Governance of Geoengineering: A Global Issue in Search of a Global Solution

Ideally, releasing iron into the ocean leads to the growth of algae, which in turn absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through photosynthesis. However, it may also lead to dangerous algal blooms that release toxins into the surrounding ocean, harming both humans and wildlife. Spraying reflective small particles as an aerosol into the atmosphere was planned to gather experimental data on what is seen as one of the most practical ways we could currently lower the amount of sunlight entering Earth’s atmosphere. These small particles can reflect sunlight back into space, mitigating climate change by reducing the amount of solar energy reaching Earth’s surface. However, these experiments were halted, in part, because researchers grew concerned about the lack of oversight and risk associated with an untested method for slowing the climate damage from CO₂ emissions.

Understanding the effects of these types of technologies will be important as humanity looks to protect itself from climate change. For humanity to reap the benefits of geoengineering and protect ourselves from climate change, it must be governed from research through deployment. This array of untested strategies for altering the global climate will require a flexible governance framework capable of protecting people while allowing responsible research to progress.

Why Worry About Governance Now?

Geoengineering experiments can be relatively inexpensive to undertake, allowing private “actors” to attempt them with no oversight or regulation. In the early 2000s Russ George founded a private research group (Planktos), who were interested in slowing climate change using “ocean fertilization,” by dumping iron into the ocean.² In 2002, they first performed a small dump of iron into the ocean off the coast of Hawaii using singer Neil Young’s yacht.³ After the initial experiment, Planktos announced plans to release thousands of kilograms of iron particles into the water near the Galapagos Islands. The area was chosen for its lack of regulatory oversight in that it did not need a permit or government approval.⁴ After significant pushback by the Ecuadorian government (who are charged with oversight of the islands), as well as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and other nongovernmental organizations, Planktos decided to go forward with their iron dump off the Pacific Coast of Canada in the territory of the Haida Gwaii instead. While there was again a swift backlash against the actions taken by Planktos, it was too late to stop them from performing the experiment. The outcome was the production of a significant algal bloom. In later studies, including those associated with Environment Canada, performed as follow-up measurements in the same area, to date there has been no conclusive result that showed whether the original Planktos experiment had a positive or negative effect on the environment.

Experiments like those discussed above are continuing, despite public and governmental pushback. The reason is simple: the climate crisis. If the adverse aspects of climate change continue, a significant amount of currently inhabited land area will be rendered unlivable, the ability of people to grow food will be negatively impacted, and humans will be forced to migrate to escape the effects. In an attempt to prevent these adverse aspects of climate change, several countries gathered in Paris to discuss methods to address CO₂ emissions; the result was the Paris Agreement.⁵ The 2016 Paris Climate Agreement’s target aims to ensure that average global temperature never rises past 1.5 degrees (°) Celsius (C) over pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, current worldwide climate policies and agreements already in place among the world’s nations will only limit temperature rise to about 2.9°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. Without a significant change in the way nations and the private sector address climate change, atmospheric temperatures are projected to rise as much as between 4.1 and 4.8°C (7.4 and 8.6° Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial levels by 2100.⁶

Unfortunately, under no foreseeable set of circumstances can the current Paris Climate Agreement’s target be met. Current carbon reduction strategies will be unable to lower emissions in time to avoid catastrophic climate change, thus making geoengineering a necessary tool for protecting humanity.

Oceans are a substantial factor in mediating climate change. The world’s oceans absorb about one-third of the total CO₂ released into the atmosphere, and as a result are becoming more acidic, harming the sea animals, especially fish.⁷ Many people throughout the world rely on the ocean, as a food source and as a source of jobs. Over thirty million people worldwide are employed by the small-scale fisheries that account for over ninety percent of commercial fishers.⁸

Along with the loss of sea life due to increasing temperatures, a 2019 report by the United Nations (UN) found that climate change threatens 25 percent of the entire world’s species with extinction.⁹ Today, the average abundance of native land-based species has fallen by at least 20 percent since 1990, with much of this decline attributed to human action, including alterations to the climate and destruction of native habitats.¹⁰ In addition, humans will have to contend with significant health-related issues arising from climate change. These challenges and other climate issues will lead to increasing pressure on the world’s governments to take immediate action on mitigating the effects of climate change.

What Does a Governance Mechanism Need to Do?

The “precautionary principle” was an idea originating in 1970s German environmental law that “legitimizes the adoption of preventative measures to address potential risks to the public or environment associated with certain activities or policies”; this could be a good starting point to consider mechanisms for regulation of geoengineering.¹¹ As suggested earlier, geoengineering in any form may present an inherently international risk, and thus an international process is needed when adopting preventative measures addressing this risk.

Without regulation or governance, governments around the world may be pressured to begin geoengineering activity to combat climate change and will respond whether or not the needed regulatory systems are in place. Each country must decide for itself the right time to use geoengineering based on its geography, economy, and numerous other factors including politics. For example, countries with significant land area at risk of flooding due to sea level rise will likely be more inclined to attempt geoengineering as the risk of unknown negative consequences is outweighed by the very real loss of homes and lives. The population of a country feeling the impacts of climate change will put increasing pressure on their government to act as they suffer more climate change–connected natural disasters, such as droughts or wildfires.¹² Corporations may also push for the use of geoengineering as they see the opportunity to reap significant profit from the manufacturing and implementation of these large-scale projects.

Any geoengineering governance mechanism must define the parameters under which research may proceed safely. Existing regulatory mechanisms targeted at research are rare, with scientists generally being able to control the direction of their own geoengineering research without interference from government and politicians.¹³ However the unknown risks of geoengineering, and the technology’s global nature, make addressing safe experimentation essential. There is also a possible danger that once a technology is demonstrated as effective, there will be less willingness among the public and by governments to work on or implement other methods of reducing CO₂ emissions. This is more than a theoretical concern, as organizations and popular authors have already suggested that geoengineering is a simpler and more cost-effective solution to climate change than converting power generation to carbon-neutral sources. ¹⁴

Where Is the Existing Governance?

Current regional and national governance of geoengineering has been mainly focused on carbon capture and storage. Geoengineering can include the removal of CO₂ from the atmosphere, such as through the use of technology like “mechanical trees.”¹⁵ When CO₂ is captured, it has to be stored somewhere to prevent it returning to the atmosphere, and one solution is to trap the CO₂ in underground wells. In 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued rules applicable to CO₂ storage wells.¹⁶ EPA’s rules on wells are focused on protecting the water table, requiring the company operating the well to monitor the area for signs of CO₂ leaks.¹⁷ To ensure continuity of monitoring, and reduce the risk of a company drilling the well and then abandoning it, EPA requires the site owner to prove they can fund long-term monitoring.¹⁸ This may be a response to the issue of site abandonment in other industries, such as mining, where an area is abandoned after environmental damage is done, requiring EPA to step in and clean up.

Carbon capture and sequestration technology was also addressed in a 2009 European Union directive. This directive established a “legal framework for the environmentally safe geological storage of CO₂,” and seeks to “prevent and, where this is not possible, eliminate as far as possible negative effects and any risk to the environment and human health.” ¹⁹ Like EPA rules, the EU directive attempts to minimize site contamination risks and ensure long-term monitoring of well sites. The major differences between two approaches are the EU requirement for government involvement in monitoring well sites, and longer monitoring times than those established by EPA.

Some existing international treaties, particularly those focused on governing the use of the ocean, may also directly or indirectly address governing of geoengineering. One example is the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, also known as the London Convention. Enacted in 1975, the London Convention counts many of the countries with a significant marine presence as members, including the United States and China; however, some countries, such as India, remain nonparties.²⁰ In 1996 the London Convention was expanded with the ratification of the London Protocol by 53 signatories. Both the London Convention and Protocol contain restrictions on dumping waste into the ocean, however it left the status of “ocean fertilization,” the release of iron or other nutrients that promote algae growth into the ocean, unclear.²¹ To address this uncertainty, later an oversight system for “research on ocean fertilization and other marine-based geoengineering techniques” was proposed, and in 2008 all parties to both agreements agreed to a resolution restricting the use of ocean fertilization to “legitimate scientific research.”²²

Another treaty that potentially addresses geoengineering governance, The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), came into force in December 1993. The UNCBD’s main objectives were conserving biological diversity, encouraging the sustainable use of the components of biological diversity, and ensuring equitable sharing of the benefits that arise from use of the ocean’s genetic resources (using genetic resources generally refers to the process of researching beneficial properties of ocean life for greater scientific understanding or commercial gain).²³ In line with the first two of these objectives, in 2008 the UNCBD asked for a prohibition on the use of ocean fertilization pending demonstration of its safety and encouraged its members to follow the London Convention and Protocol.²⁴ This has presented an issue for some observers, who note that the only way to prove ocean fertilization is safe is by conducting the type of research the UNCBD has banned.

Finally, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) contains provisions restricting the types of research conducted at sea. Under the UNCLOS, only “competent” parties are allowed to conduct research.²⁵ Further, the results of research must be released publicly, and the research projects may not interfere with others’ use of the oceans.²⁶ The force of the UNCLOS is so great that is considered customary international law, and is binding even on nonparties.²⁷

Some Have Recognized the Issues and Want to Help

Several national and international groups are currently working towards setting out the direction geoengineering governance should take in the future. One such effort comes from the Oxford Geoengineering Program, the developers of the “Oxford Principles.”²⁸ The Oxford Principles were created to serve as a guide to the development of geoengineering techniques, from research through deployment, and emphasize that deployment decisions should only be made when appropriate governance structures exist. The Oxford Principles have been recognized as providing valuable guidance to efforts towards geoengineering governance and have been endorsed by the government of the United Kingdom.²⁹ The principles are:

• Principle 1: Geoengineering to be regulated as a public good.
• Principle 2: Public participation in geoengineering decision-making.
• Principle 3: Disclosure of geoengineering research and open publication results.
• Principle 4: Independent assessment of impacts.
• Principle 5: Governance before deployment.

Principles 1 through 3 serve an important function in building public trust in geoengineering by ensuring public disclosure and participation in the decision-making process about how and when geoengineering should be used.³⁰ Replication, the ability of other researchers to recreate a study to validate the findings, is a core principle of scientific research and Principle 4 reflects that.

Earlier, a 2009 report of the UK Royal Society on geoengineering³¹ (on which the Oxford Principles are based) acted as a guide for the Asilomar Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies, a 2010 meeting held by the Climate Response Fund.³² Over 300 international experts with diverse ranges of backgrounds came together to set out principles for responsible geoengineering research. A set of principles were agreed upon, but an important decision was made that making progress with the discussion of governing geoengineering would require input from a larger and more diverse group. A follow-up meeting did not materialize, and the Climate Response Fund is, unfortunately, no longer active.

What Can We Learn from Current Climate Treaties?

Two international agreements addressing climate issues serve as useful guides to what a future geoengineering treaty could look like, and what it would take to get there. The first is the Montreal Protocol, finalized in 1987, in which parties agreed to phase out the use of ozone-depleting substances.³³ The Montreal Protocol has been largely successful, after being ratified by 197 countries and becoming the first environmental treaty to reach complete ratification, and has resulted in a 98 percent reduction in the use of substances restricted by the agreement.³⁴ The success of the agreement can be attributed to many factors, including an unprecedented level of cooperation from the international community. Initial negotiations for the Montreal Protocol were held in small, informal groups, which allowed for a genuine exchange of views. Scientists’ inclusion in these groups helped offer the discussions more legitimacy and encouraged the drafters to ensure the agreement was highly flexible to account for unknowns, like what other substances needed to be regulated to protect the ozone layer. The Montreal Protocol has even been extended to address climate change with a move to reduce the use of hydrofluorocarbons, a potent greenhouse gas (GHG) with no impact on ozone levels. These are currently used as a replacement for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which were eliminated under the original version of the Montreal Protocol.³⁵ The flexibility of the document proved valuable when it was later discovered that ozone depletion had been underestimated, and the Montreal Protocol’s controls needed to be made stricter.

The Kyoto Protocol³⁶ and its successor the Paris Climate Accords offer factors that promote or inhibit an international agreement’s success such as setting practical targets and promoting cooperation between member states. The most important factor in building any agreement is to have a strong political foundation to prevent parties from choosing to leave the agreement unilaterally. Unfortunately, the Kyoto Protocol has generally been seen as a failure due to many factors.³⁷ The Kyoto Protocol was envisioned by its drafters at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a way to “operationalize” the recommendations of the UNFCCC by committing the signatories to reduce their mean annual GHG emissions by about 5 percent of 1990 levels by the year 2012. Along with CO₂, several other GHGs were included in the agreement, including methane and nitrous oxide; however, the reduction targets were determined based on the warming equivalent to CO₂. Another problem was the ease with which signatories were able to withdraw or modify their commitments due to the nonbinding nature of the agreement. The Paris Agreement offers more promise in its ability to drive signatory nations to reduce all GHG emissions. Mitigation of the effects of climate change, such as sea level rise and increasing wildfires, was also discussed as an element of the agreement, which may eventually drive a greater interest in the use of geoengineering.³⁸ Unfortunately, many problems of the Kyoto Protocols were carried over and included in the Paris Agreement, particularly the ability for signatories to unilaterally withdraw. Member nations’ ability to withdraw at any time, without facing repercussions, means it is up to each country to maintain the political will to live up to the agreement. When a country no longer feels that pressure from its citizens, such as when there is a change of government, the lack of an enforcement mechanism and subsequent departure of an important member weakens the agreement as a whole. For example, the United States has already withdrawn and then reentered the agreement since its inception in 2015.³⁹ This weakens international perception of the agreement, and had the United States not reentered may have made the goal of the Paris Agreement to limit temperature rise impossible to achieve.

Soft Law Governance Offers a Path Forward

Soft law is an approach to governance that includes private standards, guidelines, codes of conduct, and forums for transnational dialogue.⁴⁰ Soft law is a sort of middle-of-the-road strategy, widely used in international law, sitting between formal legal agreements like laws and treaties on one side and a complete absence of commitment by the parties on the other.⁴¹ A precise definition of soft law is challenging because the border between hard law and soft law is vague, especially in the context of international agreements. For example, even some international agreements like the UNFCCC that are referred to as legally binding lack the sort of enforcement mechanisms that would clearly take them outside the realm of soft law and instead may be seen as simply forums for transnational dialogue. However, a “framework convention” like the UNFCCC does serve an important role in soft law, bringing together interested parties to discuss solutions. Agreements that fall under the definition of soft law are generally not directly enforceable, but instead create powerful expectations that encourage participants to adhere to a set of restrictions.⁴² Lack of direct enforceability is a significant downside to soft law agreements as it requires that the agreement keep parties involved through other mechanisms such as public support, or international pressure. This governance model has found success in guiding several fields, including nanotechnology.

The flexibility a soft law–based approach for geoengineering can be a major advantage over hard law. With the use of hard law, there is a risk of over- or under-regulation. This is compounded by the long and political process of modifying laws, making changes slow and challenging. As the impacts of catastrophic climate change are increasingly felt, some are pushing for shorter deployment timelines of geoengineering, and the flexibility and speed with which soft law can be adapted makes it a superior governance strategy for geoengineering. As research into the various proposed geoengineering technologies advances, it may be that some are ready for immediate deployment to counteract the damaging effects of climate change. In that case it will be advantageous to have a governance mechanism that is easily adapted to allow for deployment of a safe technology. A research experiment may also show that a specific geoengineering technology is particularly dangerous, in which case a mechanism that is able to quickly adapt will be critical to stop any other proposed experiments with that technology from going forward and causing harm.

As indicated above, nanotechnology’s development is an example from which many lessons can be learned when looking to use soft law for geoengineering governance. Earlier on nanotechnology posed an unknown level of risk, and the potential dangers were seen as global. Scientists, governments, and private entities recognized the potential dangers and agreed on a need for governance for nanotechnology. There were some laws addressing aspects of the technology as it began to gain widespread attention. These laws were limited to certain types of nanotechnology applications, such as cosmetics, and did not offer guidance for all users of the technology from a single set of regulations.⁴³ Soft law mechanisms, such as the EDF-DuPont NanoRisk Framework, have helped fill in the legal gaps and serve as a useful reference point for the slower process of government policymaking.⁴⁴

This differs somewhat from geoengineering discussions, where many scientists and private actors believe the need to act is greater than the need for governance. Geoengineering’s perceived “dangers” are very similar, in that there is an unknown risk from using the various geoengineering technologies, and the impact of any accident could be global in nature. In the context of governance of geoengineering, although there are no current laws specific to geoengineering, ocean fertilization technology is already somewhat regulated by the UNCBD even though it was not specifically addressed until later. Existing governance mechanisms may not be capable of being extended to fully regulate geoengineering, in which case a new solution would be needed.

Developing a Framework Convention

“Framework conventions” set out a framework for international agreement on an issue of common concern.⁴⁵ Framework conventions are international agreements under which signatories pledge to take future action to address a problem, and that may develop into more formal and enforceable agreements over time, like with the UNFCCC leading to the Kyoto and Paris climate agreements. A framework serves as a guide for further talks and future national-level legislation by setting down the principles and objectives on which the parties can agree. Signatories then have additional time to work out the specific details of national legislation, offering flexibility for members to meet the objectives in their own way.⁴⁶ Organizations created to administer a framework convention also serve as an important meeting place for governments to come together and discuss problems in need of international solutions.

A framework convention approach was proposed for nanotechnology, and a similar type of framework convention may be useful in guiding geoengineering governance in the future.

Early on, nanotechnology, like geoengineering today, presented a global risk not limited to national boundaries and a transnational framework was needed for governments to follow in order to ensure uniform global protections from the unknown dangers of this technology.⁴⁷ Global standards for new technologies are a critically important aspect of transnational frameworks, ensuring an even playing field for all countries. Many of the current frameworks seek to ensure economic benefits and burdens are shared between the signatories in a “fair” manner, for example, the UNCLOS’s requirement to share the benefits of ocean research with the world. Still, transnational frameworks are not a substitute for national laws. National laws remain the key implementation step of any regulatory framework, providing the enforceability required to bind private parties to the rules set down by the framework.

Framework conventions have been used in the climate context before. The UNFCCC that led to the Kyoto Protocol, discussed above, was referenced as a positive model for governing technologies like nanotechnology.⁴⁸ Ideally a framework convention directed at geoengineering would likely lead to further agreements among parties, addressing research and implementation of the technology as our understanding develops.

Some types of geoengineering governance have already begun down the path towards a framework agreement. Many advocacy organizations, such as the Oxford Geoengineering Programme and the Environmental Defense Fund, have staked out clear public positions, and these organizations have brought the relevant issues, such as the need for governance of research specifically, to the attention of national governments (e.g., the UK government’s adoption of the Oxford Geoengineering Principles). National governments are the only ones positioned to begin a transnational dialogue that would lead to a framework convention organization being formed. A framework convention organization could serve as an important place for the development of soft law around geoengineering, allowing input from interested parties in the development of a framework convention. As discussed earlier, there are several proposals for addressing appropriate norms for geoengineering, such as the rules for what types of research may be conducted and requirements for public dissemination of the research, but discussions have not progressed to the phase where mechanisms of enforcement and implementation have been considered.

What Would a Framework for Geoengineering Look Like?

Addressing climate change has reached a point of urgency, where geoengineering will be needed as one of the tools in “humanity’s belt” for addressing the catastrophic effects of temperature increases and environmental geoengineering; it will also be a field where advancements in scientific understanding are likely to come rapidly. Soft law regulation through a transnational framework would offer the most practical method for geoengineering governance, and the scope of a framework could be applied to all geoengineering technologies. However, learning from the Montreal Protocol, a regulatory scope that is initially limited in nature, possibly addressing only one geoengineering technology such as ocean fertilization, with the flexibility to expand is more likely to succeed. The scope of the governed geoengineering technologies could be expanded to other applications after success is demonstrated. Again, this would be similar to what was seen with the expansion of the Montreal Protocol to cover additional ozone-damaging chemicals. Ideally, the success of the initial agreement with its narrow focus will build momentum towards broadening the agreement until all geoengineering technologies are included.

Future Use of Geoengineering in Fighting Climate Change

Currently, stratospheric aerosol injection and ocean fertilization are the most suitable targets for a geoengineering framework convention. Both technologies have rapidly reached the point where testing is both economically feasible and necessary to further understand potential risks, such as seen in the case of the unregulated experiments on ocean fertilization discussed earlier. The ease with which either of these geoengineering technologies could be deployed should make it easier to demonstrate the need for regulation of this technology is no longer a theoretical concern and must be enacted as soon as possible.

The global impact of geoengineering is another reason that a framework convention is the most suitable governance mechanism. Dealing with a global issue requires a global solution. A framework development process could be an opportunity to educate national governments on the importance of this issue. As discussed previously, the framework convention is there to support and guide the development of national laws that can be enforced by individual governments. Governments might be more willing to implement and enforce these laws if a framework convention organization is able to engage in education and outreach during the development process.

The London Convention offers lessons on how to build an even stronger framework for geoengineering governance. While the London Convention was successful in encouraging industrialized countries to avoid disposing of waste at sea, it faced issues of recruiting coastal states to sign on. One way to solve this type of resistance is by involving the private sector in the discussion and adoption of a geoengineering framework. Also, including the private sector in discussions could ensure that business interests and needs are heard by governmental entities. Inclusion of the private sector in the framework process might also help limit the ability of any private party (like Planktos) to attempt unsanctioned geoengineering experiments.

Finally, we can look to the Oxford Principles for guidance for geoengineering development. These principles originated in a Royal Society paper written in 2009 by a group of researchers at the University of Oxford, University College London, and University of Cardiff. The authors of the Royal Society paper submitted their principles to the UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, and they were recognized by the committee in 2010.⁴⁹ In 2011, the Royal Society paper’s principles were adopted by Oxford Geoengineering for development as the Oxford Principles.⁵⁰

The principles of the 2009 Royal Society paper, which would later be adopted as the “Oxford Principles,” also formed the basis of at least one attempt to create a governance model for geoengineering, through the Asilomar Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies. This led to positive media coverage of the principles for governing geoengineering, resulting in increased discussion of geoengineering. This points out the extreme importance of media engagement in developing successful framework conventions, as public pressure is a key driver of government action.⁵¹ While the Oxford Principles are broad, they could be narrowed to address only a single area of geoengineering—ocean fertilization or stratospheric aerosol injection—we are interested in.

Where Do We Go Now?

International action on carbon dioxide emissions has faced many setbacks, and even if all current targets are met, the Earth is set to warm dangerously by the year 2100. Lowering carbon emissions and using geoengineering to protect human civilization until CO₂ levels stabilize and begin to come down may be one of the only ways to prevent the worst effects of catastrophic climate change. To achieve this, research and implementation of geoengineering will need to be governed in a way that enables the safe use of these technologies. A soft law approach using a framework convention to guide national legislation and rulemaking offers the best approach to regulating geoengineering. The flexibility of soft law will allow the framework convention to adapt as we learn about geoengineering’s impacts through research. As with the UNCBD, the results of that research can be required to be open to all. This benefits everyone, even those countries without an active research program or that are researching a limited set of geoengineering technologies.

Framework conventions have already been used to successfully address other technological risks, like nanotechnology and the use of CFCs. A framework convention can find success with geoengineering as well. The time is now, with the climate at a turning point, to begin the hard work of coming together and forming a framework agreement that will allow for the safe use of geoengineering.

Endnotes

1. Geoengineering is “the deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s natural systems to counteract climate change.” What Is Geoengineering?, Oxford Geoeng’g Program, http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/what-is-geoengineering/what-is-geoengineering (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).

2. Planktos Ecosystems, Planktos, http://www.planktos.com.

3. Ocean Fertilization (Technology Factsheet), Geoeng’g Monitor (May 30, 2018), http://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2018/05/ocean-fertilization; The Ragland Project, Geoeng’g Monitor (July 17, 2002), http://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2018/05/ocean-fertilization.

4. Ocean Fertilization, supra note 3.

5. UNFCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-first Session, (Jan. 29, 2016), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf. The term “pre-industrial levels” is not defined within the Paris Climate Agreement, but the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, uses the timeframe from 1850–1900 as a reference for pre-industrial temperature. See M. Allen et al., Frequently Asked Questions at 7, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_FAQ_Low_Res.pdf.

6. Temperatures, Climate Action Tracker (Sept. 23, 2020), https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures.

7. Ocean Acidification, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. (updated Apr. 2020), https://www.noaa.gov/education/resource-collections/ocean-coasts/ocean-acidification.

8. UN Report: Nature’s Dangerous Decline “Unprecedented”; Species Extinction Rates “Accelerating,” Sustainable Dev. Goals Blog (May 6, 2019), https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/nature-decline-unprecedented-report.

9. Id.

10. Id.

11. Precautionary Principle, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/precautionary-principle (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).

12. See Clive Hamilton, Geoengineering: Our Last Hope, or a False Promise?, N.Y. Times (May 26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/27/opinion/geoengineering-our-last-hope-or-a-false-promise.html.

13. Albert C. Lin, The Missing Pieces of Geoengineering Governance, 230 Minn. L. Rev. 2518 (2016).

14. Robert L. Olson, Geoengineering for Decision Makers 13 (Nov. 2011).

15. Victoria Harker, ASU Professor’s “Mechanical Trees” Pull Tons of CO₂ from Air, Chamber Bus. News (Feb. 24, 2020), https://chamberbusinessnews.com/2020/02/24/asu-professors-mechanical-trees-pull-tons-of-co2-from-air.

16. Wells Used for Geologic Sequestration of CO₂, Env’t Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/uic/class-vi-wells-used-geologic-sequestration-co2 (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).

17. Id.

18. Id.

19. Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of CO₂ and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 114.

20. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Int’l Marine Org., https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/London-Convention-Protocol.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2020).

21. See generally 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972, Aug. 30, 1975.

22. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972, Resolution LC-LP.1, Nov. 2, 2006.

23. Introduction, Convention on Biological Diversity (Jan. 16, 2012), https://www.cbd.int/intro. The Convention on Biological Diversity arguably operates as a soft law mechanism at this point because its decisions set nonbinding targets and do not impart obligations on signatories. See generally Stuart R. Harrop & Diana J. Pritchard, A Hard Instrument Goes Soft: The Implications of the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Current Trajectory, 21 Glob. Env’t Change 474 (Jan. 14, 2011).

24. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, The Convention on Biological Diversity Year in Review 2008, at 26 (2008).

25. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 238–240, Dec. 10, 1982.

26. Id.

27. Id.

28. Steve Rayner et al., The Oxford Principles, 121 Climatic Change 499 (Jan. 24, 2013).

29. History, Oxford Geoeng’g Program, http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/oxford-principles/history (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).

30. The Principles, Oxford Geoeng’g Program, http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/oxford-principles/principles/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).

31. Royal Soc’y, Geoengineering the Climate (Sept. 2009), https://royalsociety.org/~/media/royal_society_content/policy/publications/2009/8693.pdf.

32. Asilomar Sci. Org. Comm., The Asilomar Conference Recommendations on Principles for Research into Climate Engineering Techniques 2 (2010).

33. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-environmental-quality-and-transboundary-issues/the-montreal-protocol-on-substances-that-deplete-the-ozone-layer (last visited Jan. 15, 2021). Complete ratification refers to an agreement that has been ratified by every country and was achieved by the Montreal Protocol in 2012 when South Sudan ratified the agreement. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Austl. Gov’t Dep’t of Agric., Water and the Environment, https://www.environment.gov.au/protection/ozone/montreal-protocol (last visited Jan. 21, 2021).

34. Thirty Years On, What Is the Montreal Protocol Doing to Protect the Ozone?, UN Env’t Programme, https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/thirty-years-what-montreal-protocol-doing-protect-ozone (last visited Jan. 21, 2021).

35. The Montreal Protocol Evolves to Fight Climate Change, U.N. Indus. Dev. Org. (last visited July 28, 2020), https://www.unido.org/our-focus-safeguarding-environment-implementation-multilateral-environmental-agreements-montreal-protocol/montreal-protocol-evolves-fight-climate-change.

36. What Is the Kyoto Protocol?, U.N. Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol (last visited Jan. 20, 2021).

37. Michael Le Page, Was Kyoto Climate Deal a Success? Figures Reveal Mixed Results, New Scientist (June 14, 2016), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2093579-was-kyoto-climate-deal-a-success-figures-reveal-mixed-results.

38. The Paris Agreement, U. N. Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement (last visited Jan. 18, 2021).

39. Nathan Rott, Biden Moves to Have U.S. Rejoin Climate Accord, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/inauguration-day-live-updates/2021/01/20/958923821/biden-moves-to-have-u-s-rejoin-climate-accord.

40. Gary E. Marchant & Braden Allenby, Soft Law: New Tools for Governing Emerging Technologies, 73 Bull. Atomic Scientists 108, 108 (2017); See also Cary Coglianese, Environmental Soft Law as a Governance Strategy, 61 Jurimetrics J. at 1–18 (2020).

41. Andrew R. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. Legal Analysis 171, 180 (2010).

42. Id.

43. See FDA’s Approach to Regulation of Nanotechnology Products, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/science-research/nanotechnology-programs-fda/fdas-approach-regulation-nanotechnology-products (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).

44. Diana M. Bowman, The Role of Soft Law in Governing Nanotechnologies, 61 Jurimetrics J. 53, 66 (2020).

45. See Sam Foster Halabi, The World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Guidelines Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 39 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 121 (2010) (discussing the history and effectiveness of the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control).

46. Comm. on Hous. & Land Mgmt.., Framework Convention Concept, Econ. Comm. Eur. (Oct. 4, 2011) https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/sessions/docs2011/informal.notice.5.pdf.

47. See Gary E. Marchant & Douglas J. Sylvester, Transnational Models for Regulation of Nanotechnology, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 714, 717 (2006).

48. See id. at 715.

49. UK House of Commons Sci. & Tech. Comm., The Regulation of Geoengineering, Fifth Rep. of Session 2009–10 (Mar. 10, 2010), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/221/221.pdf.

50. Press Release, Oxford University, “Oxford Principles” Provide a Code of Conduct for Geoengineering Research (Sept. 14, 2011).

51. We All Want to Change the World, Economist (Apr. 3, 2010), https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2010/03/31/we-all-want-to-change-the-world.