Keeping Current—Property

Cases

Construction Contracts

Subcontractors are not third-party beneficiaries of subrogation waiver in development agreement between general contractor and tenant. Duke Baltimore LLC and Amazon entered into a development agreement, under which Duke would build a warehouse on its land and lease the building to Amazon. The development agreement allocated responsibility to Duke for “Landlord Improvements” and to Amazon for “Tenant Improvements,” for which Amazon would hire its own contractors. Section 12.4 of the Development Agreement contained mutual waivers of subrogation; neither party would be liable to the other or their insurers by way of subrogation or otherwise for any loss of, or damage to, the property. Duke’s contracts with its subcontractors also contained subrogation waivers. After Amazon took possession of the building, a storm blew the roof off, which caused the walls to collapse, resulting in substantial losses. Amazon’s insurer paid $50 million to Amazon and then filed a claim by subrogation against four of Duke’s subcontractors based on negligence in the construction. The subcontractors answered, asserting the subrogation waivers as a bar to the action. The trial court ruled the subcontractors could enforce the waivers against the insurer, but the appellate court reversed. On further appeal, the supreme court affirmed in part and remanded. It began by stating that contract meaning is that which a reasonable person would understand the terms to suggest, but in context and construed as a whole. In addition, the court explained that at common law, only the bargaining parties had the right to enforce contract provisions. Although the third-party beneficiary theory has emerged recently to allow a non-party to enforce contract rights, that status must be shown by clear words or intent. Here, the court found that the Development Agreement, and specifically Section 12.4, was between two parties—Amazon and Duke—and nothing suggested an intent to benefit any third party. Nonetheless, the court found language in the subcontract waivers, specifically that “no party shall be liable to another party or to any insurance company,” to be ambiguous because the words suggested that the waiver might apply to more than two parties, even as it did not identify who, beyond the two parties to each of the subcontracts, those parties might be. Resolution of the ambiguity required remand. The court went on to reject the subcontractors’ plea to find “project-wide” waivers on public policy grounds; Amazon and Duke were free to not require a project-wide waiver of subrogation. Lithko Contr., LLC v. XL Ins. Am., Inc., 318 A.3d 1221 (Md. 2024).

Deeds

Undue influence to set aside deed is not established merely by personal relationship. Marlin Geerdes died in 1999, leaving his 60-year-old wife, Janice, who lived on her own, supported by the rental income from two farm properties of 150 and 80 acres respectively. Albert Cruz, who was initially a seasonal worker, became a family friend who rented a house from the Geerdeses early in the 1990s and later lived with his family in a house near the farm. Albert and Janice worked together in various endeavors, and in 2004 they agreed to a partnership to raise hogs. In furtherance of their agreement, Janice deeded 9.64 acres to herself and Albert as tenants in common. In 2017, Janice underwent cognitive testing, and again in 2018 at age 78 with the results indicating the onset of dementia. In 2019, Janice executed a quitclaim deed transferring her interest in the 9.64-acre hog site to Albert for no consideration. In 2020, Janice’s daughter, Laura Jenkins, brought suit to set aside the deed, alleging undue influence and lack of capacity. The trial court ruled for Laura on both grounds. A divided appellate court affirmed based on lack of capacity, and Albert appealed. The supreme court reversed. The court identified four elements necessary for a finding of undue influence, namely (1) a grantor’s weakened mental condition, (2) a confidential relationship, (3) an unequal disposition of property, and (4) a result that clearly appears to be the effect of undue influence. The court found the facts did not establish a confidential relationship between the parties or reflect undue influence. The record reflected that Janice took advice, not solely from Albert, but also from her daughters, one of her farm tenants, and others. Additionally, Albert was almost illiterate, was not a family member, lived apart from Janice, and did not handle any of the business for the partnership. The court stated that family and personal ties are not enough to create a confidential relationship and raise the prospect of undue influence when one has not trusted another to handle their personal affairs. At the same time, a party alleging lack of mental capacity carries the burden of proving the grantor failed to possess sufficient consciousness to understand the import of her actions when signing the deed. Mere mental weakness will not invalidate a deed. Thus, while Janice’s mental assessments raised questions about her mental capacity, they did not foreclose the possibility that she knew what she was doing when she executed the deed. Similarly, the improvidence of a transaction, while noteworthy, is not dispositive for purposes of mental capacity at the time of a deed’s execution. Jenkins v. Cruz, 7 N.W.3d 22 (Iowa 2024).

Equitable Subrogation

Mortgage lender paying off prior debt assumes priority of earlier lender absent culpable negligence in not finding intervening judgment lien. In 2004, Brown received a mortgage loan from First Horizon Home Loan Corporation. In 2010, a judgment was entered against Brown, reflected by a judgment lien later recorded by United General Title Insurance Company in 2014. In 2016, Brown refinanced her loan with Nationstar Mortgage, which paid off the First Horizon balance of $219,873. Brown also signed an owner’s affidavit stating there were no outstanding liens on the property. The new loan was recorded in 2016. In 2019, United began enforcement to collect Brown’s debt. Brown’s property was seized, an execution sale was held, and Brown’s daughter successfully bid $102,900 to satisfy the judgment. In 2020, Nationstar’s successor, MidFirst, sued to quiet title, arguing that under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the Nationstar mortgage still encumbered the property even after the execution sale. The trial court granted summary judgment to MidFirst, but the appellate court reversed, finding Nationstar’s mortgage became effective in 2016 after the 2014 recording of the judgment lien, meaning it was extinguished by the execution sale. That court found equitable subrogation inapplicable. Nationstar was not excusably ignorant because the United judgment lien was publicly recorded. The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that the appellate court used an improper standard regarding equitable subrogation. The general rule is that when money is expressly advanced to extinguish a prior encumbrance, the new lender is subrogated to the prior lender’s rights, The new lender is treated as the assignee of the prior loan whenever necessary to prevent junior encumbrancers from accidentally being raised to the dignity of a first lien. The court recognized exceptions to the rule, specifically its unavailability to volunteers and claimants who are guilty of culpable negligence or when relief would prejudice a junior lienholder. Nationstar was not a volunteer, and United was junior to First Horizon, and thus to Nationstar and its successor, MidFirst, under the equitable subrogation rule. Otherwise, United would attain the status of the first lienholder as opposed to remaining in its original position. But, if Nationstar was culpably negligent relative to United’s recorded judgment, it would not gain priority. As such, reversal and remand were in order so the parties could present specific evidence regarding this issue, including facts concerning the title search and the monetary differences in the transactions. MidFirst Bank v. Brown, 900 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 2024).

Escrow Accounts

State law requiring banks to pay interest on escrow accounts for mortgage loans may not be preempted by federal banking law. Two borrowers with mortgage loans from Bank of America sued the bank for its failure to pay interest on funds held in escrow for purposes of paying taxes and property insurance. A New York statute requires the payment of interest at the rate of two percent per annum, but the National Bank Act, under which the bank is chartered, does not. The bank argued that the federal law preempts the state law. The district court rejected the preemption claim, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, ruling that federal law preempts any state law that “purports to exercise control over a federally granted banking power,” regardless of “the magnitude of its effects,” and that because the state interest-on-escrow law “would exert control over” national banks’ power “to create and fund escrow accounts,” the law was preempted. The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit ruling and remanded for consideration of the preemption test prescribed by the Dodd-Frank Act. The Court explained that Dodd-Frank, 12 U. S. C. §25b(b)(1)(B), enacted after the financial crisis of 2008, expressly incorporated the standard that the Court earlier articulated in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson, 517 U. S. 25 (1996). In Barnett, the Court ruled that whether a non-discriminatory state law was preempted depended on whether the state law “prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers.” The Court discussed the foundational cases for the Barnett test in which preemption was found, such as when a Florida law by its terms prevented a bank from selling insurance even as the National Banking Act expressly conferred that power; and in which preemption was not found, such as when a state law required a national bank to turn over abandoned funds to the state. The Court identified cases on both sides of the dynamic as guideposts for lower courts in making the determination. Here, the Second Circuit did not apply the Barnett analysis; instead, it relied on a line of cases going back centuries to distill a categorical test that would preempt virtually all state laws that regulate national banks, at least other than generally applicable state laws such as contract or property laws. That was an error. Cantero v. Bank of Am., N.A., 144 S. Ct. 1290 (2024).

Foreclosure

Res judicata does not bar trial court on remand from revisiting order of strict of foreclosure in favor of foreclosure by sale. In 2003, Wahba obtained a loan secured by a mortgage on her shorefront property. After Wahba defaulted and failed in her attempt to obtain a loan modification, she sued the lender, alleging deceptive and unfair trade practices, and the lender counterclaimed for foreclosure. Wahba lost on both claims, and the court ordered strict foreclosure, which resulted in the lender retaining the property with no foreclosure sale. In 2018, the court determined that the fair market value of the property was $6.7 million with an outstanding mortgage balance of $6,179,200, plus fees and expenses of $121,306. Before law day, Wahba appealed to the appellate court, which affirmed the lower court’s judgment and remanded “solely for the purpose of setting new law days.” On remand, the lender moved the court for new law days, but Wahba objected, arguing that foreclosure by sale was appropriate due to the steep rise in property values since the original judgment of strict foreclosure. The trial court rejected the argument, ruling that it was bound by the appellate court’s order. Wahba appealed again to the appellate court, which ruled against her, stating that when an appellate court has affirmed a judgment of strict foreclosure and remanded for the setting of new law days, the trial court cannot deviate from that direction. Wahba appealed to the supreme court, and the lender argued that the claim was barred by res judicata. The court reversed, explaining that when a reviewing court remands the case to the trial court for the setting of new law days, mechanically applying the doctrine of res judicata to bar the trial court from modifying the judgment of strict foreclosure in any other respect would “frustrate other social policies based on values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in legal controversies.” Instead, when an appellate court affirms and remands to the trial court with direction to set new law days—perhaps years after the original judgment—unless expressly prohibited by the remand order, the trial court should make a new finding as to the amount of the debt and to determine whether foreclosure by sale is appropriate. Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 316 A.3d 338 (Conn. 2024).

Homeowners' Associations

Payments of dues to homeowners’ association are allocated to superpriority lien to preserve first deed of trust. Swaggerty failed to pay several months of dues to his homeowners’ association (HOA). With collection costs, late fees, interest, and other charges, they quickly added up to $523, at which time the HOA’s foreclosure agent and trustee, Nevada Association Services (NAS), filed a notice of lien. Swaggerty filed for bankruptcy and set up a payment plan, sending $91 (one month’s dues) directly to the HOA. After the bankruptcy plan failed, in 2009 Swaggerty entered into a payment plan with NAS, pursuant to which he sent $500 to NAS. Of the $500, NAS kept $125 as a set-up fee, sent $125 to a title company, sent $125 to a posting company, and forwarded $125 to the HOA. Swaggerty characterized the $500 as a “down payment” on his arrears. The next month he sent another $500 to NAS, which allocated it in the same fashion. Over the next two years, Swaggerty made further payments, with $220 being applied to the delinquent superpriority portion of the HOA dues. In Nevada, up to nine months of unpaid HOA dues constitute a superpriority lien on a property, taking priority over other interests, including deeds of trust. Nev. Rev. Stat. §116.3116(3((b). Even though Swaggerty complied with their agreement, the HOA nevertheless moved to foreclose on the lien. At a public sale in 2014, SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC purchased the property for $56,000; at the time the home was valued at approximately $441,000. Swaggerty’s lender, the holder of the first deed of trust, brought a quiet title action asserting that Swaggerty’s payments had satisfied the superpriority portion of the lien, such that the first deed of trust survived the HOA foreclosure. The trial court ruled that $235 of the superpriority lien remained unsatisfied, which meant that the HOA foreclosure extinguished the first deed of trust. The supreme court reversed, finding the trial court erred in applying the test articulated in 9352 Cranesbill Trust v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 459 P.3d 227 (Nev. 2020). There, the supreme court stated that in making the proper allocation of HOA fees, an HOA may not, without express direction from the homeowner, allocate the payment to forfeit the first deed of the trust holder’s interest and deprive the homeowner of ownership of the home. The court must consider principles of justice and equity, which presume that the superpriority lien is paid first unless the court has a compelling reason to conclude otherwise. Here, the first payment of $91 was sent directly to the HOA and covered current dues; of the second $500 payment, although a portion was properly allocated to setting up the plan, the remaining amount was required to be applied to the superpriority lien and this sum added to the later $220 agreed to arrears payment, meant the lien was satisfied. The foreclosure did not extinguish the first deed of trust, and SFR took possession of the property subject to it. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 551 P.3d 837 (Nev. 2024).

Landlord-Tenant

Failure to pay rent extinguishes option to purchase in the lease. The parties had a five-year lease agreement that included an option for the tenant to purchase the property for $3.8 million. The tenant defaulted in paying, and the parties amended the agreement, but the tenant defaulted again. After the tenant failed to cure the arrearages, the landlord informed the tenant that it could not purchase the property and must vacate. Nonetheless, the tenant notified the landlord of its election to purchase. The next day, the landlord notified the tenant that it was terminating the lease for default and retaking the premises. The tenant sued to enforce the option and for breach of lease. The landlord counterclaimed for breach of contract and damages. The trial court ruled for the landlord, and the supreme court affirmed, relying on the contract-law doctrine of consideration. When an option to purchase is incorporated into a lease, the consideration for the lease is consideration for the purchase option. Because the lease and option-to-purchase provisions are dependent, the failure to pay rent is a failure of consideration that nullifies the option. This is so because the option is inseparable from and an integral part of the whole contract. An option to purchase is not a separate contract if there is no separate consideration for the option. Here, there was no separate consideration for the option. Because the landlord repeatedly notified the tenant of this failure and warned that it would have to vacate if it did not pay rent, there was no implied waiver of prior breaches. Green Leaf Farms Holdings LLC v. Belmont NLV, LLC, 549 P.3d 1199 (Nev. 2024).

Recreational Land Use Statute

Recreational use act limits liability of landowner when person permissively operates landowner’s vehicle in negligent manner. Twelve-year-old Riley Robinson and her 14-year-old sister Payton were operating an off-road vehicle on their grandfather’s land when an accident occurred, resulting in Riley’s death. Riley’s estate sued, asserting the grandfather was negligent. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that absent a showing of gross negligence, the Recreational Use Act (RUA) precluded the claim as a matter of law. Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.73301(1). The court also denied the plaintiff’s request to amend based on liability provisions of the Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC), which imposes statutory liability when a vehicle owner allows a person to use the vehicle and its negligent operation causes an injury. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.401(1). The appellate court affirmed, holding the RUA governed all claims because it was more specific. The supreme court affirmed, however, for reasons different from the appellate court’s reasons. The supreme court held that the RUA applies and precludes liability for injuries that arise when one is on the land of another, without pay, for outdoor recreational activities, with or without the owner’s permission, unless the injuries were caused by gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner. The court further ruled that the RUA applies to a statutory owner-liability claim under the MVC when the owner allows another to use a motor vehicle for recreational purposes on his land. The court noted that there is some conflict in the requirement of proof of negligence between the statutes when a defendant is the owner of both the land and the vehicle used for recreational activity. The resolution of the conflict, however, should be based on legislative intent instead of on which statute uses the most specific language. The purpose of the RUA is to encourage owners of private land to make their land available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their potential liability. The purpose of the MVC owner-liability provisions is to place the risk of damage or injury upon the person with ultimate control of the vehicle. The scope and aims of the statutes are distinct and unconnected and their incidental overlap does not mean they should be read together. The court also looked at the differences between the dates the acts were passed and the many amendments to RUA to clarify its scope and concluded that its reading of the RUA would not entirely eliminate potential landowner liability whenever an owner’s vehicle was used for recreational purposes on the owner’s land. Milne v. Robinson, 6 N.W.3d 40 (Mich. 2024).

Resctrictive Covenants

Subdivision covenants may not be amended to impose restrictions on lots expressly excepted from covenants. The Berkeley Chase Subdivision, created in 1981, contained 30 lots, with most of the lots consisting of approximately 10 acres, although Lot 5 contained 40 acres. Paragraph 1 of the subdivision covenants restricted 26 of the lots “for estate and owner-occupational purposes only” with no building other than “one single-family detached dwelling and one guest house.” Lot 5, on which historic houses and agricultural buildings were erected, and three other lots were expressly excepted from this restriction. Dorcon Group, LLC purchased Lot 5 on March 4, 2020, intending to operate a commercial bed and breakfast facility as well as a venue for weddings and other events. Under Paragraph 19 of the Deed of Subdivision, the restrictions could be “excepted, modified, or vacated in whole or in part at any time upon the vote of the owners of at least 23 of the lots.” On May 5, 2020, pursuant to Paragraph 19, the owners of 25 lots voted to amend the restrictions to prohibit property owners from conducting most commercial activities on all the lots, including venues for weddings and other events. Dorcon sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that Paragraph 19 did not authorize new restrictions on Lot 5. The trial court ruled in favor of the property owners, but the appellate court reversed, reading the term “modify” narrowly such that it did not permit the addition of new restrictions. The supreme court affirmed. The court explained that restrictive covenants on land are not favored and must be strictly construed against the grantor and persons seeking to enforce them. Substantial doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the free use of property. Although Paragraph 19 authorized modifications of restrictions, it said nothing about modifying the express exceptions in the subdivision covenants. To make its point, the court looked to Black’s Law Dictionary to find that “modify” means “[t]o make something different” or “[t]o alter,” but not to add entirely new restrictions or to terminate the exceptions found in Paragraph 1. Westrick v. Dorcon Grp., LLC, 901 S.E. 2d 468 (Va. 2024).

Taxation

Sovereign immunity does not shield a county from its obligation to pay ad valorem taxes for property it owns in another county. Pinellas County (Pinellas) owns approximately 12,400 acres of real estate in neighboring Pasco County (Pasco). Pinellas historically paid ad valorem taxes to Pasco for the property but decided that sovereign immunity relieved it of that obligation and filed suit against the Pasco County Property Appraiser seeking a declaratory judgment prohibiting future assessment and collection of such taxes. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Pinellas, and Pasco appealed. The appellate court reversed, noting that each county has constitutional and statutory authority to assess ad valorem taxes on “all property in the county.” Fla. Stat. § 125.016. The supreme court addressed the question of whether property owned by a county located outside its jurisdictional boundaries is immune from ad valorem taxation imposed by the neighboring county. With two justices dissenting, the court answered negatively, affirming the appellate court. The supreme court disagreed with Pinellas’ assertion that Florida counties enjoy the same sovereign immunity from taxation as the State. Neither Pinellas County nor the dissent identified any authority in support of this claim, even as counties enjoyed some immunity from taxes within the county. The court found it sufficient to note that Pinellas and Pasco counties’ respective sovereignties were equal. Even so, ownership of extraterritorial land is not an attribute of sovereignty; instead, the foreign sovereign owns such land subject to the laws of the sovereign where the property is located. Pinellas Cnty. v. Joiner, 389 So.3d 1267 (Fla. 2024).

Literature

Property Theory

In her article about soil, Soil Governance and Private Property, 2024 Utah L. Rev. 1 (2024), Prof. Sarah J. Fox maintains that despite the multiple roles soil plays in our economy and ecosystem—growing plants, filtering pollutants out of water, providing habitat to countless organisms, and sequestering carbon—it lacks its own legal regime for governance and protection. Instead, unlike other essential natural resources such as air and water, soil is managed on a parcel-based approach, with some federal limits such as those on solid waste disposal and surface mining, but is generally devoid of benchmarks or action-forcing provisions. The focus is more on property rights and values than on environmental health. Prof. Fox fears that unless something changes, this resource, like all resources that are limited in quantity and capacity to serve historical functions, will collapse under the near-constant externalities from the use of the soil. In her view, it will become necessary to make changes to ownership obligations and norms, moving to a mix of incentives and governmental controls to promote sustainability. She suggests reliance upon environmental laws. Congress could impose certain standards for national soil governance, including metrics for soil health that must be met. Major federal statutes could incorporate strong components of environmental federalism that rely heavily on state and local participation. She sees land use regulation at the local level as playing a key role, as local officials may be well-versed in soil health and soil science. If nothing more, the article helps highlight soil health as an integral part of the natural and human-made life systems and the roles already played by various measures for most developments and construction (federal, state, and local environmental quality reviews for polluting and erosion effects, among others) to preserve this finite resource. Whether the article will lead to the hoped-for culture and policy changes is not so assured.

Recording Acts

In Property and Sovereignty in America: A History of Title Registries & Jurisdictional Power, 133 Yale L.J. 1487 (2024), Prof. K-Sue Park offers a detailed account of how land title registries were established and evolved and their integral role in the creation of counties as they marked legal jurisdictions. Her main thrust is that land registries had a more sinister aim: as they provided a repository of written evidence of land claims, they served to deprive Native and Black Americans of their lands. She states that the main function of title registries at their origin and now has been to facilitate property markets and back then to legitimize the taking of Native American and Black American lands. In the early years of the country, it was not enough simply to possess land; instead one needed written and publicly-stored evidence of claims. She asserts that recording acts were an “expression of colonial authority to affirm settlers’ private claims to land, which they thereby claimed as part of their jurisdiction” and that “the registry, as an official legal mechanism for validating claims, assisted the colonies in making private and jurisdictional claims against the claims of Natives and other European Nations.” The article relies on original historical accounts and records of land transactions and provides extensive appendices on when and how land registries were established around the nation. Though rooted in colonial manipulations and coercion, they served to anchor claims to a façade of legitimacy. Although many of the article’s claims are quite broad, it nevertheless is an interesting exploration of the early role that land registries played in our current concept of what it means to own something.

Legislation

Alabama enacts Uniform Commercial Real Estate Receivership Act. The act provides for the appointment of a receiver before or after judgment. It contains standards for certain matters; provides for the disqualification of a receiver in case of conflict; gives the receiver the status of a purchaser for value without notice; confers the power to collect, control, conserve and protect receivership property, as well as to operate a business, incur unsecured debt, and with court approval make improvements to receivership property. 2024 Ala. Acts 380.

Colorado revises rules for tax foreclosure proceedings. The new rules prescribe forms for notice and for requesting and for conducting a public auction. They also describe the treasurer’s deed and contain redemption provisions. 2024 Colo. Ch. 165.

Colorado enacts laws to support accessory dwelling units. The law aims to increase housing access and requires local governments to allow accessory dwelling units (ADUs), subject to specified limits in the legislation. 2024 Colo. Ch. 167.

Colorado amends recording act to allow owners to remove unlawful restrictions in deeds. An owner of real property subject to an unlawful restriction may record an amendment to remove a restriction, covenant, or condition in a document on the transfer, use, or occupancy of real property based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, familial status, disability, or other personal characteristics. The governing body of an association of owners may, without a vote of the members of the association, amend the governing instrument to remove an unlawful restriction, and a member of an association of owners may request that the governing body do so. The amendments contain a prescribed form for such removal. 2024 Colo. ch. 149.

Florida amends property law to allow creation of easements in one’s land. The amendments aim to validate transactions occurring before the effective date. 2024 Fla. Laws ch. 268.

Hawaii amends landlord-tenant law to provide for handling of personal belongings of a deceased tenant. A landlord must give notice of termination of the tenancy to the tenant’s named representative or send notice to the estate of the deceased tenant at the address of the dwelling unit. The recipient is allowed to collect the tenant’s belongings. 2024 Hi. Act 33.

Minnesota amends landlord-tenant law to protect tenants’ right to organize. The amendments also require landlords to mitigate losses when a tenant abandons the premises and limits tenants’ liability for rent in such cases to the period of notice required to terminate. The amendments limit landlords’ use of tenant litigation data and impose fines for various violations of the statute. 2024 Minn. Laws 118.

Rhode Island amends landlord-tenant law on fees assessed by landlords. The amendments prohibit “convenience fees” and require disclosure of other fees assessed in addition to rent. 2024 R.I. Pub. Laws 308.

Rhode Island amends zoning ordinances to support accessory dwelling units. Accessory dwelling units (ADUs) that meet the statutory requirements are to be permitted through an administrative building permit process. Local governments may not require ADUs to be used for low-income or moderate-income households unless located in an inclusionary zone. Local governments may not revoke a permit upon transfer of title. 2024 R.I. Pub. Laws 284.

South Carolina enacts the Prohibition of Unfair Real Estate Service Agreements Act. Under the act, a real estate service agreement is unfair, void, and in violation of the Act if its term exceeds one year and either expressly or implicitly aims to run with the land or bind future owners of residential real estate identified in the real estate service agreement. The agreement may not allow for the assignment of the right to provide services without notice or consent of the owner or buyer or create a lien, encumbrance, or other real property security interest. It is also unlawful to record an unfair real estate service agreement. If it or a notice or memorandum thereof is recorded, it is void and does not give constructive notice of any rights. Civil penalties are provided. 2024 S.C. Acts 165.