Recent concerns related to the protection of voting systems from cyber threats and technical manipulation are well documented. Threats of system manipulation by technical computer experts and warnings of cyber intrusion by nation-states demand that system manufacturers and operators take additional steps to protect the voting systems. Early recommendations for the protections of and assurances that voting systems are performing as designed were introduced in the first generation of voting system standards that established a set of reliable technical standards for the security, accuracy, and accessibility of voting systems. The continuous development of these voting system standards is intended to increase the security and reliability of voting systems and to spur innovation in the development of new systems that further ensure security and accessibility for years to come.
March 01, 2018
The ABCs and 123s of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
By Clifford Tatum
This article explains the basics of voting system standards, identifies the authority for the development of voting system standards, identifies who is involved in developing these standards, and describes the process for how voting system standards are developed.
The History of Voting in America
Over the course of American history, casting a vote has been accomplished by all of the following methods: (1) voice votes; (2) paper ballots, i.e., slips of paper dropped into a ballot box and counted by hand, punch card paper ballots counted by computer, or optical mark-sense paper ballots counted by computer; (3) mechanical lever machines; and (4) direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines that record a cast ballot in computer memory.1
Through all of these voting methods, election officials have continuously sought to protect the voting process from fraud, manipulation, or mistake. Early on this protection naturally focused on fraudulent activity associated with paper ballots, i.e., ballot box stuffing, multiple votes cast by a single voter, mistake of voter intent while marking a paper ballot, and the accuracy of counting votes marked on paper ballots. However, as electronic computing of votes cast became more and more prevalent, election officials and critics alike became aware of the need to ensure the security, accuracy, and reliability of computer systems used to count the votes.
In 1975, the Office of Federal Elections of the General Accounting Office, now known as the Federal Election Commission (FEC), requested the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), formerly known as the National Bureau of Standards, to conduct a study on the use of computers and vote tallying. The study and report issued by NIST concluded that there were significant problems with the technology used to count votes.2
As a result of this report, Congress authorized the FEC in cooperation with NIST to conduct a study and report on the feasibility of developing “voluntary engineering and procedural performance standards for voting systems used in the United States.”3 This law required the FEC to report to Congress the results of the study and include recommendations, if any, for the implementation of a program of such standards (including estimates of the costs and time requirements of implementing the program).
The FEC with the support of NIST released its study on the feasibility of implementing voting system standards in 1982, and in 1990 the FEC issued the first ever voluntary standards for punch card, optical scan, and DRE voting systems known as the Voting System Standards (VSS). These standards were the first of their kind to be used by voting system manufacturers and election officials to assess the quality of voting systems.4
However, the FEC was not authorized to evaluate or ensure that voting system manufacturers were building their systems to those standards. In fact, the manufacturers through independent testing authorities conducted their own tests to the standards; these tests were reviewed by the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED), a nongovernmental entity, which issued a NASED number to systems that had been tested to the FEC 1990 VSS. The VSS were updated by the FEC in 2002 to reflect changes in technology.
It was not until the passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and the creation of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) that the federal government took an active role in certifying voting systems and ensuring that voting system manufacturers built systems that adhered to voting system standards. This landmark legislation authorized the EAC to establish new Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG); created a “Testing and Certification Program” designed to test, certify, and decertify voting systems to the VVSG; and authorized the EAC to ensure that certified systems continuously adhered to the requirements established by the VVSG. As part of its responsibilities, the EAC, along with the assistance of NIST, conducts audits of the test labs and accredits new laboratories with the authority to test new and modified voting systems to the VVSG.5
What Are the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines?
The VVSG are a set of federal specifications and requirements against which voting systems are tested to determine if they meet certain standards under a conformance assessment process. In order for a voting system to receive certification, the system and all its corresponding components must meet all applicable guidelines contained within the VVSG. Factors examined under these test requirements include: basic functionality related to hardware and software, accessibility, usability, paperwork and documentation, and security capabilities.6
Four iterations of national level voting system standards have been developed by the federal government: the FEC’s 1990 VSS, the 2002 VSS adopted by the FEC and subsequently transferred to the authority of the EAC, the VVSG 1.0 adopted by the EAC in 2005, and the VVSG 1.1 adopted by the EAC in 2015. The VVSG 1.1 was created by the EAC in an effort to update and improve version 1.0 in the areas of security, reliability, usability, and accessibility. These improvements enhanced the testability and clarity of several of the requirements contained in the VVSG 1.0.7 The EAC currently is proposing a fifth iteration referred to as the VVSG 2.0, which is expected to be adopted no later than May 2018.
What Is the Purpose of the VVSG?
The purpose of the VVSG is to provide a national level of specifications and requirements against which voting systems can be tested to determine if they provide all the basic functionality, accessibility, and security capabilities required to ensure the integrity of voting systems. These specifications allow a state and local government to rely on the fact that the voting system meets the functional requirements, performance characteristics, documentation requirements, and test evaluation criteria for the national certification of voting systems. The creation of the EAC’s Testing and Certification Program is the critical first step in the process of maintaining the reliability, accuracy, accessibility, and security of the voting systems used in our nation’s elections.
Who Creates the VVSG?
The EAC, utilizing three federal advisory committees—the Standards Board, the Board of Advisors, and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC)—is charged with developing and continuously updating the VVSG on a periodic basis.8
The Standards Board is composed of 110 members—55 state election officials selected by the chief state election official of each state and territory and 55 local election officials selected from each state and territory in accordance with a process supervised by the chief state election official.9
The Board of Advisors is composed of 35 members selected from organizations named in HAVA.10 (The statute specifies 37 members; however, this number was reduced when two of the named organizations merged in 2016.)
The TGDC is composed of the director of NIST and 14 other individuals appointed jointly by the EAC and the NIST director. These 14 individuals are selected from organizations named specifically in HAVA and from individuals with technical and scientific expertise related to voting systems and voting equipment. Pursuant to HAVA, the director of NIST serves as the chair of the TGDC and provides all technical support and research needed to develop specifications for the VVSG.11 An EAC commissioner serves as the designated federal officer of the advisory committee pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). FACA governs the activities of all federal advisory committees (with a few exceptions).12
During the developmental stages of the VVSG, the TGDC utilizes working groups to discuss, review, and propose criteria related to specifications and requirements of the VVSG. Once the TGDC submits VVSG recommendations to the EAC, the EAC forwards those recommendations to the Board of Advisors and the Standards Board for a 90-day review and comment period, and subsequently publishes the proposed VVSG in the Federal Register for public comment. The EAC is required to hold a public hearing on the record before voting on the approval of the VVSG or any modifications to the VVSG. The EAC may not vote on the final adoption of the VVSG until the expiration of the 90-day review period.13
How Are the VVSG Used?
Once the VVSG are adopted, the voting manufacturers are able to use the requirements to test new systems, modified systems, or components thereof to the new standards. Although participation by states in the EAC’s certification program is voluntary, over 40 states currently require EAC certification or have adopted some form or component of the VVSG or the EAC’s Testing and Certification Program into their jurisdiction’s process. The states and local election officials are able to rely on the EAC’s national voting system certification program to independently verify that voting systems comply with the functional capabilities, accessibility, and security requirements of the VVSG.
The Future of the VVSG
The current proposed iteration of the VVSG 2.0 contemplates the next generation of voting systems that have yet to be developed. During the development of the proposed VVSG 2.0, the TGDC utilized public working groups, for the first time, to discuss, review, and propose criteria related to specifications and requirements of the VVSG iteration as they were being developed. This method allowed for public comment throughout the entire development of the VVSG. The scope of this version focuses on 17 core principles of a voting system and provides a “more nimble high level set of principles and guidelines” that can be applied to all types of devices and components as opposed to the previous and cumbersome device-specific guidelines.
The proposed VVSG 2.0 is structured in the following manner: “high level systems design goals,” “guidelines,” “requirements,” and “test assertions,” much like the standards generated by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). These principles and guidelines will allow for a more efficient development of system requirements that test the functionality of new components and allow for easier development of test assertions that more efficiently determine whether the voting system components are functioning properly and doing what they are designed to do. This level of flexibility in the development of the standards will increase the efficiency and speed in which new systems can be developed and tested.
The proposed VVSG 2.0 has been recommended for adoption to the EAC, and the EAC has referred it to the advisory boards for review and comment. The EAC will publish the proposed VVSG 2.0 in the Federal Register for public comment, after which the EAC commissioners will deliberate and determine whether to adopt the VVSG 2.0. To see the proposed VVSG 2.0 as recommended by the TGDC, visit the EAC website at www.eac.gov.
Conclusion
The importance of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines in the development and protection of voting systems used throughout the country cannot be overstated. One need only review the history of elections in America to understand the importance of standards designed to improve reliability, accessibility, security, accuracy, and affordability. The VVSG has changed the manner in which vendors develop, modify, and maintain voting systems. Likewise, the VVSG has helped state and local election officials make better decisions about the systems they purchase and operate, the manner in which they make changes and upgrades to existing systems, and the manner in which they plan to purchase systems in the future. u
Endnotes
1. Douglas W. Jones, A Brief Illustrated History of Voting, Univ. Iowa Dep’t Computer Sci. (2003), http://homepage.divms.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/.
2. Roy G. Saltman, Effective Use of Computing Technology in Vote-Tallying (1975).
3. See Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980).
4. Fed. Election Comm’n, Performance and Test Standards for Punchcard, Marksense, and Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems (1990), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/FEC_1990_Voting_System_Standards1.pdf.
5. Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901 et seq.; see also Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
6. VVSG Fact Sheet, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/vvsg-fact-sheet/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
7. Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voluntary-voting-system-guidelines/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
8. 52 U.S.C. § 20961.
9. Id. § 20943.
10. Id. § 20944.
11. Id. § 20961.
12. 5 U.S.C. app. 2, § 4.
13. 52 U.S.C. § 20962.