Q&A with the DOJ’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force on the Strike Force’s Fifth Anniversary

In November 2019, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) launched the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) with the goal of coordinating a national response to antitrust and related crimes in public contracting, including both procurement and grant programs at the federal, state, and local levels. The PCSF was formed to combat the threats posed by procurement collusion—compromised integrity of the procurement process, undermined confidence in government, and (perhaps most importantly) the estimated billions of dollars lost to the American taxpayer as a result of collusive fraud. Examples of the types of crimes on which the Strike Force focuses include price fixing, bid rigging, bid rotation, market allocation, bribes, and kickbacks. Five years on, the Chair of the ABA’s Public Contract Law Section, Jason Workmaster, sat down with the PCSF’s Director Daniel Glad and Deputy Director Sandra Talbott to talk about what the Strike Force has been doing, what it has accomplished, and what attorneys should know to help ensure their clients do not commit any criminal acts. Sandra Talbott and Trial Attorney Daniel Loveland earlier authored an article providing additional updates on the PCSF’s fifth anniversary, which is available in the supplemental Fall 2024 edition of The Procurement Lawyer and also available by clicking here. The article was released in November 2024.

Workmaster: Sandra and Daniel, it is so good to be here with you to talk about the fifth anniversary of the DOJ’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force, which we have just observed in November 2024. Thank you both for agreeing to this question-and-answer session to explore some of the themes that you wrote about. Five years into the Strike Force, what do you think are the principal lessons that you’ve learned about collusion fraud in the public procurement space?

Glad: That’s a great question, Jason. I think there are probably three principal lessons that I’ve learned.

First, there is really clearly a demand—a need—for the enforcement that we’ve been focusing on in these areas. Whether you look at the number of people the Strike Force has trained—government people who are voluntarily coming to our training so that they can better do their jobs—the total number of investigations we’ve opened, or even the amount of taxpayer funds at stake in our convicted cases, the Strike Force is clearly meeting an important need.

We also see that need in the tips and leads that we have received from the public, from the leads we get as a result of our training and outreach, and also from the tips and leads that our agents receive in the twenty-five district teams across the country that are participating in the Strike Force.

Second, is the number of filed cases, which shows that there is real criminal conduct taking place out there that needs to stop. Our filed cases show that the conduct the Strike Force was established to fight and to combat—that is, criminal schemes that go after government procurement at every level—that conduct is pernicious. The programs range from asphalt to wildfires, from security guards to defense spending, and in areas that are extremely local and regional. And even overseas, there has been no shortage of good work for the prosecutors, the agents, the analysts, and other enforcers who are part of the PCSF. In late October 2024 in Baltimore, Maryland, for example, we unsealed multiple charges relating to procurement programs for information technology in the intelligence community that were corrupted. Those charges include allegations against, among others, government contractors and a now former government employee. The conduct alleged in the indictment and other charging documents involves kickback schemes, fraud, and money laundering. Also, in at least one of those charging documents, the government is seeking the forfeiture of proceeds of one of those schemes. These are literal, ill-gotten gains that include luxury items. For example, a yacht or a Lamborghini. But that is just the most recent demonstration in our casework of the spread of this conduct where people and companies are illegally colluding when selling goods and services to the government.

And then the third takeaway is the collaboration model that I think the Strike Force has demonstrated very well. Collaboration and cooperation are inherent in the Strike Force and why we were founded. It is, you could say, in our very DNA. This collaboration model shows that our whole-of-government approach is working. At its best, the PCSF model involves DOJ’s Antitrust Division prosecutors, prosecutors in US attorneys’ offices across the twenty-five districts that are participating in the Strike Force, and federal agents who come from agencies that cover the relevant spending and contracts. And what I’ve seen, what Sandra has seen, is that when we are actually working together and each bringing our particular expertise and strengths, we are actually able to better enforce, to better protect the public purse, and to do better for the taxpayers, which ultimately is at the core of our mission.

Workmaster: In the article, there’s a discussion of a quite recent GAO [Government Accountability Office] report estimating that the government loses $233- $521 billion every year to fraud, and the point is made in the article that if that was its own government agency, it would be the sixth most-funded agency of the government. Does that estimate surprise you? And do you have thoughts on GAO’s report on that subject?

Glad: That’s a good question. First, I have to say I really appreciate and value the work that GAO does, both as part of the enforcement community, but also just as a public citizen.

The GAO, like our OIG [Office of Inspector General] colleagues in the Strike Force, has this really interesting and cool mandate to examine systems and institutions, to flag risks, and to take a broader look at how government operates. And I really appreciate that because my job as an antitrust prosecutor is narrower: to determine whether a crime has occurred, whether the accused has committed it, and whether (consistent with the laws and policies) a charge should be filed.

But, turning to your question, Jason, I think those numbers are staggering. When I first saw them, I noticed there was a pretty significant difference between the high and the low-end—$233- $521 billion. That’s an almost $300-billion range. I am not a data scientist or an economist, nor am I an expert with the Monte Carlo model that GAO used. But to me, what stuck with me more is this notion that if the “US Department of Fraud” existed, it would be the sixth largest department in the government. Now, I don’t know if it surprised me, because we do know that typically 20 percent of government spending can be reduced by eliminating collusion across governments worldwide. We know that if you look at the Sentencing Guidelines, the risk is similar. But the number is still staggering, and it emphasizes that we have a lot of work to do to rescue those taxpayer dollars from fraud.

Workmaster: In your article Sandra, there’s discussion about what the priority areas have been for the Strike Force, including fraud in set-aside contracts involving socioeconomic programs, like small businesses, HUBZone, etc., and then also infrastructure spending. Are those still the two principal areas on which the Strike Force is focused? Or has that focus shifted?

Talbott: We have a lot of priority areas. Enhanced risk posed by increased government procurement grants and program spending in any area can very quickly become a priority if the spending becomes the subject of an anticompetitive conspiracy. With that being said, though, we have historically seen and continue to see infrastructure projects targeted, as recently evidenced in four guilty pleas and charges against a company, its vice president, and its employee, involving $100 million of state transportation construction contracts in Oklahoma. That conspiracy, as alleged, involved hallmark bid rigging conduct: agreements among competitors to submit intentionally high-priced, also known as “cover,” bids; agreements to decline bidding, also known as bid suppression; and geographic allocation, where the co-conspirators agreed to divvy up contracts using geographic delineations within Oklahoma.

You mentioned set-aside fraud. This continues to be a concern for us, and we will continue to investigate allegations that these programs, intended for disadvantaged and underserved communities, have become targets of criminal schemes, especially in egregious circumstances and when the evidence shows the contract proceeds are clearly ending up with an unqualified third-party that has used the set-aside contractor as an improper pass-through, figurehead, or front company.

And the harm from set-aside fraud is real. For instance, in June 2022, a construction company owner in Texas was convicted by a jury for conspiracy to defraud the United States and six counts of wire fraud. In this trial, the government introduced evidence showing that the set-aside fraud conspiracy lasted over a decade, during which time the defendant’s company obtained over $240 million in government contracts that ultimately benefited the defendant and his other businesses. That’s $240 million in government contracts that could have, and should have, gone to qualified service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses, but it didn’t.

Looking ahead, we will, of course, be keeping a close eye on the distribution of government funding from large spending authorizations like the Infrastructure Act. We’ll start domestically, while also looking globally. But we will also be focusing on developing smarter detection tools and improving our partnerships with our agency partners. We expect that with enough time, investment, and commitment, by using these tools, we’ll be able to uncover areas of vulnerability that we did not know existed before, as well as expanding our knowledge of known risk areas. Additionally, we expect that detection tools will allow us to better understand the full extent of a conspiracy, even though we may have had limited visibility in the past.

Workmaster: Another area that you discussed in your article is the focus on corporate antitrust compliance programs. Can you talk about the incentives and potential benefits to corporations that come through investing in compliance? Why should companies undertake these efforts? In addition, to the fact that it is simply the right thing to do, what are the incentives and rewards that are associated with having a culture of compliance?

Talbott: As you mentioned, in the article we discuss all of the ways that the DOJ has been rolling out a number of disclosure incentives for both companies and individuals, all of which suggest a concerted effort to encourage good corporate culture and governance. The DOJ and the Antitrust Division have published specific guidance, and that guidance is publicly available, as we describe in our article. Of course, an effective corporate compliance program has to be “appropriately tailored” to a company’s size and line of business, but the framework is established and ready to be used.

As to your specific question, criminal investigations can be costly to companies and convictions could lead to even more costly penalties: restitution, lost revenue through debarment, divestiture, not to mention reputational damage to a company and its shareholders.

Given the DOJ’s increased incentives to focus on a culture of compliance, as well as the accessibility and transparency of DOJ’s compliance guidance, I think that investments in compliance programs and compliance personnel just make good business sense.

Companies can and should shift their perspectives. They need to stop thinking about compliance as a cost center or expense and start thinking about compliance as a way to prevent loss and retain revenue.

Workmaster: You talked about education and training being part of the Strike Force’s mission. And part of that is outreach to contractors. Can you talk about what that looks like? Where does the rubber hit the road in terms of training and outreach to contractors on these compliance issues?

Talbott: Indeed, outreach and education are central to the PCSF’s mission as we continue to strive to deter antitrust and related crimes on the front end of the procurement process. Ultimately, deterring a crime in the first place will save taxpayers more money than detecting and prosecuting that crime after the fact, as any likely conviction, fine, or restitution may not ever fully make the taxpayer whole. At the PCSF, we focus on outreach and training because education and awareness have value. We can deter criminal conduct by educating stakeholders about what conduct is criminal and what these crimes look like in the hopes that we can stop the crime from happening and stop the money from going out the door in the first place.

We also focus on education and outreach because they are critical drivers for tips, leads, and ultimately filed criminal cases.

And to your question about contractors and vendors, we typically provide what we call “sell-side” training through trade association conferences and other similar events so that as many contractors and vendors as possible can benefit from the training.

Although we try to meet demand, it may not be feasible for us to train companies individually. Any interested contractor or association should feel free to request training from the PCSF by emailing [email protected]. They can also visit our website, www.justice.gov/atr/procurement-collusion-strike-force, which has many publicly available resources about the types of antitrust crimes that the PCSF investigates and prosecutes.

Glad: Sandra and I, like our colleagues, have spoken to a number of trade associations. I have spoken to the Society for Corporate Compliance and Ethics, an integrity alliance for large prime contractors, and legal bar associations, including different Sections of the ABA. And I always come away from those conversations feeling as though I, for the most part, had an audience full of people who were aligned with us. They were looking to protect both their principals and their principles. They were looking to make sure that the market was fair and competitive. And when I talked to bar associations in various parts of the ABA, folks like you, I’m really clear that we’re hoping to enlist company counsel, whether it’s inside counsel or outside counsel, in the effort to increase a culture of ethics, lawful conduct, and compliance. In many ways, a chief compliance officer or someone serving in that role can be one of the best allies, because they know the risks associated with the business, and they also know the costs associated with a criminal investigation and a criminal conviction. They can be some of our strongest allies in making sure the message goes out about good and lawful behavior.

Workmaster: Turning to something you mentioned earlier as well—the international aspect of the Strike Force’s mission—your article discusses the importance of collaborating with international authorities to ensure the antitrust violations are not occurring abroad, such as either the response to the war in Ukraine or the 2026 World Cup, which has been plagued by scandal in the past. How does the Strike Force’s global initiative cultivate that international collaboration?

Glad: That’s a good question, and it touches on one of our newer initiatives, “PCSF: Global.”

Let me start by taking a step back and explaining the why and the how of this international focus, and why it is so important. It really comes from the place of the US government spending billions of dollars every year overseas. Given that, our PCSF: Global initiative is designed to address the risk of spending in these international markets. We do that in the same way we do it domestically: deterrence and detection. First, we’re partnering with US law enforcement personnel abroad to ensure that we’re really meeting that “whole-of-government” response to these collusive schemes. Maybe the members of the PCL Section don’t realize it, but there are sworn federal law enforcement officers from a variety of agencies who either are residents overseas or whose areas of responsibility focus on overseas conduct. We’re also trying to leverage our close relationships with foreign enforcers and international entities to strengthen our collective capabilities and to share best practices. The US doesn’t have a monopoly on good best practices.

Workmaster: “The US doesn’t have a monopoly.” I see what you did there. That’s funny.

Glad: Jason, that was an antitrust joke, and it’s the only one I’m going to tell.

We’re also looking to facilitate the reporting of leads consistent with the overall ethos. Often, if a crime is being committed against one government, it is possibly being committed against multiple governments, whether that’s different departments in the US, or the US and another country.

Let’s turn to the two examples you asked about—you asked about first, the war in Ukraine and then the World Cup. Starting with Ukraine, we in the PCSF are working across the US government to be well-positioned to deter collusion on the front end. We’re working with the Offices of Inspector General for the Department of Defense, the US Agency for International Development, and the US State Department, to make sure that they know and that the entities overseas with which these agencies interact know what the red flags of collusion are, and the conditions under which collusive schemes can arise and persist. We’re doing this work with our international partners and with international organizations so that we all, collectively, will be better positioned to deter collusion in the first instance. And, if it still happens, we want to help them detect it so that we can remedy the fraud and restore faith in the system. Within Ukraine specifically, we are collaborating with EU partners and Ukrainian authorities on legislative reforms to ensure that the government agencies in Ukraine have the modern tools needed to combat collusion during the reconstruction that will eventually come. We’re also spending time with the Ukrainians in those various agencies, where we’re sharing our knowledge, sharing our experiences, and helping them build out their capacity to investigate and prosecute collusion. And really by leveraging this intra-government and inter-government—“intra-” to the US and “inter-” among other governments—we’re trying to facilitate a seamless reporting system to identify potential collusion. Obviously, our focus in the PCSF is collusion that impacts US taxpayer dollars. But we are very interested in Ukraine because, as you know, there are taxpayer dollars flowing to that region, and probably will be for many years to come.

Turning to the World Cup, the United States, Canada, and Mexico are hosting in 2026. We are working together trilaterally and within the US to create our own team of enforcers to educate and then spot, deter, and detect collusive conduct to the extent it arises. For deterrence, it really lets us amplify the message that in the eleven US host cities, the enforcement agencies are committed to ensuring fair play in the run-up to the World Cup. We’re working with international organizations like the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the sporting federations that put on these events, so that they’re aware of the red flags and the conditions that are ripe for collusion, ensuring that people are best positioned to prevent collusion before it even starts. The cooperation we have for the deterrence mission feeds into detection, because we built those relationships and they allow for real-time sharing of trends, tips, and leads. It positions us to have an effective and efficient response to collusion.

Workmaster: In your article, there’s reference made to the prior Trump administration and the current Biden administration both being supportive of the Strike Force’s mission. The Strike Force has bridged two administrations and is poised to enter a third. Given the change in administrations in 2025, do you think that support will continue? Can you break out your crystal ball and make some predictions? And, as long as we’re looking into the future, where do you see the next five years going as you move forward to the Strike Force’s ten-year anniversary in 2029?

Glad: Good questions, Jason. Stopping criminal conduct that takes money from taxpayer-funded projects is, in my view, a non-partisan goal. I think that’s reflected in the support we’ve seen from multiple administrations. The PCSF has just turned five years old in 2024, which means we were founded in 2019. We have persisted and thrived under two different administrations. In the PCSF itself, we’re made up of career civil servants—all of the agents, prosecutors, analysts, investigators are career civil servants. I expect we’ll be hard at work in the next administration, too.

Over the next five years, I don’t think our focus shifts. I think our focus remains the same. We have a mission and a goal of greater deterrence, enhanced detection, and amplified enforcement to deter collusion in public procurements at all levels. Those goals will remain.

Based on the GAO study, Jason, that you asked about earlier, I don’t expect there to be any shortage of work for us to do. That focus on the mission in some ways reflects that Sandra and I come from the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, where our North Star is the Sherman Act, a law passed in 1890. So, consistent enforcement goals are second nature.

Still, I do think some things are likely to change, including the ways in which these conspiracies arise, persist, and are committed, and thus how we in the enforcement community evolve and pivot to address that. As to how these schemes arise, the Antitrust Division, and the DOJ more broadly, are focusing on algorithmic collusion, the use of new technology used to carry out criminal conspiracies. This is an emerging area, and I expect DOJ will have more to say about this in the future, both through speeches and policies, and also in our filed cases.

Relatedly, I mentioned how these schemes persist and are committed. I think the ways in which people—all people—communicate have changed so much in the roughly two decades of my career. That is also true for people who conspire to rig bids and participate in schemes to defraud. At the beginning of my career, it was fairly common for corporate conspirators to communicate about their crimes on company email. That was the place that defense attorneys could go to when conducting an internal investigation, or where company counsel conducting an audit could first spot some of this conduct. And that was the place that law enforcement could go, by subpoena or search warrant, to gather those conspiracy communications. When I first started my career, that’s pretty much where the action was.

But that is simply not the case anymore. People are multi-channel communicators, and what we’ve seen in many of our investigations, and I expect many of the PCL members have seen, is that employees of all stripes, but including those who are criminal conspirators, use a variety of communications tools, sometimes under the mistaken impression that they won’t be found out.

This is very clearly a challenge. It’s a challenge for counsel, for companies, and for enforcers. But I also think it presents an opportunity. There are a lot of opportunities to gather this information; law enforcement personnel, company counsel, and people who are interested in compliance are still adjusting and evolving in the way that we spot these.

With three large federal spending programs—so that’s the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act of 2022, and the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)—we’re in a heightened spending environment, and thus there is absolutely a heightened risk for collusion and fraud.

As an illustration, there’s an 11th Circuit opinion that begins, “Like bears to honey, white collar criminals are drawn to billion-dollar government spending programs.” It’s a rough paraphrase, but I think I have it almost verbatim, and IIJA is a trillion-dollar spending program.

As we’ve seen in some of our recent cases, whether it’s the Oklahoma construction contract case that Sandra was talking about, or our Rocky Roads investigation (which involves the paving and road construction in the Mountain West), or even a couple of our recent trials, government spending on large infrastructure products has been, today is, and I suspect will remain, an area of focus.

Actually, while I’m thinking about it, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention services, whether it’s IT, as in the cases we unsealed in Baltimore in October, or providing other services like security guards or other services. The government spends a lot of money on services, too, and that will also remain an area of focus.

The other thing that is changing, or evolving, as Sandra mentioned, is proactive detection, the use of data analytics. It is, and will remain, a focus of our efforts. There is just so much potential here, and we are just beginning to tap it. Our partners really have expertise on the future of proactive enforcement, and we have learned so much from data scientists, data analysts, and economists and others in those fields working in the Offices of Inspector General and with us at DOJ. As we think about the future of proactive detection, with the amount of money being spent, our efforts here are incredibly needed and necessary.

Proactive detection—the use of data analytics—helps us look upon a field of haystacks to understand which haystack we should begin examining to find the needle or needles relating to the criminal conduct. And that can be very, very powerful. After all, the Strike Force is here to protect the taxpayer dollars.