Aspects of Science, Technology, and Law Connecting Cybersecurity and Environmental Security

Cybersecurity includes protecting enterprise and infrastructure systems and personal identity and privacy. Environmental security includes protecting people from the natural environment (e.g., extreme weather) and protecting the natural environment from human activities (e.g., mitigating climate change risks).

Most people agree that these issues are globally significant but regard them as separate topics. Cybersecurity risks start in cyberspace, and incidents emerge in fractions of a second. Climate change risks begin in the natural environment. Many developments occur over years or even decades. However, there are many similarities beyond being at the top of the risk lists. We discuss these similarities and resulting synergies later in this article.

Several treaties and international agreements focus on cybersecurity and environmental security, but they address these subjects separately.

The “Budapest Convention” (Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001) is the first international agreement aimed at reducing computer-related crime “by harmonizing national laws, improving investigative techniques, and increasing international cooperation.”² The United Nations (UN) Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) does not explicitly address cybercrime.³ However, its provisions are highly relevant to addressing cybercrime by providing protocols for close international cooperation in mitigating criminal activities.⁴

The UN Environmental Programme has stimulated international collaboration and agreements.⁵ Notable among the accomplishments are the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the annual Conference of the Parties (COP), including COP26 in November 2021. The COPs lead to agreements on climate but do not address cybersecurity.

However, cybersecurity and environmental security have many connections that become apparent with a joint analysis. For example, many regulations to protect the environment (e.g., electronic waste disposal) have led to unintended consequences (e.g., salvaged components become platforms for cyberattacks). As discussed later, the digitization of transportation, construction, electric power distribution, and others has reduced many environmental impacts but has led to many cyber vulnerabilities and threats. Moreover, cyber risks have delayed the implementation of systems intended to protect the environment (e.g., emission trading systems, intelligent power meters).

However, some connections are positive. Notably, the efficiency of many systems has improved, and carbon footprints reduced because of business needs to improve security and reliability. As discussed later, some developments initially intended to improve security can mitigate climate risks.

Unintended Negative Consequences of Environmental Regulations Leading to Cybersecurity Threats and Incidents

First, in the United States, 25 states have regulations for electronic waste disposal. “Electronic waste management in the U.S. has been characterized as ‘inconsistent,’ ‘disparate,’ and a ‘patchwork” and has led to a situation in which exporting e-waste to dumps in Africa and Asia from the U.S. is far more profitable than recycling or environmentally safe domestic disposal.⁶ While the e-waste dumps in some African countries are highly toxic health hazards, a significant fraction of the equipment is functional. Some African countries use this equipment to establish second-hand electronics industries to help grow their economies.⁷ However, hackers also take the free equipment and build botnets (i.e., large, automated computer networks) to launch cyberattacks.⁸ Such botnets have led to millions of victims and hundreds of millions of dollars in damage.⁹

Second, there are many environmental regulations for the automobile industry. The EPA reports that “[s]ince model year 2004, CO2 [carbon dioxide] emissions have decreased 24% or 112 g/mi, and fuel economy has increased 32% or 6.1 mpg.”¹⁰ Much of these improvements come from the increase in digital technologies in automobiles. Modern automobiles have more than 100 million lines of code that improve greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increase performance, safety, entertainment, and connectivity. Furthermore, the industry sees a significant opportunity to monetize the information flowing to and from the modern car.¹¹ Juniper Research reports that vehicles with embedded connectivity will grow to 200 million from 110 million in 2020. Widespread implementation of 5G networking will accelerate this growth and monetization potential.¹²

However, digitization makes automobiles a significant cybersecurity target.¹³ A 2019 report stated, “The troubling issue for industry technologists is that these vehicles’ safety-critical systems are being linked to the Internet without adequate security and with no way to disconnect them in the event of a fleet-wide hack.”¹⁴ The Connected Car Report 2020 describes a variety of cybersecurity threats and incidents in automobiles and the industry. The totals are increasing.¹⁵ This report states that “[a]ll of Car and Driver’s top 10 best-selling cars for 2020 . . . have features that allow Internet connectivity with safety critical systems and no known way to disconnect those systems.”¹⁶ There are some emerging regulations and standards to address these threats. For example, the UN Economic Commission for Europe has developed the WP.29 Regulations on Cybersecurity and Software Updates.¹⁷ The International Standards Organization and the Society of Automotive Engineers have created the ISO/SAE 21434:2021 “engineering requirements for cybersecurity risk management in road vehicles.”¹⁸ Some companies (e.g., Ford) have created vehicle security operations centers to respond to current incidents.¹⁹ However, these regulations and standards are in the early stages of global implementation. In the U.S., Congress has taken some initial actions. Senators Markey (D-MA) and Blumenthal (D-CT) have introduced the Security and Privacy in Your Car (SPY Car) Act to address these risks. This legislation directs NHTSA and the FTC to establish federal standards to ensure cybersecurity in increasingly digital vehicles and protect drivers’ safety and privacy.²⁰

Third, farms and agribusinesses are subject to many environmental regulations, notably pesticides, clean air, and water usage.²¹ The agriculture sector contributes to climate change and is affected by climate change. For example, the WEF states, “Food systems are currently responsible for 20–30% of global greenhouse emissions. Inversely, climate change threatens to cut crop yields by over 25%.”²² To comply with regulations and increase yields, agriculture firms are creating new “smart farm (SF)” and “precision agriculture (PA)” products and services based on the Internet of Things (IoT), drones, robotics, and artificial intelligence (AI). The WEF report states that “if 15–25% of farms adopted precision agriculture, global yield could be increased by 10–15% by 2030, while greenhouse gas emissions and water use could reduce by 10% and 20%, respectively.”

While these new developments are promising and potentially extremely valuable, multiple factors limit their growth. These new technologies are still too expensive for many smaller farms in less-developed areas. Moreover, they have also created new cybersecurity vulnerabilities. A recent survey paper defines a taxonomy of cyber threats to various SF and PA-based systems and provides many examples and references.²³ For example, “IoT-based technologies create new cyber-security vulnerabilities and cyber-threats. Hackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to control on-field actuators, sensors, and autonomous vehicles such as tractors, drones, sprayers, and planters, as well as related databases and applications.”²⁴ Other examples include threats to livestock—for instance, “unauthorized changes to data that could negatively influence the health of a herd.” For example, an unauthorized user could alter data to create the appearance of a severe disease outbreak or alter data to inhibit health treatments for the herd.²⁵ These and many other examples show that many cybersecurity improvements are required to realize the benefits of SF and PA in mitigating climate risks.

Climate Risk Mitigation Approaches Limited by Cybersecurity Threats and Incidents

First, carbon markets are the primary market-based systems that may reduce GHG emissions to meet the Paris Agreement goal of limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C. A recent National Law Review article summarizes critical legal and regulatory issues associated with carbon markets. Corporations can purchase carbon credits by helping finance projects that reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2). Carbon markets enable the trading of carbon credits to help organizations meet legal or corporate goals for GHG emission reductions.²⁶ Carbon markets were an important topic at COP26, including significant agreements concerning a global market mechanism framework. The COP26 results are essential to effective large-scale implementation, but the parties must resolve the remaining details and implementation procedures.²⁷ This topic will be an active discussion topic later this year in the leadup to COP27 and in the sessions. However, cybersecurity incidents and threats have slowed progress for several years. For example, in 2013, Interpol published a report entitled “Guide to Carbon Trading Crime.” It stated that “[t]he intangible nature of carbon emissions thus makes investments in emission reductions particularly vulnerable to the fraudulent manipulation of measurements and false or misleading claims concerning the environmental or financial benefits of carbon market investments.”²⁸ A 2015 article in Foreign Policy stated that “Europe’s carbon-trading market was supposed to be capitalism’s solution to global warming. Instead, it became a playground for gangsters, international crime syndicates, and even two-bit crooks—who stole hundreds of millions of dollars in pollution credits.”²⁹ Although this situation is improving, there are still many issues to be resolved to reach the potential for carbon markets to help mitigate climate change risks on a large scale. The lack of transparency is a significant factor limiting the growth of carbon markets and the source of many criticisms. A 2020 paper describes the results of extensive interviews with market stakeholders. It states that “carbon markets remain contested and require new ideas and concepts to construct legitimacy.”³⁰ However, that paper also says, “trust in carbon markets as an appropriate way to address climate change remains high. Therefore, new forms of international emission trading are likely to evolve under article 6 of the Paris agreement.” Furthermore, the voluntary markets are growing in visibility and credibility. Credit qualification standards (e.g., the Verified Carbon Standard from Verra) will help build carbon markets to a significant scale.³¹

The “Smart Grid” is a second area where cybersecurity threats and incidents have limited progress toward mitigating climate risks. The U.S. power grid includes all plants generating electricity and the transmission and distribution systems that bring power to enterprise and retail customers. The need for grid modernization has grown during the past twenty years. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) describes the Smart Grid as “an intelligent electricity grid. It uses digital communications technology, information systems, and automation to detect and react to local changes in usage, improve system operating efficiency, and, in turn, reduce operating costs while maintaining high system reliability.”³² One of the critical aspects of the Smart Grid is the ability to integrate distributed renewable energy sources, including wind and solar, to optimize their productivity despite their variable power generation characteristics.

The power grid contributes significantly to climate change through its CO2 emissions, and its reliability is also greatly affected by extreme weather. The US EIA reports that “[i]n 2020, emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) by the US electric power sector were 1,447 million metric tons (MMmt), or about 32% of total U.S. energy-related CO2 emissions of 4,575 (MMmt).”³³ U.S. DOE also reports that “[t]he leading cause of power outages in the United States is extreme weather, including heatwaves, blizzards, thunderstorms, and hurricanes. Events with severe consequences are becoming more frequent and intense due to climate change. They have been the principal contributors to an observed increase in the frequency and duration of power outages in the United States.”³⁴

Estimates of the potential for widespread Smart Grid implementation to reduce the GHG emissions from the power sector vary, depending notably on the integration of renewable power generation. However, the Global Energy Transformation 2050 report says that “[r]enewable electricity paired with deep electrification could reduce CO2 emissions by 60%, representing the largest share of the reductions necessary in the energy sector.”³⁵

Despite the potential of the Smart Grid to create many economic, operational, and environmental benefits, progress has been slower than anticipated ten to fifteen years ago. A recent analysis of Smart Grid implementations in major countries states that the U.S. implementation is only about 15%.³⁶ There are many reasons for this slow progress, including various social acceptability factors in the relationships among multiple stakeholders.³⁷ Among these factors is concern about consumer data privacy collected by smart meters.³⁸

There have been concerns about cyber threats to the power grid for several years.³⁹ These threats continue to grow. For example, Energy Secretary Granholm warned in an interview last summer that our adversaries can shut down the grid.⁴⁰ The Smart Grid adds an overlay of a computer and communications network to the physical grid of generators, transmission lines, and distribution systems. This overlay has an attack surface vulnerable to various cyber threats. A valuable survey of these threats and possible mitigation measures has recently appeared.⁴¹

The third area in which cybersecurity threats and incidents have limited progress toward mitigating the risks of climate change is the development of “Smart Cities.” Cities are significant sources of GHG emissions, and digital technologies are essential aspects of strategies to improve the efficiency and resilience of city operations. BloombergNEF reports, “Cities only cover 3% of the earth’s land surface, but city infrastructure (mainly buildings, energy, and transport) creates over 70% of carbon emissions. . . . Digital and sustainability policies have started to merge as cities recognize technology’s ability to advance sustainability outcomes.”⁴² For instance, Boston created the “Boston Smart Utilities Program,” whose objective is “developing strategies for more efficient, equitable, sustainable, resilient, and innovative utility services and infrastructure in the City of Boston.”⁴³

Despite the potential advantages of “smart city” initiatives, progress has been slower than many schedules anticipated. There are many causes for this lack of progress, including funding shortfalls, practical ways of scaling beyond the pilot project phase, lack of interagency cooperation, and poor public-private collaboration. However, “[d]ata security concerns are still the top hurdle to the adoption of initiatives involving connected devices, including smart-city deployments.”⁴⁴

Of course, cybersecurity and privacy issues for “smart city” implementations have been the subjects of many initiatives for several years.⁴⁵ However, new threats continue to develop. For example, the danger of a disinformation-based attack on critical infrastructure has only recently been a subject of research. The growth of connected cars could lead to significant security incidents (e.g., adversaries manipulate urban traffic to maximize disruptions to city operations, including emergency response).⁴⁶

Significant mitigations of growing security and privacy threats are essential to faster progress toward reducing GHG emissions. Cybersecurity is high on the list of limiting factors for such improvement, and these threats significantly impact mitigating climate change.

Synergies Between Cybersecurity Developments and Climate Change Risk Mitigation

However, there are also positive consequences resulting from the similarities between cybersecurity developments and climate risk mitigation.

For example, modeling these risks and their effects involves understanding phenomena ranging from microscopic to planetary scale. Consequently, these problems engage some of the world’s best computer and natural scientists. Furthermore, after years of speeches, publications, and legislative actions, the public still understands these risks poorly, so the media must do better. Governments and corporations have spent many billions of dollars to resolve these problems with no end in sight. Consequently, there is still much activity in business formation, government programs, academic research, and intellectual property management focused on addressing the risks and developing resulting benefits.

Pitchbook, the leading provider of venture capital information, recently reported, “Climate change mitigation is turning into a mainstream investment strategy that attracted record amounts of capital in 2021 (e.g., VCs invested $34.2 billion in climate tech in 2021).?”⁴⁷ Pitchbook also reports that “Information security is among the fastest-growing and highest-priority verticals of IT software, and startups are capitalizing on the opportunity.” VC investment in information security companies grew to $25.6B from $11.1B in 2020.⁴⁸ All this investment leads to much new technology and intellectual property. Accordingly, there are increasing opportunities for synergistic applications.

One development showing such synergy is blockchain. Blockchain’s initial development was to secure financial transactions, notably to prevent the duplication of digital transactions.⁴⁹ However, there have been many applications of blockchain technology in recent years, including those areas discussed in this paper.

For example, BloombergNEF reports many opportunities for blockchain technology in the Smart Grid and carbon trading. These opportunities arise from the ongoing digitization of the power industry, the growth of decentralized assets (e.g., renewable generation, microgrids), and the need for more security in carbon trading. “By 2050, there may be over $300 billion worth of decentralized small-scale photo-voltaic solar assets traded. Blockchain can be a valuable tool for asset visibility, optimization, and trading.”⁵⁰ Some companies (e.g., Carbon Connect) are now using blockchain-enabled technology for producing carbon offsets.⁵¹ Executing protocols that do not require the energy-intensive operations of bitcoin trading is a significant advantage in these applications.⁵²

A second technology development showing significant synergy potential is quantum computing. After years of development, quantum computing developments attract substantial capital and show material progress. Pitchbook reports that 269 companies have raised more than $7 billion for development in various areas of quantum computing, with about $3.5 billion raised in the last year.⁵³

Much early funding for quantum computing focused on cryptography.⁵⁴ Theoretically, large-scale quantum computers can break the encryption systems widely used in financial services and other critical infrastructure. There is growing concern about the possibility that such capabilities can become widespread (i.e., Q-Day) and decrypt massive volumes of sensitive information.⁵⁵

However, there are now many potential applications in addition to cybersecurity.⁵⁶ One developing area of possible application is climate change risk mitigation. Potential applications include designing better materials for solar cells, wind turbine blades, and more efficient batteries for large-scale storage. Other applications include optimization algorithms for traffic management to reduce carbon emissions.⁵⁷ BloombergNEF reports that “[m]aterial simulation and system optimization have the biggest implications from a climate-tech perspective.”⁵⁸

Recommendations and Concluding Remarks

Here are three recommendations for future legislation, regulations, standards, and business planning.

First, any legislation or regulations focused on the environment and climate should anticipate and address cyber threats arising from proposed implementations. For example, the rules governing electronic waste disposal must consider cyber risks from equipment disposal.

Second, engineering codes and standards for constructing critical infrastructure (e.g., Smart Grid, Smart Cities) must have a strong climate science and technology foundation. An excellent example of such an approach is a partnership announced at COP26 among NOAA, the American Society of Civil Engineers, and the University of Maryland. This consortium will accelerate the development of significant climate-smart engineering codes and standards. This approach is an excellent model for integrating new science and technology into the legal framework of a global industry essential for future development.⁵⁹

Third, business plans, including R&D and intellectual property management, must recognize potential synergies from climate tech and cybersecurity developments. Both fields attract significant investment and produce substantial intellectual property.

In conclusion, the growth of digital strategies in many industries offers many benefits, including many aspects of climate change mitigation. However, these strategies also create new cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Legislation, regulation, management, operations, and research should jointly consider climate change and cybersecurity for future development.

Endnotes

1. World Econ. F., Global Risks Report 2021: Insight Report (Jan. 2021), https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2021.

2. International and Foreign Cyberspace Law Research Guide, Geo. Law Libr., https://www.law.georgetown.edu.

3. The Budapest Convention and Its Protocols, Council of Eur., https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention.

4. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto,” U.N. Off. on Drugs & Crime, unodc.org.

5. U.N. Env’t Programme, unep.org.

6. Kelsea A. Schumacher & Lawrence Agbemabiese, E-waste Legislation in the US: An Analysis of the Disparate Design and Resulting Influence on Collection Rates Across States, 64 J. Env’t Plan. & Mgmt. 1067 (2021).

7. Mathias Nigatu Bimir, Revisiting E-waste Management Practices in Selected African Countries, 70 J. Air & Waste Mgmt. Ass’n 659 (July 2020).

8. Routledge Companion to Global Cyber-Security Strategy (Scott N. Romaniuk & Mary Manjikian eds., 2021).

9. Press Release, US Dep’t of Just., Emotet Botnet Disrupted in International Cyber Operation (Jan. 28, 2021), justice.gov.

10. US Env’t Prot. Agency, The 2021 EPA Automotive Trends Report, EPA-420-R-21-023 (Nov. 2021).

11. Michele Bertoncello, Christopher Martens, Timo Moller & Tobias Schneiderbauer, Unlocking the Full Life-Cycle Value from Connected-Car Data, McKinsey (Feb. 11, 2021).

12. Cars with Embedded Connectivity to Reach 200 Million by 2025, with 5g Adoption Set to Soar, Juniper Rsch. (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.juniperresearch.com/press/cars-with-embedded-connectivity-to-reach-200.

13. Anthony Martin, Vehicle Cybersecurity: Control the Code, Control the Road, Vehicle Dynamics Int’l (Mar. 18, 2020).

14. Consumer Watchdog, Kill Switch: Why Connected Cars Can Be Killing Machines and How to Turn Them Off (July 2019).

15. Consumer Watchdog, Connected Car Report 2020: The Models Most Open to Hacks (Nov. 2020).

16. Id. at 1.

17. UN Regulations on Cybersecurity and Software Updates to Pave the Way for Mass Roll out of Connected Vehicles, UN Econ. Comm’n of Eur. (June 24, 2020), unece.org.

18. ISO/SAE 21434:2021: Road Vehicles—Cybersecurity Engineering, ISO (Aug. 2021), https://www.iso.org/standard/70918.html.

19. Upstream, 2022 Global Automotive Cybersecurity Report (2022), upstream.com.

20. Press Release, Sen. Ed Markey, Senators Markey and Blumenthal Demand NHTSA Proactively Address the Cyber Risks of Internet-Connected Cars (June 11, 2020), markey.senate.gov.

21. Laws and Regulations That Apply to Your Agricultural Operation by Farm Activity, US Env’t Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/agriculture/laws-and-regulations-apply-your-agricultural-operation-farm-activity.

22. World Econ. F., Innovation with a Purpose: The Role of Technology Innovation in Accelerating Food Systems Transformation at 6 (Jan. 2018).

23. Abbas Yazdinejad et al., A Review on Security of Smart Farming and Precision Agriculture: Security Aspects, Attacks, Threats and Countermeasures, 11 Applied Sci. 7518 (Aug. 2021).

24. Id. at 2.

25. Peter Mutschler et al., 2018 Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program: Threats to Precision Agriculture (Feb. 2020).

26. Samuel L. Brown, Global Carbon Markets: What’s Next?, 11 Nat’l L. Rev., no. 298, Oct. 25, 2021.

27. Dalia Majumder-Russell, Carbon Markets and COP26, CMS Law-Now (Dec. 16, 2021), https://cms.law/en/gbr/.

28. Environmental Crime Programme, Interpol, Guide to Carbon Trading Crime 25 (June 2013).

29. McKenzie Funk, The Hack That Warmed the World, Foreign Policy (Jan. 30, 2015).

30. Mareike Blum, The Legitimation of Contested Carbon Markets after Paris—Empirical Insights from Market Stakeholders, 22 J. Env’t Pol’y & Plan. 226 (2020).

31. Verified Carbon Standard, Verra, https://verra.org/project/vcs-program/.

32. US Dep’t of Energy, Quadrennial Energy Review: Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System (2015), energy.gov.

33. FAQs: How Much of U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions Are Associated with Electricity Generation?, US Energy Info. Admin. (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=77&t=11.

34. US Dep’t of Energy, supra note 32.

35. Int’l Renewable Energy Agency, Global Energy Transformation: A Roadmap to 2050, at 3 (Apr. 2019).

36. Paolo Sospiro et al., Smart Grid in China, EU, and the US: State of Implementation, 14 Energies 5637 (2021).

37. Dylan Bugden & Fichard Stedman, Unfulfilled Promise: Social Acceptance of the Smart Grid, 16 Env’t Rsch. Letters 034019 (2021).

38. Dasom Lee & David J. Hess, Data Privacy and Residential Smart Meters: Comparative Analysis and Harmonization Potential, 70 Util. Pol’y 101188 (2021).

39. Sen. Roy Blunt, Infrastructure Cybersecurity: The U.S. Electric Grid, senate.gov (July 16, 2021).

40. Chandelis Duster, Energy Secretary Says Adversaries Have Capability of Shutting Down US Power Grid, CNN (June 6, 2021).

41. Shahid Tufail, Imtiaz Parvez, Shanzeh Batool & Arif Sarwat, A Survey on Cybersecurity Challenges, Detection, and Mitigation Techniques for the Smart Grid, 14 Energies 5894 (2021).

42. Kirti Vasta, Digital Technologies for Smarter, More Sustainable Cities, BloombergNEF (June 14, 2021).

43. Boston Smart Utilities Program, Bos. Planning & Dev. Agency, bostonplans.org.

44. Kim Hart, Speed Bumps on the Way to Smart Cities, axios.com (Nov. 13, 2019).

45. Rida Khatoun & Sherali Zeadally, Cybersecurity and Privacy Solutions in Smart Cities, 55 IEEE Commc’ns Mag., no. 3, Mar. 2017, at 51.

46. Marcin Waniek et al., Traffic Networks Are Vulnerable to Disinformation Attacks, 11 Sci. Reps. 5329 (2021), nature.com.

47. Svenja Telle, Pitchbook Analyst Note: Archetypal Investing into Climate Tech 5 (Dec. 15, 2021).

48. Emerging Tech Research, Pitchbook, 2021 Annual Information Security Report (Feb. 3, 2022).

49. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, www.bitcoin.org (Mar. 24, 2009); Lewis Popovski & George Soussou, A Brief History of Blockchain, Legaltech News (May 14, 2018).

50. Amanda Ahl, Blockchain Opportunities in Power Still Abound, BloombergNEF (Apr. 23, 2021).

51. Carbon Connect Int’l, https://carbonconnect.io/.

52. Amanda Ahl, Where Blockchain Can Help the Environment, Not Hurt It, BloombergNEF (May 24, 2021).

53. Rsch. Ctr., Quantum Computing, pitchbook.com.

54. Patrick Thibodeau, Thanks to the NSA, Quantum Computing May Someday Be in the Cloud, Computerworld (Jan. 4, 2014).

55. Arthur Herman, Q-Day Is Coming Sooner Than We Think, Forbes (June 7, 2021).

56. McKinsey & Co., Quantum Computing: An Emerging Ecosystem and Industry Use Cases (Dec. 2021).

57. Daphne Leprince-Ringuet, Quantum Computing Could Be an Unexpected Tool to Help Battle Climate Change, ZDNet (Sept. 9, 2021).

58. Technology Spotlight: Quantum Computing, BloombergNEF (July 14, 2021).

59. Press Release, Univ. of Md., Advancing Climate-Smart Infrastructure and Building Construction (Nov. 8, 2021), https://umdrightnow.umd.edu.