The Make Available Theory of Passive Conduct Infringement
A copyright holder using the “make available” theory shows direct infringement by demonstrating the defendant made the work publicly available, even where the work was not displayed, sold, or actively distributed by the defendant. See SA Music, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2020 WL 3128534, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2020) (discussing the theory and collecting cases). Some courts have recognized the existence of the theory but refused to apply it. In the digital image hosting context for example, some courts have declined to apply the make available theory where the alleged infringer did not “communicate” the purportedly infringing hosted images to the computers of those who used the website’s search engine. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007).
The “make available theory” was an ideal solution for the problems created by music file-sharing platforms around the turn of the century. In those settings, an individual may have had music files licensed for his individual use residing on a server that is connected to a file-sharing platform (like the now-defunct Napster or Limewire) that allowed third parties to access his server to make unlicensed copies of the music files. In that scenario, the original licensee did not display, copy, or distribute the copyrighted material—he simply “made it available” for others to find, usually through an index provided by the file-sharing platform. Many Courts found infringement under the “make available theory” in this context. E.g. Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP & Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 188 (D. Me. 2006) (KaZaA user found liable).
Conversely, some courts have rejected the “make available” theory outright, finding that an alleged infringer must actively distribute the copyrighted work or at least offer to do so before it can be liable for infringing the distribution right. This is the prevailing doctrine in the Ninth Circuit for example, which tracks the usual requirement that an infringer engage in volitional conduct. See SA Music, LLC, supra, 2020 WL 3128534, at *4.
Renewed Interest in Expanding the Make Available Theory
Certain plaintiffs are currently filing lawsuits for direct infringement against companies whose websites passively host content—often under a current or expired license from the copyright owner—that might be found by a third party, if the happen to look in just the right place. Plaintiffs in these matters often engage a vendor to search the allegedly offending websites for copyrighted works that are hosted (perhaps unknowingly) on a server and claim infringement against the website owner for making available the images to the public without license or authorization—even though the website owner was merely passively hosting the content. It is not yet clear whether courts will expand the “make available theory” to cover these scenarios.
Conclusion
The weight of case authority nationwide, and widespread adoption of the volitional conduct standard by federal circuit and district courts alike, strongly suggests that at least active conduct by an alleged infringer involving actual dissemination—akin to file-sharing or interactive music streaming—is required to demonstrate a cognizable “make available” claim for direct infringement. But copyright practitioners should be aware of this renewed effort to assert the “make available theory” outside of its file-sharing origins.