balance the needs of all governmental units as well as the needs of citizens in the plan formulation or revision.

Coordination is achieved by balancing the needs of all affected governmental units and selecting a particular course of action from among the competing proposed courses of action.

Clearly, the city may not, consistent with Goal 2, unilaterally take action to amend its acknowledged comprehensive plan to adopt a provision that is inconsistent with the provisions of the acknowledged comprehensive plan of an affected jurisdiction.

27 Or. LUBA 372, 393–94 (1994) (alterations in original) (quoting Rajneesh Travel Corp., 13 Or. LUBA at 209–11) (citing City of Portland v. Washington County, 27 Or. LUBA 176 (1994)), aff’d, 882 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). The Chapin text acknowledges the need for communication among public agencies, but it is not as insistent on coordination as Goal 2. Kaiser, Godschalk & Chapin, supra note 17, at 359–64, 472–73. As reflected by the times, the focus of the Chapin text is on cooperation among city departments. Id. at 472–73.

See materials on the state agency coordination program from 1977 to 2003 in the Knight Collection, supra note 19, boxes 10–11. Counties were also given limited coordination authority over other local governments and special districts within their boundaries under SB 100 §19 (1973 Or. Laws 80), now Or. Rev. Stat. § 195.025(1). For an early view of this arrangement, see Laurel Mather Walker, The County as Coordinator in Oregon’s Land Use Planning Program (1975) (Master’s thesis, University of Oregon), in the Knight Collection, supra note 19, box 16.

58. 13 Or. LUBA 202.

59. Id. at 210–11 (footnote omitted) (citing Twin Rocks, 2 Or. LUBA 36). On the other hand, if another party to the proceeding presents evidence of coordination in the record, the fact that the respondent did not undertake the coordination will be an insufficient basis for reversal or remand of the decision. Davenport v. City of Tigard, 23 Or. LUBA 565, 575–76 (1992).

60. See Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev. v. Douglas County, LUBA Nos. 2018-039/040/041/048/049/051, 2019 WL 5130303, at *20–22 (Aug. 2, 2019); Or. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Klamath Falls, 39 Or. LUBA 641, 671 (2001); Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev. v. Douglas County, 33 Or. LUBA 216, 221–23 (1997); 1000 Friends, 27 Or. LUBA at 384–85, 393–95.

61. See 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Metro, 26 P.3d 151, 159–62 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); Residents of Rosemont v. Metro, 38 Or. LUBA 199, 227–30 (2000); D.S. Parklane Dev., Inc. v. Metro, 35 Or. LUBA 516, 645–47 (1999), aff’d as modified, 994 P.2d 1205 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).

62. In City of Woodburn v. Marion County, a city challenged alleged overreach by a county in exercising its coordinative functions. 45 Or. LUBA 423, 436–37 (2003). In City of Portland, Portland successfully challenged Washington County’s unilateral amendment of its comprehensive plan to the advantage of suburban Beaverton, an exercise of the coordinative function given to Metro. 27 Or. LUBA at 183–93; see also City of Sandy v. Metro, 48 Or. LUBA 363, 376–80 (2005).

63. Roads End Water Dist. v. City of Lincoln City, 67 Or. LUBA 452, 471–73 (2013); Santiam Water Control Dist. v. City of Stayton, 54 Or. LUBA 553, 558–59 (2010); Port of St. Helens v. City of Scappoose, 58 Or. LUBA 122, 139–42 (2008); Bear Creek Valley Sanitary Dist. v. Jackson County, 27 Or. LUBA 328, 338–40 (1994).

64. Adkins v. Heceta Water Dist., 23 Or. LUBA 207, 216–18 (1992).

65. See 1000 Friends of Oregon v. City of North Plains, 27 Or. LUBA 372 (1994) (articulating the requirements of the obligation to coordinate).

66. In Creswell Court v. City of Creswell, 35 Or. LUBA 234 (1998), LUBA remanded city code amendments effectively excluding manufactured home parks because the city had failed to coordinate with nearby cities about whether they were willing to absorb the city’s unmet fair share of that particular regional housing need. Of the city’s argument that it only needed to coordinate if it were “depriving other jurisdictions of their fair share of low-income citizens,” LUBA said “[t]he city’s logic is self-refuting.”

67. See Cox v. Polk County, 49 Or. LUBA 78, 88–90 (2005); Turner Cmty. Ass’n v. Marion County, 37 Or. LUBA 324, 353–61 (1999) (involving some coordination efforts that met the standard and others that did not); 1000 Friends, 27 Or. LUBA at 384–85, 393–95. Compare Davenport v. City of Tigard, 22 Or. LUBA 577, 587 (1992) (coordination deficiencies), with Davenport v. City of Tigard, 23 Or. LUBA 568, 575–76 (1992) (correcting deficiencies and surviving a second challenge).

68. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 215.503(2), 227.186(2), 268.360(1). However, in Western PCS, Inc. v. City of Lake Oswego, LUBA found a city charter provision that allowed the adoption of “emergency” ordinances without notice or public hearing to be inconsistent with Goal 2 and state law and not protected by the “home rule” provisions of the Oregon Constitution. 33 Or. LUBA 369, 378–79 (1997).

The Chapin text acknowledges that perspectives other than those of planning experts, including those of “citizens” and public officials, “warrant at least passing mention,” yet effectively excludes those views from consideration. Kaiser, Godschalk & Chapin, supra note 17, at 470–72. Chapin’s observations on “citizen” (rather than public) participation are focused on getting citizens and “other organized private interests” to understand planning issues and their resolution and on cultivating among civic leaders and organizations a practice of “sharing” in planning and of providing media to report on planning studies and recommendations. Id. In this light, Chapin recommends coordination with organizations “such as the Jaycees and various women’s service organizations.” Id. This approach would not square with Oregon’s public participation goal. See Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1.

69. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.628–.644 (periodic review of plans and land use regulations generally); id. §§ 197.296–.302 (for certain housing measures). However, periodic review is largely dormant and ineffective. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 371–72, 392–93. The housing measures are limited in their application and are of little use outside the housing area. The Chapin text does not directly discuss plan updates, but it does suggest keeping land use data current. Kaiser, Godschalk & Chapin, supra note 17, at 298–300. It also advocates cyclical review of plans. Id. at 475–77.

70. 109 P.3d 376, 378–80 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); see also Western PCS, 33 Or. LUBA 369; Adkins, 23 Or. LUBA 207. This requirement, however, does not apply to plans and land-use regulations that predated its adoption. See Schmidt v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 564 P.2d 1090 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).

71. 617 P.2d 655 (Or. App. 1980). State Housing Council was an LCDC decision in a case that preceded the establishment of the Land Use Board of Appeals under former Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.300 et seq.

72. State Housing Council, 617 P.2d at 661. The petitioners in State Housing Council appealed. While the case was pending before the Oregon Supreme Court, the Oregon Legislature changed the applicable appeal process, leading the court to dismiss the case since the petitioners could file a new challenge under the new appeal process. State Housing Council v. City of Lake Oswego, 635 P.2d 647 (Or. 1981). Shortly thereafter, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a LUBA decision affirming a school board decision to close a school. Westside Neighborhood Quality Project, Inc. v. School Dist. 4J Bd. of Dirs., 647 P.2d 962 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 653 P.2d 999 (Or. 1982). The court concluded that the school board decision was not a “land use decision” subject to LUBA review for substantially the same reasons that the city decision in State Housing Council was not subject to LCDC review. Id. at 966; see also Conte v. City of Eugene, 66 Or. LUBA 95 (2012) (concluding that a decision granting a property tax exemption under section 307.618(1) of the Oregon Revised Statutes was subject to the “fiscal exception” in State Housing Council, even though one of the considerations for approval was compliance with the city’s plan and zoning regulations); Jesinghaus v. City of Grants Pass, 42 Or. LUBA 477 (2002) (concluding that a decision creating a reimbursement district was subject to the “fiscal exception” in State Housing Council); Baker v. City of Woodburn, 37 Or. LUBA 563 (2000), aff’d, 4 P.3d 775 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that decisions establishing the process to form a reimbursement district and approving the formation of a reimbursement district were subject to the “fiscal exception” in State Housing Council); Petrie Co. v. City of Tigard, 28 Or. LUBA 535 (1995) (concluding that a decision repealing a sanitary sewer reimbursement district was subject to the “fiscal exception” in State Housing Council).

73. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.015(10) (defining “land use decision”); id. § 197.015(12) (defining “limited land use decision”); City of Pendleton v. Kerns, 653 P.2d 992 (Or. 1982) (concluding that LUBA has jurisdiction over decisions that will have a “significant impact on present or future land uses”). In Kerns, the petitioners challenged a decision authorizing the extension of a street and creating a local improvement district to assess the benefitted landowners. The court found that several of the statewide planning goals were implicated by the decision, notwithstanding that the decision had fiscal impacts as well. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.175(1) (“Cities and counties shall exercise their planning and zoning responsibilities . . . in accordance with ORS chapters 195, 196 and 197 and the goals approved under ORS chapters 195, 196 and 197.”); Petersen v. City of Klamath Falls, 566 P.2d 1193 (Or. 1977) (concluding that city annexations are an exercise of “planning and zoning responsibilities” that must be in accordance with the goals under section 197.175(1)); Act of July 22, 1977, ch. 664, § 12, 1977 Or. Laws 598, 600 (codified at Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.175(1)) (making explicit the court’s conclusion in Petersen); see also State ex rel. Moore v. City of Fairview, 13 P.3d 1031, 1034–35 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that a reimbursement district condition requiring payment of water and sanitary sewer fees was not subject to the “fiscal exception” in State Housing Council); D & B Home Invs. v. City of Donald, 51 Or. LUBA 1, 6–7 (2006) (concluding that a condition of approval imposing systems development charges was not subject to the “fiscal exception” in State Housing Council); Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County, 43 Or. LUBA 270 (2002) (concluding that a decision increasing public hearing and local appeal fees was not subject to the “fiscal exception” in State Housing Council); Ramsey v. City of Portland, 29 Or. LUBA 139, 141–42 (1995) (concluding that a decision rejecting a local appeal because it was not accompanied by the required appeal fee was not subject to the “fiscal exception” in State Housing Council).

74. 826 P.2d 54 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 833 P.2d 1233 (Or. 1992). The rule certification process was part of a legislative effort to coordinate state agency programs affecting land use through LCDC under Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.180.

75. Id. at 55; see also W. Side Sanitary Dist. v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 614 P.2d 1141 (Or. 1980) (indirect legislative preemption); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 737 P.2d 607 (Or. 1987) (direct legislative preemption).

76. Springer, 826 P.2d at 56 (quoting State Housing Council, 617 P.2d at 662). The court determined:

The unifying theme in the cited cases is that governmental programs that affect land use are not subject to the land use laws if the fundamental purposes of the programs would be frustrated by attempting to coordinate them with land use requirements or if the primary objectives of the programs are so different from the land use requirements that an attempt at coordination would result in sacrificing those primary objectives to an incidental effect.

Id. at 56–57. Similarly, the court concluded:

Reduced to essentials, petitioners ask us to construe the tax statutes, or to require the department to apply them, in a manner that is contrary to their plain terms and to convert them into adjuncts of the land use laws. However, the fact that both bodies of law relate to farm and forest lands and have some objectives in common does not make them a single coordinated statutory scheme. The preferential tax assessment statutes contain clear definitions of eligibility for their benefits. They are not land use regulations, and they were not intended to be an enforcement mechanism for the land use laws. The very fact that the two schemes deal with the same subjects in such different and sometimes disparate ways illustrates that their administration cannot be and was not intended to be coordinated.

Id. at 57–58.

77. 129 P.3d 713 (Or. Ct. App. 2006); Or. Rev. Stat. § 223.314.

78. Id. at 718.

79. Home Builders Ass’n of Lane County. v. City of Springfield, 156 P.3d 167 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).

80. The basis for exceptions is found in Goal 2, Part II, itself, as well as a subsequently adopted statute. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.732. That statute provides:

“Exception” means a comprehensive plan provision, including an amendment to an acknowledged comprehensive plan, that:

(A) Is applicable to specific properties or situations and does not establish a planning or zoning policy of general applicability;

(B) Does not comply with some or all goal requirements applicable to the subject properties or situations; and

(C) Complies with standards under subsection (2) of this section.

Id. § 197.732(1)(b).

81. The exceptions statute provides:

A local government may adopt an exception to a goal if:

(a) The land subject to the exception is physically developed to the extent that it is no longer available for uses allowed by the applicable goal; [or]

(b) The land subject to the exception is irrevocably committed as described by [LCDC] rule to uses not allowed by the applicable goal because existing adjacent uses and other relevant factors make uses allowed by the applicable goal impracticable. . . .

Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.732(2). These standards are mirrored in Goal 2, Part II, itself. For an early view of the exceptions process, see Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., Exceptions (1976), which can be found in box 1 of the Knight Collection, supra note 19. The exceptions process is extensively discussed by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation & Development Commission, 724 P.2d 268, 277–79 (Or. 1986); see also 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 752 P.2d 271, 286–89 (Or. 1988).

82. See Cotter v. Clackamas County, 53 Or. LUBA 25, 30 (2006); Sandgren v. Clackamas County, 29 Or. LUBA 454, 457 (1995). The applicable standard is set out in LCDC’s administrative rules:

Whether land has been physically developed with uses not allowed by an applicable Goal, will depend on the situation at the site of the exception. The exact nature and extent of the areas found to be physically developed shall be clearly set forth in the justification for the exception. The specific area(s) must be shown on a map or otherwise described and keyed to the appropriate findings of fact. The findings of fact shall identify the extent and location of the existing physical development on the land and can include information on structures, roads, sewer and water facilities, and utility facilities. Uses allowed by the applicable goal(s) to which an exception is being taken shall not be used to justify a physically developed exception.

Or. Admin. R. 660-004-0025(2). Physically developed claims are subject to a fact-intensive review and must show that the inconsistent development is of such an extent that the subject site is no longer available to apply the relevant goal. See Dooley v. Wasco County, 81 Or. LUBA 44, 53–55 (2020); Columbia Riverkeeper v. Columbia County, 78 Or. LUBA 547, 563–66 (2018); Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev. v. Columbia County, 32 Or. LUBA 221, 225–26 (1996).

83. This portion of the exceptions process requires that “the land subject to the exception [be] irrevocably committed to uses not allowed by the applicable goal because existing adjacent uses and other relevant factors make uses allowed by the applicable goal impracticable.” Or. Admin. R. 660-004-0028(1). The requirements for a committed exception are also demanding, and they include a requirement for findings showing that the underlying goal cannot be applied, now or in the future, to the site. See Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev. v. Curry County, 947 P.2d 1123, 1124-25 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); Dooley, 81 Or. LUBA 44, 53–55; Hood River Valley Residents Comm. v. Hood River County, 75 Or. LUBA 452, 459–67 (2017); Cent. Or. Landwatch v. Deschutes County, 74 Or. LUBA 156, 169–74; (2016); Brown v. Jefferson County, 33 Or. LUBA 418, 424–36 (1997).

84. See Or. Coast All. v. Tillamook County, LUBA Nos. 2021-101/104, 2022 WL 16530688 (Sept. 30, 2022) (involving an extensive analysis of the “committed,” “developed,” and “reasons” exceptions).

85. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.732(2)(c)(A).

86. By that time, LCDC had already rejected the contention that the “compelling facts and reasons” standard meant that “[t]here can be no room for doubt,” noting that “[s]uch a standard is unrealistic in a world where even the criminal law excludes only reasonable doubts.” 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Multnomah County, 1 LCDC 309, 320 (Or. 1980).

87. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.732(2)(c). These standards also appear in Goal 2, Part II, itself, and in LCDC’s administrative rules implementing the same. Or. Admin. R. 660-004-0020(2).

88. Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev. v. Umatilla County, 39 Or. LUBA 715, 718–32 (2001).

89. Brown, 33 Or. LUBA at 438; 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Marion County, 18 Or. LUBA 408, 413–14 (1989).

90. VinCEP v. Yamhill County, 171 P.3d 368, 370–74 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).

91. Or. Shores Conservation Coal. v. Coos County, LUBA No. 2020-002, 2021 WL 2336704, at *6–15 (May 4, 2021).

92. Devin Oil Co. v. Morrow County, 62 Or. LUBA 247, 266–68 (2010).

93. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Jackson County, 423 P.3d 793 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).

94. See Landwatch Lane County v. Lane County, 69 Or. LUBA 88, 94–99 (2014) (rural industrial park). A model exception request was granted for an urban-level golf course on resource lands outside an urban growth boundary for the nationally well-known Bandon Dunes Golf Course, one of three that were granted. See Applicant’s Statement, Proposed Findings, and Supplemental Exception Statement for 2010 Text Amendments to Bandon Dunes Resort Master Plan and Bandon Dunes Resort Zoning Ordinance (2009) (on file with the author).

95. In researching for a textbook on Oregon planning law, Professor Jeffrey Litwak notes the dearth of scholarship on exceptions, which is especially surprising in light of their importance to the state’s planning program. Email from Jeffrey Litwak to author (Oct. 16, 2022) (on file with the author).

96. In 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 703 P.2d 207 (Or. 1985), the Oregon Supreme Court held that LCDC unlawfully attempted to require a county to take a reasons exception before incorporating a new city. That court held that no exception was required and that LCDC’s attempt to read a prohibition against incorporating new cities into Goal 14 (Urbanization), supra note 12, constituted “a de facto goal amendment and cannot be sustained by this court.”

97. Oregon’s Statewide Land Use Planning Goals, Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., (last visited Oct. 28, 2022); see also Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., Oregon Statewide Planning Goals and Guidelines 1 (2019), This suggested use of the guidelines is reenforced by the statutory definition of that term:

“Guidelines” means suggested approaches designed to aid cities and counties in preparation, adoption and implementation of comprehensive plans in compliance with goals and to aid state agencies and special districts in the preparation, adoption and implementation of plans, programs and regulations in compliance with goals. Guidelines shall be advisory and shall not limit state agencies, cities, counties and special districts to a single approach.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.015(9).

The use of guidelines was a much-discussed topic at the adoption of the statewide planning goals in 1974. The final hearing record contains no less than 325 mentions of the goals and their use. Complete Binder Final Public Hearings on the Statewide Planning Goals (Dec. 13, 1974) (on file with the author); see also correspondence from Professor Sy Adler, Interim Dean and Professor of Urban Studies and Planning, Portland State Univ. (Oct. 25, 2022) (on file with author).

98. 507 P.3d 804 (Or. Ct. App. 2022); see also 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Jackson County, 423 P.3d 793, 803–04 (Or. Ct. App. 2018); Reading v. Douglas County, 70 Or. LUBA 458, 464–65 (2014).

99. Nicita, 507 P.3d at 813.

100. In contrast, LCDC rules for the implementation of Goal 5, Or. Admin. R.660-015-0000(5); Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., Goal 5: Natural Resources, Scenic and Historic Areas, and Open Spaces, (last visited Nov. 20, 2022), provide for “safe harbors” that guarantee compliance with that goal if followed, Edward Sullivan & Caleb Huegel, Oregon’s Resource Protection Conundrum, 58 Willamette L. Rev. 1, 16, 53–57 (2021).

101. See correspondence from Al Burns supra note 55.

102. See supra note 61.

103. See supra note 69.

104. These processes are treated under Goal 1 and Statewide Planning Goal 14 (Urbanization), respectively. See Sullivan, supra note 19; Edward J. Sullivan, Urbanization in Oregon: Goal 14 and the Urban Growth Boundary, 47 Urb. Law. 165 (2015); Edward J. Sullivan, Urban Growth Management in Portland, Oregon, 93 Or. L. Rev. 455 (2014).

105. See Sullivan, Reviewing the Reviewer, supra note 38.

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Edward J. Sullivan

BA, St. John’s University (N.Y.), 1966; JD, Willamette University, 1969; MA (History), Portland State University, 1973; Urban Studies Certificate, Portland State University, 1974; MA (Political Thought), University of Durham, 1998; Diploma in Law, University College, Oxford, 1984; LLM, University College, London, 1978. Edward J. Sullivan serves as Adjunct Professor at Lewis and Clark College, Northwestern School of Law; Willamette University College of Law; and Portland State University. The author particularly appreciates the assistance of Caleb J. N. Huegel, staff attorney for the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals, and A. June Bradley, 2024 JD candidate at Willamette University College of Law, for their assistance in the preparation of this article. In addition, the author thanks the following persons who gave generously of their time and expertise to review drafts of this article: Professor Sy Adler, Al Burns, Professor Paul Diller, William Kabeiseman, Allen Johnson, Carrie Richter, Professor Jeffrey Litwak, Dwight Merriam, FAICP, Michael Robinson, and Professor Dan Tarlock. Any errors in this work are the author’s.