While the neighbors’ action was pending, Sand Land filed an application with the Town’s Chief Building Inspector requesting a “preexisting certificate of occupancy” for the use of the property for (1) the operation of a sand mine; (2) the receipt and processing of trees, brush, leaves, and other clearing debris into topsoil or mulch; (3) the receipt and processing of concrete, asphalt pavement, brick, rock, and stone into a concrete blend; and (4) the storage, sale, and delivery from the property of sand, mulch, topsoil, wood chips, and concrete blend. In support of its application, Sand Land submitted affidavits from eight individuals stating that the property had been used continually for these operations since before the Town adopted its zoning code. In opposition, the neighbors submitted various exhibits that, they insisted, conclusively refuted Sand Land’s claim.
The Town’s Chief Building Inspector found that Sand Land was entitled to a preexisting certificate of occupancy for: “(i) the operation of a sand mine, (ii) the receipt and processing of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris into topsoil or mulch, and (iii) the storage, sale, and delivery of sand, mulch, topsoil, and wood chip,” but not for the receipt and processing of concrete, asphalt pavement, brick, rock, and stone into concrete blend and issued a certificate of occupancy to that effect. Sand Land did not appeal but the neighbors did, arguing that the evidence Sand Land had submitted to the Chief Building Inspector did not support the finding of “pre-existing use status.”
Following a public hearing on the neighbors’ appeal, the zoning board of appeals (ZBA) concluded that the evidence presented supported the finding that the storage, sale, and delivery of sand constituted a legally established nonconforming use, and that the receipt of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris was a preexisting accessory use to the mining operation on the site. However, the processing, storage, and sale of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris into topsoil or mulch were “new uses” that were not preexisting. The ZBA annulled those portions of the Chief Building Inspector’s determination and certificate of occupancy that approved such “new uses” as preexisting.
Sand Land appealed, arguing that it was irrational, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, and internally inconsistent for the ZBA to conclude that the evidence established that the property could “receive” brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris, but that the same evidence did not establish that these materials, once on the property, could be “processed” or sold. The New York Supreme Court agreed with and reinstated, in its entirety, the certificate of occupancy issued by the Chief Building Inspector. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court and confirmed the ZBA’s determination.
A use of property that existed before the enactment of a zoning restriction that prohibits the use is a legal nonconforming use, but the right to maintain a nonconforming use does not include the right to extend or enlarge that use. Public policy favors its reasonable restriction and eventual elimination. To that end, the courts will enforce a municipality’s reasonable circumscription of the right to expand the volume or intensity of a prior nonconforming use. In general, the determination of a zoning board regarding the continuation of a preexisting nonconforming use must be sustained if it is rational and supported by substantial evidence, even if the reviewing court would have reached a different result.
In this case, the Appellate Division found that the ZBA’s findings as to preexisting uses were not arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or internally inconsistent on the evidence presented. The evidence supported the Chief Building Inspector’s findings that the operation of a sand mine, including the storage and delivery of sand, constituted a preexisting nonconforming use, and that the receipt of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris was a preexisting accessory use to this mining operation. The evidence also supported the ZBA’s finding, in effect, that Sand Land had not met its burden of proving that the processing of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris into topsoil or mulch, and the storage, sale, and delivery of mulch, topsoil, and wood chips were not “new uses,” or were a permitted expansion of any legally established nonconforming but constituted a “significant change” from the nonconforming sand mine operation and the accessory receipt of various yard debris.
Further, the ZBA did not improperly place the burden on Sand Land. The owner of a property must establish that the allegedly pre-existing use was legal prior to the enactment of the prohibitive zoning ordinance that purportedly rendered it nonconforming. When the matter went for review before the ZBA, the ZBA was authorized to consider the Chief Building Inspector’s determination de novo and make such a “determination as in its opinion ought to have been made in the matter. When presenting the matter to the ZBA, the neighbors only had to show that the evidence submitted by Sand Land in support of its application was insufficient to demonstrate that the challenged uses existed on the subject property prior to the adoption of the prohibitive zoning ordinance.”
Phair v. Sand Land Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 02341, 137 A.D.3d 1237, 28 N.Y.S.3d 400 (App. Div.)
In the related action, which is the neighbors’ action for an injunction to enforce the zoning ordinance and prevent the use of the property as inconsistent with its residential zoning, the Appellate Division upheld the injunction for the use the ZBA found not to be pre-existing — the use of the property for the processing of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and other land-clearing debris into topsoil or mulch, or for the storage, sale, and delivery of mulch, topsoil, and wood chips. Private property owners may maintain a common law action to enjoin the continuance of a zoning code violation and to obtain damages to vindicate their discrete, separate, and identifiable interests if they can establish special damages due to the defendant’s activities. Sand Land made no claim that the plaintiffs could not prove special damages, so the court reversed the order of the trial court to the extent it dismissed, as academic, those portions of the plaintiff’s case.
Hunterstown Ruritan Club v. Straban Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 143 A.3d 538 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016)
In 1955, the Ruritan Club purchased a 14-acre property along Red Bridge Road to provide the community with recreational opportunities, such as baseball fields, picnic areas, swing sets, and other activities typically found in community recreation parks. A portion of the property was informally used for go-cart racing beginning in the early 1960s. The Club eventually entered a relationship with the Hunterstown Kart Club (HKC), some of whose members belonged to both organizations. The two groups formalized their relationship in a lease governing HKC’s use of the property for go-cart racing.
The property was zoned for the first time in 1992. The Club’s property was zoned MU-2. Go-cart racing is not a permitted use in that district, but the parties stipulated that go- cart racing was a legal preexisting nonconforming use when the Ordinance was adopted.
The intensity of the use of the property for go-cart racing began to increase incrementally, and over time both the use of the land and the hours of operation expanded. At some point, the township’s zoning officer issued a written notice of zoning violation to the Club. The Club then applied for a certificate of nonconformance, requesting recognition of the use of the property for go-cart racing on Saturdays and Sundays. In response, the zoning officer issued a Certificate of Non-Conformance that identified the pre-existing nonconforming conditions as follows: “The non-conforming use consists of Go Kart Racing events located on the existing track at the above site on Saturdays only with all racing ending at or before 11 pm. Any expansion of this non-conformity must be approved by the municipality prior to its establishment.”
The Club filed an “Application to the [Board] for a Zoning Hearing,” accompanied by a copy of the certificate of nonconformance. The Club described the proposed use of the property as “expansion of activity to allow current use after 11:00 p.m. on Saturday and on Sunday.” At the hearing, the Club amended the application to remove the request to allow racing after 11:00 p.m. on Saturday.
After a hearing, the Board concluded that the Club failed to satisfy the special exception standards of the Ordinance and denied the Club’s application for an expansion of its nonconforming use.
The Club appealed to the trial court, arguing that it was not proposing a change in use or to physically expand the area used for racing but only to conduct the same racing that had occurred for years. The trial court reasoned that the Club’s failure to appeal from the certificate of nonconformance as well as its application for a nonconforming use change indicated that the Club was not challenging the limitation of its nonconforming use to Saturdays only, but was seeking to expand the use to include Sundays. The trial court further concluded that the Board did not deny the Club its right to the natural expansion of its nonconforming use but, instead, “accepted the Certificate of Nonconformance as establishing the prior use (racing on Saturdays only) and then denied the request to extend racing to Sundays” based on a failure to satisfy Ordinance standards. Accordingly, the trial court denied the Club’s appeal.
On appeal to appellate court, the Club argued that it never abandoned the nonconforming use of go-cart racing on Sunday.
“A lawful nonconforming use is a use that predates the enactment of a prohibitory zoning restriction, and the right to continue a legal nonconforming use is entitled to the constitutional protection of due process …. [T]he fundamental basis for the protection of uses and structures that were lawful when instituted is the ‘inherent and indefeasible’ right of this Commonwealth’s citizens to possess and protect property guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Thus, “[a] lawful nonconforming use establishes in the property owner a vested property right which cannot be abrogated or destroyed, unless it is a nuisance, it is abandoned, or it is extinguished by eminent domain.” In this case, the Board specifically found that Sunday racing took place prior to the enactment of the Ordinance, and nothing in the record suggests that such use was abandoned.
The court contrasted a property owner’s constitutionally protected property right to continue a legal nonconforming use, which is an interest that runs with the land, with a certificate of nonconforming use, which is personal to the property owner:
A certificate proves the existence of a nonconforming use. The mere absence of a certificate [of nonconforming use] does not deprive the landowner of his right to continue a lawful nonconforming use. Rather, in an administrative proceeding such as this, absence of a certificate generally deprives a landowner of the most efficient method of proving the existence of the use, and shifts to the landowner the burdens of proof and persuasion. In short, a certificate represents a procedural advantage, not an independent property right. Conversely, the lack of a certificate results in a procedural disadvantage and not in the loss of a property right.
Here, the [Board] determined [that the applicant] was not entitled to continue the nonconforming use because it failed to timely re-register the use after purchasing the subject property. The [Board] erred in reaching this legal conclusion. Because the right to continue a nonconforming use arises from constitutional protections and not from regulatory provisions, the right cannot be lost in this way.
Similarly, the Board erred in this case by concluding that the Club was not entitled to continue its nonconforming use because the use was not reflected in the certificate of nonconformance.
Additionally, under the doctrine of natural expansion, “the right to expand [a nonconforming use] as required to maintain economic viability or to take advantage of increases in trade is also constitutionally protected.” Consequently, “a nonconforming use cannot be limited by a zoning ordinance to the precise magnitude thereof which existed at the date of the ordinance.
The right to natural expansion is not unlimited, and municipalities may impose reasonable restrictions on expansions of nonconforming uses. Thus, “conditions on the land associated with the protected use” may be subject to reasonable regulation. However, such regulation cannot be accomplished by way of a certificate of nonconformance, which can neither expand nor limit a lawful nonconforming use. The grant or denial of a nonconforming use certificate has no bearing on an individual’s property rights.
Matter of 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 2016 NY Slip Op 04423, 140 A.D.3d 889, 33 N.Y.S.3d 382 (App. Div.)
This was a proceeding to review the Town of Huntington Zoning Board of Appeals’ denial of the site plan application of 7-Eleven, Inc.
The Town ZBA denied the site plan application of the petitioner 7-Eleven seeking to demolish an existing structure on a certain parcel of real property being utilized as a restaurant and to construct a convenience store on the property. In this appeal, 7- leven contended that the N.Y. Supreme Court improperly upheld the ZBA’s decision to deny 7-Eleven approval for a “[c]hange of use” under the Town Code.
In a proceeding to review a determination of a zoning board of appeals, a zoning board’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance is entitled to great deference and will not be overturned by the courts unless unreasonable or irrational. Judicial review is generally limited to determining whether the action taken by the zoning board was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. However, where the issue involves pure legal interpretation of statutory terms, deference is not required.
The Town Code provides that “[a] nonconforming use may be changed to … any use which the [ZBA] shall find to be less intensive and more in character with the uses permitted in the district in which the nonconforming use is located.” 7-Eleven asserted that since the conditions on the site currently do not conform to, inter alia, various dimensional zoning regulations in the district in which the property is located, 7- Eleven satisfied the definition of “nonconforming use” under the Town Code. The court disagreed.
While the Town Code allows for applicants to seek approval from the ZBA to change nonconforming uses to make them “less intensive and more in character with the uses permitted in the district,” it does not apply to uses that are already in conformity with the zoning regulations of the district in which the property is located. Otherwise, that provision could be used to change conforming uses so that they are in violation of applicable zoning regulations. “The law generally views nonconforming uses as detrimental to a zoning scheme, and the overriding public policy of zoning in New York State and elsewhere is aimed at their reasonable restriction and eventual elimination.” 7-Eleven’s proffered interpretation of the Town Code was inconsistent with this aim. Therefore, pursuant to the court’s independent review of the law, the court affirmed the ZBA.
Matter of Martinos v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Town of Brookhaven, 2016 NY Slip Op 02828, 138 A.D.3d 859, 29 N.Y.S.3d 497 (App. Div.)
This was a proceeding to review a determination of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Brookhaven, which after a hearing granted the applications of Miller Beach Surf Club, Inc. for, inter alia, a certificate of existing use and an extension of nonconforming use.
Miller Beach Surf Club, Inc. submitted applications to the Town BZA for, inter alia, certificates of existing use for a clubhouse, an office building, and a one-family dwelling located on its property, and for an extension of nonconforming use for certain alterations made to the clubhouse, as well as two decks, an awning, a gazebo, and a detached storage shed. After a public hearing, the BZA granted the Surf Club’s applications. An opponent commenced a proceeding seeking to annul the BZA’s determination. The N.Y. Supreme Court granted that petition, annulled the determination, and remitted the matter to the BZA for a new determination.
Following remittal, and after a public hearing, the BZA again granted the Surf Club’s applications. The petitioner commenced this second proceeding, alleging that the BZA’s determination was arbitrary and capricious. The opponent appealed a denial of its petition by the Supreme Court.
“Nonconforming uses or structures, in existence when a zoning ordinance is enacted, are, as a rule, constitutionally protected and will be permitted to continue, notwithstanding the contrary provisions of the ordinance. However, the owner must establish that the allegedly preexisting use [or structure] was legal prior to the enactment of the prohibitive zoning ordinance which purportedly rendered it nonconforming.”
Here, the Surf Club established that its existing use of the clubhouse, office building, and one-family dwelling was legal prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance that rendered that existing use nonconforming. Accordingly, the Surf Club established the existence of a legal nonconforming use, and it was not arbitrary and capricious or irrational for the BZA to grant the Surf Club a certificate of existing use.
However, the Surf Club’s erection of the decks, the awning, the gazebo, and the detached shed on its premises, and the completion of certain alterations to its clubhouse, constituted an impermissible extension of that nonconforming use, not a mere increase in volume or intensity of the same nonconforming use. As such, the BZA’s determination to grant the Surf Club’s application for an extension of nonconforming use violated the Town Code provision that prohibits the extension of nonconforming uses. Accordingly, the portion of the BZA’s determination that granted the Surf Club’s application for an extension of nonconforming use was arbitrary and capricious and should have been annulled by the Supreme Court.
Development Agreements
Pittsboro Matters, Inc. v. Town of Pittsboro, No. COA16-323, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 1342 (Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2016)
This opinion addresses a lower court’s dismissal of a citizen suit challenging a series of zoning amendments by the Town of Pittsboro in furtherance of a large development zoned as a Planned Development District (PPD). The opinion details a long and complex procedural history, but several of its rulings are worth noting.
The third claim challenges the Third Rezoning Ordinance and the Chatham Park Master Plan and requests that they be declared null and void because the Town Board acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner in approving them. The fifth claim challenges the Chatham Park Master Plan and the Planned Development District Ordinance because neither is consistent with either the Town’s Land Use Plan, the North Carolina General Statutes, or the Town’s original Zoning Ordinance.
Plaintiffs alleged that the Planned Development District Ordinance did not comport with the Town of Pittsboro Zoning Ordinance because of its insufficient substantive compliance regarding riparian buffers, density of development, maximum building heights, and minimum landscape buffers and setbacks, and should, therefore, be declared null and void. However, when a town establishes its zoning ordinance, it is not a rigid structure that cannot be altered in the future. To make way for future development, a municipal entity must have the freedom to change and innovate. The PDD Ordinance is such an innovation, providing “that all ordinances and portions of ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.” Therefore, the PDD Ordinance, by its own terms, ensures it is compliant with the Town’s Zoning Ordinance.
The plaintiffs’ fifth claim alleges that the same PDD rezoning and the Master Plan approval as discussed above were inconsistent with the Land Use Plan of the Town of Pittsboro.
However, “by necessity a comprehensive plan must undergo changes. If any zoning plan is to be comprehensive, it must be kept up to date. It would become obsolete if the council refused to recognize the changing conditions in the community. A comprehensive plan is not a rigid and immutable mold, but rather general guidelines for the guidance of zoning policy.”
For both the ordinance that allowed the creation of planned development districts and the ordinance that establishes the specific planned development districts of Chatham Park, the Town’s Board of Commissioners adopted “consistency statements.” Both statements articulate that the “actions taken by the Board are consistent with the adopted comprehensive plan, including the Land Use Plan, and other officially adopted and applicable Town plans.” The Town states that it created planned development districts to “advance the vision and goals of these plans, to foster the orderly growth of the Town, and to establish a sound structure for larger developments containing residential and / or non-residential uses.” The Town further states that the planned development districts for Chatham Park specifically were not only to advance the comprehensive plan’s vision and goals, but also to “promote the expansion of the Town’s public infrastructure, encourage a variety in the Town’s housing stock, and to promote the strength of the Town’s economy and the creation of local jobs.”
Whether the PDD Ordinance or the ordinance adopting the Chatham Park Master Plan is in conformity with the Town’s Land Use Plan, or any of its other applicable plans, is a legislative decision of the Town’s Board. “The Board’s own conclusions, as outlined in its consistency statements, as to this conformity will not be passed upon by this Court because it is not subject to judicial review.”
The eighth claim challenges the Small Area Review and Approval Process because there was no notice given, public hearing held, or consistency statement issued with the adoption of the “Process,” and because this “Process” was unduly vague. The court concluded, though, that this claim was properly dismissed by the trial court because the small area plan review and approval process adoption was neither the adoption of an ordinance requiring notice and a public hearing, nor a zoning amendment requiring the adoption of a “consistency statement.”
The small area plan review and approval process was adopted without notice and a public hearing. State law requires that the city council shall hold a public hearing after notice prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of an ordinance. However, while the adoption, amendment, or repeal of an ordinance in a zoning context requires notice and a hearing, the adoption of a resolution does not. The crucial test for determining that which is legislative (ordinance) from that which is administrative or executive (resolution) is whether the action taken was one making a law or one executing or administering a law already in existence.
The “Process for Review and Approval of Small Area Plans” adopted by the Town was merely “administering a law already in existence,” and, thus, it was a resolution and not an ordinance subject to the required notice and hearing requirements state law. The process resolution provided the “context, overview of process, submittal requirements, and procedures” as to how the Master Plan, which governs the Small Area Plans, will be administered. Therefore, the adoption of the process resolution was not the adoption of an ordinance that would require notice and a hearing.
City of Shavano Park v. Ard Mor, Inc., No. 04-14-00781-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11029 (Tex. App. Oct. 28, 2015)
In this case, operators of a day care facility opposed an annexation and a development agreement between a city and a developer of a fuel dispensing facility and brought an action requesting the court declare that agreement void because the development agreement is improper contract zoning.
Generally, a city has authority to annex an area if it is within its extraterritorial jurisdiction, or if it owns the area. A city has authority to enter a written contract with an owner of land located in the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the City had the statutory right to enter a development agreement with the developer regarding annexation of the developer’s property. The issue here is whether appellees have standing to seek a declaration from the trial court that the development agreement is void because the agreement is improper contract zoning.
The premise of the City’s argument on appeal is that there is no injury that is attributable to the development agreement; the purported contracting away of the City’s legislative functions fails to show injury; the taxpayer exception for particularized injury fails because appellees are not taxpayers nor can they show the requisite expenditure; and no justiciable interest exists because any complained-of acts occur in the future.
The general test for constitutional standing in Texas courts is whether there is a “real” (i.e., justiciable) controversy between the parties that will be determined by the judicial declaration sought. For a party to have standing to challenge a governmental action, as a rule, it “must demonstrate a particularized interest in a conflict distinct from that sustained by the public at large.” The U.S. Supreme Court, applying standing principles that are analogous to Texas standing jurisprudence, at least with respect to challenges to governmental action, has explained that the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing consists of three elements: (1) “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a ‘legally protected’ [or cognizable] interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical’”; (2) “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” — the injury must be “fairly traceable” to the challenged action of the defendant and not the independent action of a third party not before the court; and (3) it must be likely, and not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
After reviewing the procedural history of the case, the court concluded that appellees were not given an opportunity to fully develop evidence relevant to the City’s jurisdictional challenge to their standing to request that the trial court declare the agreement void. The court remanded to allow further testimony on standing.
In addition to seeking a declaration that the agreement was void, appellees also asked the trial court to declare that the annexation ordinance resulted from an illegal contract between the City and the developer; therefore, the contract is void and the resulting ordinance is void.
The Texas Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) requires that relevant governmental entities be made parties, and thereby waive immunity, for claims challenging the validity of ordinances or statutes. However, the DJA does not enlarge a trial court’s jurisdiction, and a plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief does not confer jurisdiction on a court or change a suit’s underlying nature.
On appeal, the City concedes the DJA may require a city be included in a suit when an ordinance is sought to be invalidated. However, the City asserts a proper claim must first exist. The City contends a proper claim does not exist here because only a quo warranto proceeding brought by the State may challenge the annexation ordinance. Therefore, the City concludes appellees do not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action to invalidate the annexation ordinance.
The determination of whether an individual landowner, as opposed to the State in a quo warranto proceeding, has standing to challenge annexation turns on whether the challenge attacks a city’s authority to annex the area or merely complains of a violation of statutory procedure. Procedural irregularities in the exercise of a city’s annexation power may render the annexation voidable, but do not render the annexation void.
The purpose of a quo warranto proceeding is to question the right of a person or corporation, including a municipality, to exercise a public franchise or office. Thus, a quo warranto suit by the State on behalf of its citizens is the only proper method to challenge procedural irregularities such as lack of notice, adequacy of the service plan, lack of a quorum for hearing, and other defects in the process of adopting an annexation ordinance. Through quo warranto proceedings, “the State acts to protect itself and the good of the public generally, through the duly chosen agents of the State who have full control of the proceeding.” Therefore, the State must bring the action to question irregular use of the delegated annexation authority. A quo warranto proceeding settles the validity of the annexation on behalf of all property owners in the subject area and avoids the problems of successive individual suits that are only binding on the parties and may yield conflicting results.
On the other hand, if the annexation ordinance is wholly void, a quo warranto proceeding is not required. When objections are leveled to an annexation ordinance relating to irregularities that make it voidable only, such objections must be raised by quo warranto; but if an annexation ordinance is challenged as wholly void, it may be challenged by collateral attack by any person affected by the ordinance. Private party challenges to annexation are permitted when the challenge is based on the municipality exceeding the annexation authority delegated to it by the Legislature. The question in this case was whether appellees’ allegation that the annexation ordinance is wholly void, and not merely voidable, is based on a procedural defect in the annexation process, or on the City exceeding its annexation authority as delegated by the Legislature.
Appellees do not challenge any procedural defect in the annexation process, the City’s right to annex the developer’s property, or the City’s right to include gasoline stations within its zoning classifications. Appellees challenge the fact that the City intentionally excluded “gas filling stations” from all of its zoning districts, while simultaneously contracting with the developer for the development of a gasoline station. In other words, the ordinance is wholly void because it constitutes contract zoning.
Impermissible “contract zoning” occurs when a governmental entity agrees to zone land in a certain way in exchange for a landowner’s agreement to use the land in a certain way. Zoning is a legislative function a city cannot cede. Therefore, a city cannot surrender its authority to determine proper land use by contract. Zoning decisions must occur via the legislative process and not by “special arrangement” with a property owner. “[C]ontract zoning is invalid because, by entering into such agreements, the city impermissibly abdicates its authority to determine proper land use, effectively bypassing the entire legislative process.”
On appeal, the substance of the City’s challenge to appellees’ standing to bring a declaratory judgment action implicates the merits of whether the ordinance actually is the result of improper contract zoning. However, in this interlocutory appeal from the denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, this court did not reach the merits of that claim. Instead, the court addressed only whether the trial court has the power to reach the merits of appellees’ claim and concluded that, because appellees’ request for a declaratory judgment rests on whether the annexation ordinance is wholly void, and not merely voidable, a quo warranto proceeding was not required to challenge whether the annexation ordinance is void as the result of contract zoning. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction based on its argument that the appellees lack standing because only the State could challenge the City’s annexation ordinance in a quo warranto proceeding.