The Arctic: Shrinking Ice, Growing Importance

With greater access to resources and more efficient transit routes, the Arctic will be a new arena for strategic competition. Both Russia and China have made efforts to increase their influence in the region and this trend will continue. See Shaheer Ahmad & Mohammad Ali Zafar, Russia’s Reimagined Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (Mar. 9, 2022); Alessa, 1-3, 10-11, 24, supra; David Auerswald, A U.S. Security Strategy for the Arctic, War on The Rocks, May 27, 2021; Brewer, supra; U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 1, 7, supra; U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 1-2, 5-6, 7, 10-12, supra. The United States has interpreted significant Russian military investments in the Arctic as a “multilayered militarization” of the region and indicated that Russia has “increase[d] the potential for competition and conflict.” U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 7, 9, supra.

The strategic importance of the Arctic will undoubtedly grow over the next ten years as polar ice continues to recede and technological advancements in shipping allow easier access. The attractions of the region are too much for the nations of the world to ignore: quicker, cheaper transits for commercial transportation, greater ability to access oil and other mineral resources, and increased access to fish stocks. As commercial transportation gains more efficiency and speed utilizing the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage, military forces will similarly take advantage of easier movement through the Arctic into Europe, Asia, and North America. Indeed, Russia has recently demonstrated the capability to project forces from the Arctic into the North Atlantic and Pacific. See Brewer, supra; Vladimir Isachenkov, Russian Nuclear Submarine Test-fires 4 Missiles, Associated Press, Dec. 12, 2020; Hearing on Coast Guard Arctic Operations Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 116th Cong. 2 (Dec. 8, 2020) (testimony of Adm. Charles W. Ray, Coast Guard Vice Commandant).

The United States and partner nations will seek to improve presence, coordination, and domain awareness in the Arctic. Auerswald, supra; Brewer, supra; Megan Eckstein, New Arctic Strategy Calls for Regular Presence as a Way to Compete With Russia, China, U.S. Naval Institute, Jan. 5, 2021; U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 18-19, supra; U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 19-20, 23, supra. Improving communications and domain awareness is a challenge the United States shares with its allies, and its Arctic partners should be incorporated into those efforts. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 19-20, 23, supra; U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, Arctic Strategy 8, 11-12 (Jul. 21, 2020).

Russia has also attempted to establish new norms in the Arctic through its claims to the Outer Continental Shelf and its management of the Northern Sea Route. See Andrea Kendall-Taylor et al., Navigating Relations with Russia in the Arctic: A Roadmap for Stability, Center for a New American Security, Nov. 18, 2021; Auerswald, supra; Burgess, 61-62, supra. One of the most significant issues over the next ten years is how Russia will participate in developing legal frameworks and governance in the region. Russia has invested significantly more in the Arctic than any other state, which is unsurprising given Russia has more Arctic territory than any other state, and a large portion of its economic independence depends on its Arctic territory. Brewer, supra; U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 7-9, supra. Russia owns approximately 53% of the Arctic coastline. Brewer, supra. Predictably, Russia’s 2020 Arctic Strategy identifies the Arctic as a key component to its national security and articulates a national strategy for the region. Ekaterina Klimenko, Russia’s New Arctic Policy Document Signals Continuity Rather Than Change, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Apr. 6, 2020. Moreover, Russia’s Military Doctrine states that “ensuring the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” is one of the primary missions of the military. Russian Federation, Военная доктрина Российской Федерации (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), para. 32(s), Dec. 25, 2014. This links the military directly to securing the Russian Arctic, a region that is considered vital to Russia’s national security strategy.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has significantly disrupted the geopolitical environment. It is unclear how the Arctic will be impacted as established international norms and governance are being challenged. In theory, the Arctic could be one area where Russia, China, and the United States find opportunities for communication and dialogue over shared interests, despite tensions elsewhere. The Arctic presents a unique opportunity for constructive dialogue and cooperation between Russia, the United States, and the other Arctic nations. Russia seeks to establish the Northern Sea Route as a globally recognized transportation corridor that significantly reduces the distance, travel time, and fuel costs between European and Asian markets, thereby allowing goods to be transported faster and cheaper. Ahmad and Zafar, supra; James Kraska, International Security and International Law in the Northwest Passage, 42 Vanderbilt J. of Transnational L. 1109, 1124 (2021). Moreover, Russia’s economic viability and energy independence hinges on the Arctic because 75% of its oil reserves and 95% of its natural gas reserves are in the region. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 10, supra. To serve its own interests, Russia could choose a more collaborative approach to establishing or reinforcing norms for maritime law in the Arctic. Ahmad and Zafar, supra. However, the Arctic is more likely to turn into another theater of strategic competition with increasing risk of conflict as Russia and China aggressively challenge established international norms. Given the recent disruptions to diplomatic efforts with Russia across a range of issues, and China’s apparent diplomatic alignment with Russia, and with no apparent near-term end to the conflict in Ukraine, it seems prospects for international cooperation in the Arctic are beyond the horizon. Zachary Basu, China Lays Out 5-point Position on Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, Axios, Feb. 25, 2022.

A change that can be expected within the next ten years is further development of the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage as viable trade routes. Ahmad and Zafar, supra. As a consequence, there will be a growing need for clarification on how Article 234 interacts with the general framework of UNCLOS and impacts various issues, such as the ability of coastal states to implement reporting and escort requirements for vessels that transit through their territorial seas, contiguous zones, and Exclusive Economic Zones. For example, the United States officially regards Russian and Canadian management of the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage as improper because they are contrary to U.S. interpretation of how Article 234 should be applied. However, both Russia and Canada take the position that they have designed regulatory frameworks based on governing international law, or at least their interpretations of it. See Burgess, 61, supra; Stanley P. Fields, Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Overlooked Linchpin for Achieving Safety and Security in the U.S. Arctic, 7 Harvard National Security J. 80-86 (2016), but see Ahmad and Zafar, supra. It is incumbent on the United States as the world’s dominant naval power and an Arctic coastal state to assess its own position on Article 234 and adopt a clear policy position on the article’s application in the larger context of UNCLOS, particularly regarding international straits and transit passage. See U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 1-2, supra; Fields, 59-61, 81-93, supra; Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation, Can.-U.S., Jan. 11, 1988, E101701-CTS No. 1988/29. As maritime activity in and the strategic value of the Arctic increases, there will be an increasing need for clarity and consensus on coastal state rights pursuant to Article 234 in particular and international agreements in general.

Another possible development is progress on an international fisheries agreement to regulate commercial fishing in the Arctic. See Victoria Herrmann, Preparing for an Arctic on the Move: Developing Integrated, International Partnerships for the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Oct. 25, 2021; Burgess, 64, supra. The growing global population and rising demand for protein food resources have already sent fishing fleets throughout the world in search of new fishery resources. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, et al., How China Targets the Global Fish Supply, N.Y. Times, Sep. 26, 2022. Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) fishing has proliferated globally and there is growing concern about ensuring sustainable fisheries in the face of mounting IUU. U.S. Dep’t of State, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing.

With regard to international law, UNCLOS still provides the foundational legal framework for the Arctic, but there remains disagreement in the international community about how specific articles of the convention interact in the unique context of ice-covered waters in the Arctic. Burgess, 59, 61, supra. The world’s largest volume of resources under competing and contested claims are in the Arctic. Burgess, 62, supra. Nonetheless, the basic framework of UNCLOS, together with the Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organization, present proven and effective methods for developing international frameworks. Kendall-Taylor, supra; Kraska, 1129-30, supra.

As an Arctic nation and global power, the United States has vital interests in the Arctic that bear directly on U.S. national security and economic prosperity. Ahmad and Zafar, supra; Burgess, 64, supra. Historically, the Arctic has not been a key geographic focus of U.S. national security policy. It should be. The United States should set clear objectives and prioritize diplomatic, economic, and military activities essential to maintaining its sovereignty, and promoting Arctic maritime governance that reinforce established international norms that have proven essential to global stability and security.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent the official position of the Commandant, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, or the Department of Defense.

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