I. Afghanistan
A. Girls’ Access to Education
1. Codified Developments
On December 22, 2022, Taliban-controlled Afghanistan suspended university education of all women. Two days later, the Taliban banned all forms of women’s education beyond grade seven, stating the need to fully segregate girls and boys under their interpretations of Sharia Law. In late January 2023, Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban’s Deputy Minister of Culture and Information, shared the Taliban’s plan to open classrooms for all girls and women in the Hijri Shamsi Calendar New Year, the March 21, 2023. “Primary and secondary schools in cold climate provinces reopened” with the New Year, with “those in hot climate provinces having already reopened earlier in the year.” However, “girls’ secondary schools across the country remained closed.” “A letter from the de facto Ministry of Education” “circulated widely on social media” stated “that “for now [only] girls’ schools . . . from grade one to six” would be reopened,” continuing its mark on Afghanistan as the only state with restrictions against female education.
On May 3, 2023, the de facto Ministry of Public Health of Afghanistan announced that only male medical students would be allowed to take the Exit Supplementary Exam, a requirement for pursuing further specialized medical studies. Subsequently, in July 2023, the de facto Ministry of Higher Education of Afghanistan announced that only male students would receive permission to take the Kankor (university entrance examinations), with the upcoming sessions scheduled in late July.
On August 23, 2023, at Kabul International Airport, de facto police prevented a group of female students from traveling to Dubai to pursue higher education, even though the female students had been accepted to a program funded by a UAE businessman because they were not all accompanied by male guardians (mahrams). According to reports, at least some of the women were subsequently able to travel to Dubai.
2. Resistance
In pre-Taliban Afghanistan, women were the majority of educators. From the late 2022 through early 2023, there has been a systemic ban on women in unsegregated workplaces and most teaching positions have been filled with Taliban members, and curricula now reflect the Taliban’s beliefs of terrorism, misogyny, and other forms of violence. However, news coming from the region reflects an undying resistance of women and girls to continue education, creating secret schools and placing their lives and well-being at risk for their futures. Relatedly, Matiullah Wesa, a prominent Afghan campaigner for female education was arrested by the Taliban for his opposition.
3. Related Occurrences: the Treatment of Women
a. United Nations Shut Down
On April 5, 2023, the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan informed the United Nations that, effectively immediately, no Afghan woman was permitted to work for the UN in Afghanistan. “This decision extended a previous directive announced on December 24, 2022, banning Afghan women from working for national and international non-governmental organizations.” Several UN national female personnel [had] experienced restrictions on their movements, including harassment, intimidation, and detention.” As a result, all UN Afghan Staff were instructed not to report to the office until at least May 5, 2023, and subsequently, all have worked from home.
b. Freedom of Movement:
On April 19 and 20, the de facto Department of Hajj and Religious Affairs of Baghlan and Takhar provinces issued letters prohibiting women from gathering during Eid al-Fitr.
The Taliban began enforcing a ban on women’s beauty salons on June 25, giving business owners a deadline of July 25th to close their doors. On July 19th, a group of around twenty-five beauty salon owners and employees gathered in Kabul to protest the ban peacefully. Taliban security forces forcefully dispersed the protest with water cannons and warning shots fired into the air; four female protesters were arrested and released later the same day.
On August 26, 2023, the Taliban Minister of the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in Bamyan province banned women from visiting Band-e-Amir National Park for failing to comply with the hijab order, as women had continued to visit the park despite a previous ban on women using parks, gyms, and public baths nationwide.
In early September 2023, Taliban Department of Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice officials in Khost and Zabul provinces announced via loudspeaker that women are forbidden from going to local markets or shops without a mahram.
B. Media Freedom
Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, the press and media are continually threatened and subject to limitations. Journalists are frequent targets of the de facto government, with raids and death threats. Publication counts dropped from nearly 100 to eleven following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. Afghanistan was ranked 156/180 countries in the 2022 World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders (RSF). Afghanistan received an eight out of ten score in freedom and scored one out of four in free media. Journalists and their families face further economical and psychological pressures. Journalists face interrogations, seizures of equipment, and torture. The Taliban published ambiguous directives regulating media coverage, banning topics controversial to their enforcements of religious restrictions and negative coverage of national figures, allowing arbitrary and broad monitoring and enforcement.
In February 2023, the Taliban banned several broadcasters, including Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Radio Azadi. Furthermore, Taliban armed forces raided the private broadcaster Tamadon TV and attacked the staff present without cause. Consequently, several broadcasters, including the Afghanistan Journalists Center, relocated abroad. At the end of February, media staff were prohibited from photographing and recording meetings in Helmand by de facto governors; this ban was subsequently lifted on March 3rd.
In March, the Taliban published new guidelines controlling YouTube channels, requiring a license to operate and implementing taxation every three years. Journalists were arrested in Baghlan because of their criticism of de facto authorities and were later released within a day. But journalist Mortaza Behboudi was arrested on January 7, 2023 and released after 284 days of imprisonment, which was on October 18, 2023.
Juxtaposed to these actions, the de facto government organized events highlighting World Press Freedom Day, recognized on the May 3rd, to show a commitment to protect the rights of media. But the arrests of journalists continued throughout May. At the end of the month, the Taliban established several committees to monitor media activities, leaving unpublicized the responsibilities of the committees. A secret UNAMA investigation revealed a lack of independence in private radio stations.
Specifically, the Taliban implemented the following restrictions for media broadcasters:
A prohibition on broadcasting music;
Segregation of male and female broadcasters;
A prohibition on women calling into radio programs, except for programs concerning medical or religious issues of women, which women are allowed to phone in to ask questions;
A requirement for female employees to comply with the niqab policy and be accompanied by male guardians to enter the workplace;
A prohibition on broadcasting programs and opinions considered contrary to national interests or critical of the Taliban;
A requirement for YouTube contributors to be licensed; and
A requirement to use the term “Islamic Emirates” to refer to the Taliban.
The Taliban began issuing journalism ID cards on July 25th, and identified journalists are increasingly arrested according to reports.
Recently, the Taliban raided the Hamesha Bahar Radio and TV network in Jalalabad, citing mixed-gender journalism training as the cause. The Taliban police forced two other radio stations located in the same compound to close for alleged associations with Hamisha Bahar.
The Commission on Media Violations held a meeting on August 12th concerning the importance of transparency with the conditions of arrested journalists and the need for clear and effective enforcement mechanisms. These meetings have provided insight to freedom of media violations.
In August, the de facto government drafted new directives regulating media and freedom of press, revising approximately thirty percent of Afghanistan’s pre-Talib policies. The draft aims to integrate Taliban interpretations of Sharia Law and requires full transparency and disclosure of media funding, but has been announced to exclude any gender-based restrictions. It is still unknown when and if the Taliban’s supreme leader will approve the draft.
II. Iran
A. Non-adherence To Hijab Requirements
Presently, hijab is compulsory in Iran. But this was not historically the case. The wearing of hijab continues to be a subject of debate, increasingly in the past year with heated debates surrounding women, life, and freedom protests.
1. Legal Basis for Enforcing Hijab
Article 167 of Iran’s Constitution permits judges to rely upon Islamic sources when legal verdicts are absent from codified laws, resulting in massive impacts on anti-compulsory hijab protesters’ arrest and punishment.
Falling under Tazir offenses of the Criminal Code with variable punishments, the hijab is not precisely defined, leaving ambiguity juxtaposed against social norms.
The “Law of Spreading the Culture of Chastity and Hijab” highlights the hijab’s cultural importance and assigns promotion duties. The “Law of Protecting Those Who Command the Good and Forbid the Evil” empowers individuals to enforce the hijab and Islamic values.
The “Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and the Hijab” is the latest by the Iranian Judiciary following 2022 protests, updating the “Law of Spreading the Culture of Chastity and Hijab,” as expanded by the Parliamentary Judiciary Committee, from Articles 15 to 70.
The vote by the Internal Committee occurred following the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran open session with representatives collectively decided the reviewing the contentious “Chastity and Hijab Bill” within the internal commission, removing it from the public discussion arena. This step, guided by Article 85 of Iran’s constitution, transferred the bill’s examination to a dedicated group of representatives. Among the assembly’s 238 representatives, a majority of 175 voted in favor of this decision, with forty-nine in opposition, and five abstaining. The Guardian Council refused the most recent version in October due to inconsistencies in existing law with huge concerns about adoption.
2. Proposed Regulations in the Bill
The proposed bill outlines the responsibilities of public and governmental institutions in enforcing the hijab. It defines the offense of an unacceptable practice of wearing hijab and imposes penalties for failing to adhere to compulsory veiling. These penalties range from fines and imprisonment to travel restrictions, passport confiscation, and the loss of citizenship rights.
The bill’s scope defines the public sphere as encompassing all areas outside of private homes, commercial establishments, corporations, and online virtual platforms. A separate set of regulations govern the manner of dress in private vehicles. Anyone in violation faces punishment. Additionally, institutions are held accountable for the improper attire of employees, forcing the monitoring of hijab compliance both before, during, and after the employment process.
Under the new bill, police and intelligence agencies – including the Ministry of Intelligence, the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Basij, and the Command of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Wrong—receive authority to directly confront women who do not adhere to veiling regulations.
3. Binding Policies Regarding the Hijab
Various institutions, including offices, banks, schools, shopping centers, universities, and private companies must withhold services from those not wearing the hijab. Disciplinary committees within universities must review cases of non-compliance and administer punishments. The governmental Central Bank of Iran prohibits services to individuals not adhering to the hijab requirement. In some provinces, individuals without hijab face access restrictions to hospitals and medical facilities, illustrating the comprehensive state policies and mechanisms to enforce hijab across Iran.
4. Conclusion
Iran’s legal basis for enforcing hijab, including Article 167 of the Constitution Law, has led to the imposition of various punishments for hijab violations. The proposed “Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab” faces controversy and was temporarily withdrawn from public discussion. The bill includes regulations that extend throughout public and private spaces, imposing fines, imprisonment, and other penalties for non-compliance. Binding policies at the local and administrative levels have made the enforcement of compulsory hijab even stricter, affecting various aspects of public life, including education and healthcare. The debate around the enforcement of hijab continues to be a significant issue in Iran, holding potential implications upon individual freedoms and rights.
B. Treatment of Baha’i Faith
1. Legal repercussions on the Baha’i minority community for not following already-constricting laws against assembly, organization, or incorporation
Article 13 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran recognizes only three minority religions: Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Christianity. While the government limits and constrains the religious expression and practices of these three groups, non-recognized groups, most prominently the Baha’i community, have experienced a zero-tolerance policy by the state, instituting a number of measures that deny such religious groups from forming, let alone being formally recognized. Over the course of 2023, the religious minority of Bahai’s have continued to face obstacles in their religious practice, livelihoods, and freedom to participate in Iranian society.
For example, in the first week of November 2023, Iranian security forces were reported to have arrested nineteen adherents of the Baha’i faith, including five elderly women. This behavior followed a pattern of similar behaviors, such as arrests of Baha’i leaders in August, the bulldozing of homes, and unsupported accusations of spying. In 2022, the Tehran Appeals Court supported a local religious court decision to confiscate property and homes from the Baha’i community.
2. Position of the United States Government & Congress
The May 2023 U.S. Department of States Country Reports on Religious Freedom detailed numerous reports of government officials targeting members of the Baha’i community, including reports of Iranian government agents arresting and detaining a Baha’i photographer and accusing a family of “activism in cyberspace” without evidence; the family’s electronic devices were seized toward the end of 2022. The government regularly arrested Baha’is in Shiraz on “unknown charges.”
In February 2023, U.S. Senator Van Hollen introduced Senate Resolution 492 calling to “reverse state-imposed policies denying Baha’is and members of other religious minorities equal opportunities to higher education, earning a livelihood, due process under the law, and the free exercise of religious practices.” The Resolution calls for sanctions and international cooperation to end the Iranian government’s mistreatment of the Baha’i community. As of November 20, 2023, it has yet to pass.
In response to multiple raids of the homes of Baha’i Iranians, confiscation of property, and arbitrary arrests and detention of Baha’is, on September 12th, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a similar resolution, condemning the Iranian government’s systemic attacks on the Baha’i community and other religious minorities. The U.S.Department of Treasury, in a separate action, also sanctioned Iranian government personnel in September 2023, citing, among other reasons, the government’s treatment of religious minorities.
3. Views of the United Nations
The UN report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman, highlights 333 incidents of targeting and attacks against members of the Baha’i faith, with approximately “80 cases of arbitrary detentions, interrogations and unlawful arrests.” Further, the Special Rapporteur notes “destruction of properties, cemetery desecration, as well as denials of education and various forms of economic pressure, including reports of forced closure of Bahaʼi-owned businesses and confiscation of Bahaʼi properties,” akin to “mental and physical torture[.]” For example, authorities have denied “appropriate medical treatment of two former leaders of the Baha’i community, Mahvash Sabet and Fariba Kamalabadi.” The basis of the arrests of members and leaders of the Baha’i community have varied, but the Iranian authorities frequently cite “causing intellectual and ideological insecurity in Muslim society,” a position reflecting the Iranian government’s intolerance of religious minorities outside of the predominant Twelver Shia sect and, at least facially, those minority religions mentioned in the Constitution.
Whether the Iranian government will take any steps to address the concerns outlined in the Special Rapporteur’s report and those reported by independent media and NGOs and other institutions, remains to be seen. A primary issue is the enforcement of obligations on the Iranian government to respect international norms, or at a minimum, to honor obligations under international treaties. For example, the Special Rapporteur aptly noted Iran’s membership as a state party, among others, to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Despite the fact that the Iranian Constitution elucidates several rights supporting the inclusion of religious and ethnic minorities, such as the freedom of association, peaceful assembly, and equality, these ends are undercut by the application of a state ideology giving little deference to religious dicta, leaving aggrieved religious minorities, such as the Baha’is, little room to argue against the constitutionality of the actions of the Iranian government vis-à-vis their rights. Such deference to extra-constitutional interpretations provides the Iranian government the right to suppress and oppose minority groups like the Baha’is. This leaves the question of reform to rest, not simply with the government based on its own interpretation of these apparently positivist constitutional norms, but rather for more robust global and universally accepted obligations under treaties to which Iran is a signatory, supplanted by jus cogens norms.
Questions remain regarding the extent to which attempts of reform have yielded progress in the Iranian government’s record with the treatment of religious minorities, including the Baha’i community. The United Nations General Assembly passed resolution A/77/463/Add. 3 on December 5, 2022, calling on the Iranian government to institute reforms against the targeting of religious minorities like the Baha’is. The Iranian government pushed back on the resolution, accusing the UN of “selective adoption of country-specific mandates,” yet subsequent actions of the government throughout 2023 indicate disregard and, as reports indicate, an increase of targeting religious minorities. This has been the case despite the issuance of subsequent resolutions at the UN. The extent to which the Iranian government is willing to curtail the freedom of religious expression of its religious minorities remains to be seen, but it is clear from its 2023 records that a reform is yet to take place.
4. Recommendations
The Iranian government can still pursue its interests while preserving the rights of religious minorities in the country. Should the government decide—or be compelled—to follow international obligations and norms, it can immediately, without the imposition of any external frameworks, by following already-existing constitutional guarantees to minorities. The question turns on the government’s willingness to pursue this without expecting external recommendations. Given the Iranian government’s attitude, it is challenging to imagine external pressure will yield the sort of reform required for the Iranian government to come to bar with international norms.
III. Nicaragua
A. Treatment of the Catholic Church
1. Nicaragua and the Catholic Church—an overview of the events from 2022 to 2023
The relationship between the Nicaraguan government and the Catholic Church is complicated. Throughout 2023, clergy members reported consistent and permanent surveillance of church services as well as incidents of anti-Catholic motivated assaults. A September 2023 United Nations panel discussed the amplifying tensions in Nicaragua, noting that, in the past six months, it has grown to be substantially worse.
The tension between the government of Nicaragua and the Catholic Church escalated considerably since last March when Pope Francis described President Ortega’s government as a “gross dictatorship.” A few days following the statement, the last Vatican representative in Nicaragua returned to Rome, closing the respective Diplomatic Office.
In February 2023, the Nicaraguan government convicted and sentenced Bishop Alvarez—imprisoned since August 2022 for treason—to twenty-six years in prison for “undermining national integrity,” stripping him of his citizenship. Press reports revealed that many ministers from various regions face prosecution, detainment, and exile for “no clear reasons.” Between 2022 and 2023, around sixty-five religious congregations were expelled from Nicaragua, and others were denied entrance.
In October 2023, the Nicaraguan government flew 222 political prisoners to exile, stripping them of their nationality; twelve priests were transferred to Rome. Monsignor Alvarez, one of the priests presented with the option to return to Rome, rejected the possibility and was locked in Modelo prison. In May, the government launched a financial investigation for alleged money laundering activities carried out by the Church. Church bank accounts were frozen, and officials requested financial documents, impacting congregational activities and capacity to pay for basic needs. Furthermore, the government confiscated Church property.
Publicly disclosed information on the United Nations’ website records public authorities canceling the legal status of over 320 non-profit religious organizations during 2023, affecting radio stations, schools, universities, and other institutions run by religious orders. Over twenty-seven institutions faced takeover due to regulatory breaches. For instance, Central American University—one of the country’s foremost institutions—was deprived of its legal status and liquid bank account, resulting in the confiscation of its facilities. The Jesuit order running the institution shared that they were accused of working as a “center of terrorism.”
Legal analysts deem the events as serious human rights violations, attacking critical thinking bastions where people can exercise their freedom of thinking and expression. The United Nations Human Rights Office (Office of the High Commissioner) expressed grave apprehension, stating “deep[] concern[] about the systematic patterns of harassment against members of the Catholic Church and other religious denominations by Nicaraguan authorities.”
Following the failure of the Nicaraguan government to take adequate measures to address these condemnations of their acts, United Nation Special Rapporteurs on freedom of religion or belief, freedom of opinion or expression, and on human rights defenders, sent an official communication to the head of the state, stating that the freedoms of religion, belief, association, and opinion are consistently violated and that the ongoing events cultivate a systematic attack on Nicaraguan civil society.
The Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights from September 2022 highlights the international community efforts, urging the Nicaraguan government to implement 396 recommendations to strengthen its institutional and legislative framework and form a new basis for democratic values. The government has yet to respond. The United States has imposed several sanctions on Nicaragua in the last year, attempting to stimulate a change in direction in the Central American country, ranging from visa restrictions on governmental authorities to suspensions of new U.S. investment for certain sector imports.
On July 14th, victims of the Nicaraguan government, alongside national and international NGOs submitted a letter against the EU-CELAC Summit requesting the establishment of a “Group of Friends of the Nicaraguan People” to promote cross-regional responses to the human right crisis in Nicaragua.
The Catholic Church is conspicuously experiencing adverse consequences stemming from recent governmental measures in Nicaragua. These measures vis-à-vis the Catholic Church underscore the broader societal context characterized by routine exposure to human rights violations.
IV. Turkey & Ukraine
A. Treatment of the Greek Orthodox Church
The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Turkey and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) face intricate legal, religious, and geopolitical challenges.
1. Legal Identity and Property Control under Turkish Law
Following the government-incited riots against the Greek Orthodox minority in 1955, when the community comprised around 100,000 people, the Church has dwindled to its present-day remnant of 3,000 believers or less. The riots of 1955 were a defining moment in the history of the Greek Orthodox Church in Istanbul. The violence which the Turkish government instigated resulted in the displacement and impoverishment of many Greek Orthodox Christians. The Church has never fully recovered from this event, and its numbers have declined in the years ever since. The Church is imperiled by the prolonged closure of the Halki Theological School, the only institution in Turkey for training Orthodox clergy. This ongoing closure prevents the Greek Orthodox Church in Turkey from training new clergy.
The Turkish authorities have also confiscated many of its historical buildings and churches, converting some into mosques or museums. The two most significant accounts of such seizure are a recent Supreme Court ruling allowing the government to take possession of a historic orphanage on the island of Pringipo and the expropriation of 152 properties of the Balukli Hospital in Istanbul.
The denial of legal status impedes the Patriarchate’s access to the judiciary, hindering its ability to protect interests and engage in legal advocacy. Turkish Law 5253 on Associations poses ambiguities in forming nonprofit associations. Despite the absence of explicit prohibitions against religious organizations obtaining legal identity, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate faces difficulties achieving this status, further restricting access to legal advocacy.
On November 15, 2022, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) declared that Turkey had violated the human rights of the Greek Orthodox Taksiarhis Church when it denied the Church property registration rights. Historically, the Church is a legal foundation under Turkey’s law of the Greek Orthodox Community of Istanbul, making Turkey’s refusal to the Greek Orthodox Church to claim its property rights discrimination, which resulted in a fine of 5,000 euros.
2. Tensions within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church resulting from the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church has a complex history, with branches including the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC) and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). The 2014 events in Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, heightened existing tensions. In January 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted autocephaly to the OCU, resulting in tensions between the former and the Russian Orthodox Church.
While autocephaly is a step towards independence, the lack of recognition from the Russian Orthodox Church resulted in internal conflicts and external pressures that some perceive as aligned with Russian political influence. The Russian invasion in 2022 intensified the crisis, prompting a reconsideration of the relationship between religious and national identity.
Metropolitan Onuphry’s initial indecision on the war caused a division among the UOC clergy. The invasion prompted a reconsideration of the relationship between religious and national identity, leading some to join the OCU. Under pressure, the UOC-MP leadership voted to change the Church’s status, distancing itself from the Russian Orthodox Church. However, resistance persists, emphasizing the importance of “canonicity” and viewing the OCU as non-canonical. The crisis reveals a shift in identity priorities, highlighting national identity and a nuanced relationship between religious and national affiliations.
B. Freedom of Religion
1. Turkey
Overview of USCIRF Report (Released on November 13, 2023):
While violent attacks on Greek Orthodox religious sites have decreased in the last decade, vandalism and destruction of Greek Orthodox religious properties persist.
The highest number of attacks on the Greek Orthodox community was in the Marmara Region, Istanbul, which is associated with the largest concentration of non-Muslim populations.
The seizure of Prince’s Greek Orthodox orphanage in 1964 was cited as an example of property seizure used as a form of retaliation by the Turkish Authorities. Although the Ecumenical Patriarchate regained ownership after sixty years through the European Court of Human Rights, there is significant damage and disrepair due to abandonment and neglect by the Turkish Authorities. The considerable financial burden of repairing and preserving the site lies squarely on the Greek Orthodox community.
Despite the decrease in violent attacks, vandalism incidents persist, with arson and treasure hunting contributing to the destruction of Greek Orthodox religious property. A lack of prosecution for such incidents was noted.
2. Ukraine
Overview of an article published in the Guardian:
The Ukrainian parliament approved a law to ban the Moscow-linked UOC following allegations of collaboration with Russia after the 2022 invasion.
The UOC denies ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and disputes the accusations made by Kyiv, asserting that the draft law would be unconstitutional.
The initial approval of the law occurred in the first reading, with a requirement for a second reading and approval by the president for it to become effective.
The law aims to ban the activities of religious organizations affiliated with centers of influence in Russia conducting armed aggression against Ukraine, subject to termination by a court.
Lawmakers support the bill, considering it a historic step toward removing “Moscow priests from the Ukrainian land.”
The UOC argues that the draft law contradicts the European Convention on Human Rights and Ukraine’s constitution, asserting its independence from the Russian Orthodox Church.
Ukrainian authorities, post-Russia’s invasion, have viewed the UOC as loyal to Moscow, leading to a crackdown on the church. A government commission maintains that the UOC is still canonically linked to Russia despite the church’s claim of cutting ties in May 2022.
Metropolitan Pavlo, the UOC’s second most senior priest, faces accusations of inciting inter-religious hatred and justifying Russian aggression. He denies the charges.
The Ukrainian Security Service reports sixty-eight criminal cases, including treason accusations, initiated against UOC representatives since Russia’s invasion.
Political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko suggests that a ban on the UOC may not halt its activities, and it could be challenged in Ukrainian courts and at the ECtHR. Fesenko also proposed that the church registers as a new entity without referencing canonical ties to Russia.
(Iran) Omar Hajajra; Sanaz S. (Afghanistan); Joy Momin; Melike Alkaya (Turkey); (Nicaragua) Agustín Artucio; Laura Rathmann (Ukraine & Turkey); George Kounoupis; Ian Teh. Co-Editors are Joy Momin and Kelly Blount.
