Keeping Current—Property offers a look at selected recent cases, literature, and legislation. The editors of Probate & Property welcome suggestions and contributions from readers.
Termination agreement must provide for sale of all units. The condominium, consisting of 96 units, was established in 2007. Only six units were sold to individual purchasers. In 2018, the plaintiffs bought one of those units, and a year later, the condominium association held a meeting to discuss termination. The declaration set forth procedures for terminating the condominium, which were consistent with the termination provisions of the Arizona condominium act and required approval by at least 90 percent of the unit owners. At the time, a purchaser from the developer, PFP Dorsey, owned 90 units and cast its votes in favor of termination. The termination agreement provided for the sale of all units and other interests in the condominium not already owned by PFP Dorsey to PFP Dorsey. The agreement called for the payment of fair market value for the units and contained a mechanism for obtaining an independent appraisal. After the condominium association recorded a warranty deed transferring title to plaintiffs’ unit, PFP Dorsey took possession, changed the locks, and disposed of the plaintiffs’ personal property. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a claim against the condominium association and PFP Dorsey, seeking ejectment, the imposition of a constructive trust, and quiet title. They argued that the sale violated the condominium act procedures for terminating the condominium and alternatively that the termination procedures were unconstitutional because they authorized the taking of private property for private use. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the appellate court reversed in part, finding that an earlier version of the Arizona condominium act applied, which contained different appraisal rights. The supreme court reversed. It first ruled that the termination procedures were not unconstitutional because the plaintiffs as purchasers had agreed to be bound by them. The termination, however, did not comply with the act. In plain terms, the act requires that “all the common elements and units … be sold.” Ariz. Code § 33-1228(C). “All” means the whole amount, and not just those not held by the developer or its successor. Cao v. PFP Dorsey Invs., LLC, 545 P.3d 459 (Ariz. 2024).
Government does not have to repair or maintain road used by public absent express or implied acceptance of a dedication. Property owners of Lakefront Subdivision sought to require Sumter County to repair roads in their subdivision. In 2010, the county signed an easement agreement with the subdivision for the sole purpose of road maintenance. The county maintained the roads from 2010 through 2019, but there was no evidence that it ever expressly accepted the roads; at two county board meetings the board discussed the roads without accepting them. The property owners filed for a writ of mandamus to require the county to repair the roads and to declare that the roads were public roads. The trial court held the county did not own the roads and was not required to repair or maintain them. The appellate court vacated and remanded for the trial court to consider whether there was evidence of recognition of the roads as a public road or implied acceptance of dedication. The supreme court reversed and remanded. The court reaffirmed the long-standing precedent that public recognition of a road alone does not obligate a county to repair and maintain a road used by the public. Instead, there must be some acceptance, either express or implied. The appellate court erred to the extent it suggested that mere public use is sufficient. The supreme court, however, remanded the case to determine whether there was an implied acceptance. Sumter County v. Morris, 896 S.E.2d 571 (Ga. 2023).
Building code violation does not breach covenant against encumbrances. In 2017, Poon sold a condominium unit to Galvan, conveying by a warranty deed that included a statutory covenant against encumbrances. Previously, reconstruction work converted the building into three condominium townhouse units, separated by interior walls that failed to include fire barriers, as required by the city building code. Galvan learned of the building code violation when he began to renovate his unit. In 2018, the city sued Galvan and his two neighbors to enforce the code. Galvan paid significant sums for the violation and for professional remediation of the issue, and he also incurred expenses for living elsewhere while construction took place on his unit. Galvan filed suit, asserting various claims including breach of the deed covenants. The trial court granted a directed verdict for Poon, but the appellate court reversed, finding a breach of the covenant against encumbrances because the violation subjected Galvan to the threat of litigation and made the home unmarketable and uninhabitable. The supreme court reversed. The court discussed the history of the covenant since the nineteenth century, concluding that an encumbrance relates to rights or interests in the land rather than the condition of the property. Governmental regulations, standing alone, do not constitute an encumbrance because they are primarily concerned with use of the land. A contrary interpretation would make sellers warrant matters of which ordinary citizens generally lack knowledge. Other jurisdictions are split on whether violations of government regulations are encumbrances. Absent governmental enforcement actions, almost none holds that violations of building codes, as opposed to other types of regulations like zoning laws, are encumbrances. This is because building or housing code violations usually involve obscure or technical details that are not apparent to individuals engaged in normal title searches or property inspections. Galvan v. Poon, 999 N.W.2d 351 (Mich. 2023).
Easements implied from prior use can be exclusive. In the 1940s, the Cutlers purchased two adjacent parcels of land and built a home on one (the 643 Property) and later installed a driveway, a brick garden planter, and a chain-link fence that encroached by eight feet onto their neighboring parcel (the 651 Property) for a total area of 1300 square feet, about 13 percent of the parcel. In 1986, the Cutlers conveyed the 651 Property to their son Bevon, who built a house on it to sell for profit. Before the conveyance, the Cutlers applied to the city to adjust the boundary between the two lots to the line marked by the chain-link fence, but the process was never completed, and the legal boundary line remained unchanged. In 2014, Romero bought the 651 Property and Shih bought the 643 Property. Years later, a survey revealed the encroachment and Romero sued Shih to have the encroachments removed or for damages. The trial court found that Shih had an implied easement. When the Cutlers sold the 651 Property in 1986, the parties intended that the encroachments would continue because they were reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the 651 Property; otherwise, the driveway would be too narrow. The intermediate appellate court reversed in part, stating that California law did not recognize an exclusive implied easement. The supreme court in turn reversed. Giving a tutorial on the mechanics and policy underlying implied easements, the court stated that under California law, easements can arise both in favor of the grantor and grantee by implication based on the intention of the parties as manifested by the facts and circumstances of the transaction. Although California has codified the doctrine of implied easements, Cal. Civ. Code § 1104, the cases make clear that the law of implied easements is broader than the statutory language would suggest. Nonetheless, implied easements are not favored because they deprive the servient owner of the exclusive use of the property, and courts do not lightly infer that the parties intended to create one. The supreme court framed the issue as whether an implied easement can be exclusive because Shih’s claimed easement effectively excluded Romero from making any use of the area. Any reasonable person observing the two properties in 1986, when the Cutlers divided them, would have assumed that the owner of the 643 Property retained some continuing interest in the disputed strip of land. The court rejected Romero’s argument that the recognition of exclusive implied easements undermines a buyer’s ability to rely on the legal descriptions in recorded instruments, the concern being outweighed by the interest in protecting reasonable expectations of parties to transactions by giving effect to what they “must have intended,” given the “obvious and apparently permanent nature of the pre-existing use.” Romero v. Shih, 541 P.3d 1112 (Cal. 2024). The court went on to discuss the trial court’s findings on what the Cutlers’ successors might have noticed at the time of their purchases. Ordinarily, implied easements from prior use are based on uses existing at the time of severance, and once established, their burdens and benefits run to successors. In many states, Shih would have prevailed on a claim of title by adverse possession, rather than the exclusive easement theory.
Evidence that city’s property tax assessment scheme disproportionately raises taxes in communities of color may violate fair housing laws. Tax Equity Now N.Y. LLC, a tax equity advocacy group, sued the City and State of New York challenging the city’s property tax system. It alleged staggering inequities in tax bills in violation of the New York Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) § 305(2) and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601. The lower court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the court of appeals reversed the dismissal against the City. RPTL § 305(2) requires the assessment of all property in each assessing unit at a uniform percentage of value. The court found that the plaintiff introduced sufficient facts to avoid dismissal. It claimed that properties within the same borough were assessed at vastly different rates— one community being assessed at over triple the rate of that in a comparable faster-appreciating community. The plaintiff’s complaint included a graphic depiction of great disparities of assessed value to market value for the property class consisting of 1-to-4-unit homes. In addition, the plaintiff complained that the tax assessments for coops, 98 percent of which were built before 1974, were too low because the city compared them to rental properties subject to rent stabilization. On the FHA claim, the plaintiff alleged that the tax policy favored owner-occupied housing over rental housing and the disparities fell disproportionately on minorities, who are disproportionately renters bearing the burden of taxes passed through by landlords. This cohort, the plaintiff claimed, was over-assessed by $1.9 billion and over-taxed by $376 million annually. The court concluded that vastly higher rates (as much as 275 percent) resulting from government policy could operate to make housing “otherwise unavailable” within the prohibition of the FHA by increasing the cost of purchase, exacerbating housing shortages, and perpetuating segregation. The plaintiff relied on an array of public documents, studies, and statements by government officials as to the disparities in tax rates and assessments. Whether or not the allegations would stand up at trial, the court did not opine, ruling only that they were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Tax Equity Now N.Y. LLC v. City of New York, 2024 N.Y. LEXIS 298, 2024 WL 1160498 (March 19, 2024).
Violation of fair housing act is affirmative defense in forcible entry and detainer action. The parties entered into an oral lease under which the tenant agreed to do pet care and light housekeeping in lieu of paying rent. Soon after she took possession, she claimed that the landlord repeatedly demanded that she engage in sex with him. Her refusals were met a notice to quit from the landlord. When she refused to vacate, the landlord commenced a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action. At trial, the tenant asserted a violation of the state fair housing law as an affirmative defense to eviction. The district court ordered eviction, stating that a landlord may file a notice to quit for no reason or any reason and concluding that a claim of a discriminatory or retaliatory eviction under the fair housing law is not a defense to an FED action. The court stated that a tenant had recourse by pursuing a civil remedy against the landlord in a separately filed action. The supreme court reversed. Under the Colorado Fair Housing Act, the first state-wide legislation in the nation to prohibit discrimination in housing, enacted in 1959, it is unlawful to discriminate in the renting of housing because of impermissible factors. Colo. Stat. § 24-34-502(1)(a)(I) (later amended to cover sex). The court stated that that the landlord did not dispute the tenant’s allegation that the landlord sought to evict the tenant in retaliation for her refusal to have sex with him. This, the court held, amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the act. Even so, it remained to be decided whether a landlord’s statutory violation can be asserted defensively in an FED action, or whether a tenant is limited to pursuing affirmative relief (meaning damages), as the district court concluded. The court adopted the former position. Although Colorado has long recognized that a landlord has a right to decline to renew a lease for any reason, that right is not absolute. Instead, the state act and its federal analogue protect renters not only from eviction, but also from discriminatory actions that would lead to eviction. If a statutory violation is not a cognizable defense in a FED action, the act would wholly fail to fulfill its purpose of preventing discriminatory or retaliatory evictions. Requiring a tenant first to suffer a wrongful eviction and then pursue a separate action to vindicate her statutory right undermines the effectiveness of the statutory scheme, even if recognizing affirmative defenses causes some delay in FED actions. Miller v. Amos, 543 P.3d 393 (Colo. 2024).
Punitive damages are constitutionally excessive when award equals thirty-three times tenant’s compensatory damages. The plaintiff suffered a serious knee injury at his apartment complex when his leg punched through a section of elevated walkway that had been weakened by dry rot. The owners and managers of the apartment complex knew that the walkway and other structures at the complex had deteriorated to the point that they required “life safety” repairs but chose not to repair the walkway. The plaintiff sued the defendants for negligence and violation of the state’s residential landlord-tenant statute, which requires safe and habitable dwellings. The jury awarded $296,000 in damages for medical expenses and pain and emotional distress. The jury also awarded punitive damages of $10 million against each defendant. On a post-verdict review of the punitive-damages verdict, the trial court concluded that the evidence permitted the jury to find the defendants liable for some amount of punitive damages, but that imposing $10 million in punitive damages would violate the defendants’ due process rights. Instead, the trial court determined that the maximum amount to be nine times the amount of compensatory damages and, accordingly reduced the award to $2.7 million. On appeal, both the intermediate appellate court and the supreme court affirmed. By statute, punitive damages are unavailable unless it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has acted with malice or has shown a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with a conscious indifference to the health, safety, and welfare of others. Ore. Rev. Stat. §31.730(1). The court explained that federal law alone governs the question whether an award of punitive damage is constitutionally excessive because there is “no state law excessiveness challenge under the Oregon Constitution.” Although the US Supreme Court has not set any constitutional “rigid benchmark” to limit punitive damages, it has articulated three guideposts: “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; the disparity or ratio between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Here, two of the guideposts—reprehensibility and comparable civil sanctions—support a significant punitive damages award. But the amount exceeded the approximately $300,000 in actual compensatory damages by a ratio of 33 to 1. There was no evidentiary basis for increasing the second term of the ratio by inferring significantly greater “potential harm” to the plaintiff. The disparity was dramatically greater than the “single-digit ratio” that the Supreme Court has suggested is—except in extraordinary circumstances—the limit of what due process will permit, no matter what the tort. Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC, 544 P.3d 342 (Ore. 2024).
Government survey that describes lot as riparian determines its boundary with neighboring lot. The plaintiff, owner of Government Lot 1, sued her neighbors, owners of Government Lot 7, to determine the boundary between their lots. A US government survey recorded in 1867 created the lots. The survey showed Lot 1 and Lot 7 as containing 53 acres and 33 acres, respectively, separated by the Loup River. Over the past 150 years, the river gradually moved to the east and uncovered new land on the defendants’ west side of the river. The plaintiff claimed ownership of land on both the east and west sides of the river and asked the court to confirm her proposed boundaries in metes and bounds. The defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the eastern boundary of Lot 1 be established as the thread (that is, the center) of the river. Both parties sought summary judgment and agreed that judicial determination of Lot 1 would resolve all claims and counterclaims. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that Lot 1 was riparian property, whose boundaries are fixed by the river. The supreme court affirmed. The court first noted that for land to be riparian, it must have a stream flowing over it or along its border. If Lot 1 was riparian when first surveyed, the boundary between the two lots is the thread of the river. What controls are the government corners fixed by the government survey and when appropriate the field notes, including plats, at the time of the original survey. When lands are granted according to an official plat of the survey of such lands, the plat itself, with all its notes, lines, descriptions, and landmarks, becomes as much a part of the grant or deed by which the lands are conveyed. Here, the survey and field notes showed Lot 1 to be riparian. The plat did not depict anything other than a riparian tract. Nothing in the field notes otherwise supported the plaintiff’s argument for a metes and bounds description. Puncochar v. Rudolf, 999 N.W.2d 127 (Neb. 2024).
Bankruptcy discharge does not accelerate promissory note to start running of statute of limitations. A homeowner defaulted on his Nevada mortgage loan and subsequently obtained a discharge in bankruptcy of his mortgage debt. Later in 2014, a default in payment of dues to the homeowners’ association resulted in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the property to SFR Investments Pool. Bank of New York Mellon, the holder of the promissory note for the home mortgage loan, brought a judicial foreclosure action against SFR, arguing that its deed of trust survived the foreclosure sale. At trial, SFR argued that the bankruptcy discharge automatically accelerated the due date of the promissory note, therefore barring the bank’s action under Nevada’s six-year limitations period. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 104.3118(1). The district court ruled that the bank’s judicial-foreclosure claim against SFR was not time-barred. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Under the Nevada statute of limitations, an action to enforce the obligation to pay a note accrues within six years after the due date or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date. The borrower’s bankruptcy discharge did not make the loan due for several reasons. First, the statute listed only two documents that determine when a loan becomes “wholly due” for purposes of triggering the limitations period—the mortgage or deed of trust and any recorded written extensions. SFR failed to identify any provision in the promissory note, deed of trust, or other written instrument that indicated a bankruptcy discharge automatically accelerated the due date on the promissory note. Second, a debtor’s bankruptcy discharge excuses only a personal obligation on the loan secured by the deed of trust. Nothing in a discharge extinguishes a lender’s right to foreclose on the mortgage after bankruptcy. Third, acceleration is seldom implied, and courts usually require that a lender accelerate in a manner so clear and unequivocal that it leaves no doubt as to its intention. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. SFR Inv. Pool, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 3840, 2024 WL 687627 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2024).
Exclusion of disabled child from hockey team and ice arena may violate state human rights act. In 2019, a minor child (M.U.) signed up to play hockey on a girls’ team run by Team Illinois Hockey Club. Team Illinois leased and operated the Seven Bridges Ice Arena. During the hockey season M.U. began treatment for various psychological issues, including suicidal thoughts, and her mother shared that information with M.U.’s team coach. Shortly thereafter, the coach banned M.U. from all Team Illinois activities until she fully recovered and sent emails to other team members’ families, instructing them to have no contact with her. Through her parents, M.U. filed suit against Seven Bridges and Team Illinois, alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 Ill. Consol. Stat. § 5/5-102(A). The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that Team Illinois was not a physical place and thus not a place of public accommodation. The appellate court reversed, finding persuasive a US Supreme Court decision interpreting the analogous provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, to hold that professional golf association tours and qualifying rounds are public accommodations because the events occurred at public golf courses, which are covered by the federal act. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). The state supreme court affirmed and remanded. The court found the plain language of the state statute clear and unambiguous. First, a person under the act includes a corporation and an organization, both of which apply to Team Illinois. Second, the ice rink fits within the definition of a public place of accommodation as a place of exercise or recreation. M.U. v. Team Illinois Hockey Club, Inc., 2024 Ill. LEXIS 146 (Ill. Mar. 8, 2024).
In Title Theft, 81 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 161, Prof. Stewart Sterk analyzes one of the scams affecting a small but growing number of property owners across the country—title theft. Although his article does not explore the origins of title theft or discuss its widespread coverage in popular media coverage, one may infer that much of the current malaise results from the confluence of our aging population and the rapid growth of technology, often leading to negative outcomes. Title theft generally involves several individuals acting in concert who prepare fake documents purporting to sell property to unwary buyers or offering refinancing to actual property owners in financial distress. In other instances, they use the stolen title to secure equity loans unbeknownst to the property owners, often leaving them with insurmountable losses. Prof. Sterk provides an updated review of the common-law rules that guard owners’ titles and comments on modern expansive options currently available or being proposed to protect owners. Prof. Sterk notes the well-established foundational rule that a forged deed is void. Thus, in instances of title theft the law has routinely protected those victimized by forgery. Similarly, the law of fraud has protected consumers, albeit somewhat to a lesser extent. In some instances, fraud “in factum” is treated the same as forgery, although fraud “in inducement” is not. Forgery and fraud are also viable statutory options for criminal actions throughout the country. For the victimized, however, civil and criminal relief, although available in principle, are realistic only for victims with access to sophisticated knowledge bases and substantial financial resources. Title Theft examines many options proposed nationally and in Prof. Sterk’s home state of New York, concluding that none is satisfactory in addressing the financial burdens faced by the victims of the transgressors. Those options include county programs that notify individuals whenever a document is recorded involving their property, expanding potential criminal options, reforming notary procedures, and delaying court procedures involving title disputes. Prof. Sterk focuses on insurance as the best potential resource to possibly deter theft activity or at least compensate victims of title theft. He notes the plethora of entities currently marketing title and identity theft protection in a variety of questionable forms, some of which have triggered state action in jurisdictions investigating whether those companies are involved in fraud as well. In comparing the standard title insurance policies that homeowners usually secure, he indicates that they are inadequate for title theft protection since they do not cover post-policy fraud or forgery. He proposes new legislation to require post-policy protection, although he does not specify exactly what it should look like. He does somewhat acknowledge the existence of cost v. benefit concerns associated with mandatory insurance for both the title insurance industry as well as consumers who must pay higher premiums for greater protection. Prof. Sterk believes such legislation would build upon the knowledge and resources of title insurance companies who already monitor property records and that forcible expansion of their coverage would incentivize them to use their expertise to provide greater help to consumers facing title theft.
Who owns the sidewalks? Is it owners of abutting property? The vendors selling food and wares? The restaurants for their outdoor dining? The neighborhood for its block parties? In Sidewalk Government, 122 Mich. L. Rev. 613 (2023), Prof. Michael C. Pollack suggests that the answer is neither required by established legal principles nor intuitive. In probing the issue, he begins by recounting the myriad users (residents, businesses, the government) and uses (dining, festivals, Christmas tree sales) that occur on space nominally said to be public, the sidewalk. He goes on to show that inevitably there are conflicts among users and uses—pedestrians want easy passage without having to dodge scaffolding and sandwich boards, and neighbors want quiet and fresh air. Then there is the question of who is responsible for maintaining sidewalks. He believes that the usual methods for mediating conflicts—property law, public regulations, social norms, or a mix of these—are inadequate, revealing a fragmented web with both siloed and interdependent authority and out of sync. Prof. Pollack proposes a new paradigm, called Sidewalk Law, governed by a Department of Sidewalks, which would coordinate all facets of sidewalk life, including the private obligations of maintenance and snow removal, responsibility for trees, over food carts, and delivery robots. An appointed commissioner would be accountable for the state of the sidewalks. Although the notion of a single regulatory body for managing common space is a good idea, there remain the many thorny issues of assigning priority over uses—al fresco dining versus pedestrian passage?
The Supreme Court decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021), seems to have struck fear in the hearts of so many about so much—from rent regulation to historic preservation. In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid and Customary Use: Protecting the Public’s Right to Recreate on Dry Sand Beaches, 35 Colo. Nat. Res. Energy & Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2024), Anna A. Schmelzle speaks about beach access. She sees the holding in Cedar Point —that a government-authorized physical invasion of property need not be permanent to qualify as a per se taking — as a departure from half a century of the Court’s takings jurisprudence. In challenges to customary use statutes, property owners attempt to restrict public access to dry sand beaches and claim that the statutes constitute a per se taking by allowing the public to access private beach property. Nonetheless, she believes that states’ customary use statutes, founded upon ancient principles, can withstand a takings challenge under the expanded takings law of Cedar Point. The doctrine of customary use, dating back to the time of Blackstone, protects the public’s ancient, reasonable, and continuous use of dry sand for dancing, playing games, and using dry fishing nets on certain land. In modern times, courts and legislatures have recognized the public’s customary use of dry sand beaches in state statutes, constitutions, and common law to cover sunbathing and picnicking. Customary use statutes fall within the Court’s exception to a taking as a background principle. This is so because the public’s interest in dry sand property predated the government’s property interest, which means that the government’s initial transfer of dry sand property to private owners never included the right to limit public beach access. Thus, the right to exclude the public from dry sand beaches never inhered in the title held by current owners. Another reason she offers for protecting beach access pertains to the Court’s recognition of the government’s inherent power to legislate and abate public nuisances—here, conduct by property owners that interferes with public beach access rights. State statutes may prohibit actions that unreasonably interfere with a right common to the general public without effecting a taking. Beaches provide a variety of societal benefits, including improving overall health and well-being, supporting tourism, and increasing local property values. Customary use statutes abate what can be seen as public nuisances in property owners’ interference with the public’s right to use, enjoy, and recreate on the dry sand. Although the assertion of Cedar Point in this context might seem doubtful to many, the author makes a convincing case for protecting public beach rights from takings challenges.
Colorado provides immunity to landowners from liability for injuries to persons crossing land with notice of danger. An owner posting a sign with prescribed warnings is not liable to a person who enters the land at a primary access point and is injured or killed on the land by a known dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. 2024 Colo. Ch. 27.
Florida adopts law to enable quick removal of unlawful occupants from residential real property. The law is aimed at recent concerns about squatters. A property owner may request, on a prescribed form, that the sheriff remove a person unlawfully occupying a residential dwelling so long as (1) the person unlawfully entered and remained on the property, (2) the property was not open to the public, (3) the property owner directed the unauthorized person to leave the property, (4) the person is not a current or former tenant, (5) the person is not an immediate family member of the property owner, and (6) there is no pending litigation related to the property between the property owner and any known unauthorized person. The unlawful occupant is subject to criminal penalties. 2024 Fla. Laws ch. 44.
Indiana prohibits land ownership by citizens of foreign adversaries. The law applies to agricultural land and prohibits all forms of acquisition of title and lesser interests in the land by citizens of China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, or a country designated as a threat to critical infrastructure by the governor. 2024 Ind. Acts 168.
Indiana limits enforceability of long-term residential real estate service agreements. Agreements under which a service provider promises to provide services in connection with the maintenance, purchase, or sale of residential real estate and that are not to be performed in their entirety within one year after the agreement is entered are not recordable, do not create a lien on any property, and do not bind bona fide purchasers. The act applies to agreements made after March 14, 2024. 2024 Ind. Acts 62.
South Dakota requires sellers to disclose facts concerning homeowners’ associations. A seller must inform the buyer about the homeowners’ association, provide a copy of its governing documents, and a statement about required assessments. 2024 S.D. SB 217.
South Dakota prohibits homeowners’ associations from including or enforcing provisions on firearms. Governing documents may not prohibit or restrict the lawful possession, transportation, storage, or discharge of firearms or ammunition. 2024 S.D. SB 39.
South Dakota places restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land. The restrictions apply to persons and entities from the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Cuba, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The act limits the amount of land that can be acquired. 2024 S.D. HB 1231.
Utah adopts provisions for recorder of deeds to alert property owners of recordings against their property. Notices are sent electronically. 2024 Utah SB 165.
