In 2022, the American Tort Reform Foundation listed Georgia as its number one “judicial hellhole,” a title that Georgia retained for 2023. Among other reasons cited by the foundation for Georgia’s ranking is the Georgia Court of Appeals’ June 2023 decision in Pierce v. Banks. Pierce concerns whether an enforceable settlement existed after an insurer attempted to accept a claimant’s demand by using a check stating that it was “void after 180 days.” The court answered the question in the negative in what some would argue is an overly technical and pedantic interpretation of the mirror image rule and the law concerning negotiable instruments. This interpretation has caused a great deal of consternation and rate pressure among Georgia automobile insurers despite the Georgia General Assembly’s two attempts since 2013 to establish by statute—Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1—what can and cannot be included in settlement offers. The 12 months following Pierce have seen the Georgia Supreme Court deny certiorari while the Georgia Court of Appeals entered two similar decisions in Patrick v. Kingston and Redfearn v. Moore. This trio of claimant-friendly decisions suggests that Georgia’s top billing as a “judicial hellhole” is likely to remain safe for 2024 in the eyes of the American Tort Reform Foundation. However, that ranking may change, as a new and updated third version of section 9-11-67.1 took effect on April 22, 2024, which likely renders Pierce and its progeny judicial dead ends by significantly limiting the ability of the plaintiff’s personal injury bar to “set up” bad-faith claims against insurers. This article explores the history of Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1; the circumstances surrounding Pierce, Patrick, and Redfearn; and how the 2024 revisions to section 9-11-67.1 may change the dynamics between claimants and insurers that led to Pierce, Patrick, and Redfearn.
On May 7, 2013, the first version of Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1 took effect. As originally enacted, section 9-11-67.1 (2013) applied to “any offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle [] prepared by or with the assistance of an attorney” sent “[p]rior to the filing of a civil action[.]” The statute required that such offers be in writing and contain the following material terms:
The 2013 version of section 9-11-67.1(e) provided that offers “shall be sent by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested, and shall specifically reference [Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1].” In addition, the 2013 edition provided that the offeror could “require payment within a specified period . . . not less than ten days after the written acceptance of the offer to settle.” Such payment could be made by cash, money order, wire transfer, cashier’s check, insurance company check, or electronic funds transfer. To accept an offer under the 2013 statute, a recipient may provide “written acceptance of the material terms outlined in [Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1(a)] in their entirety.”
The impetus for section 9-11-67.1 arose in the more than 20-year aftermath of Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt. In Holt, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized a common-law claim for a failure to settle where an insurer fails to take the opportunity to settle a claim that presents a case of clear liability against the insured and special damages in excess of the applicable limits. Following that decision, policy limits demands in Georgia became known as “Holt” demands and frequently cited the decision. However, clarification of the rights and duties arising in connection with such demands—including “what constitutes an offer to which an insurer must respond, when an insurer’s inquiry about medical liens amounts to a counteroffer, and how much time an offeror must provide for a response in order to trigger an insurer’s duty to respond”—was slow to come. For instance, the Georgia Supreme Court did not definitively resolve the question of whether “an insurer’s duty to settle arises when the injured party presents a valid offer to settle within the insured’s policy limits” until 2019, 27 years later. It was against this backdrop of somewhat glacial judicial guidance that the 2013 version was drafted and enacted. As recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, “the [Georgia] General Assembly’s goal in passing § 9-11-67.1 was to address the negative effects of [Holt]” including “[a] perceived concern . . . that it was arguably enabling plaintiffs to present settlement offers ‘with impossible deadlines and expose [the] insurance company to potential “bad faith” claims when it is unable or unwilling to abide.’” The Eleventh Circuit explained:
In enacting § 9-11-67.1, the General Assembly reportedly sought to reduce bad-faith claims by giving insurance companies adequate time to investigate claims and offers before having to decide whether to settle. The Act was arguably meant to be a compromise between the plaintiff and defense bars and to reduce procedural quibbling over the technical sufficiency of a settlement offer.
Facially, the 2013 version sets forth a relatively straightforward procedure. A claimant can submit a demand in writing stating the five items required by section 9-11-67.1(a) (2013) and the recipient can accept the offer by accepting those same five items. Such a result would simplify and clarify the process of reaching settlements, which would be consistent with Georgia’s “strong public policy of encouraging negotiations and settlements” while preserving the common-law claim for negligent failure to settle in cases where an insurer fails to settle in response to a demand presenting clear liability and special damages in excess of limits. However, such was not to be the case for Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1 (2013).
In 2017, the Georgia Supreme Court answered certified questions from the Eleventh Circuit concerning whether an insurer’s failure to provide payment by the deadline set forth in a demand meant there was no binding settlement with the claimant despite the insurer’s acceptance of the five materials terms set forth in section 9-11-67.1(a) (2013). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit found an ambiguity in the statute between the five material terms set forth in section 9-11-67.1(a) (2013) and the payment provisions of section 9-11-67.1(g) (2013). In answering the certified questions, the Georgia Supreme Court viewed section 9-11-67.1 (2013) through the lens “of [the] large body of law on contract formation generally and settlement formation specifically[,]” which requires that “settlement agreements [] meet the same requirements of formation and enforceability as other contracts.” Through that lens, the Georgia Supreme Court determined that offers and acceptances under section 9-11-67.1 (2013) were still subject to the mirror image rule and the rule that “an offeror is the master of his or her offer, and free to set the terms thereof.” Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to hold that section 9-11-67.1 (2013) “preclude[ed] Pre-Suit Offers from requiring terms in addition to those set forth in subsection (a)[.]” Instead, the Georgia Supreme Court held that “subsection (a) merely sets forth five terms that, at a minimum, must be included in every Pre-Suit Offer.” Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court viewed section 9-11-67.1(a) (2013) as setting forth five terms that an offer must include but not prohibiting the inclusion of additional terms not mentioned in that section. Given the existence of Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1(g) (2013) concerning the time period of payment, the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding appears to be overly broad, as a narrower holding could have incorporated a payment requirement without viewing section 9-11-67.1 (2013) as establishing only the minimum requirements for offers thereunder.
In addition to the common-law contract rules, the Georgia Supreme Court found support for its holding in section 9-11-67.1(c) (2013), which states that “[n]othing in [Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1 (2013)] is intended to prohibit parties from reaching a settlement agreement in a manner and under terms otherwise agreeable to the parties.” Despite this apparently bilateral language, the Georgia Supreme Court held that section 9-11-67.1(c) (2013) “does not preclude a Pre-Suit Offer from requiring acceptance of terms in addition those set forth in subsection (a).” Notably, the insurer argued that this approach rendered section 9-11-67.1 (2013) meaningless; however, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that section 9-11-67.1 (2013) still provided necessary clarification to questions arising in the wake of Holt.
Two justices dissented, asserting that the majority’s ruling eviscerated the goal of section 9-11-67.1 (2013) recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, by placing excessive reliance on the freedom to contract. Predicting the litigation that would come, the dissent noted “the majority has re-opened the door for ‘plaintiffs to present settlement offers with impossible deadlines [that] expose the insurance company to potential “bad faith” claims’ even where, as here, the insurance company accepted the non-conforming Pre-Suit Offer in its written response and sought to secure prompt payment.”
Four years later, on May 4, 2021, a revised version of Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1 took effect. The five material terms set forth in the 2013 version remained, but the revised statute required the claimant to itemize what will be provided to the releasee. Further, the 2021 version added a requirement that the claimant provide medical records in the claimant’s possession and allowed the claimant to request an affidavit concerning whether all insurance has been disclosed to the claimant. The 2021 version of section 9-11-67 appeared to attempt to address Woodard by revising three subsections. First, for section 9-11-67.1(b), the 2021 version adds that “[u]nless otherwise agreed by both the offeror and the recipients in writing, the terms outlined in [Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1(a)] shall be the only terms which can be included in an offer to settle made under [Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1].” Second, for section 9-11-67.1(c), the 2021 version changes the language from “otherwise agreeable to the parties” to “otherwise agreeable to both the offeror and the recipient of the offer.” Third, for section 9-11-67.1(d), the 2021 version adds that “if a release is not provided with an offer to settle, a recipient’s providing of a proposed release shall not be deemed a counteroffer.” However, the 2021 version of section 9-11-67.1 applies only to causes of action for personal injury, bodily injury, and death arising from the use of a motor vehicle on or after July 1, 2021.
The July 1, 2021, effective date means that there is only one reported decision concerning the revised version of section 9-11-67.1—Redfearn. However, Redfearn follows the line of cases based on Woodard applying the 2013 version of section 9-11-67.1, including, most notably, Pierce, which caused significant waves through the bar when the Georgia Court of Appeals entered its decision last June.
In Pierce, the claimant sent what the Georgia Court of Appeals described as a “detailed offer letter” requiring the payment of the subject policy’s $25,000 limit and written acceptance within 31 days. The offer required, inter alia, that “any payment requiring the name of a payee must be made out to ‘Aaron Pierce and Brooks Injury Law, LLC’ and that, ‘as an act necessary to accept this offer,’” (1) “payment had to ‘be received 15 days after [the insurer’s] written acceptance of the offer’” and (2) “‘the settlement payment and all other documents sent by [the insurer] must not include any terms, conditions, descriptions, expirations, or restrictions that are not expressly permitted in this offer.’” In addition, the offer included the following “caution”:
Multiple cases demonstrate the hazards of attempting to negotiate agreements without terms and conditions for acceptance being clear, and we want to be clear that this offer must be accepted exactly as stated and that any variance at all from any terms or conditions of acceptance or any variance at all from the quoted language above, even if accidental, will be a rejection of this offer.
Within the 31-day response period, the insurer’s counsel sent a letter to the claimant’s counsel stating “that the insurer ‘had authorized her to accept’” the offer and attaching the settlement check and limited release. The settlement check was made payable to “Aaron Pierce and Brooks Injury Law LLC,” without the comma between “Law” and “LLC,” and stated that the check was “void after 180 days.” Subsequently, the claimant’s counsel advised that the insurer’s “purported acceptance was not identical to the offer” and that the claimant was rejecting the insurer’s “counteroffer.” Thereafter, the claimant filed suit, alleging nearly $1,000,000 in medical expenses, and ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether there was a settlement between the parties after the insureds raised “accord and satisfaction” in their answer. The claimant’s motion raised four arguments: (1) The insurer’s counsel communicated only her authority to accept the offer, (2) the insurer did not provide the settlement funds 15 days after its acceptance, (3) the settlement check stated that it was “void after 180 days,” and (4) the settlement check did not include the comma between “Law” and “LLC.” In response, the insureds argued that the insurer had complied with the five materials terms set forth in section 9-11-67.1(a) (2013) and that the acceptance did not vary from the terms of the offer. In addition, the insureds argued that the claimant’s arguments that the insurer sent the settlement funds prior to 15 days after acceptance and that the settlement check did not have a comma between “Law” and “LLC” were “utterly absurd” and immaterial.
The trial court held that there was an accord and satisfaction based on the insurer’s compliance with the five materials terms set forth in section 9-11-67.1(a) (2013) and its determination that the offer required only that the claimant receive the settlement funds within 15 days after acceptance. In addition, the trial court held that the statement that the settlement check was “void after 180 days” and missing a comma did not constitute a variance from the offer because Georgia law “does not require a bank to pay on a check that is presented more than six months after its date” and the missing comma was “not language.”
Referencing the Woodard line of cases, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the insurer’s “purported acceptance” patently failed to accept and comply with the requirements of the offer. The key to the court’s reversal is the difference between bilateral and unilateral contracts. In a bilateral contact, the parties create a contract by expressing their mutual intent to be bound according to their agreement to material terms that define their rights and obligations. In a unilateral contract, a contract can exist only if the offeree performs the actions requested by the offeror without any variance from the terms of the offer. Thus, the court rejected the insureds’ material terms argument as meritless because the distinction between material and immaterial terms does not exist for a unilateral contract given that the acceptance must be identical to the offer. On this basis alone, the Georgia Court of Appeals essentially rendered meaningless the Georgia General Assembly’s purported goal in including the five material terms in Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1(a) (2013).
After placing settlements reached under section 9-11-67.1 (2013) under the umbrella of unilateral contacts, the court addressed two items that it felt varied from and were not identical to the offer.
First, the court found that the insurer’s actions of including the check for the settlement funds with the acceptance did not meet the terms of the offer requiring payment on the 15th day after acceptance because all that the 2013 version of section 9-11-67.1 required is that the offeror give the insurer at least 10 days from the time of written acceptance. While the claimant argued that specifying the date of payment was absurd, the court was unconcerned by the implications that giving offerors the control to specify that level of precision in their offers raises because “if a party fails to deliver payment in the manner specified in the offer, then that party did not accept the offer.” A concurring opinion further attempted to justify the rejection of the insureds’ absurdity argument, noting with approval the claimant’s argument that payment was required on a specified date in order for the claimant “to comply with the terms of his own health insurance and those of the Medical Benefits Reimbursement Statute.” However, Georgia Code section 33-24-56.1(g) requires only that a claimant provide a benefit provider with “notice of the existence the claim . . . not later than ten days prior to the consummation of any settlement or commencement of any trial. . . .” Further, Georgia Code section 33-24-56.1(g) requires that any such notice “include a request for information regarding the existence of any claim by a benefit provider and an itemization of payments for which the benefit provider seeks reimbursement including the names of payees, the dates of service or payment or both, and the amounts thereof.” Thus, while compliance with Georgia Code section 33-24-56.1(g) appears to be solely a matter of concern for claimants, the court disregarded any concerns about gamesmanship that its holding raised.
Second, the court found that the “void after 180 days” language on the settlement check constituted a counteroffer. The insureds argued that the language was standard for bank checks and consistent with Georgia’s version of the in the Uniform Commercial Code. However, the court rejected the insureds’ argument as overstated, noting that the Uniform Commercial Code does not state that checks are automatically void after 180 days and, instead, states only that a bank is not required to accept a check presented after 180 days. Moreover, the court noted that the insurer could have chosen any number of other means to pay the settlement funds as provided for in section 9-11-67.1(f) (2013), including cash, wire transfer, or electronic funds transfer.
The court’s opinion does not address any of the parties’ other arguments; and, in a footnote, the court noted that it took no position concerning whether the insurer’s counsel’s statement in the acceptance that she was authorized to accept the offer and the missing comma from the settlement check “invalidated the acceptance.” Nonetheless, the court’s holding concerning the arguments it resolved raises significant questions as to what remaining benefits the 2013 version of section 9-11-67.1 provides, especially given the Georgia General Assembly’s intent to reduce bad-faith claims and reduce procedural disputes concerning settlements and Georgia’s public policy favoring settlement. Pierce appears not to recognize or honor either and provides to claimants advantages that the 2013 version of section 9-11-67.1 was not meant to provide.
On July 18, 2023, the insured filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Georgia Supreme Court. However, on January 9, 2024, the Georgia Supreme Court denied the petition, leaving the Court of Appeals’ decision as the final word on the issue, which features prominently in the American Tort Reform Foundation’s “judicial hellhole” ranking for Georgia.
Thirty-five days later, on February 13, 2024, the Georgia Court of Appeals reached a similar decision in Patrick v. Kingston, involving the same three-judge panel and the same attorneys for the claimants as in Pierce. As in Pierce, the claimant in Patrick sent a detailed pre-suit demand letter to the insurer purportedly pursuant to the 2013 version of section 9-11-67.1, which included this statement:
In addition to the requirements for the release, neither the settlement payment nor any other document sent by Progressive can include any terms, conditions, descriptions, or representations that are not permitted in the release. If Progressive sends any document (e.g., the written acceptance, the release, the settlement check, etc.) that includes any terms, conditions, descriptions, or representations that are not permitted in the release, it will be a counteroffer and rejection of this offer. . . .
As in Pierce, the insurer accepted the offer and provided a draft release and check made payable to the parties specified in the demand that stated it was “VOID IF NOT PRESENTED WITHIN 90 DAYS[.]” However, the claimants rejected the insurer’s acceptance, citing (similar to the claimant in Pierce) purported variances between the offer and acceptance. As in Pierce, the claimants then filed suit, and the insured filed a motion to enforce settlement, which the trial court granted. The only issue addressed by the Georgia Court of Appeals was the voiding language at issue in Pierce, and the parties and the court’s discussion were almost identical to those in Pierce with identical results based on Pierce. Thus, the die has been cast with regard to the fate of the 2013 version of section 9-11-67.1. While it may establish some minimum standards for demand letters, it does precious little to simplify the settlement process or prevent the type of gamesmanship that it was intended to deter.
The fate of the 2021 version of Georgia Code § 9-11-67.1 may be no better. One hundred days after Patrick, the Georgia Court of Appeals decided Redfearn v. Moore, under the 2021 version of section 9-11-67.1. Notably, Redfearn involved the same attorneys arguing on behalf of the claimants as in Pierce and Patrick and one of the same judges from the three-judge panel that decided Pierce and Patrick. Despite the changes to the 2021 version of section 9-11-67.1, the situation presented and results were similar to those in Pierce and Patrick. As in Pierce and Patrick, the demand letter from the claimants contained a large number of specific terms and conditions, requiring acceptance within 31 days of the insurer’s receipt of the demand and payment 41 days after the insurer’s receipt of the demand. Among other terms and conditions, the demand stated as follows:
As an act necessary to accept this Offer, State Farm must draft and deliver a limited release that complies with the requirements of this Offer exactly as they are specified, required, and stated in this Offer, and any variance between the language of the limited release and the requirements of this Offer exactly as they are specified, required, and stated in this Offer, even if minor or accidental, will constitute a rejection of this Offer.
Further, the demand stated, “It will be a rejection of this Offer if the settlement payment or any other document sent by State Farm includes any terms, conditions, descriptions, expirations, or restrictions that are not expressly permitted in this Offer.”
The insurer communicated its acceptance within days, enclosing with the acceptance a proposed release and settlement check. Thereafter, the claimants returned the settlement check and filed suit, taking the position that the insurer’s acceptance did not meet the terms of the demand. The insured then filed a motion to enforce settlement, which the claimants opposed on the grounds that the insurer had rejected the demand “by (1) requiring the payment to be endorsed by all payees; (2) omitting commas in the payees’ names on the payment; (3) including the claim number, named insured, and date of the loss on the payment; (4) sending payment eight days after the offer was received; and (5) failing to deliver a release identical in language to the offer.” The trial court denied the motion to enforce settlement, and the insured successfully petitioned the Georgia Court of Appeals for an interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the 2021 version of section 9-11-67.1 “was intended to address the unfair tactics advanced by plaintiffs in pre-suit offers” and that once there was agreement as “to the five statutory material terms set forth in subsection (a), a binding settlement agreement was created irrespective of whether he agreed with the additional non-statutory terms.” While the Georgia Court of Appeals recognized that section 9-11-67.1 was amended in 2021, the court nonetheless returned to the underlying logic of Pierce and Patrick, noting that even the 2021 version of section 9-11-67.1 “does not change the general law regarding contract formation and settlement formation specifically.” Thus, as in Pierce and Patrick, the court rejected the insured’s argument that agreement only as to the material terms was necessary to form a contract; instead, the court relied on the unilateral contract view of settlements, requiring identical acceptance and unvaried compliance with the terms of the offer.
Despite the litany of issues identified by the claimants in the insurer’s acceptance, the court focused on a single issue—the endorsement language on the settlement check. Specifically, the settlement check stated on the back that it “MUST BE ENDORSED BY ALL PAYEES.” The claimants argued that the demand did not permit and specifically prohibited such language because the claimants lived in Indiana, which would require the check to “embark on a multi-state journey” in order to be endorsed. In response, the insured, similar to the claimant in Pierce, argued that the settlement check’s endorsement language was consistent with Georgia law concerning negotiable instruments, which should have illustrated the irrelevancy of the claimants’ argument. Further, the claimants gave their attorneys the authority to endorse on their behalf any check received due to the case, which would appear to make the objection to the endorsement all the more pointless and irrelevant. However, rather than recognizing the practical and legal effect of that law and the claimants’ grant of authority to their attorneys (i.e., the check could be endorsed by all payees through the authority granted to the claimants’ attorneys), the court viewed the extension of authority as further grounds for finding that the endorsement language on the settlement check constituted a rejection of the offer. Further, as in Pierce and Patrick, the court noted that its result was the insurer’s fault, despite concerns about gamesmanship, because the insurer could have chosen one of the other methods of payment listed in the 2021 version of section 9-11-67.1(f).
Ultimately, the Redfearn court’s discussion of section 9-11-67.1 serves only to confirm the position of Georgia’s appellate courts on the importance of the two prior versions of section 9-11-67—they matter very little. Indeed, beyond establishing the five items that must be included in an offer, the time ranges for acceptance and payment, and the methods of payment other than check, Woodard, Pierce, Patrick, and Redfearn all show that Georgia’s appellate courts place more stock in a pedantic view of contract law than they do in applying a statute that was intended to facilitate settlement in a manner that is consistent with the public policy of a state that encourage settlements.
The 2024 version of the statute, it is to be hoped, should unravel the pedantic mess of unilateral contract theory created by Woodard, Pierce, Patrick, and Redfearn. First and foremost, the 2024 version of section 9-11-67.1(a) specifies that “[a]ny offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from a motor vehicle collision shall be an offer to enter into a bilateral contract.” On this basis alone, it appears that for all settlement offers involving motor vehicle collisions in Georgia following April 22, 2024, Woodard, Pierce, Patrick, and Redfearn are irrelevant. Further, the 2024 version of section 9-11-67.1 states that the “only materials terms” of an offer are (A) the date by which it must be accepted, which cannot be less than 30 days from receipt; (B) the amount of monetary payment; (C) the party or parties to be released; (D) whether the release will be full or limited and what the claimant or claimants will provide to the releasees; (E) the claims to be released; (F) the date by which payment shall be delivered, which cannot be less than 40 days from receipt; and (G) if requested, a statement under oath from the insurer concerning the disclosure of insurance that provides or may provide coverage for the subject claim. Any terms beyond those seven “shall be construed as an immaterial term,” but parties will have the option to mutually agree to immaterial terms in writing, except any variance in any “immaterial term shall not subject the recipient to a civil action arising from an alleged failure by the recipient to accept an offer to settle such tort claim if [the] recipient otherwise complies with [Georgia Code section 9-11-67.1(i)].” Thus, the 2024 version of section 9-11-67.1 provides protection from common-law failure to settle claims if an insurer attempts to accept an offer in writing in a timely fashion, provides any requested statement under oath concerning available coverage, and either pays the amount demanded or the applicable limits.
These changes in the 2024 version of section 9-11-67.1 go far to addressing the questions raised over 32 years ago in the wake of Holt. Arguably, the changes should not have been necessary given the apparent understanding of the purpose behind the 2013 and 2021 versions of section 9-11-67.1. However, it remains to be seen what, if any, challenges the plaintiff’s personal injury bar may raise in response to the 2024 version of section 9-11-67.1. Regardless, it should be expected that Georgia’s appellate courts will take as narrow an interpretation of the 2024 version of section 9-11-67.1 as possible because they will likely view it as a statute in derogation of common law. Even so, the 2024 version of the statute appears to provide the level of specificity necessary to avoid the results reached in Pierce, Patrick, and Redfearn. That said, it should be noted that the question of whether the insurers’ actions in Pierce, Patrick, and Redfearn actually created liability for a common-law failure to settle claims under Holt remains to be seen, and a decision holding that the insurers’ unsuccessful attempts to settle were not in “bad faith” could eventually show that, while likely costly and time-consuming to resolve, the Georgia Court of Appeals’ decisions do not serve to create or expand extracontractual liability. However, it is likely that the damage such potential liability presents has already been done, as auto insurance rates continue to rise in Georgia. Hopefully, the 2024 version of section 9-11-67.1 will reduce the cost of settlements and litigation in Georgia and, by extension, reduce rate pressures on a consuming public that fails to realize that personal injury recovery and insurance premiums are a zero-sum game. Whether such changes will result in a lowering of Georgia’s “judicial hellhole” ranking remains to be seen.
