The views expressed herein have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association, and accordingly, should not be construed as representing the policy of the American Bar Association.
Ex parte E.L., 2015 WL 5511249 (Ala.).
The Alabama Supreme Court ruled a Georgia court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it allowed adoption of mother’s biological children by her same-sex partner. The Georgia judgment was unenforceable in Alabama, notwithstanding the Full Faith and Credit Clause, because the Georgia court did not first terminate the biological mother’s parental rights, a prerequisite to adoption by a non-spouse under Georgia law.
E.L. and V.L. were involved in a same-sex relationship for approximately six years. During that time, E.L. gave birth to three children through use of assisted-reproductive technology. Following the births of the children, V.L. acted as a parent and the parties made a joint decision to legally formalize and protect V.L.’s parental role. V.L. filed a petition to adopt the children in the Georgia court and E.L. later filed a “parental consent to adoption.” The Georgia court entered its final decree and new birth certificates were issued.
E.L. and V.L. later ended their relationship. V.L. filed a petition in the Alabama courts alleging that E.L. had denied her access to the children and had interfered with her ability to exercise her traditional and constitutional parental rights. She asked the Alabama court to register the Georgia judgment, declare her legal rights pursuant to the Georgia judgment, and award her some measure of custody of or visitation with the children. E.L. moved that the court dismiss V.L.’s petition on multiple grounds. She argued the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on V.L.’s petition; the Georgia court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Georgia adoption; the family court should have refused to recognize and enforce the Georgia adoption for public policy reasons; and the family court denied her due process when it awarded V.L. visitation rights without holding an evidentiary hearing at which E.L. could be heard.
The appellate court rejected E.L.’s first three arguments, but held the family court erred by awarding V.L. visitation without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The issues raised by E.L. in the appeal regarding the effect and validity Alabama courts should afford the Georgia adoption decree are issues of law and the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed them de novo. Its review did not extend to the legal merits of the Georgia judgment as prohibited by the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution.
E.L. argued that the Georgia judgment was unenforceable in Alabama because the Georgia court lacked subject matter jurisdiction since the state statute does not provide for “second parent adoptions,” and that V.L. was not a bona fide resident of Georgia at the time of the adoption. However, E.L. also argued that even if the Georgia court was not lacking subject matter jurisdiction when it issued the adoption decree, enforcing the Georgia decree would be contrary to Alabama’s public policy.
V.L. argued that the Georgia court had subject matter jurisdiction, and even if the Georgia court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the decree should be upheld because Georgia statutes bar any challenge to adoption decrees filed more than six months after the decree is entered, and there is no public policy exception to the full faith and credit clause.
E.L. and V.L. willingly appeared with the children before the Georgia court, so personal jurisdiction was not disputed. Thus, lack of subject matter jurisdiction was the only possible ground a Georgia court could have for not enforcing the Georgia judgment.
E.L. argued the Georgia court failed to comply strictly with relevant statutory requirements because the court failed to terminate her own parental rights. Both the guardian ad litem and amici curiae argued in their briefs that, regardless of the Georgia court’s failure to terminate E.L.’s parental rights, the Georgia judgment was properly issued because adoption decrees in Georgia are issued under that statute.
The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that because E.L. did not surrender her parental rights, the Georgia court was not empowered to enter the Georgia judgment declaring V.L. to be an adoptive parent of the children. In other words, the court found the Georgia court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter its adoption decree, which was therefore unenforceable under the full faith and credit clause.
The dissent argued that while the Georgia court erred by entering the judgment by which V.L. became an adoptive parent of the children, it was an error on the merits, not an error that deprived the Georgia court of subject matter jurisdiction.