Keeping Current—Property

Cases

Conversion of Goods: Statute of limitations usually runs from time of theft, but not if converter obtains possession by invalid gift. In the 1980s, Swan and Rankin operated a retail clothing store and engaged the celebrated artist Jean-Michel Basquiat to create a drawing as a prototype for business cards. They kept the drawing but decided not to use it for this purpose. Rankin died in 1989. In 2019, a store employee, Page, consigned the drawing to Sotheby’s, which sold it at auction. Page told Sotheby’s that he had received the drawing as a gift from Rankin. After Swan demanded the return of the drawing, Sotheby’s rescinded the sale and filed an interpleader action. Swan then sued Page and Sotheby’s, alleging conversion. Page moved to dismiss on the ground that the suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The court explained that under New York law, a cause of action for conversion accrues when all of the facts necessary to sustain the cause of action have occurred so that a party could obtain relief in court. In the case of theft, the cause of action accrues at once. The district court erred in dismissing the case, although understandably, the Circuit Court noted, given the conflicting legal theories asserted. In her amended complaint, Swan offered alternative theories as to how Page came into possession of the drawing—that he stole it at some point in the late 1980s or early 1990s (far more than three years before the suit was filed in 2022) but also that he received it as an unauthorized gift from Rankin. On a motion to dismiss, a court is required to accept all factual allegations as true and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences—here that Page obtained the drawing by an invalid attempted gift, which would have meant the action was not barred. Swan v. Page, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32186, 2024 WL 5165516 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2024).

Eminent Domain: Road improvement project that changes traffic flow, but does not change access points to owner’s retained land, is not a taking requiring compensation. The State began a construction project to convert a road into a new section of Interstate 69 and to close an existing intersection. After the State was unsuccessful in buying a 0.632-acre strip of land needed for the project, it filed an eminent domain action against the owner, Franciscan Alliance, Inc., and two holders of easements over the strip. The parties employed independent appraisers, with the State’s appraisers valuing the land at $40,500 and the defendants’ appraisals ranging from $1,986,000 to $4,400,000, which included an alleged reduction in the value of Franciscan’s retained land. At trial, the State moved to exclude the defendants’ appraisals and any other evidence of claimed damages from increased “circuitry of travel” to access the defendants’ businesses based on the closed intersection. The trial court denied the motions, and a jury awarded Franciscan $680,000 plus interest and $1,500,000 plus interest to one of the easement holders. The supreme court reversed and remanded the trial court decision. The court noted that the federal and state constitutions require just compensation for the taking of private property for public purposes. Just compensation includes an assessment of the fair market value of the property being acquired along with damages to the residue of the property retained by the owner. There is no right to compensation for damages that do not result from the taking. The court stated that two legal principles are well-settled when landowners claim damages based on loss of access from reconfigured roadways: a landowner cannot recover damages for changes in traffic flow past their property; and landowners can recover damages when ingress and egress to their property is actually or constructively eliminated. Further, although evidence of changes to a property’s “highest and best use” is admissible to determine the amount of compensation owed, it is irrelevant to establishing whether a taking has occurred. Here the defendants’ ingress-egress points were not actually or constructively eliminated. Instead, this was a traffic-flow case, with the evidence produced only alleging a negative effect on the land’s commercial use from the increased circuitry of travel to the land. Indiana v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 245 N.E.3d 144 (Ind. 2024).

Foreclosure: Homeowners’ association that wrongfully sells property in foreclosure is not indispensable party to lender’s suit against foreclosure buyer to set aside sale. Staab purchased a condominium unit at a foreclosure sale conducted by the homeowners association to recover unpaid fees owed by the unit owner. Wells Fargo, the loan servicer, sued Stabb and the unit owner, seeking a declaration that the sale without the consent of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) or the Federal National Mortgage Association, the holders of the deed of trust, was void under the Federal Foreclosure Bar established by a 2008 statute. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (prohibiting foreclosure of FHFA property “without the consent of the Agency”). Staab moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that Wells Fargo omitted to join the homeowners’ association in the suit. The trial court ruled for Wells Fargo, declaring Staab’s deed to the property void, ordering Wells Fargo’s deed of trust reinstated, and authorizing Wells Fargo to foreclose on the property. Staab appealed. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a person is an indispensable party if it “claims an interest” related to the litigation and is “so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . impede the person’s ability to protect the interest” or “leave an existing party subject to . . . inconsistent obligations.” D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). Here, the trial court was able to grant the relief Wells Fargo requested—a declaration that Staab’s purchase of the property and deed were void—without ordering equitable or monetary relief against the homeowners’ association. In fact, the homeowners’ association did not claim title to or a mortgage on the property, which might be extinguished by the foreclosure sale. Instead, it actively disclaimed any interest in the litigation. It was not necessary to resolve Staab’s potential claims against the homeowners’ association to adjudicate Wells Fargo’s arguments about the validity of the foreclosure sale and its deed of trust. Staab v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 328 A.3d 391 (D.C. Ct. App. 2024).

Landlord-Tenant: Clause in shopping center lease providing for reduced rent if anchor tenants close is valid and does not constitute liquidated damages. After extended negotiations, in which both sides were represented by counsel, the parties entered into a lease of space in a shopping center. The lease contained a “cotenancy provision” that gave the tenant an option to terminate the lease or pay a reduced “substitute rent” if the landlord failed to maintain leases with three anchor tenants or leases covering at least 60% of the gross leasable space in the shopping center for a period of six months. After the tenant invoked the cotenancy provision and paid substitute rent for 20 months, the landlord sued for a declaration that the cotenancy provision was an unenforceable liquidated damages clause and sought to recover $638,000 from the tenant. At the time of the suit, the tenant’s scheduled rent was $42,000 per month, but the substitute rent was $12,000. The trial court granted the tenant’s motion for summary judgment. The intermediate appellate court agreed, and the supreme court affirmed. The court first explained the difference between an alternative performance clause, which is not per se unenforceable, and a liquidated damages clause, which is unenforceable if it exacts a penalty for breach of agreement. The cotenancy agreement here was of the former character—to avoid allowing the tenant to pay substitute rent, the landlord had a “realistic and rational choice” to prevent its trigger by finding other anchor tenants through incentives and other marketing efforts. The court explained that cotenancy provisions are not negotiated in a vacuum—here, the parties, sophisticated and represented by counsel, obviously assessed the risks of entering into the lease, and these provisions were their method of allocating those risks. Absent unconscionability or significant public policy concerns, contracts are to be enforced as written and agreed to by the parties. JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC, 560 P.3d 297 (Cal. 2024).

Landlord-Tenant: Ordinance that requires regular inspections of rental housing units and allowed inspectors to obtain administrative search warrants is not facially unconstitutional. Orange City passed an ordinance requiring periodic inspections that included the option of securing a search warrant for the premises if an inspector was refused entry to a rental unit. Certain owners and renters filed suit asserting the ordinance violated the search and seizure clause of the Iowa state constitution because the city did not have to show probable cause that a violation had occurred in the unit. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, declaring unconstitutional the mandatory inspection requirement of the ordinance and permanently enjoining the city from seeking administrative warrants to conduct inspections. The city appealed, and the supreme court reversed. Although the plaintiffs’ case focused on comparisons between the Iowa Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, the court made clear that the Fourth Amendment does not control the interpretation or application of the state provision. The court found the ordinance does not violate the state or federal provisions because US Supreme Court precedent holds that administrative warrants are permitted to be issued without any specific knowledge of a violation within a particular dwelling. Additionally, because plaintiffs brought a facial challenge to the ordinance, they were required to prove that it was totally invalid and incapable of any valid application on any set of facts. Here, the court laid out several scenarios in which the ordinance could operate without violating the state constitution. For example, if reliable neighbors reported to the city that a unit had no smoke detectors, that could justify seeking a warrant under traditional probable-cause theory. Further, the city could choose not to seek an administrative warrant and instead pursue legal options that do not involve warrants and include traditional due-process features such as notice to tenants and the opportunity to be heard. Also, the ordinance allowed for private inspections so that the government would not be involved in the process at all. Singer v. City of Orange City, 15 N.W.3d 70 (Iowa 2024).

Premise Liability: Forestry statute immunizes forestland owners from liability for personal injury caused by falling trees in riparian management zone. Chrisman was seriously injured when he drove his work vehicle through forestland on an extremely windy day, and a tree fell on the vehicle. Before the accident, the state granted a timber harvesting contract to a lumber company, which hired a logging company, which cut trees, except for a band of trees in a riparian management zone (RMZ). RMZs are buffers of trees left standing on either side of a river or creek to benefit wildlife and water quality. Chrisman and his employer sued the state, the lumber company, and the logging company for negligence. The defendants claimed protection under the Forest Practices Act of 1974, which immunizes forestland owners from liability when a tree required to be left standing in an RMZ falls and causes damage or injury. Wash. Rev. Code § 76.09.330. Chrisman asserted that the defendants were not forestland owners and, therefore, could not claim immunity under the statute. He also claimed defendants were not immune on the theory that the RMZ was improperly drawn, and thus, the tree that struck Chrisman was not required to be left standing. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the logging and lumber companies were not forestland owners because they did not have the right to harvest RMZ trees. The appellate court also ruled that immunity would not attach if an RMZ was improperly drawn. The supreme court reversed, explaining that the act reflected a policy in favor of leaving riparian areas unharvested to benefit biodiversity and water quality and that falling trees would enhance habitat. The legislature anticipated that leaving trees standing could cause personal injury or property damage, so the act gives broad immunity, notwithstanding other statutory provisions, rules, or common law. The plain language of the statute extends this immunity to forestland owners, who must comply with the designation of the RMZ. The lumber and logging companies were forestland owners as defined by the act because they were in actual control of the forestland and had a right to sell or otherwise dispose of the timber on the land. The legislature expected that trees left in an RMZ would be vulnerable to blowdowns but believed that these blown-down trees would produce environmental benefits. To claim immunity, the forestland owners were required to leave trees in the RMZ zone standing but had no duty to adopt measures to protect against windthrow. The court concluded that the immunity under the act does not depend on the accuracy of a final RMZ designation. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 562 P.3d 343 (Wash. 2025).

Minerals: State statute governing the payment of royalties does not abandon mineral rights. Petitioners filed claims to the mineral rights attached to 393 parcels of land based on their contention that the state abandoned all interest in the disputed minerals by passing a statute in 2017 that established a process for releasing mineral royalties to the owners of tracts of land adjoining the Missouri River. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 61-33.1-01 to 61-33.1-07. They asserted that after the statute’s passage, the minerals had no owner and that they became the owners by claiming the minerals before anyone else. The trial court dismissed the petitioners’ cases for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the petitioners’ appealed. The supreme court stated that the statute in question only directed the state to release mineral extraction royalties to the actual owners of tracts lying entirely above the high-water mark of the Missouri River. The statute also set up a process for determining what part of the Missouri riverbed channel was state-sovereign land and for determining if the money paid to the state should be returned to actual property owners, but otherwise, the state did not abandon state property by the statute. The court ruled that a petitioner must have a valid interest or ownership in the disputed mineral interests to maintain a quiet title action. Such an action cannot be used to acquire an interest in real property; rather a petitioner must first own an estate in real property in order to test the claims of others. Here, the petitioners had no interest in the minerals and admitted having no surface rights to any of the tracts and no traceable connection to the hundreds of tracts listed in their petitions. The court characterized their claims as a convoluted and circular legal theory to create an interest or estate by simply asserting ownership and demanding through burden shifting that others disprove their allegedly superior rights. Nelson v. Lindvig, 14 N.W.3d 66 (N.D. 2024).

Taxation: Municipality does not lose ad valorem tax exemption by engaging private company to manage municipal golf course. The City of Gulf Breeze owned and operated a public golf course for several years, with the county property appraiser finding the course exempt from ad valorem taxation under Article VII, §3(a) of the Florida Constitution, providing that all property owned and used exclusively for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt. In an effort to operate the golf course more efficiently, the city hired a management company. After the parties executed a management agreement, the appraiser ended the exemption, claiming that the agreement was a lease and the property was no longer being used exclusively by the city. The city filed suit and received summary judgment in its favor. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a ruling in favor of the appraiser. The city appealed, and the supreme court quashed the appellate court decision. The court explained that the management agreement did not alter the city’s ownership and control of the property but expressly disavowed being a lease or granting any tenancy or proprietary interest in the golf course. In fact, the agreement reserved to the city “at all times … access to the [golf course property] for any purpose” and stated that “nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to limit the city’s right to do anything regarding the [golf course] which the City would otherwise be entitled to do.” The court stated that the relevant constitutional test for the controversy is exclusive municipal use, which is exemplified by municipal control. Here, neither the involvement of a management company to facilitate the efficient operation of the property nor the means chosen to compensate the company (a portion of any profits generated) were in derogation of the city’s control of the property and its concomitant exclusive use. City of Gulf Breeze v. Brown, 397 So.3d 1009 (Fla. 2024).

Tax Foreclosure: Forfeiture of surplus value after tax foreclosure by holder of tax sale certificate is unconstitutional. Roberto, the owner of a mixed-use commercial and residential property, failed to pay sewer bills because, he claimed, his tenants did not pay rent during the COVID-19 pandemic. 257-261 20th Avenue Realty, LLC (20th Avenue) purchased the tax sales certificates under the Tax Sale Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 54:5-1 to 54:5-137. Years later, 20th Avenue filed to foreclose on the property. The redemption amount was $33,000. Because Roberto did not respond to redeem, a default judgment was entered. At the time, the property had a value of up to $500,000. After the sale, the US Supreme Court decided Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023), ruling that the forfeiture of surplus after a tax sale is a taking that requires compensation. The appellate court reversed the default judgment under the reasoning of Tyler. Joining the growing list of states striking down tax sale foreclosure systems under Tyler, the supreme court affirmed, holding that the version of the TSL in effect ran counter to the principles outlined in Tyler and violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court began by explaining the state’s centuries-old tax sale foreclosure system, which creates a continuous lien on property for unpaid property taxes. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-6. Municipalities convert the liens into a stream of operating revenues through the sale of tax certificates at auction. Potential buyers can start the bidding at a maximum interest rate of 18% and the certificate is sold to the bidder willing to buy it at the lowest rate. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-32. The successful bidder agrees to pay taxes to the municipality and can sue to foreclose the property owners’ title between two and 20 years from the date of purchase of the certificate. In 2024 after the Tyler decision, the New Jersey legislature amended the tax foreclosure law to give property owners more ways to preserve the equity in property, including by demanding a judicial sale or internet auction and to have any surplus funds from the sale returned to them. If no one bids on a property and the tax sale certificate holder gets title, it is “presumed that there is no equity in the property.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-87(b). Nonetheless, it was the prior law that applied to the facts here, and the analysis lined up on all squares with Tyler—New Jersey recognizes a property right to surplus equity in real property; private lienholders are acting jointly with local governments under the law to perform a traditional public function, the collection of taxes, and thus are considered state actors; and it was without question that the taking of surplus equity under the sale of tax liens is a public use as they are designed to raise revenue for municipalities to operate. The court did not rule on whether the revised statute is constitutional. 257-261 20th Avenue Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 327 A.3d 1177 (N.J. 2025).

Zoning: Dog-rescue operation is allowed as kennel in residential zone. A homeowner operated the Vermont English Bulldog Rescue to offer temporary foster care to rescued dogs. The dogs were kept in the backyard, enclosed by a fence, and were walked around the neighborhood by volunteers. There were no other structures associated with rescue use. The town issued a notice of zoning violation but eventually issued a limited permit to allow only one dog outside at a time. The neighbors appealed. The trial court ruled that the plain language of the home business exception in the regulations prohibited outdoor uses. The court rejected the landowner’s argument that she was operating a “kennel,” reasoning that the town bylaw provision allowing kennels was limited by the outdoor restriction for home businesses. The supreme court reversed in a close textual reading of the regulations. First, the court explained the home business exception allows certain uses of property in a residential zone that are not solely residential, such as accessory uses and structures, childcare centers, churches, elementary and middle schools, and parks. Town of Williston Development Bylaw § 39.1.3. Home businesses are defined as “any commercial activity conducted . . . by the residents . . . that meets the standards established here.” Id. § 20.4.1. The “space used for the proposed home business shall be within the dwelling or in an accessory structure.” Id. Appendix G § 3(a). The bylaw also contained provisions expressly permitting kennels, defined as “any space used to confine dogs,” as a home business and requiring that kennels comply with the standards for “accessory structures” and “fences” contained in the bylaws. Id. § 20.9. The supreme court went on to note that, as the lower court observed, the kennel and home-business provisions are in tension; the kennel provision clearly contemplates some outdoor use of residential property because it refers to accessory structures and allows for higher fences, but the home-business provision generally prohibits outdoor workspaces and storage. In resolving the apparent conflict between two provisions in a regulation, the court explained that the specific provision is held as an exception to the general provision. Here, the kennel provision is more specifically applicable to the homeowner’s operation. The court believed this reading was the most sensible; otherwise, reading the home-business provision so as to prohibit outdoor uses by kennels in residential districts would render the provision permitting kennels as home businesses virtually meaningless because kennels typically require the use of outdoor space for the proper care for dogs. In re Pederzani Administrative Appeal, 328 A.3d 1278 (Vt. 2024).

Literature

Land Use: In a Georgia Law Review Symposium, Evolving Landscapes: American Land Use Law & Resiliency, 58 Ga. L. Rev. 1535 (2024), several scholars consider how climate change may affect where and how we build and live. First, Prof. Albert C. Lin in Public Insurance as a Lever for Semi-Managed Climate Retreat, 58 Ga. Law Rev. 1535 (2024), describes the growing and worrisome trend of private casualty insurers declining to issue or renew homeowner policies in California, Colorado, Florida, and Louisiana following massive payouts from hurricane and wildfire damage in recent years. But he challenges the idea of state-backed insurance as the most effective response, even with ongoing managed retreat efforts. Managed retreat policies aim to move people and communities out of climate-vulnerable areas. But, by offering underpriced coverage, such programs have encouraged development in climate-vulnerable areas, such as floodplains and the wildland-urban interface. He proposes to link public insurance with buyouts: public insurance in climate-vulnerable areas should be made contingent on insureds agreeing to buyouts if property damage exceeds a predetermined threshold amount.

Land Use: Profs. Mark Nevitt and Michael Pappas, in Climate Risk, Insurance Retreat, and State Response, 58 Ga. Law Rev. 1603 (2024), continue the dialogue on the insurance problem and claim that some areas are just too vulnerable to insure. In their view, we need to rethink various governmental policy choices, including interventions modeled after the federal National Federal Insurance Program as well as state insurance programs. In finding the best strategy, they note that the extent of government intervention will vary from region to region and will depend on weighing concerns about physical risk against the financial costs of intervening.

Land Use: Prof. Tom Lininger, in Empowering Family Forestland Owners to Reduce Wildfire Risk, 58 Ga. L. Rev. 1567 (2024), notes that some commentators have argued for measures to reduce the human presence in the Wildland-Urban Interface, given the growing wildfire risk, especially in the Western United States, the recent Los Angeles wildfires being a case in point. But he rejects the idea of wholesale removal of humans from these areas, instead believing the better strategy is to assist family forestland owners in fireproofing their residences and improving the health of their forests. Family forestland owners have a salutary effect on forest resiliency, such that excluding them altogether would create more problems than it would solve.

Land Use: In Building Climate Resilience with Local Tools, 58 Ga. L. Rev. 1663 (2024), Prof. Shelley Saxer urges local planners to employ the many land use tools already at their disposal to blunt the toll of climate change. There are both short- and long-term approaches that may prove efficacious, including requiring sustainable and green development, invoking nuisance laws, creating renewable energy incentives, and adopting smart city regulations. She believes it is imperative that the principle of social-ecological resilience guide the creation of sustainable communities, and this effort must embrace an inclusive and community-wide approach.

Land Use: Prof. John Travis Marshall calls our attention to rural communities in Farmland and Forestland in an Era of Climate Change: Hurricane Michael and Opportunities to Advance Rural Resilience, 58 Ga. L. Rev. 1721 (2024). He points out that rural communities, where some 20% of Americans live, are at heightened vulnerabilities and shows the significant lapses in state planning and disaster recovery policies that left smaller rural communities, farmers, and forestland owners wholly unprepared for major disasters. Focusing on the ravages of Hurricane Michael and the weak housing recovery, he offers ways to mitigate disaster-related housing loss, thus enabling more robust and long-term housing recovery.

Land Use: Prof. Blake Hudson, in Resilient Forest Management and Climate Change, 58 Ga. L. Rev. 1775 (2024) takes the position that we can better manage forests for greater resilience, but there are scientific and policy complexities that stand as obstacles, although not insurmountable. In his view, the primary adaptation solutions for creating greater forest resiliency—reducing fire risk and integrating more climate resilient species into forests—often fall short in the face of a host of impediments, including federalism, geographic and ecological differences in forests, and scientific unknowns. New thinking to overcome these impediments includes incentivizing market development, increasing government investment, reforming federal administrative law, and harnessing expertise in regional forestry programs to build trust.

Mortgages: Prof. Julia Patterson Forrester Rogers provides what she identifies as the first comprehensive comparison of the traditional paper mortgage, the eMortgage, and UCC Article 12 mortgage in her article eMortgage and Crypto-Mortgage in Home Finance, 52 Pepperdine L. Rev. 1 (2025). The article also evaluates what she has coined as a “crypto-mortgage,” which is a loan secured by real estate where the payment obligation is tied to a non-fungible token (NFT) “that can be transferred without an electronic mortgage loan registry system.” Having the payment obligation secured by an NFT is distinguished from having the real estate tied to an NFT. The characterization of the NFT linkage seems relatively figurative because the obligation is kept track of through its utilization of blockchain technology, which is itself an electronic registration, albeit in a different way than the modern traditional mortgage electronic recording system. Throughout her comparative analysis, Prof. Rogers makes several interesting assertions regarding the relationship between residential purchasers and mortgage lenders. She undoubtedly is correct in noting that consumers generally fail to understand mortgage loan documents and cites studies that have attempted to measure consumer understanding based on the preparation and presentation of those materials. The studies seem to confirm one’s natural expectation that less lengthy documentation and more time spent in explanation to persons with higher levels of education leads to greater understanding. As Prof. Rogers notes, the inevitability of nearly all documentation moving to electronic formats leads to new issues regarding consumer understanding and their potential future legal actions. She asserts that reliance on a paper-based system for loan processing and tracking has proven problematic in light of the high costs associated with storage as well as the susceptibility of paper to unpredictable weather-related natural disasters. She also cites the significant role of lost documents as contributing to the Great Recession. Prof. Rogers links the paper problem with what she calls a payment problem related to sufficient notice of mortgage servicer transfers, and the holder in due course problem, joining the growing chorus of those advocating its repeal for residential mortgage transactions. Technological responses to the above problems have taken various forms since the turn of the century, and Prof. Rogers provides a significant timeline, including the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (UETA) and E-Sign, both of which recognized an electronic version of a paper promissory note called a transferable record, and the 2022 adoption of UCC Article 12 to accommodate emerging technologies, which established the controllable electronic record (CER). She asserts that Article 12 facilitates the use of crypto-mortgage architecture as evidence of a payment obligation embedded in or tethered to an NFT. As Article 12 contemplates blockchain technology and a cryptographic key as a method of control, it provides a legal basis for the crypto-mortgage. The article is quite futuristic, although she includes many suggestions for Congress, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and like organizations to take the lead in setting a regulatory structure for the expanding use of new technologies in the mortgage loan realm.

Legislation

District of Columbia enacts Uniform Commercial Real Estate Receivership Act. The act authorizes the appointment of a receiver before or after judgment, with the power to collect and manage receivership property. The act sets standards for eligibility to serve and for removal. The receiver may take possession, custody, and control of receivership property. 2023 D.C. ch. 658.

New York regulates short-term rentals. Registration and record-keeping are required, and safety measures must be in place. 2024 N.Y. Laws 672.

New York creates Climate Change Adaptation Cost Recovery Program. The program aims to secure compensation from responsible parties for climate change effects based on a standard of strict liability. A climate change adaptation fund is created. 2024 N.Y. Laws 679.

Michigan amends landlord-tenant law to prohibit discrimination based on source of income. 2024 Mi. P.A. 178.

Michigan prohibits discrimination in real estate transactions. The act applies to real estate brokers and salespersons and prohibits discriminatory practices, policies, and customs in sales, appraisals, and advertisements on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, height, weight, familial status, or marital status. 2024 Mi. P.A. 180.