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Pennsylvania Supreme Court Clears Path for Terminated At-Will Employees to Bring Tortious Interference Claims

Brian A Hill and Alexandra Prime

Summary

  • The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Salsberg potentially opens the door for a significant expansion in litigation using the intentional interference tort. There will likely be an increase in the number of plaintiffs asserting tortious interference against any employees involved in their termination. 
  • These claims are now significantly more likely to make it past the motion to dismiss phase and be dismissed only after discovery demonstrates whether the employees involved in the termination were acting within the scope of their employment. Someone who, without authority, has a hand in getting an at-will employee fired can now be sued much more easily, even if the employment is at-will. 
  • Practitioners in this arena in all jurisdictions should be aware of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling as it may signal what’s to come in other states.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Clears Path for Terminated At-Will Employees to Bring Tortious Interference Claims
Suriyapong Thongsawang via Getty Images

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently opened the door for terminated at-will employees to bring suits against their former coworkers, managers, and colleagues for tortious interference with a contractual relationship. Salsberg v. Mann, 310 A.3d 104 (Pa. 2024). Counsel for employers and former employees should now plan for terminated employees to bring tortious interference claims when counseling clients following bad breakups.

Cara Salsberg worked as an accountant at Drexel University under the supervision of Donna Mann for several years before Salsberg was terminated due to unsatisfactory performance based on Mann’s recommendation. Salsberg sued Mann for intentional interference with Salsberg’s contractual relationship with Drexel, alleging that Mann manufactured performance issues as a pretext for causing Salsberg’s firing in retaliation for Salsberg meeting with Mann’s supervisor regarding concerns about Mann’s behavior. The trial court granted Mann’s motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Salsberg’s claims based on alleged tortious interference.

The Superior Court—Pennsylvania’s intermediate court—affirmed the trial court’s dismissal in a divided, en banc opinion, holding that an intentional interference claim is cognizable in Pennsylvania only for prospective employment, not a presently existing at-will employment relationship like Salsberg’s. According to the Superior Court, while prospective contractual relationships afford less than a contractual right, a claim for interference with a prospective contractual relationship requires merely a showing of a probability of a future contractual relationship. On the other hand, at-will employment provides only a “mere hope” that the employment relationship will continue. Thus, the Superior Court held, because Salsberg had an at-will employment contract, she did not have any reasonable expectation of continued employment.

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review and concluded that allowing a claim for intentional interference with an existing at-will employment contract or relationship against a third party is not only consistent with tort and Pennsylvania law but also serves the interests of justice. The Supreme Court reasoned that at-will employment, though generally characterized by the parties’ ability to terminate the employment relationship at any time, still confers a protectable interest even if not a contractual right. According to the Supreme Court, creating a distinction between the probability of a future contractual relationship, which is a protectable interest, and claims where there is only a mere hope of a continued at-will employment relationship ignores the expectation interest a party has in continued at-will employment absent unlawful interference by a third party.

Notwithstanding its recognition of a claim for tortious interference with an existing at-will employment relationship by a third party, the Supreme Court went on to find that because Mann was an agent of Drexel, and since a party cannot interfere with its own contract, Salsberg could not sue Mann unless the alleged misconduct fell outside the scope of Mann’s authority. Thus, the Court held that because Mann was not acting outside the scope of her employment, she would not be considered a third party for purposes of Salsberg’s intentional interference claim.

What’s notable about the Supreme Court’s decision is its focus on the relevance of an employee’s at-will status. The Court’s opinion turns on the lack of a distinction between the probability of a future contractual relationship and the “mere hope” of a continued at-will relationship—the former has long allowed for a cognizable claim for intentional interference while the latter has not. Interestingly, the Court also notes that the weight of authority in other jurisdictions appears to align with its holding based on similar reasoning. As support, the Supreme Court looked at cases from Indiana, Wisconsin, Arizona, Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon, and Tennessee, which all stated that at-will employees have a protectable interest in their continued employment.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Salsberg potentially opens the door for a significant expansion in litigation using the intentional interference tort. There will likely be an increase in the number of plaintiffs asserting tortious interference against any employees involved in their termination. These claims are now significantly more likely to make it past the motion to dismiss phase and be dismissed only after discovery demonstrates whether the employees involved in the termination were acting within the scope of their employment. Someone who, without authority, has a hand in getting an at-will employee fired can now be sued much more easily, even if the employment is at-will. Practitioners in this arena in all jurisdictions should be aware of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling as it may signal what’s to come in other states.

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