On Monday morning, just before the scheduled argument, the court denied the motion because it was filed too late, was not signed by both parties, and failed to address cost allocations. In addition to denying the motion, the court ordered the parties to appear before it to discuss cost allocations.
When the court convened for the oral argument, Farva was a no-show. The court was not happy. It issued an order requiring her to show cause why she should not face professional discipline.
Already in a hole, Farva kept digging. In her response to the show-cause order, she recited that she had relied on opposing counsel to represent her views at the oral argument. But she went on to criticize that same opposing counsel for what she characterized as an inaccurate statement of how costs and fees were to be allocated.
What’s more, Farva’s response did not even attempt to explain why she had waited until after the close of business on the Friday before the scheduled Monday hearing to file her motion, or why she had disregarded the instructions of the clerk’s office and the requirements of Rule 42(b) of the Appellate Rules of Procedure.
Worst of all in the court’s view, Farva seemed oblivious of the fundamental truth that "it is the court’s power, not that of counsel, to decide when a case requires argument." (italics added)
So grave was Farva’s error, the court concluded, that:
Some formal response is necessary. We therefore reprimand Jafri for neglect of her duties to this court. This is a public reprimand, which Jafri must report whenever called on to disclose her disciplinary history.
Farva may have filed the appeal, but it was still the court’s party. (She can, however, cry if she wants to.)
The case is Oasis Legal Finance v. Chodes, 7th Cir.