Ethics 2000 Meeting Minutes

Sunday, September 27 and Monday, September 28, 1998
Chicago, Illinois

Commission Members Present:

Liaison:

Seth Rosner, Board of Governors

Guests:

Loretta C. Argrett, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility

Jackson M. Bruce, Jr., Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility

Daniel W. Hildebrand, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility

Donald W. Hilliker, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility

Ralph G. Elliot, Liaison to Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility from
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline

William H. Jeffress, Jr., Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility

George A. Kuhlman, Ethics Counsel

Eileen B. Libby, Associate Ethics Counsel

Robert Litt, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General

Bruce Alan Mann, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility

M. Peter Moser, Chair, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility

Burnele V. Powell, Chair, CPR Coordinating Council

Observers:

See attached

Reporters:

Nancy J. Moore

Carl A. Pierce

Staff:

Jeanne P. Gray

Susan M. Campbell

Charlotte K. Stretch

The Commission meeting was held on Sunday, September 27, 1998, from 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., and on Monday, September 28, 1998, from 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

I. Minutes of Previous Meetings

The minutes of the Committee meeting of July 31 - August 1, 1998 were approved as submitted.

II. Model Rule 4.2

The Ethics 2000 Commission and the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility met in joint session to discuss Rule 4.2. Robert Litt of the Department of Justice was also present for the discussion.

Prof. Hazard served as Commission Chair during the discussion of Rule 4.2 in light of Chief Justice Veasey’s decision to recuse himself as Chair with respect to this Rule. Prof. Hazard pointed out that the Commission has three drafts before it: the Ethics Committee draft (unapproved), the Ethics 2000 draft (also unapproved), and the current Model Rule.

One member proposed that the Commission discuss whether there is agreement regarding the purpose of the Rule, then determine what the exceptions to the Rule are and the definition of a represented party. A member stated his view that one of the most important purposes of the Rule is to deal with the imbalance of legal skill between lawyers and nonlawyers. Another member responded that in drafting a Comment on the purpose of the Rule, it is essential not to imply that imbalance is the only reason for the Rule.

One member stated that the purpose of the Rule is to prevent (rather than reduce) disclosure of privileged or harmful information. He added that if a lawyer is permitted to talk with a represented person, the Rule should indicate the circumstances under which that can happen and the scope of the permitted discussion. He noted that the Rule cannot stop clients from contacting opposing counsel but it can regulate what lawyers do when contact is made. He suggested that a court must determine whether the client should obtain new counsel or has intentionally waived the right to counsel. He felt that the Rule should define the principles that would guide the court in making a decision.

A member suggested that it is impossible for the Rule to anticipate all of the possible fact patterns that might arise. Lawyers often have to make tough judgment calls. He suggested that the Rule contain a general prohibition, a statement of purpose and some discussion of the marginal cases. Others agreed with this approach, noting that since the DOJ agrees that the case law supports them, there is no need to tinker with the Rule. Prof. Moore added that one exception would be the area of corporate representation where the caselaw is not consistent.

A member of the Ethics Committee raised one of the concerns of prosecutors: they often operate in several jurisdictions and must deal with varying rules and interpretations. Prof. Moore responded that the multijurisdictional problem is pervasive and cannot be solved in Rule 4.2. She added that disciplinary authorities recognize good faith attempts by lawyers to resolve difficult ethical issues.

The Commission then discussed the operation of the Rule with respect to corporations. The members agreed that those who are authorized to speak for the corporation are included in the "control group." An observer asked under what circumstances an employee (not a member of the control group), who witnesses an accident can be contacted. There was agreement that the employee can be contacted unless he has established a lawyer-client relationship with the corporation’s lawyer or outside counsel. A number of Commission members stated their belief that although a lawyer cannot automatically assert that he represents all of a corporation’s employees, he can be specifically retained to do so.

Mr. Litt observed that the DOJ would like some certainty about what it can do. He noted that when witnesses are contacted it is often not known what they know or will say. He added that vagueness in the Rule can have a chilling effect on law enforcement. Several members responded that if a witness begins to discuss information that might be imputed to the corporation, the lawyer must stop the discussion. Mr. Litt suggested that certain things that are wholly innocent can be imputed, such as record keeping, etc. He felt that the discussion would need to stop only if it covered culpable conduct that would be attributable. Several members responded that the word "culpable" may be too narrow, while the word "involvement" may be too broad. The Commission then focused on when a lawyer knows, for purposes of being disciplined, that the point of terminating the discussion has been reached.

A member asked if it is possible to define a group that cannot be contacted other than the control group. A member suggested that there is a necessary indeterminacy before a certain stage but that the lawyer must stop the discussion as outlined above.

Prof. Hazard asked Mr. Litt to report on what the DOJ would like the Commission to understand. Mr. Litt advised the Commission that the admissions clause causes confusion. He added that the DOJ is not seeking to expand what it understands the existing case law to be. He stated that the DOJ is not in favor of allowing lawyers to make a broad assertion that they represent a person in any current or future matters. The Commission was not persuaded that such an assertion prevented the government from engaging in otherwise lawful activity. Several members noted the difficulty in trying to determine whether or not a particular communication concerns "the subject matter of the representation."

The Commission discussed circumstances in which an investigator, who may or may not be under the supervision of a lawyer, can engage in contacts prevented by Rule 4.2. Several factors were considered: whether the investigator is hired by the client or the lawyer; whether the investigator is seen as the "alter ego" of the lawyer; whether the investigator is undercover; and the lawyer’s responsibilities under Rules 5.3 and 8.4.

Mr. Litt observed that Rule 4.2 has been the most contentious issue between the DOJ and the bar in the last 10 years. He expressed his hope that a Rule can be drafted that will prevent some of the friction. He felt that the main areas that should be clarified are: the proper role of agents; the scope of organizational representation; and pre- and post-charge investigation.

Prof. Hazard thanked Mr. Litt for joining the Commission to discuss Rule 4.2. He stated that the Commission is very interested in continued candid discussions with the DOJ. Mr. Litt agreed that the discussion had been helpful and should continue.

The members agreed that the next step should be to prepare a draft that reflects the Commission’s views and to prepare a memorandum outlining the reasons for the Commission’s position. The draft and memo should then be sent to the Ethics Committee for review and then to a broader audience for review and comment.

A member proposed a straw vote approving the Model Rule as is, adding "court order." Another member suggested three additions: adding "for good cause shown;" using "unrelated" instead of "separate;" and clarifying the term "known." Nine members agreed that the Commission should proceed by drafting a Rule reflecting its position as outlined in the proposed straw vote with additions. Three members preferred providing comments on the Ethics Committee draft in addition to proceeding with an Ethics 2000 draft. Chief Justice Veasey abstained.

Prof. Hazard indicated that he will appoint a drafting committee to work with the Reporters on the next draft. A member requested that the drafting committee consider putting the substance of paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Ethics Committee draft in the Comment.

III. Model Rule 1.6

The Commission reviewed Comment [3] explaining "information relating to representation of a client," which was drafted in response to a letter from a former member of the Ethics Committee who felt that the phrase was unclear and too broad. This led to discussion of the Commission’s decision to move Rule 1.8(b) regarding use of client information to Rule 1.6(a). While both Rules deal with loyalty and confidential information, Rule 1.8(b) is a conflicts rule. Several members felt that moving "use" to 1.6(a) confused the Rule with respect to disclosure of information. An observer remarked that if the Commission moves 1.8(b) to 1.6, there will be an implication that some substantive change was intended. The Commission agreed that it should avoid confusion. A motion was made, seconded and unanimously approved to move "use" back to Rule 1.8 and to change Comments [3] and [5] regarding "information relating to representation of a client."

The Commission moved to a discussion of Rule 1.6(b)(1). Several options were considered:

1. include no modifier because the body of subparagraph (b) already states that a lawyer may reveal information only "to the extent necessary;"

2. use the term "imminent;"

3. use the term "reasonably certain;"

4. use both "imminent" and "reasonably certain;" or

5. use the term "probable."

The Commission agreed that "probable" was not strong enough and that having no modifier may imply a substantive change that is not intended. Several members felt that "imminent" was not inclusive enough but that the concept should be discussed in the Comment. Others felt that lawyers understand "imminent" and the term should not be removed. A member expressed concern that broadening the freedom of the lawyer to speak might subject lawyers to increased civil liability. Others felt that the concern was unfounded.

A motion was made and seconded to amend Rule 1.6(b)(1) to state: "to prevent ‘imminent’ or ‘reasonably certain’ death or substantial bodily injury." The motion passed with a vote of 6 to 5. A second motion was made and seconded to amend Rule 1.6(b)(1) to state: "to prevent ‘reasonably certain’ death or substantial bodily injury." The motion passed with a vote of 8 to 4. The Commission agreed that the Comment should explain that "reasonably certain" includes "imminent."

A motion was made and seconded to delete paragraph (b)(3). The motion was defeated with a vote of 4 to 7.

A motion was made and seconded to delete paragraph (b)(4). The proponent argued that the substance of the Rule is covered by implied authorization and that the Rule is a lawyer protection measure. Other members disagreed and felt the Rule was necessary. The motion was defeated with a vote of 1 to 12.

A suggestion was made to combine paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3). The Commission asked the Reporters to consider the suggestion.

A motion was made and seconded to approve the proposed draft of the Rule 1.6 (Black Letter only) consistent with the decisions made at this meeting. The motion passed with a vote of 11 to 2.

Chief Justice Veasey asked the Commission members to provide their comments on the proposed Comments to Carl Pierce as soon as possible.

IV. Model Rule 1.7

A motion was made and seconded to amend paragraph (b)(1) to read: "the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client." Several members preferred this positive statement of the Rule which avoids the use of the word "prevent." Some members thought that inclusion of the word "independent" would be an improvement. Prof. Moore was concerned that adding the word independent seems to imply that the conflict disappears. She felt that co-clients understand that when they agree to a common representation the lawyer is precluded from providing certain kinds of advice. The motion passed unanimously.

A member asked the Commission to reconsider its decision to require a writing signed by the client. He felt that this requirement places too great a burden on lawyers. Others felt that even though lawyers aren’t currently used to obtaining a signed writing, the requirement will soon become routine and will fade as a problem. Another member noted that this Rule protects lawyers as much as clients. The Commission agreed to leave the Rule as drafted and to see what comments are received.

Comments

A member suggested that Comment [3] be changed to read "economically adverse" rather than "generally adverse." All agreed that the change clarified the intent of the Comment.

A member asked how others felt about including examples in the Comments. Several members and observers indicated that the examples are helpful.

A member commented that he is interested in the response from real estate lawyers regarding the last sentence of Comment [4].

The Commission agreed to delete the last sentence of Comment [8a] which discusses the effect of the Rule in malpractice actions. The members agreed that the Preface was the appropriate place for that type of statement.

In response to a suggestion, the Reporter indicated that she would clarify the first sentence in Comment [9].

A Commission member was concerned that the use of the illustrations in Comment [10] should not preclude a situation where a sophisticated user of legal services agrees to waive all future conflicts because it cannot otherwise obtain the expertise of a particular lawyer or firm it wants to hire for a very limited purpose (such as tax work). The Reporter felt that the illustrations do not preclude that situation, since the Comment states only that "ordinarily" clients will not be permitted to make such open-ended general waivers. She added that the illustrations in the Comment attempt to demonstrate "bookend" situations -- one clear yes and one clear no -- without commenting on the middle. A member expressed her concern that if the bookends are too extreme, there may be a suggestion that anything in the middle is okay. She wanted to make sure that lawyers are forced to make a decision about the propriety of the action they want to undertake.

A member suggested that the issue of sex with clients, currently mentioned at the end of Comment [12], be flagged better. The Reporter noted that Rule 1.7 is relevant only to sexual relationships that predate the formation of the lawyer-client relationship because proposed Rule 1.8(k) prohibits other sexual relationships with clients.

A member suggested that the example in Comment [14] was confusing because it involves a relationship that is heavily regulated. Other members suggested deleting the Comment because the issue is dealt within Comment [3] and can be dealt with as part of informed consent.

In response to questions, the Reporter indicated that she would clarify that Comment [15] refers more to subparagraph 1.7(a). A member suggested amending the first sentence to clarify that legal positions can be taken in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. Some members also suggested that the Comment say directly that a lawyer may advocate a position that another of the lawyer’s clients would not take, so long as the lawyer does not represent the second client on that issue.

The Commission agreed to delete Comment [16] as unnecessary and possibly incorrect.

The Commission agreed to delete Comment [16a] and possibly replace it with a Comment addressing the client status of members of a class who are not named members. The Comment’s purpose would be to determine the propriety of a lawyer representing an opponent of the class also representing unnamed members of the class on unrelated matters. The Commission agreed that with respect to issues such as this one, it should invite several experts to provide their comments and possibly meet with the Commission. Chief Justice Veasey also suggested obtaining information from the Working Group on Mass Torts.

A member expressed his concern that Comment [18] places the interests of lawyers ahead of the interests of clients and was "bad ethics." Others disagreed, saying that the Comment was a correct application of the Rule. Some members felt that the issue of client identification should be dealt with outside of the Rules. An observer remarked that it was crucial for this issue to be covered in the Rules. A member stated that the main point is that these situations are fact-driven and not necessarily a conflict. A motion was made and seconded to approve the Comment as written. The motion passed with a vote of 7 to 3.

The Commission agreed to delete Comment [19a] as an unnecessary reference to statutory law.

A member asked what would be the appropriate default rule when a lawyer does not inform joint clients of the lawyer’s inability to keep confidences between clients and one client reveals confidential information with the instruction to the lawyer not to tell the other client. Prof. Moore pointed out that the problem with a default rule is that it suggests that if you follow a certain path you are home free. It is better to require lawyers to exercise judgment in particular situations.

A member expressed his opinion that the last sentence of Comment [26] seems to imply that joint clients will not receive the same degree of "loyalty" and "independent judgment" as they would if they were separately represented. In order to avoid the suggestion that such duties are not owed, Prof. Moore proposed changing "independently" to "separately" in the last line of the Comment and adding a cross-reference to the need to obtain the clients’ informed consent to any limitations on the scope of the representation necessitated by the fact of the joint representation. A member queried how much a lawyer can limit the scope without becoming incompetent to handle the representation.

Members will provide any additional editing suggestions directly to the Reporter.

V. "Future" Issues

The Commission discussed concerns raised by others that the Commission is not addressing changes in the legal profession. The Commission agreed that it is not inclined to make wholesale changes to the Model Rules but is interested in addressing emerging issues. The Commission agreed unanimously that as an operating principle it would follow a presumptive rule of making no change unless it is substantively necessary.

Several areas that the Commission felt need attention are: prospective waivers, class actions, multidisciplinary practice, fee sharing, mediation, specialization, technology, advertising in the electronic age, delivery of legal services, pro se help services (including ghost writing of documents and lawyers volunteering at the courthouse), document preparation, hotlines, research firms, national law practice v. state regulation, choice of law, alliances between law firms - international and domestic, client/law firm relationships, mobility of lawyers, clients under a disability, and imputation.

The Reporters and staff will identify those areas where it would be most helpful to invite comments from experts.

VI. Administrative Matters

Chief Justice Veasey reported that Prof. Tom Morgan has agreed to serve as a third Reporter for the Commission and that Prof. Nancy Moore will assume the role of Chief Reporter.

A member asked whether the final report to the House would indicate the votes of the Commission members on the various proposed amendments. Several members expressed their hope that the final report will have the support of all members. It was suggested that when interim drafts are circulated for comment, it would be helpful to highlight the areas of greatest controversy so that those who wish to may concentrate their comments in those areas.

Chief Justice Veasey indicated that he will discuss the presentation of the final report with President Phil Anderson. He anticipates that the report will be submitted in August 2000 and will be debated in February 2001.

The Commission agreed to hold a meeting December 11 - 12, 1998 in Philadelphia. Chief Justice Veasey and the members of the Reporter Subcommittee will hold a conference call with the three Reporters and Ms. Stretch to discuss the work plan and incorporating the new Reporter.

The Commission agreed to combine the hearings and Advisory Council meetings. The next hearing will be in conjunction with the Midyear Meeting in Los Angeles. There will be a hearing but no Commission meeting during the Conference on Professional Responsibility in June 1999. Chief Justice Veasey asked Mr. Fox to chair that hearing.

VII. Model Rule 1.10

The Commission discussed several problems related to the definition of "firm" because of the variety of associations and relationships that exist. A member suggested eliminating the definition in the body of the Rule and leaving it in the Comment only. A member felt that the discussion of imputation in Comment [6] was unclear. An observer recommended changing the word "case" to "matter." The Reporter stated that the reason to leave the definition in the black letter Rule is to alert people to the fact that a "firm" is more than the traditional notion of firm. An observer suggested that the Commission look at when imputation happens and change the definition to refer to a "lawyer" rather than a "firm." This received enthusiastic response from the Commission and led to related changes such as: "associated in the practice of law." A member felt that the phrase "practice of law" can even be problematic and suggested "associated in a practice." Another member added that the notion of "holding out" is still needed and perhaps should be incorporated in a fourth category. Mr. Rosner indicated that the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice will be considering changes to this Rule.

The Commission then discussed imputation in the context of legal aid offices. A member indicated that this is an increasing issue as legal aid lawyers move to law firms. Several members felt that there should be no exemptions other than the existing one for government agencies. A member pointed out that legal aid organizations advance the interests of their clients not an organization as stated in subparagraph (b)(2). Another argued that legal aid clients deserve the same protections as private clients and added that the emphasis on shared economic interests in private law firms is unnecessary.

A member questioned whether Comment [19] on screening would cause problems for small firms and give large firms a competitive advantage. The Reporter responded that the ability to provide effective screening is often just a practical problem.

A member asked if screening should be permitted without the consent of the client. She wondered if this would be an appropriate place to provide a Rule with a bracketed alternative for those states that choose to adopt a different view from the Model Rules. Several members felt it was better to take a definite position. Several members were opposed to screening without client consent and asked to hear arguments in favor of it. Some reasons given were: it is not always possible to get consent because you cannot reveal confidences; if all lawyers in a firm act in good faith, it works; and the mobility of lawyers. Prof. Pierce stated his view that there should not be different treatment of public to private moves and private to private moves. He felt that the focus should be on the effectiveness of the screen. An observer agreed stating that screening should be viewed from the standpoint of the client.

A member called for a straw vote on allowing screening only with client consent. The vote was 6 for and 2 against. The Reporter suggested an addendum to carve out certain situations such as when a former client has no reason to agree to a screen but the lawyer has only a limited amount of pertinent information.

A member suggested that the Commission examine the assumption that government lawyers are exempt from screening. Another member added that the subject of government lawyers is complicated by the fact that at the local government level private lawyers can be retained as special attorneys general to supplement short-staffed offices.

Regarding the content of screens, a member suggested a three-part requirement: reasonable time after the conflict is noted; reasonable manner (apparatus, security, separation); and reasonable belief that the screen will work. A member felt that clear ABA guidelines will improve the chances of getting client consent.

The Reporter asked which Rules should be included in Rule 1.10(a). The current draft includes Rules 1.7(a)(1), 1.8(c), and 1.9. She noted that under the Restatement all personal interest conflicts (Rule 1.8) are imputed. A member responded that whether the Commission imputes personal interest conflicts is a matter of fairness to lawyers. She added that the Commission agreed at a previous meeting that some personal interest conflicts involve a conflict for the associated lawyer. She wondered what empirical information is available to help the Commission determine whether the Rule should be changed. She then requested the Reporter to come up with an inventory of the various types of personal interest conflicts that appear in reported cases. An observer remarked that the Commission should bend toward protecting clients.

VIII. Model Rule 1.8

Chief Justice Veasey suggested that any drafting issues be discussed directly with the Reporter. He noted that Rule 1.8(b) will be returned to Rule 1.8 pursuant to the decision made during the discussion of Rule 1.6. Subject to a decision on personal interest conflicts, Rule 1.8 is now complete.

IX. Preliminary Discussions

Model Rule 1.1

Prof. Pierce indicated that he had added a provision to the Comment that a lawyer should comply with continuing legal education requirements. This was opposed in a comment prepared by the Advisory Council member representing the Law Practice Management Section, on the basis that there is no empirical or demonstrative evidence establishing that MCLE programs enhance lawyer competence. In the same comment, the Council member suggested that the Rule address adequate law practice management skills. Keeping in mind the Commission’s minimalist philosophy, Prof. Pierce did not make this addition.

The Commission briefly discussed enforcement of this Rule. An observer said he was unaware of any lawyer discipline cases where the lawyer was charged solely with a violation of Rule 1.1.

Model Rule 1.9

A member wanted to clarify the relationship between Rules 1.9 and 1.11. She wondered which Rule applies to a private lawyer hired by the government only for a particular matter. She went on to state that under an Ethics Committee opinion, Rule 1.11 applies to former government lawyers to the exclusion of Rule 1.9. There was some disagreement with this position.

Prof. Moore asked if the Rule should include a nonconsentability provision. The Commission had some difficulty in developing circumstances in which a former client conflict should be nonconsentable.

The Commission agreed that a definition of substantial relationship should be left to the case law.

Prof. Moore asked how former joint clients should be handled. She proposes to clarify in the Comment that a lawyer has a duty of loyalty to a former joint client, even if the lawyer has no confidential information about the representation. An observer noted that under the current Rule, you cannot represent one former joint client against the other unless the client was warned of the possibility at the outset of the joint representation. He did not believe it needed to be clarified further.

Rule 1.11

Prof. Moore wondered if the Rule would apply when a lawyer moved from one government agency to another. She did not see why it would not. She will also add a cross-reference to the screening requirements in Rule 1.10.

The Commission discussed concurrent conflicts of government employees, specifically those of part-time government employees who also practice privately. One member suggested dealing with them under Rule 1.7. Prof. Moore would like to see the Rule address some concurrent conflicts issues.

A member noted that the current definition of "matter" comes from the conflict laws and includes only litigation. She believes it should be expanded to include regulation drafting and other kinds of legal work often undertaken by government lawyers.

Rule 1.12

The Commission discussed if former mediators should be dealt with under Rule 1.12 or Rule 1.9. Prof. Moore suggested that since mediators often receive confidential information about their clients, they might be better dealt with under Rule 1.9. A member pointed out that mediators do not receive the confidential information in the context of a lawyer-client relationship. Prof. Pierce suggested a separate rule on mediation, as in the proposed Tennessee Rules.

Prof. Moore queried if the Rule would apply to private judges, who are not always former judges.

Prof. Moore brought up the situation of a judge who receives confidential information in the course of settling another judge’s case. There is one reported case in which the conflict was treated under Rule 1.9 so that screening was not allowed. The Commission believed such a case should be treated under Rule 1.12 since a judge in that situation is acting as a mediator.

Informed consent

A member had some concerns with the proposed definition. He felt that it left a subjective decision, what is "reasonably adequate information," up to the client. Prof. Moore explained that it was meant to be an objective standard determined by the fact finder in the case.

The member said that Reporters’ Observation 6 suggests that the sufficiency of the disclosure will be judged by the particular client involved. He would prefer that the standard be that of a reasonable lay person. He also suggested a "reasonably available alternative" standard for the disclosure.

An observer said that he thought the definition did a good job of limiting the burden on practicing lawyers. He did not believe it called for every possible contingency to be disclosed to the client. Another observer stated his belief that a definition of the term was a critical client-protection measure.

Respectfully submitted,

Charlotte K. Stretch

Special Counsel

MEETING OBSERVERS

John Berry, State Bar of Arizona

David Caylor, International Municipal Lawyers Association

Robert A. Creamer, Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society

Robert Cummins, ABA Section of Litigation

Ralph G. Elliot, Connecticut Bar Association

John M. Gardner, National Association of Bond Lawyers

Mark I. Harrison, Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers

Doug Heidenreich, William Mitchell College of Law

Noel Hensley, Southwestern Legal Foundation

M. Peter Moser, ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility

Robert E. O’Malley, Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society

George Overton, Chicago Bar Association

Mary Beth S. Robinson, Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society

Dan Shneidman, State Bar of Wisconsin Professional Ethics Committee

Nancy Slonim, ABA Media Relations

William P. Smith, National Organization of Bar Counsel

Raymond R. Trombadore, ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline