When judicial recusal should occur is a perilous topic to discuss these days; in fact, to describe it as perilous may even be an understatement given recent public attention on this topic. As judges, most of us will become quite anxious if we are hearing a case where our impartiality could be questioned. What should we consider when this issue presents itself?
As a starting point, we can consider the ethical concept that underpins the issue of recusal or disqualification (while recusal is a judge’s sua sponte withdrawal from a case and disqualification is removal based on a party’s motion or required by statute, both terms are often used interchangeably). A judge’s ethical duty to recuse arises from the duty to act impartially, which is based in our understanding of procedural due process as a constitutional principle. The duty to recuse originally developed as part of our common law jurisprudence brought from England, although, under the common law, the duty to recuse was limited to instances where a judge had a pecuniary interest in a case. However, in 1927, the United States Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510, departed from that narrow common law focus and began an expansion of the duty to recuse under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment that more broadly considered a judge’s duty to be neutral when deciding a matter. The Supreme Court continued its expansion almost 30 years later by stating that due process required more from an impartial tribunal than avoiding “actual bias,” but that “‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. [Citation.]’” (In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136, italics added.) After Murchison, the Supreme Court further elaborated that due process requires a judge to recuse when, based on “objective and reasonable perceptions,” actual bias has not been proven but nonetheless a “serious risk” of it is present. (Caperton v. A.T. Massey (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 884.)