Keeping Current—Property offers a look at selected recent cases, literature, and legislation. The editors of Probate & Property welcome suggestions and contributions from readers.
FORECLOSURE: Gross inadequacy of price absent proof of fraud, unfairness, or oppression is not enough to set aside foreclosure sale. After a homeowner defaulted in paying monthly common charges, the homeowners association (HOA) sold the property at a foreclosure sale to Saticoy Bay for $35,000. Saticoy Bay then instituted a quiet title action against Nationstar, the holder of the deed of trust on the property. Nationstar argued that “the sales price of the property at the HOA auction was not commercially reasonable,” the standard used in personal property foreclosures under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Nationstar provided an appraisal valuing the property at $335,000 as of the date of the foreclosure sale. The court rejected the commercial reasonableness standard, explaining that the HOA foreclosure statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 116.31162–116.31164, creates an elaborate scheme for HOA foreclosures, dictating the method, manner, time, place, and terms of its foreclosure sale, thus leaving an HOA little autonomy in taking extra-statutory efforts to increase the winning bid at the sale. The court reaffirmed its long-standing framework for evaluating other real property foreclosure sales: “[I]nadequacy of price, however gross, is not in itself a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee’s sale, absent additional proof of some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression as accounts for and brings about the inadequacy of price.” Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d 641 (Nev. 2017).
FORECLOSURE: Defense that foreclosure sale price is less than fair market value must relate to value at time of sale. After the Sostarics defaulted on a $200,000 mortgage loan, Marshall, the lender, purchased the property at a foreclosure sale for $60,000. Marshall then obtained a deficiency judgment of $175,407, which the supreme court reversed, allowing the defense that the fair market value of the secured property was not obtained at the foreclosure sale. On remand, the Sostarics offered an appraisal showing the property had a present value of $149,000. Marshall challenged the appraisal because it reflected current value and not that at the time of the sale. The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment for Marshall. On the Sostarics’ second appeal, the supreme court affirmed. It first noted that the legislature had changed the law after the first appeal by precluding the defense that the sale did not produce the fair market value. W. Va. Code § 38-1-7. But since that amendment became effective after the sale, it did not apply to the Sostarics’ property. Nevertheless, because the appraisal of the property reflected current value and not that at the time of the foreclosure, the Sostarics’ challenge to the deficiency judgment failed. Sostaric v. Marshall, No. 16-0685, 2017 W. Va. LEXIS 866 (W. Va. Mar. 24, 2017).
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS: Homeowners association has standing to bring construction defect claim on behalf of all unit owners, including those who purchase after commencement of suit. High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Association (High Noon) managed a common interest community with 342 residential units. In 2007, High Noon filed a complaint against D.R. Horton on “behalf of itself and all of the High Noon . . . unit owners” alleging breach of implied warranties of workmanlike quality and habitability, breach of contract, breach of express warranties, and breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, High Noon obtained written assignment of the claims of 194 individual unit owners. In 2014, the trial court granted partial summary judgment for Horton on the basis that High Noon did not have representational standing to assert construction defect claims on behalf of its current members who were not unit owners at the time the complaint was filed. The supreme court reversed and held that High Noon has statutory standing to represent unit owners who purchased their units after the litigation commenced. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3102. This enabled judicial consideration of common defects throughout a community in the most efficient method possible. But High Noon did not have standing to continue claims for owners who sell their units after the litigation commenced because those persons were no longer members of the association. High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Ass’n v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 402 P.3d 639 (Nev. 2017).
LANDLORD-TENANT: Landlord’s failure to timely return forfeited security deposit does not trigger liability for treble damages. A residential tenant vacated after his term ended and requested the return of his $750 security deposit. The landlord responded with a statement of deposit account, which was signed but not sworn to under penalty of perjury as required by the security deposit statute. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 186, § 15B. The statement listed charges (for unpaid rent, late payment fees, carpet cleaning, apartment cleaning, and damages) of $968.08, leaving a balance of $218.02. Thereafter, the tenant commenced a class action suit, later removed to federal court, against the landlord alleging that the statement did not comply with the statute and included improper charges, that the landlord had forfeited the right to retain the deposit by failing to return it within 30 days of the termination of the tenancy, and that the landlord was liable for statutory treble damages on the amounts wrongfully withheld. The federal court certified to the state court the question whether a violation of the itemized deductions requirement, resulting in the forfeiture of the deposit, also makes the landlord liable for treble damages under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 186, § 15B(6)(e). The Supreme Judicial Court answered no. The court found that the statute aims to protect tenants by giving clear guidelines to landlords for handling security deposits, but that the legislature intended that the treble damages provision apply only to certain expressly stated violations. The failure to return a forfeited deposit was not one of these violations. Otherwise, a landlord who produces a deposit statement with improper deductions on the 30th day could be liable for treble damages because there would be no time to return the forfeited amounts within the prescribed time. The context of the rest of the statute did not support that reading. Phillips v. Equity Residential Mgt. L.L.C., 85 N.E.3d 12 (Mass. 2017).
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: Painting is not an “improvement” requiring approval under restrictive covenant. In 2004, the Korths purchased a residential lot subject to restrictive covenants and submitted plans to paint their house blue, but acquiesced to the developer’s denial of the proposed paint color and insistence on an earth tone. Nonetheless, ten years later, the Korths informed the homeowners association (HOA) of their decision to repaint their house. After conflict ensued over whether color approval was necessary, the Korths repainted their residence blue without seeking approval. The HOA filed a lawsuit asserting that the Korths violated three restrictive covenants: prohibitions of certain “external improvement[s]”; prohibitions of “storage” of things “obnoxious to the eye”; and provisions stating that “[n]o objectionable, unlawful or offensive trade or activity shall be carried on upon any Lot nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or become a nuisance or annoyance to the neighborhood or surrounding Lots.” After a trial, the district court entered a judgment for the HOA, concluding that the Korths were aware of the need for paint color approval when purchasing in a community with broad developer authority. The district court also found that the blue paint color was “a nuisance, annoyance, and obnoxious to the eye.” The supreme court reversed, regarding this as a straightforward matter of interpreting the restrictive covenants. Finding the terms unambiguous, it held that painting is not an “improvement,” as it is not something that is typically “constructed,” “erected,” “placed,” or “permitted to remain” on land. Painting did not involve “storage” of a thing (making it irrelevant whether the paint itself was obnoxious to the eye), and paint color was not a “trade or activity.” Therefore, nothing in the restrictive covenants prohibited the Korths from painting their house blue, nor did any portion of the covenants require permission before doing so. Estates at Prairie Ridge Homeowners Ass’n v. Korth, 904 N.W.2d 15 (Neb. 2017).
SALES CONTRACTS: Buyer’s action for rescission or reformation is not anticipatory breach. A buyer agreed to purchase a developable waterfront lot under an agreement requiring the seller to deliver certain necessary government approvals as a condition to closing. The agreement further provided that if approvals could not be obtained by the outside closing date, then either party could terminate the agreement on 30 days’ notice, followed by a refund of the deposit. The state environmental agency discovered flaws in a retaining wall along the waterfront of the property and required the seller to remedy them. Thereafter, the parties amended the agreement to increase the down payment, to share the costs of remediation, and to extend the closing date. That date was later extended 11 more times over the course of a year because of ongoing remedial work. The amendments also included a forbearance clause, by which the buyer agreed not to commence any legal action against the seller if development approvals were not issued or remedial work completed by the new closing date. Before the latest closing date arrived, the buyer sued for reformation or rescission, alleging fraud in the inducement of the amendments to the agreement, based on the seller’s representations about its ability to complete the remedial work necessary to close. The buyer sought to eliminate the increase in the purchase price and the requirement of sharing in the costs of repairs to the property. But the trial court granted summary judgment for the seller on a counterclaim that the buyer had defaulted, thereby entitling the seller to retain the entire down payment and the buyer’s payments made toward remediation of the property. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the buyer had committed an anticipatory breach by the commencement of the rescission action. The court of appeals reversed, explaining that an anticipatory breach of a contract is a repudiation of a contractual duty before the time fixed in the contract for performance has arrived and requires an expression of intent not to perform by the repudiator that is “positive and unequivocal.” That was not the case here. The action sought reformation of the amendments to the contract and specific performance of the original agreement; the mere asking for judicial approval to avoid a performance obligation is not the same as establishing that one will not perform that obligation absent such approval. Princes Point LLC v. Muss Dev. L.L.C., 87 N.E.3d 121 (N.Y. 2017).
TRESPASS: Squatter who filed false documents claiming title to house was guilty of theft and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Gentry entered a foreclosed mansion, valued at more than $2 million, without the bank’s consent. Gentry changed locks, posted signs warning against trespassing, and on a gate she placed a flag for the “Moorish National Republic” along with a sign stating, “I Abka Re Bay, seize this land” for the “Moorish National Trust.” Before entry, Gentry recorded miscellaneous documents regarding the property, including a quitclaim deed to herself. The state arrested and prosecuted Gentry, with a jury convicting her of theft of property, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103, and aggravated burglary. She was sentenced under statutory guidelines to 20 years and three years for each conviction, respectively. On appeal in a case of first impression the supreme court considered whether Tennessee’s consolidated theft statute encompassed the offense of theft of real property and whether Gentry had committed that offense. After reviewing the common law and statutory history of theft, the court noted the current statute is heavily based on the Model Penal Code, generally requiring proof that a defendant exercised nonconsensual control over property without the owner’s knowledge, and with intent to deprive the owner of the property. The statute is to be broadly construed and not restricted to offenses recognized before its adoption. A separate statute defining property expressly includes real property, and Model Penal Code comments state real estate is stolen if one unlawfully transfers property of another with the purpose of benefitting one who is not entitled to it. Although many states have incorporated distinctions and limitations in their theft statutes to avoid theft liability for real property, the court noted that Tennessee has not adopted any limitations. Gentry’s conviction therefore stood. The court rejected her claim that the trial court improperly cut off her examination of a witness on whether adverse possession was a defense to theft, although it did not address the merits of the claim. State v. Gentry, No. W2015-01745-SC-R11-CD, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).
WATER LAW: A dominant landowner may not alter the time or flow of water over a servient estate, even if total volume of water discharged is unchanged. The Zubkes owned land that drained through two culverts below a road flowing onto the Rumpzas’ land. The Zubkes modified the established flow characteristics of the two drainage areas through the installation of pumps, tiles, and pits to allow areas that had previously remained wet to drain. The modifications caused the watercourse to be continually wet. The Rumpzas filed suit claiming the increased drainage prevented them from harvesting crops on land previously farmed. The Zubkes asserted that they were simply compensating for the buildup of silt that caused an obstruction in the watercourse on the Rumpzas’ property. The trial court found for the Rumpzas, prohibiting further enhanced drainage by the Zubkes and ordering the removal of the additions used to facilitate the change. The supreme court affirmed. The law permits a dominant estate owner to drain water onto a servient estate by means of a natural or established watercourse, but it does not permit restoring the natural flow by raising the elevation to compensate for the buildup of silt on the servient estate. There is no authority for the proposition that a servient landowner has a duty to clear natural obstructions from a watercourse for a dominant estate’s benefit. On the contrary, an upper owner may not collect and move surface water onto the property of the lower owner in a way other than the previous manner. Rumpza v. Zubke Bros. LLC, 900 N.W. 2d 601 (S.D. 2017).
ZONING: Railroad that owns land in fee used for railway tracks is not “owner” of land for purposes of notice and consent requirements of annexation statute. National Lime sought to annex 224 acres of its property in Grand Prairie Township to the city of Marion, Ohio. The state annexation statute requires that a majority of the “owners” of land within the territory proposed for annexation sign the petition for annexation. Ohio Rev. Code § 709.02(C)(1). Norfolk Southern Railway owned two strips of land, containing railway tracks, which passed through the proposed annexation parcel. It did not consent to the annexation. The statute defines “owners” as private corporations “seized of a freehold estate in land; except that easements and any railroad, utility, street, and highway rights-of-way held in fee, by easement, or by dedication and acceptance are not included.” Id. § 709.02(E). The parties agreed that the deeds to Norfolk granted a fee simple interest in the strips but disputed whether Norfolk’s interest fell within the exception in the annexation statute. The trial court held that Norfolk’s consent was required, but the supreme court reversed. The court found the term “rights of way” ambiguous, referring either to a nonpossessory interest in another’s land or to the land itself. In the context of the statutory exception, the latter meaning made more sense, focusing on the way the piece of land is used. To achieve expedited annexation proceedings, the legislature meant to exclude from “owner” holders of rights of way, regardless of whether the holder possessed the right to pass over the lands or owned the land in fee. Accordingly, because the land here was used for railway tracks, Norfolk fell within the exception to the definition of “owner,” such that its consent was not necessary. State ex rel. Nat’l Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commissioners, No. 2016-0505, 2017 Ohio LEXIS 2181 (Ohio Oct. 31, 2017).
ZONING: Statutory notice requirements are not met when published proposed rezoning reflects an ordinance that differs from ordinance actually adopted. A developer sought to build a multistory apartment complex on land adjacent to a law office owned by the Bucks. The developer submitted an application to rezone its land to “B-3 community business district.” Notice of a public hearing and the proposed new ordinance, including a synopsis, was published in the local newspaper. After the planning committee recommended the addition of conditions, the developer negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with other affected landowners. At the public hearing, the city council approved the rezoning, subject to the committee’s conditions and the terms of the MOU, which created a “QB-3 qualified community business district.” The Bucks sued the city and the developer for failing to comply with statutory notice requirements. The trial court held that publication of the MOU terms and “Q conditions” was not necessary. In reversing, the supreme court found a violation of the statutory notice and publication requirements. Ala. Code § 11-52-77. Publication of a proposed rezoning in full is necessary to apprise affected persons so they can prepare for the hearing. A proposed zoning ordinance that is modified after notice is published is deficient if the use for the zoned property differs significantly from the use allowed in the notice originally published. It is immaterial whether any person is prejudiced by the failure to comply with the notice requirements. The notice statute requires that the ordinance ultimately adopted be the same as the published proposed ordinance. Here the notice did not refer to amendments containing conditions and limited uses. Ex parte Buck, No. 2150220, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 111 (Ala. Oct. 27, 2017).
Housing. In a recent article, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 Yale L.J. 78 (2017), Prof. David Schleicher explores what seems to be a problem in America. A variety of policies in effect across the country keep us stuck in place where we live, minimizing our options to move residences. Although many policy narratives focus on this as a good thing, generating a sense of community or fostering useful stability, Prof. Schleicher sees such narratives as short-sighted. He explains that state and local governments erect barriers to interstate mobility through land use laws, occupational licenses that give people vested interests in not moving and create barriers to entry for outsiders, and subsidies and public benefits that encourage people to stay put. These laws combine to reduce the incentive to exit while creating entry limits in areas where some might otherwise move. Prof. Schleicher identifies negative macroeconomic consequences from declining interstate mobility rates, including labor market stagnation and higher costs for federal safety net programs. He suggests that state and local governments have little reason to value these macroeconomic effects more than the gains they receive from maintaining their existing populations. Instead, the federal government should address the macroeconomic concerns by, for example, nationalizing some occupational licensing, encouraging greater land use control standardization or interstate compacts, promoting stronger Fair Housing Act enforcement, and providing tax incentives, subsidies, or other direct relocation incentives. Mobility barriers are fortified by our legal and policy choices, such that substituting such choices can get us un-stuck.
Land Use. The debate over the wisdom of regulation on short-term rentals (like Airbnb) is hitting communities across the nation as the sharing economy blossoms. One common complaint by incumbent landowners is that short-term rentals bring nuisance problems into the community from the transient populations. Major proponents of such complaints are not just the neighbors but also hotel industry advocates who fear the competition from short-term rentals and seek to paint them as harmful. To test the effects of regulations restricting short-term rentals, economists Jin Hyuk Kim, Tin Cheuk Leung, and Liad Wagman look at evidence from Anna Maria Island, Florida, in a recent article, Can Restricting Property Use Be Value Enhancing? Evidence from Short-Term Rental Regulation, 60 J.L. & Econ. 309 (2017). The article presents a sophisticated theoretical framework, coupled with statistical analysis of data on housing prices and investment in three distinct areas across Anna Maria Island that have historically distinct means of regulating short-term rentals. All three areas were affected when the state passed a law prohibiting local governments from regulating the duration of rentals. That state law preempted a restrictive regulatory regime in Holmes Beach, making Anna Maria Island a useful, natural experiment with data for testing the effect of restrictive short-term rental regulations on the area. The authors’ empirical analysis supports the conclusion that “zoning laws that restrict vacation rentals seem to be inefficient policy” because owners’ property rights are “valued more highly than the neighborhood externalities caused by renters.” According to their analysis, nonresident ownership of property decreased and property values decreased in areas affected by the regulation (except in areas with an especially high density of nonresident-owned properties).
Property Theory. Prof. Meredith M. Render defends the proposition that property is a conceptually distinct area of law in her recent article, The Concept of Property, 78 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 437 (2017). She explains that the critical feature of property law that gives it that distinctiveness is the numerus clausus principle, a common law rule that “demands that every legal ownership relationship sits within a restrictive menu of existing forms of ownership—the life estate, the fee simple, and so forth.” Numerus clausus works, she explains, only to “eliminate idiosyncratic interests” and is not geared toward arriving “at a correct or even substantively justifiable outcome in a given dispute.” This “conceptualist” feature of property law distinguishes it from contract law and other doctrines that have no such form restrictions. “Non-conceptualists” are those that do not see form restriction as a critical feature of property and fail to see any problem with conflating property forms with other doctrines with open-ended legal form options. Prof. Render explains why attentiveness to form matters to a coherent, unified doctrine. She then explains why numerus clausus operates as an imperative rule that “applies prescriptive pressure” regardless of context because it shifts legal interests into categories, if they are to be considered property, leading to more identifiable meaning and immediately attaching broadly applicable rules to the interest as soon as we know the category in which it fits. Prof. Render also defends numerus clausus against a realist critique, articulating the principle’s ability to constrain judicial decision making and its role in coordinating transactions by enabling individuals to understand each other as they communicate with a shared, limited vocabulary. Under the conceptualist view, we not only can but also must separate property interests from nonproperty interests. Using the significance of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) to the 2008 financial crisis as one example, Prof. Render demonstrates how the loose treatment of property forms can lead to disastrous consequences when CDOs were regarded as stable financial assets (property) yet “behaved like highly unstable personal contracts.”
Real Covenants. Prof. Chad J. Pomeroy, in Real Doctrine & Covenants, 65 Drake L. Rev. 481 (2017), makes the argument that the movement of states to invalidate transfer fee covenants is misguided. He notes two laudable purposes of such covenants: capital recovery and permitting developers to finance the often-substantial costs of real estate development over a long period. In this respect, he asserts that they are no different from homeowner association fees for maintenance, repair, improvements, and expansion over time. Abolishing them will frustrate the parties’ contract expectations and unnecessarily restrict rights and economic benefits that flow from them. Because, in his view, they are just real covenants, the existing legal regime is adequate to avoid them when they are burdensome or offend public policy. Any special treatment should be limited to a prescribed form and some sort of exemplary notice.
Takings. The U.S. Supreme Court pronounced a categorical rule that a taking results when a government regulation “denies all economically viable use” in the seminal case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In a recent article, On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas: Making or Breaking the Takings Clause, 201 Iowa L. Rev. 1847 (2017), Prof. Carol Necole Brown and Attorney Dwight H. Merriam present research findings on cases invoking Lucas to reveal its true impact. They examine more than 1,700 cases in state and federal courts to find that Lucas claims were successful in only 1.6% of cases. Their article provides a helpful summary of Lucas and detailed discussions of dozens of cases applying it. In sections on jurisprudential and practical implications, the authors provide many lessons useful to litigants and judges on how and why plaintiffs lost Lucas-style takings claims (and how and why some won). In the process, the article provides a useful overview of the steps in a Lucas-type regulatory takings case and explains what happens when a Lucas claim fails but a claim proceeds under the alternative balancing test of Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Particular attention is given to the determination of the relevant parcel for the denominator, a factor critical in identifying the degree of diminution. The authors explain tactics that have been used to alter or manipulate the denominator to bring it closer to the numerator—something which can either bring it closer to a claim for a total taking under Lucas or increase the odds of a takings finding under Penn Central. The article’s appendix listing citations to successful Lucas cases (organized by the focus of the court’s inquiry) is of particular utility for those researching the issue, developing a case, or exploring how to adjust property rights and ownership interests in anticipation of altering the denominator.
CALIFORNIA protects owners of manufactured homes from liability for taxes after transfer. The owner must properly endorse and deliver a certificate of title to the transferee and deliver a notice of sale to the Department of Housing and Community Development. 2017 Cal. Stat. Ch. 832.
CALIFORNIA prohibits public entities from adopting laws and policies affecting housing opportunities based on immigration status. The law prohibits the adoption of ordinances, regulations, policies, or administrative actions that compel landlords to compile information or inquire into the immigration or citizenship status of prospective tenants. Nothing prohibits landlords from complying with legal obligations under federal law. 2017 Cal. Stat. Ch. 490.
CALIFORNIA requires disclosures to prospective tenants that property is located in a flood hazard area. The notice, which must be given in no smaller than eight-point type, also must advise the tenant of the web address of the Office of Emergency Services for information about hazards and that the landlord’s insurance does not cover the loss to the tenant’s personal belongings in case of flooding. 2017 Cal. Stat. Ch. 502.
CALIFORNIA expands immunity from liability for volunteer managers of common interest communities. The act extends immunity to mixed-use developments when a volunteer officer or director is a tenant of a residential separate interest or owns no more than two separate residential interests. The volunteer is protected from liability in excess of the coverage of insurance, provided the volunteer acts in good faith and is not wantonly, willfully, or grossly negligent. 2017 Cal. Stat. Ch. 278.
CALIFORNIA amends common interest community act to facilitate installation of solar panels on roof tops. The amendments prohibit an association from establishing a general policy prohibiting the installation or use of a solar energy system for household purposes on the roof of the building in which the owner resides or an adjacent garage or carport assigned to the owner for exclusive use. The amendments also prohibit an association from requiring approval of the solar energy system by a vote of members of the common interest development. 2017 Cal. Stat. Ch. 818.
NEBRASKA enacts provisions for the imposition of a lien on the real property of recipients of medical assistance. The state obtains a lien if the recipient transfers real property to a related person (other than a spouse, dependent, or disabled child) for less than full consideration and the property is subject to the recipient’s actual or constructive possession or control. The lien may be released if the recipient indemnifies the state for the medical assistance provided or in case of undue hardship. 2017 Neb. Laws L.B. 268.
NEW JERSEY prohibits discrimination against persons who are liable to serve in the armed forces. The law makes liability for service a protected status and covers discrimination in housing (buying and renting) and employment. 2017 N.J. Laws 184.
NEW JERSEY adopts Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act. Under the law, a user may use an on-line tool to direct the custodian to disclose to a designated recipient or not to disclose some or all of the user’s digital assets, including the content of electronic communications. If the user does not have an on-line tool, the user may allow or prohibit disclosure to a fiduciary in a will, trust, power of attorney, or other record. A direction under either of these methods overrides a contrary provision in a terms-of-service agreement that does not require the user to act affirmatively and distinctly from the user’s assent to the terms of service. 2017 N.J. Laws 237.
NEW YORK requires landlords to disclose to prospective tenants that the certificate of occupancy is valid. The disclosure must be made in conspicuous boldface type, although the actual certificate will suffice. Any agreement purporting to waive this requirement is void. 2017 N.Y. Laws 446.
OREGON regulates mortgage loan servicers. The act requires licensing and bonding with minimum reserves. Servicers must adhere to specified protocols in relating to borrowers. 2017 Or. Laws S.B. 98.
OREGON adopts Receivership Code. The act authorizes the appointment of a receiver before judgment when the property is in danger of loss, material injury, or impairment; and after judgment as reasonably necessary to carry out the judgment. Duties are prescribed for collecting and disposing of assets from the estate. 2017 Or. Laws S.B. 899.