What We Know About Ranked Choice Voting, Updated for 2025

Introduction

Can ranked choice voting (RCV) enhance American democracy and better represent the people? RCV is increasingly used in American cities and some states as an alternative to single-choice plurality elections. Plurality voting risks electing candidates with a limited base of support rather than those with broader backing. It can encourage polarizing campaign behavior and may discourage new candidates from seeking office. RCV aims to lessen these issues by allowing voters to rank candidates based on their preferences and conducting an instant runoff when necessary to determine the candidate with a majority of the votes. RCV allows instant runoff elections rather than having a separate runoff election weeks later. Originally known as Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), it is also employed in many other countries. Australians have used RCV, or “preferential voting,” for a hundred years to elect state and federal representatives.

New research has examined RCV’s effects on voters (i.e., public opinion, voter behavior, and turnout), candidates, and political campaigns. This report reviews the recent literature published in peer-reviewed academic journals and books and answers common questions about RCV, addressing its efficacy and viability as a reform.

In sum, the research provides evidence that RCV is an improvement over plurality voting with clear benefits in terms of representation, campaign quality, mobilization, and turnout. Research shows that RCV encourages greater consensus building as well as more civil political campaigns. The research currently has more marginal or difficult-to-test effects in other areas, such as the diversity of candidates running for office. There are some mixed results from the published studies, in part due to authors emphasizing either the glass as half full or half empty, often based on similar data sources. As Drutman and Strano reported in 2021, “the research should also allay fears that RCV is too confusing or discriminatory: voters understand RCV, and learn to like it, too, particularly with experience.” That remains true today.

A caveat is the still comparatively limited use of RCV in the United States. Use of RCV has grown and is now used for public elections in 51 jurisdictions, including two states (AK and ME), with hundreds of elections. This has contributed to a growing list of empirical studies. Yet, this remains a small fraction of the total number of public elections nationwide. Another concern is that elected officials in both major political parties are often reluctant to endorse reform proposals that give their party less control over its nominating processes, as is the case when RCV is combined with nonpartisan primaries. This occurred when several election reform state ballot measure proposals were unsuccessful in 2024.

Problem Statement

How is ranked choice voting (RCV) working in the United States? Whereas single-choice plurality voting can contribute to divisiveness in U.S. elections, does RCV offer more candidate choices, less negative campaigns, and increased turnout in practice? Does the research have any bearing on RCV’s viability as a reform (e.g. do voters understand it)?

Arguments in Favor

Arguments in favor of RCV include improving representation and the number and diversity of candidates by lowering the bar to run for office (John and Zach 2018; Colner 2024), giving voters (especially independents) more choices (Santucci 2021), and potentially reducing polarization (Reilly 2021) by electing more consensus building candidates (Sinclair et al. 2024). Some contend that when voters rank multiple candidates, moderate candidates have increased opportunities to attract support (Horowitz 2004). Candidates from rival factions may also campaign differently and less negatively in order to attract second preferences from their rival's supporters (Donovan, Tolbert and Gracey 2016; Donovan and Tolbert 2022; Kropf 2021; Reilly 2021). RCV may increase mobilization efforts as candidates reach out to more voters in search of first, second, and third choices, resulting in increased turnout. This may affect groups traditionally less likely to participate, such as young people and lower income and education groups, reducing political inequality.

Does the Public Want Majority Winners?

In a single-winner contest, the main purpose of ranking candidates, often the top 3 in order of preference, however, is to ensure that the winning candidate has the support of a majority, not a plurality, of the voters. Electing candidates with majority support is consistent with democratic values. Under RCV, also called instant run-off voting (IRV), if no candidate receives an outright majority of first choices, the candidate with the fewest ballots is eliminated, and ballots cast for that candidate count towards those voters’ next marked preference. The process repeats until a candidate receives over 50 percent of the vote and that candidate is declared the winner. While simple in design, RCV can have significant effects. It should be noted up front that multiple preference rankings are not required, and existing research finds that most voters do not rank more than two or three candidates (Wendland and Carman 2023). Research on RCV in practice tends to focus on US cities, which by and large use nonpartisan elections.

Does the public care that winning candidates have majority of the votes? In a 2024 random sample survey conducted by the polling firm YouGov in the eight states plus DC that had ballot measures proposing RCV, the nonpartisan primary, or both, there was high support for majority winners, the main objective of RCV. Among this sample of registered voters, an overwhelming 86 percent of respondents said it is very or somewhat important “that the winning candidate in the election has a majority of the votes cast.” When “don’t know” respondents were omitted, this number rose to 88 percent or nearly 9 in 10 respondents. Sixty percent said it is very important, and only 26 percent somewhat important that the winner has a majority, with strong support outnumbering modest support. Favoring majority winners was found among every age group, including 60 percent of young people under age 35, 57 percent of middle-aged people (35-64), and 61 percent of people over age 65 and all partisan groups. Most Americans want winning candidates to earn a majority of votes, just as sports teams with the most points on the scoreboard should win the game.

Have Americans Heard of RCV?

Broad familiarity with a reform can indicate its future viability. The nationally representative 2022 Cooperative Election Study (CES) conducted by YouGov found that 56 percent had heard of RCV and 44 percent of respondents had not. Just two years later, the 2024 survey discussed above used the same methodology and question-wording. It found the percentage of respondents who had heard of RCV rose to 67 percent. Over just two years, the percentage of the public who had heard of RCV rose by over 10 percentage points. Recent policy adoptions and ballot measure campaigns have significantly increased awareness of the process among the mass public.

Do Voters Understand RCV When Using It?

Election laws and reform proposals can sometimes feel complicated or “in the weeds” so to speak, and may be difficult for average citizens to understand without meaningful educational efforts. The lion’s share of US elections use plurality voting, where individuals cast a ballot for a single candidate for each elected office, and the candidate with the most votes (even if not a majority) wins the seat. Some scholars argue ranking candidates in order of preference may be unfamiliar for voters accustomed to marking a single choice for each elected office (Burnett and Kogan 2015), and may disadvantage minority voters (Atkeson et al 2024). Others argue RCV could increase information costs, depress turnout, and exacerbate turnout disparities based on demographic factors (McDaniel 2016).

Although some critics are concerned about increased complexity, published research and survey data have found few differences in reported understanding of RCV based on race or socioeconomic status. A study comparing voters in RCV cities to those in matched non-RCV cities found comparable rates of understanding of election rules. The study also found few differences in reported understanding of RCV between white respondents and people of color but did find higher comprehension among the most educated respondents (Donovan et al 2019). A study that asked voters to rank Democratic primary candidates found no statistically significant differences in the reported understanding of ranking by education or race/ethnic groups (Coll 2021).
In “Demographic differences in understanding and utilization of ranked-choice voting” (Donovan, Tolbert and Harper 2022), the authors compared voters’ self-reported understanding of RCV in the 2021 New York City mayoral primary election with nearly 1 million voters to two previous surveys of different US cities. A table from the paper is reprinted below. In NYC, when asked “overall, how well do you think you understand RCV,” 94 percent of respondents said extremely well, very well, or somewhat well. This compares to 87 percent who reported similar understanding from a sample of California RCV cities, and 91 percent from Minnesota cities. Across jurisdictions in the West, Midwest and East, almost 9 in 10 people said they understood RCV. There were similar, high rates of understanding RCV voting instructions (see bottom row of the table). Despite their large population, demographic, and socioeconomic diversity, New Yorkers demonstrated a high understanding of RCV even in the first use of the process, showing the education campaigns were effective. Consistent with earlier research, the study found no systematic differences in terms of race/ethnicity or age in terms of reported understanding of RCV (Donovan et al 2022).

This study contrasts with earlier research, which found older respondents less likely to report they understood RCV well, and less likely to report ranking as many candidates as younger respondents Coll (2021). Donovan et al (2019) noted that in plurality elections, certain voting errors (overvotes and undervotes) and lower rates of understanding have been associated with older and less-educated voters, so RCV is not different in that regard.
 

[Note: this review does not include research that uses overvotes and undervotes as a proxy for misunderstanding election rules because many factors can drive ballot errors, including ballot design, use of mail ballots, voter instructions, candidate campaigns, poll worker education, and other election administration and political factors. See Orr 2022, Burnett and Kogan 2015 and Maloy and Ward 2021 and Neely and McDaniels 2015 for research on under and overvotes.]

Do Voters Rank Multiple Candidates?

Ranking multiple candidates does not necessarily equate to understanding how RCV works. An individual can understand RCV but only prefer and rank one candidate. This can be for any of several legitimate reasons. In some cases, a voter may simply dislike all remaining options—akin to a voter declining to turn out for a runoff election in which the two remaining candidates are unappealing. A voter may also decline to rank any backup choices if the voter’s first choice is a clear front-runner and the voter is confident that their favorite candidate will be among the top two remaining candidates. That said, ranking patterns can indicate voters’ engagement with the system, and most voters do in fact rank multiple candidates.

Candidate behavior is a factor in whether voters rank. RCV encourages outreach and engagement with more voters, and when candidates ask voters to include second and third choices, they do. Conversely, if a voter's favorite candidate encourages non-ranking, this can lead to decreased use of rankings.

In the 2021 Democratic mayoral primary in NYC, frontrunner Eric Adams (the eventual winner), encouraged his supporters to only vote for him. Carmen and Wendland (2023) use exit poll data from the NYC primary to analyze what increased voters’ likelihood of ranking multiple candidates. Using multivariate regression, they found that voters who were asked by candidates to rank them second or third were more likely to rank several candidates. Better-educated voters were more likely to rank multiple candidates. Finally, the authors find that voters who perceived a more positive campaign environment (i.e., more civility among the political candidates) were more likely to rank (Carmen and Wendland 2023).

The Donovan et al (2022) study used the same exit poll data from the NYC primary and also reported high rates of ranking multiple candidates (see figure below). Using multivariate regression and holding other factors constant, they found that Black, Latino and Asian American voters all had an over an 80 percent probability of ranking multiple candidates, as did people over the age of 65. While white voters had an over 90 percent probability of ranking multiple candidates, all racial groups reported very high rates of ranking (average 87 percent). As discussed in the paper, ranking candidates in the NYC primary was higher than in the CA or MN cities in earlier periods.

The takeaway is that voters engage with RCV more when candidates ask them to, and when they are provided with information on how the process works. The rollout of RCV in NYC was considered successful for these reasons, including the voter education campaigns.  Single-city or state case studies can be limited. Research that compares different places (space) over time has the most leverage in helping policymakers and scholars understand the impacts of the process.

In contrast, Sante Fe, NM held its first RCV election in 2018. City officials in Santa Fe fought its implementation. The resulting lawsuit led to a short voter education period; the city implemented RCV only three months after the court ordered it to. In “The impact of voter confusion in ranked choice voting,” the authors use exit poll data to study voters’ reaction to this first RCV election (Atkeson et al 2014). They found that 16 percent of voters reported having felt very (6 percent) or somewhat (10 percent) confused, and Hispanic voters were more likely to express confusion. At the same time, 84 percent of respondents did not express confusion, comparable to the statistics reported above for the CA and MN cities. There have been two RCV elections in Sante Fe since 2018, indicating more research is needed to know if these trends continue or whether it was the result of the first election under the new system. However, there is no baseline for the percentage of voters reporting confusion under plurality elections (research by Donovan et al 2019 show similar understanding for RCV and plurality elections).

The nonprofit FairVote studied the same 2018 Sante Fe RCV election. Like the Atkeson et al (2024) paper, they found 84 percent said the new RCV ballot was not confusing, while only 6 percent said very confusing. The FairVote study also found, "94 percent of respondents said they were satisfied with their voting experience, while only 4 percent said they were unsatisfied. Seventy one percent said they support using ranked choice voting in future elections, and nearly nine-in-ten voters reported ranking more than one candidate” (Robinson 2018). Turnout in the 2018 Sante Fe mayoral election was the highest since 2006. While drawing on similar exit poll data, the two reports highlighted the results differently. That said, even with just three months to educate the public about the new election system, there was generally high reported understanding of the process in Santa Fe.

A recent study in the Election Law Journal (Ntounias 2023) sought to measure if RCV changes voter behavior with respect to looking for information. The author hypothesizes that if RCV creates a more complex information environment than typical single preference elections, voters should search and retain more information on candidates, especially on non-co-partisans. The author uses a randomized survey experiment to test these hypotheses on a nationally diverse sample of US adults. Contrary to the hypothesis, voters did not change their information search behaviors, nor did they spend more cognitive effort in the process of voting. Thus, RCV did not meaningfully change the cost of voting for individuals. People already have to look for information on multiple candidates just to pick one, which is not different from ranking multiple.

In sum, baseline rates of self-reporting understanding of RCV are high and comparable to understanding plurality elections. Voter education campaigns are important in self-reported understanding of the process. Research published in the Election Law Journal finds RCV isn't more cognitively difficult but is based on an experiment, one step removed from an actual campaign. Many studies analyze the first election using RCV. Further research is needed on this topic, especially the effects of targeted outreach efforts.

Does RCV Increase Voter Turnout?

An alternative measure of engagement with RCV is voter turnout. Until recently, few scholars have been able to study the effects of RCV on turnout because survey data was not available for municipal elections in off-year elections where RCV is frequently used. Thus, little was known about whether RCV was associated with increased or declined political participation. Recent research relies on voter file data to study local elections that did not previously exist (Schaffner et al. 2020).

In one of the first studies to explore this question, Kimball & Anthony (2016) use a difference‐in‐differences design, matching cities using RCV with demographically similar cities using plurality voting on the same date. The results show that RCV helps reduce the substantial drop in turnout that commonly occurs between primary and runoff elections by combining the two elections into a single instant run-off. Yet, using the aggregate city level data, the study found RCV was not associated with increased turnout. That said, voting is an individual-level behavior so individual-level data is preferable. Other evidence, however, finds that voter turnout rates are higher in RCV than plurality local elections (Bowler, Donovan, & Brockington, 2003).

Some research finds that youth voter turnout increases in places using RCV. For example, Juelich & Coll (2021) used survey data to study voter turnout for seven RCV and 14 matched non-RCV local elections. The results showed no statistical difference in voting rates between RCV and plurality cities. They did find that younger voters were 9 percentage points more likely to vote in RCV cities than in plurality cities. They attribute this to increased contact between voters and candidates/campaign contacts in RCV elections. Voter mobilization is thus a key force driving youth in RCV elections. The study featured a matched city survey design and statistical controls, but did not include panel data, meaning the effects were not measured over time.

One of the arguments presented in Bernard Fraga’s The Turnout Gap (2018) and in Ansolabehere et al. (2022) is that using survey data to measure turnout is problematic (see also Rogers and Aida 2014). While national surveys like the American National Election Survey (ANES) and Census Current Population Survey (CPS) have long histories of measuring self-reported voting, there is significant overreporting of turnout due to social desirability bias: people tend to say that they voted when they did not because they think that they probably should have participated in the election.

Because of these concerns, an increasing number of scholars are turning to national voter files to study registration and turnout (Igielnik et al 2018). Voter files include the population of US adults who voted (or did not vote). These administrative data are compiled from the 50-state voter rolls and combined with commercial and government data. These data have afforded new opportunities for studying turnout in federal elections, primaries and local elections. Unlike individual state voter files alone or other commercial data vendors (i.e. L2), the vendor Catalist includes all US adults (265 million people), including people who are registered to vote and those who are not. These data have been shown to provide a more accurate measure of turnout than proxying turnout with surveys (Fraga & Holbein 2020; Fraga 2018; Ritter & Tolbert 2020).     Using administrative data also allows comparisons across cities using RCV instead of single-city case studies.

Using voter file data from off-year local elections, Dowling et al. (2024) find individuals living in RCV cities are more likely to vote nationwide. This study also reported evidence that campaigns in RCV cities have higher rates of direct campaign contact with voters than campaigns in similar places without RCV. Using panel data with repeated measures of individual voting over time, results show that people in RCV jurisdictions are significantly more likely to vote in off-year elections than individuals living in non-RCV places, all else equal. Increased campaign contact is shown to be the primary causal mechanism, as discussed above.

A concern raised by critics is that RCV biases against lower socioeconomic status (SES) voters. Off-year elections tend to have low turnout that is skewed to more affluent and educated voters, regardless of election rules. A follow-up study by Dowling et al. (forthcoming) tests if individuals living in RCV cities versus plurality cities are more likely to vote for subsamples of demographic groups defined by education (low, medium, and high) and income (quartiles). Using voter file panel data, the study tests whether RCV is associated with higher turnout for different demographic groups in the 2021 and 2023 off-year elections. The results find RCV is associated with boosts in turnout across high and low SES groups.

Does RCV Change How Candidates Campaign (i.e. Increase Campaign Civility)?

Ranked choice voting (RCV) can influence how candidates conduct their campaigns. For example, candidates are incentivized to appeal not only to their base but also to supporters of other candidates in order to secure second or third choices. This need for broader appeal can lead to more civil and cooperative campaigning.

Some contend that RCV reduces polarization because moderate candidates have increased opportunities to attract support when voters rank multiple candidates (Horowitz 1991; 2004; see also Sinclair et al., 2024). Horowitz (2004) evaluates the effectiveness of the Alternative Vote (AV), another term for RCV used cross-nationally. He argues that under realistic conditions, preferential voting encourages coalition-building and accommodation and rewards political moderation and compromise. Reilly (2021) draws on cross-national data to find that RCV changes elections from zero-sum contests to more positive campaigns. Preferential systems have been lauded by scholars as a potential mechanism for mitigating ethnic group conflict and reducing tension in divided societies (Reilly 2001, 2002).

Voter satisfaction with democracy has been decreasing over time and this is a real source of risk for the long-term stability of democracy. A cross-national public opinion study found that, other things being equal, voters were more satisfied with how democracy worked in nations where people voted for candidates in order of preference, like RCV (Farrell and McAllister 2006).

Candidates from otherwise rival factions may also campaign differently than they would have under plurality voting to win the second preferences of each others’ voters. Kropf (2021) examined campaign communications (Twitter hashtags) in US RCV elections and found that the system may foster a more civil campaign environment, i.e., one in which candidates cross-promote each other as members of slates. Since candidates aim to be ranked favorably by a wider audience, there is a reduced incentive to engage in negative campaigning that could alienate potential supporters.

One study draws on national survey data that compares campaigns conducted under RCV to similar jurisdictions (using a matched sample design) using plurality voting rules (Donovan, Tolbert and Gracey 2016). The survey asked respondents about their perceptions of the campaign tone in the most recent local election compared to previous local elections. The results showed that campaigns were perceived as less negative in places using RCV; voters in RCV cities were twice as likely to report local campaigns were “a lot less negative.” People in RCV cities were also significantly more satisfied with the conduct of local campaigns, and less likely to report that candidates were frequently criticizing each other. The authors argue that candidates will take a more moderate and conciliatory approach in order to be the backup choice of their opponents’ supporters.

However, the impact of RCV on campaign civility is not uniformly observed. Research by Donovan and Tolbert (2023) indicates that while most candidates and voters perceive RCV campaigns as less negative, this perception may not always extend to front-runners (as frontrunners may be less reliant on backup support to cross the 50% threshold). This suggests that RCV’s effectiveness in promoting civility may depend on various contextual factors.

Alaska adopted a top-four primary and RCV general election system in 2022. A notable outcome was the election of Mary Peltola, a Democrat (and Alaska Native), to the state’s sole seat in the US House of Representatives, as well as the reelection of moderate Republican Lisa Murkowski, senior US senator who fended off challenges from MAGA Republicans (McBeath 2023). Research has found that the Alaska system is associated with more ideologically moderate candidates winning elections (Sinclair et al. 2024).

In summary, RCV has the potential to encourage more civil campaigning by motivating candidates to seek broader support, thus reducing polarization. However, its effectiveness in changing campaign behavior may vary based on contextual factors and the dynamics of individual elections.

Does RCV Change Which Candidates Run and Win?

Political representation can be improved when voters have more choices among candidates. RCV can influence both the pool of candidates who choose to run and which candidate(s) win. Concerning the impact on candidate entry, Colner (2024) examined the effects of RCV on candidate participation in local elections. Analyzing data from 273 matched RCV and non-RCV cities over three decades, the research found that the implementation of RCV led to an initial increase in the number of candidates running for office. However, this effect diminished in subsequent election cycles.

John et al. (2018) compared similar cities in the California Bay Area that did and did not adopt RCV using difference-in-differences research design. The study’s sample was city council and mayoral/manager elections in 11 California cities (four RCV and eight control cities) between 1995 and 2014. The results show that RCV adoption was associated with an estimated nine-point increase in the percentage of candidates from racial or ethnic minority groups. During that same time period, the percent of racial or ethnic minority candidates in non-RCV cities decreased marginally. Kimball and Anthony (2016) corroborate these findings. Looking at Minneapolis from 2005 to 2013 (RCV was first used in 2009), the number of candidates for the city council almost doubled following the adoption of RCV.

A recent survey experiment indicates that voters are more willing to support minor candidates in RCV than in plurality elections. Researchers asked survey respondents to vote in a hypothetical version of the 2020 US presidential election between Joe Biden (Democrat), Donald Trump (Republican), Howie Hawkins (Green), and Jo Jorgensen (Libertarian) (Simmons et al., 2022). Among respondents randomly assigned to vote under plurality rules, 3.75 percent voted for Hawkins or Jorgensen; among respondents randomly assigned to vote under RCV, 7 percent ranked Hawkins or Jorgensen first. If minor candidates are more able to win support under RCV conditions, they may be more likely to run in RCV elections.

RCV can also affect which candidates ultimately win elections. Allowing voters to rank candidates in order of preference reduces the likelihood of vote splitting among similar candidates, which can occur in plurality elections. This mechanism can enable candidates with cross-cutting appeal to gain support through transferred votes in subsequent counting rounds (Amy, 2000). Consequently, RCV may increase the chances of consensus candidates winning, as they are more likely to be ranked as a second or third choice by a wider array of voters. Reilly (2021) provides empirical support for how RCV fosters moderation and increases the chances of centrist candidates winning by reducing the likelihood of extreme candidates dominating elections.

Candidates who had hesitated to enter a race for fear of being a spoiler may be more willing to enter an RCV race, which could encourage the representation of overlooked perspectives in the campaign. This may make it easier to replace ineffective or corrupt incumbents. In plurality, voters of a particular ideological persuasion may stick with a disliked candidate because if only some of them shift to a replacement on their side, they could end up allowing the other side’s candidate to win. In RCV (where vote-splitting is less of a concern) they are freer to shift to a better alternative (Myerson, 1993).

While RCV may increase the candidate pool, more research is needed on whether it leads to more diversity of candidates in terms of race and gender (see Colner 2024; Terrell, Lamendola and Reilly 2021).

Do Americans Support RCV?

Public opinion surveys consistently find Americans want to modernize and update US election rules. National opinion surveys, such as the Cooperative Election Study, find there is high support in general for changing US election rules. Two-thirds of Americans favor comprehensive election reform, including laws such as no-excuse absentee mail voting, early in-person voting, the direct election of the US president, nonpartisan redistricting, automatic voter registration (AVR), voter ID laws, etc. (Coll et al. 2022). This public support extends to the reform of primary elections, including 58 percent of whom favor RCV for primaries among those expressing an opinion (Boatright et al. 2024). Yet, there are also significant differences by partisanship, with Republicans less favorable of election reform proposals.

As discussed above, a 2024 survey was conducted in the 8 states with election reform measures on the ballot. Respondents were prompted with a description of RCV and how it works, and then asked whether they were in favor. Among respondents who expressed an opinion, 24.5 percent of respondents strongly favored RCV and 30 percent somewhat favored RCV, or 54.5 percent combined [16 percent of respondents did not have an opinion on RCV when asked]. Individuals who report they don’t know about a reform often do not support it.

Support for election reform proposals can be contingent on framing. People who feel like they regularly lose in elections are significantly more likely to favor a range of election reforms, including RCV. Feeling like a loser in American politics (i.e., voting for the losing political party or candidate) can condition support for changing how elections are conducted. Using a survey experiment, Donovan et al (2022) prompted people to consider how satisfied they were with how US democracy works, and to think about the design and structure of the American government. Respondents were then asked if they felt like they were on the winning or losing ‘side’ of politics. Asking people to think about the design of the American government (i.e., the experimental prompt) was associated with higher rates of respondents reporting they felt like they were on the losing side. The study found that feeling like an electoral loser was associated with increased support for election reform, including RCV. The relationship holds with controls for partisanship and other factors. An implication of study is that the more Americans are prompted to think about their government and democracy, the more likely they support changing how it works.

The literature shows with consensus that younger voters are more receptive to new election rules such as RCV, while older voters are more opposed. McCarthy and Santucci (2021) document that opinion surveys regularly find younger voters to be supportive of RCV. In a recent study, Dowling (2025) argues that a voter’s age plays a significant role in how easily people adapt to new electoral systems and how interested they are in reforming election laws. Dowling examines these claims using two national surveys conducted by YouGov, one from the 2022 Comparative Election Survey and one from 2023. In both surveys, respondents were asked identical questions if they favored use of RCV.
Among respondents who have an opinion on RCV, a high number of young people (ages 18-29) support RCV across the two surveys (75 and 78 percent, respectively). As the age cohorts ascend, support for RCV decreases. The striking similarity across the two national surveys conducted one year apart provides support for this pattern. Among the oldest age cohort, 70 years plus, only 18-40 percent favored RCV. For young people, more proportional representation constitutes an enduring value that is unlikely to subside in the future (Dowling 2025).

Opinion research also suggests members of minority racial groups prefer RCV to a greater extent than white Americans. Anthony et. al. (2024) analyze a series of survey experiments testing the effects of various arguments on voters' preference for RCV vs choose-one ballots. In the survey, majorities within each racial group preferred the status quo to RCV. However, Latino, Asian American, and MENA respondents were more inclined to support RCV than white respondents.

Given that the public generally favors RCV in surveys, one puzzle is that many 2024 ballot measures that included RCV failed. Why?

One hypothesis is that voters may rely heavily on cues from trusted sources such as elected officials and party leaders when making a final decision on an election reform policy change. A random sample of registered voters in the states with election reform measures on the 2024 ballot were asked if they had heard an elected official endorse or oppose the initiative or referendum in their state to change election rules. However, nearly two-thirds said they had not heard such an elite cue. In short, statewide reform measures may benefit from more support from trusted sources and intermediaries in order for people to vote yes, even if they generally support RCV.

Conclusion

Unlike other proposed reforms, RCV is actively used by many voters across the country, and scholars and policymakers are constantly learning more about its effects (Santucci 2022). At a time when political dysfunction and dissatisfaction with the government feel unprecedented (Lawson and Henricksen, 2025), RCV, or runoff elections, stand out as a solution backed by a decent body of research, as well as by voters themselves.

This report found that RCV increases voter turnout and does so among both low and high-socioeconomic voters. There is evidence it decreases negative campaigning and can lead to the election of candidates with a broader base of support, including more moderate candidates. It appears to increase the number of candidates running for office (at least for some time) and may produce more diverse candidate pools, which can improve the representation of the public by elected officials. RCV is associated with increased direct campaign contacts (i.e. mobilization) and more satisfaction with democracy. There is evidence it does not appear to confuse voters, though we need to know more about how people search for information. In these ways and others, RCV may help improve US democracy.

This document has been submitted to the Task Force for American Democracy for consideration and has been posted and/or circulated for information purposes only. The views expressed herein represent the opinions of the author(s) and not those of the Task Force or the ABA. They have not been reviewed or approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and, accordingly, should not be construed as representing the position of the Association or any of its entities. This publication is freely available to download, copy and distribute provided there is attribution to the ABA Task Force for American Democracy, and provided this notice is reproduced on all copies.

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