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March 08, 2021

Commission on Evaluation of Rules of Professional Conduct

Meeting Minutes
Friday, December 10, through Sunday, December 12, 1999
Amelia Island, Florida

Commission Members Present:
E. Norman Veasey, Chair
Lawrence J. Fox
Albert C. Harvey
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (not present on Sunday)
Patrick E. Higginbotham
W. Loeber Landau
Margaret C. Love
Susan R. Martyn
Lucian T. Pera
Henry Ramsey, Jr.
Laurie D. Zelon

Seth Rosner, Board of Governors

Nancy J. Moore
Thomas D. Morgan
Carl A. Pierce

Jeanne P. Gray
Charlotte K. Stretch
Susan M. Campbell


See list following minutes.

The Commission meeting was held on Friday, December 10, from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., on Saturday, December 11, from 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. and on Sunday, December 12, from 8:30 to 11:00 a.m. in Amelia Island, Florida.

I. Minutes of Previous Meetings

The minutes of the Commission meeting of October 15 - 17 were approved as submitted.

II. Rule 1.13

The Reporter requested reconsideration of the Commission's vote regarding disclosure to protect the corporate client. The Commission felt the proposed changes to Rule 1.6 would cover most situations because the interests of third parties would be implicated. A motion to keep the present language of Rule 1.13 passed unanimously.

III. Rule 1.1

The Reporter pointed out that a sentence has been added to Comments [1] and [5] to highlight the relevance of any agreement between the lawyer and client to limit the scope of the representation. The Commission felt it was unnecessary to have the sentence in both Comments. A Reporter noted that the sentence in Comment [1] can be seen as an attempt to limit malpractice liability. He felt that the sentence was more appropriate in Comment [5]. A member suggested the following wording, "Any agreement between the lawyer and the client limiting the scope of the lawyer's representation of the client may delimit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible." The Commission agreed that the cross-reference to Rule 1.2 was helpful. The Commission voted unanimously to put the sentence in Comment [5]. A member suggested replacing the word "elaborate" in Comment [5] with "extensive."

IV. Rule 1.2

Some members expressed concern with the proposed last sentence of paragraph (a). The Reporters explained that the change in paragraph (a) is designed to reflect the current state of the law. A member noted that a lawyer is an agent as well as an officer of the court. He observed that the two principles are sometimes hard to reconcile. A member pointed out that another issue is the extent to which the lawyer has to consult with the client. The Reporter noted that consultation is covered in Rule 1.4. The Commission agreed to delete the last sentence of paragraph (a) and move it to Comment [1].

A member noted that Comment [1] should clarify the relationship between implied authority and specific instructions from the client. Another member added that the Comment should also refer to Rule 1.16 and the circumstances under which the lawyer has the right to withdraw.

It was moved to change paragraph (a) to read: "Subject to paragraphs (b) and (c), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by the client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify." The motion passed unanimously.

A member asked if the Comment should indicate that this Rule does not obligate the lawyer to file an appeal. The Reporter noted that the subject is covered in Comment [3] of Rule 1.3.

The Commission discussed restoring some of the language from Comment [1] that had been deleted in the current draft. The Commission agreed that the Reporter will return some of the language and will add cross-references to Rules 1.4 and 1.16. The Reporter will post the new language on the listserv for discussion.

A member asked why paragraph (b) had been deleted. A member responded that at the last meeting the Commission voted to move the paragraph to the Comment or the Preamble. It was moved to restore paragraph (b). The motion passed 4 to 3. The Reporter noted that Comment [3] would also be restored.

An observer asked why the writing requirement was deleted from paragraph (b) of the draft (paragraph (c) of the current Rule). A member noted that, since Rule 1.5 as proposed by the Commission will require a writing, an additional requirement is not needed. It was moved to approve proposed paragraph (b) with no writing requirement and include a cross-reference to Rule 1.5. The motion passed unanimously.

A member moved to delete the last sentence of proposed paragraph (c) (paragraph (d) in the current Rule). The members agreed that the concept was sound but was oddly worded. The motion to delete paragraph (c) passed with one contrary vote.

There was a consensus that the deleted proposed paragraph (x) be moved to the Comment.

A member observed that the current wording of Comment [5] implies that means are a subset of objectives. The Commission agreed that the second to last sentence should be reworded by adding "in addition" at the beginning and deleting "also."

A member moved that the third sentence of Comment [6] be amended to read, "Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely." The motion passed unanimously.

The Commission reviewed Comment [10], which was amended in light of the Commission's decision not to have a separate rule on fiduciaries. The Commission decided that the current Comment language was sufficient to make the point that fiduciaries sometimes have special obligations and voted to make no changes.

V. Rule 1.3

The Commission agreed with a suggestion that the word "adequately" in Comment [1a] be changed to "competently." There was a consensus that the Rule as proposed is ready to be distributed for public comment.

VI. Rule 1.4

The Commission agreed that paragraph (c), which defines informed consent, should be moved to Terminology and that Terminology should become a new Rule 1. A member noted that many of those commenting on the public comment draft made this suggestion. Comment [5] would also be moved to the new terminology rule. The Commission agreed that the Comment to Rule 1.4 should address the relationship between the duty to communicate and the responsibility to obtain informed consent.

The Commission agreed to retain the current black-letter language of Rule 1.4.

The Reporter noted that Comment [1a] was moved from Rule 1.2. The Commission approved the Comment with the deletion in the third line of the reference to settling a civil matter.

The Commission agreed that the deleted language in Comment [1] should be restored.

One member argued that the term "status" in paragraph (a) should be clarified. The consensus of the Commission was that the term is not misunderstood. The Commission did not agree with a suggestion that the word "currently" be inserted in paragraph (a).

The Commission reviewed the comments received on the draft that was posted for public comment. The Commission asked the Reporters to redraft Comment [5] in light of the suggestions.

VII. Rule 3.4

A member commented that the term "reasonably foreseeable proceeding" was very broad. A Reporter pointed out that the Rule is qualified by the word "unlawfully," which was used by the Kutak Commission because the law was inconsistent. Several members felt that the addition of "knows or reasonably should know" was not necessary and the word "illegal" was sufficient. A motion to return to the current Model Rule passed with one dissent.

The Reporter suggested adding "knowingly" before "assist" in the last line of paragraph (a). A motion to delete the scienter requirement from paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) was defeated 5 to 4. On reconsideration, the motion to delete the scienter requirement from paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) passed 5 to 4. The Commission discussed the need to be clear on the scienter requirement in all Rules.

The Commission discussed the proposed new language in paragraph (b) regarding an offer to compensate a witness contingent upon the content of the testimony or the outcome of the proceeding. A member moved that the language of the first sentence of DR 7-109(C) from the Model Code of Professional Conduct replace the proposed language and be moved to a new paragraph. A member stated that the Kutak Commission thought that the Model Rule language covered these situations. The motion to replace the proposed new language in paragraph (b) with the first sentence of DR 7-109(C) and move it to a new paragraph passed.

A member noted that jurisdictions differ on this issue and the new language should be deleted. A motion was made to return to the current Model Rule language in paragraph (b) and retain the current Comment. An observer indicated that prosecutors would have to be exempted. The Reporter stated that the Rule only prohibits inducements that are prohibited by law. The motion to retain the current paragraph (b) and relevant Comment passed.

A motion to go back to the Model Rule language in paragraph (c) passed.

The Reporter indicated that proposed paragraph (h) is a codification of an ABA Ethics Opinion. A member felt that the words "for the purpose of obtaining an advantage in a civil matter" were too vague. A motion to delete paragraph (h) passed with one vote opposed.

A member moved to delete paragraph (g) because there is a great deal of variation in state law. The motion passed.

The Commission approved the additional language in Comment [2].

VIII. Rule 2.X

The Reporter stated that paragraph (b) was redrafted because the prior draft was too vague. A member asked why the paragraph only applies to unrepresented parties. A Reporter noted that the second sentence covers any situation where a party does not understand the lawyer's role. He felt that the two sentences are sufficient for a disciplinary rule. The Commission agreed and approved the paragraph as drafted.

An observer expressed concern regarding the scienter requirement. He asked if "reason to know" implied a duty to inquire. He added that the definition of "knows" seems to cover the intent of this paragraph. It was moved to strike "reason to know." The motion passed 6 to 1.

The Commission asked an observer from the International Academy of Mediators to explain the group's objections to this draft. He noted that mediation is a developing field, which encompasses extremely complex as well as small cases. He said there is a perception that lawyers are trying to take over the field. He noted that the IAM objects to the second sentence of paragraph (a) because the functions of mediators and arbitrators are different and some states do not require mediators to be impartial.

A member observed that the Commission intends to cover only issues that are unique to lawyers as mediators. The Reporter noted that mediators and arbitrators are not treated differently in the proposed Rules. The Commission approved paragraph (a) as drafted. A member suggested that the Comment discuss the distinctions between different types of neutrals.

The Reporter indicated that some in the mediation community have commented unfavorably on paragraph (c) because they feel it is difficult to distinguish between advice and information. A disciplinary counsel noted that, if the Rule provides that a lawyer can give information "where appropriate," the lawyer will always argue that it was appropriate. A member suggested that the Rule focus on the fact that the lawyer-neutral does not form a lawyer-client relationship with the parties. The Commission voted to delete paragraph (c).

An observer stated that paragraph (d) doesn't work in practice. He said that the concept of termination of the lawyer's services doesn't apply in mediation and that the lawyer should not be converted into a representative of one of the parties. A member noted that, since this is not a prohibitory provision, it might be better to delete it. The Commission agreed unanimously with the suggestion to delete paragraph (d).

The Reporter indicated that she would prefer not to add anything to the Comment on this subject. She noted that Rule 1.12 now provides that a neutral may not work on the same or a substantially related matter and that conflicts are imputed. The Commission agreed that the Comment should cross-reference Rule 1.12 and address conflicts of interest.

A member asked why paragraph (d)(1) was stricken. A member responded that all mediators have confidentiality obligations. A Reporter suggested that the black letter refer to the regulations governing mediator confidentiality to clarify that lawyers can be disciplined for failure to comply. The Commission agreed to add this reference.

IX. Rule 3.8

The Commission discussed the proposed addition of "or maintaining" after "prosecuting" in paragraph (a). A member felt "maintaining" could be confusing and does not encompass all situations that could arise between commencing prosecution and the trial. A motion to make no changes to paragraph (a) passed unanimously. The Commission did not agree with a suggestion to discuss maintaining a prosecution in the Comment.

The Reporter noted that there has been some confusion about when paragraph (c) applies, in part because the Comment is not consistent with the black letter. An observer added that the term "important pretrial rights" is vague. A member observed that it is hard to write a rule on this issue that would not be unconstitutional or unlawful. He felt that the paragraph should be deleted or should refer to other law. An observer who is a disciplinary counsel stated that paragraphs (c) and (d) cause the most conflict between prosecutors and disciplinary counsel because defense counsel often attempt to use disciplinary rules to fight procedural rules. Some members were concerned that if this provision is deleted prosecutors will be immune from sanctions.

A motion was made to retain paragraph (c) in principle and to have the Reporters respond to the criticism regarding the black letter. A member suggested language to the effect that "a prosecutor may not knowingly take action to deprive a defendant of a recognized procedural right." He noted that states are moving in different directions on this issue. He suggested Rule 3.4, which refers to external law, as a model. Another member questioned the need for the Rule if it merely states that prosecutors should obey court rules and restates constitutional requirements.

The movant indicated that his motion was not intended to extend paragraph (c) beyond unrepresented persons. He asked the Reporters to consider whether (c) should be extended or whether the suggested language on deprivation of procedural rights should be added as a separate provision. The motion to retain paragraph (c) in principle passed.

Some members felt paragraph (d) goes to the heart of a prosecutor's obligations, and others felt that it went beyond what was constitutionally required. A motion was made to leave paragraph (d) unchanged. A member proposed an amendment to the motion to add the phrase "shall not contrary to constitutional law knowingly." There was no second to the proposed amendment. The original motion to make no amendment to paragraph (d) passed with one strong dissent.

The Commission discussed whether impeachment evidence is evidence that "tends to negate the guilt." An observer who is a federal prosecutor indicated that under the Giglio case it does not technically constitute evidence that tends to negate guilt. A member suggested an addition to the black letter regarding impeachment evidence. Another member noted that, if the new general provision suggested previously is added, this specific reference would be unnecessary. The Commission felt that a new general catchall provision would be controversial. There was a consensus to add a reference to impeachment evidence to paragraph (d).

An observer remarked that paragraph (e) assumes that prosecutors have control over investigative agents. A disciplinary prosecutor stated that Georgia changed its rule to cover only those under the direct supervision of the prosecutor. The Commission asked the Reporter to draft an amendment along those lines.

A federal prosecutor stated that the Department of Justice has been challenging paragraph (f) for years. Their position is that the provision is a matter of procedure, not ethics. A member pointed out that the paragraph was amended in 1995 to remove the requirement that the prosecutor seek and secure prior court approval for issuing subpoenas. The Commission agreed with the Reporter that the 1995 amendment eliminated the most objectionable feature and voted to retain the current Model Rule.

A member asked if paragraph (g) was consistent with Rule 3.6 on trial publicity. A member responded that paragraph (g) was intentionally broader. A Reporter said he felt the paragraph was of doubtful constitutional validity. A member felt that the paragraph was very broad and should be limited to statements the prosecutor knows are likely to create prejudice against the accused. Other members felt that prosecutors are not hampered by this Rule because it allows statements that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose. A motion was made to retain paragraph (g). The motion passed 6 to 2. The two dissenters felt that the provision should not go beyond Rule 3.6 and would then be unnecessary.

The Commission discussed the proposed deletion of the second to the last sentence in Comment [1]. The Reporter stated that the sentence has been problematic; several states have deleted or amended it. She added that the sentence is inaccurate because grand jury proceedings are not adjudicative. A motion to delete the sentence was not seconded. A member moved that the Commission approve the fourth alternative listed in the Reporter's Observations - delete the sentence and replace it with a provision in the black letter requiring prosecutors to present to the grand jury "material facts tending substantially to negate the existence of probable cause." Several observers felt this proposal went beyond the current law. They argued that this is procedure, not ethics, and that practice varies. The vote on the motion was 3 to 2.

The low number of members voting prompted the Commission to continue the discussion. A Reporter suggested that the Commission leave this area to the development of procedural law. A member argued that if the sentence is deleted there will be a gap. She felt that the Commission should approve the fourth alternative and get comment from interested persons. Another member argued that including a provision that is inconsistent with constitutional law demeans the importance of the Model Rules. The motion to delete the second to last sentence of Comment [1], replacing it with the fourth alternative proposed in the Reporter's Observations, passed 5 to 1 on a revote.

X. Rule 3.6

The Reporter explained that the only change proposed to paragraph (a) is the clarification that the lawyer's decisions will be judged by reference to the standard of a reasonable lawyer.

The Reporter explained that at the last meeting the Commission asked him to consider moving subparagraph (6) of Comment [5] into Rule 3.8 or to suggest other alternatives. The Reporter stated that his proposed solution is to modify paragraph (b)(1) to eliminate the inconsistency between the text and the Comment. A member pointed out that an alternative was to retain paragraph (b) unchanged and delete subparagraph (6). A member moved to leave both the Rule and the Comment unchanged. The motion failed with a vote of 3 to 4.

Several members agreed that subparagraph (6) was good practice but goes further than the Rule and is an unrealistic expectation. A motion to retain paragraph (b) unchanged passed unanimously. A motion to delete subparagraph (6) was made. The proponents argued that Rule 3.8(g) adequately covers the situation. The motion to delete subparagraph (6) of Comment [5] passed 4 to 3.

A proponent of the motion asked the opponents what they would propose. One member stated that she would discuss the best-practice aspect of paragraph (b) in a new Comment not tied to the introduction to Comment [5]. Others noted that the Commission was not using the Comment to discuss best practice.

The Reporter asked the Commission to clarify whether its decision at the last meeting was to delete all of paragraph (b)(7)(i) or just the proposed new material. The Commission agreed that it only intended to delete the new material. One member objected to the term "family status."

The Commission agreed with the cross-reference to Rule 3.8 in new Comment [8].

A member suggested that the Reporters check the definition of "firm" to make sure that paragraph (d) is consistent with other Rules.

XI. Rule 8.4

A federal prosecutor observed that proposed Comment [x] is helpful because it acknowledges that lawyers may advise a person of acts that the person is lawfully entitled to undertake. She noted that lawful acts would include certain types of investigation permitted under Title 18. A member was opposed to the Comment, which he thought implied that a client, acting as an agent of a lawyer, could perform actions that the lawyer ethically could not.

Another member observed that lawyers are not acting through clients when advising them on their legal rights. He added that this Rule does not permit a lawyer to advise a client to take illegal action; such advice is prohibited by other Rules. Another member suggested an analogy between the Comment and the ABA Ethics Opinion on Rule 4.2 that discusses advising a client regarding direct communication with the opposing party. There was a consensus that Comment [x] should incorporate the preceding observations.

The Reporter indicated that this draft combines proposed paragraphs (g) and (h) from the previous draft and clarifies that this provision applies only when the lawyer is acting in a professional capacity. A member asked why the draft does not include all of the categories listed in current Comment [2]. The categories were taken from the Code of Judicial Conduct. He added that the draft does not contain the reference to legitimate advocacy currently in the Comment. Another member questioned whether ethics rules should prohibit anything beyond what is prohibited by law. A motion was made to return to the current language of Comment [2] and delete proposed paragraph (g). The Commission agreed that every attempt to change this provision brings new problems. The motion to delete paragraph (g) and make no changes to Comment [2] passed.

XII. Rule 6.1

The Reporter stated that there has been considerable opposition from the legal services community to the Commission's vote at the last meeting in favor of mandatory pro bono. Opponents argued that this recommendation would overshadow the Commission's other work. They feared that if mandatory pro bono is approved the Rule will no longer suggest that the majority of pro bono be done to help persons of limited means. Those in favor of mandatory pro bono argued that even the best programs are not able to fill the need and lawyers have a professional obligation to help those who cannot afford representation. A member moved to make no changes to the current Rule and circulate it for public comment.

Another member suggested that since the Commission is closely divided it should circulate the draft with a bracketed choice between "shall" and "should aspire to" to invite debate on the subject. The words "mandatory" and "voluntary" would also be bracketed in the title. She moved to amend the initial motion to circulate the current Rule by adding brackets to the draft and title as described. The motion to amend the initial motion passed 5 to 4. The motion then passed as amended with a vote of 7 to 2.

The Commission asked that the Reporter's Explanatory Memo circulated with the draft reflect this discussion and note that the Commission is not taking a position on mandatory pro bono. The Commission indicated that alternatives such as buyouts, averaging, etc., should be addressed in the Reporter's memo but need not be drafted as alternatives.

XIII. Rule 4.2

It was moved to circulate for comment the draft of Rule 4.2 that was prepared for the Commission's May 1999 meeting. The motion passed with one vote opposed.

A representative from the National Employment Law Association presented his organization's comments. They recommend that "may be" in the sixth line of Comment [5] be changed to "is sought." They believe the current language is too broad. A Reporter indicated that the Commission would consider this suggestion with the other comments received at the end of the public comment period.

XIV. Rule 6.3

A member made a motion to sever the current Rule from the new proposal and draft a new Rule to cover the issue of conflicts of interest in providing legal services. The motion to sever passed unanimously.

A member asked if legal services was a defined term. He felt it is a broad concept that would be difficult to define. Another member felt that the Comment should mention that in some circumstances being on a board could bring about a disqualification under Rule 1.7. Others felt that might discourage lawyers from serving on boards.

The Commission then discussed whether there was a need for special provisions regarding imputation or conflicts-checking procedures for those providing pro bono service at a legal service office.

Commission members Laurie Zelon and Margaret Love volunteered to work with the Reporters on this Rule.

XV. Rule 5.5

The Reporter indicated that this new draft incorporates the suggestions made in a National Law Journal article by Geoffrey Hazard. Members asked questions about the intent of paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4): whether paragraph (a)(2) covers writing wills for employees; whether paragraph (a)(1) should say "in anticipation of litigation" rather than "preparing for litigation;" whether paragraph (a)(4) should say "in the other jurisdiction;" whether paragraph (a)(3) means it is permissible for a New York lawyer consulted by a client in New York to handle a matter in another state; and whether anything not specifically listed in paragraph (a) is prohibited. A Reporter cautioned that this Rule cannot be used to rewrite the unauthorized practice of law rules. A member added that these are very real problems. He liked having a Rule that provides a safe harbor for lawyers.

A member suggested that the language in paragraph (a)(2), "other than making appearances in court," should also be in paragraph (a)(3). Another noted that such an instance would be covered by pro hac vice rules. The Reporter agreed that paragraphs (a)(2) and (3) probably do not need to deal with litigation since it is dealt with in paragraph (a)(1).

A disciplinary counsel noted that paragraph (a)(4) has a practical problem because lawyers can easily associate with lawyers licensed in the jurisdiction in which they want to work. He said the Rule is in effect creating admission by association. He also noted that disciplinary counsel will be less interested in prosecuting lawyers whose conduct occurs in another jurisdiction. A member expressed concern over drafting an ethics rule in this fast-moving and complex field. He felt the draft was useful in articulating the problems.

A member moved that the Reporters work on the details and create a new draft for the next meeting. There was a consensus that the Commission agreed with the direction of the draft. A member suggested that the Comment mention that this is a safe harbor and the examples are only illustrations. The Commission also felt that this Rule and Rule 8.5 should be released for public comment together.

XVI. Rule 8.5

The Commission approved the Rule as drafted but agreed that it should be released for public comment simultaneously with Rule 5.5. A member suggested that some examples would be helpful in the Comment.

XVII. Rule 1.14

The Reporter stated that the draft uses the term "diminished capacity," which was a recommendation of the 1993 Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients. There was a consensus that the Comment should explain the new term. The Reporter also indicated that he will delete the word "legal" in paragraph (b).

A member cautioned against using the term "least restrictive alternative" in the black letter because it is always possible to second-guess the lawyer. Another member suggested adding a Comment indicating that generally courts seek the least restrictive alternative.

The Commission suggested that the Comment include a caution regarding family representation. Lawyers must be concerned about the client's interest and not lose the attorney-client privilege. The Commission agreed that the Comment should clarify that while many family members may be involved there is still only one client; other people should not be present at lawyer-client conferences without the consent of the client. If the client lacks the capacity to consent, the lawyer must act in accordance with Rule 1.14.

A member asked if paragraph (c) was an exception to Rule 1.6 or whether actions the lawyer needs to take would be impliedly authorized. Another member noted that it would be impossible to argue that a lawyer's actions were impliedly authorized if the lawyer needs to reveal confidences to protect the client despite client instructions to the contrary. A Reporter noted that the three paragraphs of 1.14 must be read together. There was a consensus that paragraph (c) is not an exception to Rule 1.6. A motion was made to approve the black letter as drafted. A Reporter stated that it would be preferable to have a link between Rules 1.6 and 1.14 in the text. Another Reporter suggested adding "information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6" to paragraph (c). The motion to approve the black letter as drafted, deleting "legal" in paragraph (b), passed. The Commission asked the Reporter to consider how best to flag the issue regarding Rule 1.6.

XVIII. Rule 1.17

The Commission liked the proposed changes to the Rule and approved it to be released for public comment. One member expressed concern that the Rule would indirectly allow lawyers to sell off their best cases. A member responded that lawyers would violate their fiduciary duty by selling the less appealing cases to an incompetent lawyer.

XIX. Drafts Released for Public Comment

Due to the large number of drafts on the agenda, the Commission was only able to briefly discuss the comments received on the drafts distributed in March. Several suggestions were made for the Reporters to consider for the next meeting:

1) Move former clients back into Rule 1.9.

2) The written conflict waiver required by Rule 1.7 should summarize the circumstances constituting the conflict as well as the consent.

3) The timing of the written conflict waiver should be parallel to Rule 1.5 - within a reasonable time after the facts constituting the conflict become apparent.

4) The black letter, not the Comment, of Rule 1.7 (or possibly Terminology) should indicate the client's signature is not required on the conflict waiver. A term such as "manifesting" or "confirming" should be used.

5) The Rule 1.7 Comment should indicate that a new writing may be required as facts change.

XX. Future Meetings

The Commission will hold an Advisory Council meeting, featuring speakers from the Southwestern Legal Foundation, and a public hearing on February 10 in Dallas in conjunction with the ABA Midyear Meeting. The Commission's next meetings will be February 11 - 13 in Dallas and March 24 - 26 in Chicago.

Respectfully submitted,


Charlotte K. Stretch


William T. Barker, American Insurance Association
Robert Creamer, Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society
Robert Creo, International Academy of Mediators
Steve Csontos, Department of Justice
Juliet A. Eurich, Department of Justice
John M. Gardner, National Association of Bond Lawyers
Noel Hensley, Southwestern Legal Foundation
Joseph R. Lundy, Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society
Robert E. O'Malley, Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society
George W. Overton, Chicago Bar Association
Bruce Ross, ABA Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section
William P. Smith III, National Organization of Bar Counsel
Dan Williams, National Employment Law Association


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