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December 30, 2024

Ethics Column: When to Recuse or Disclose?

Hon. W. Kearse McGill

When judicial recusal should occur is a perilous topic to discuss these days; in fact, to describe it as perilous may even be an understatement given recent public attention on this topic.  As judges, most of us will become quite anxious if we are hearing a case where our impartiality could be questioned.  What should we consider when this issue presents itself?

As a starting point, we can consider the ethical concept that underpins the issue of recusal or disqualification (while recusal is a judge’s sua sponte withdrawal from a case and disqualification is removal based on a party’s motion or required by statute, both terms are often used interchangeably).  A judge’s ethical duty to recuse arises from the duty to act impartially, which is based in our understanding of procedural due process as a constitutional principle.  The duty to recuse originally developed as part of our common law jurisprudence brought from England, although, under the common law, the duty to recuse was limited to instances where a judge had a pecuniary interest in a case.  However, in 1927, the United States Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510, departed from that narrow common law focus and began an expansion of the duty to recuse under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment that more broadly considered a judge’s duty to be neutral when deciding a matter.  The Supreme Court continued its expansion almost 30 years later by stating that due process required more from an impartial tribunal than avoiding “actual bias,” but that “‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.  [Citation.]’”  (In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136, italics added.) After Murchison, the Supreme Court further elaborated that due process requires a judge to recuse when, based on “objective and reasonable perceptions,” actual bias has not been proven but nonetheless a “serious risk” of it is present. (Caperton v. A.T. Massey (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 884.)

When considering recusal or disqualification in a particular matter, a judge should also look to his or her own jurisdiction for specific rules and case law.  Most jurisdictions have adopted in part or completely the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct and, for this discussion, we can consider rule 2.11, which sets out a number of particular circumstances that should be examined, but generally states, “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned….”  Further, while not part of the rule itself, comment 2 advises, “A judge’s obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed.”  This comment buttresses the idea that a judge’s ethical duty to self-examine and consider recusal always applies, even where no motion to disqualify has been filed.  Nonetheless, the core problem that exists with recusal is that, beyond certain “bright-line” disqualifying rules (such as financial or campaign interests, family relationships, or prior legal work as an attorney), a judge has wide discretion to decide if recusal is needed, and any ethical sanction for failing to recuse where a clearly disqualifying rule does not apply appears rare.  This discretion can often lead to cognitive errors or illusions that allow potential bias and partiality issues to be ignored or unconsciously overlooked by a judge, a point that is well-documented by academics who specialize in judicial psychology.  On the other hand, even where a judge may be inclined to recuse, such discretion may be hampered by counter pressures, such as the ethical duty to hear and decide cases that have been assigned (see rule 2.7) or even influences from supervising judges to not recuse and avoid administrative burdens on moving a case from one judge to another.  In many ways, a judge’s thoughts to recuse or not recuse can present a true dilemma.

Is there a third way?  Given particular factual circumstances, a judge may well conclude that disclosure in lieu of recusal is a better approach.  Disclose is defined more broadly than the duty to recuse and is reflected in the wording of comment 5 to rule 2.11: “A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification.”  The focus in comment 5 is on what the parties or their lawyers could reasonably consider relevant instead of only the judge, who makes a recusal decision in private.  Therefore, disclosure can enhance the goal of impartiality, as well as promote transparency, by giving the parties the opportunity to seek disqualification based on the disclosed information, seek additional information from the judge, waive disqualification, or appeal a judge’s decision to not disqualify.  As stated in the California Judicial Conduct Handbook (4th edition), at page 495, disclosure “serves the important role of reaffirming the integrity and impartiality of the judicial institution.  It provides the parties with the reassurance the judge has examined whether or not certain factors in regard to the case require recusal, that the judge has determined that recusal is not required, and that, in spite of that determination, the judge believes the parties and their counsel should be made aware of those factors.”

Ultimately, a judge’s decision to recuse or disclose is a lonely one.  However, by always keeping the idea at the forefront that a judge’s goal is to decide any matter impartially, the best decision will always be made.

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