This article surveys significant legal developments in Canada in 2023. All information in this article is current to November 2023.
While the war in Ukraine and Canada’s response to it remained a significant driver of trade policy in 2023, new issues and challenges emerged.
The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) proposed to radically overhaul its approach to customs valuation and, once again, delayed its marquee customs modernization program. While the pace of new antidumping/countervailing-duty (AD/CVD) proceedings slowed somewhat in 2023, enforcement of existing measures increased with the CBSA making its first-ever “particular market situation” finding and, in what appears to be a policy shift, routinely imposing retroactive antidumping reassessments despite Canada’s self-professed “prospective” normal value system.
On sanctions, while Canada has tried to align its actions with those of its international partners, it has also increasingly signaled a willingness to implement unilateral sanctions measures both with respect to Russia and other jurisdictions. However, Canada continues to be conspicuous in its failure to provide sanctions-related guidance, unnecessarily complicating compliance efforts.
Also this year, Canada joined other jurisdictions in passing modern slavery legislation imposing public self-reporting requirements with respect to risks of forced or child labour in supply chains. Businesses with reporting obligations will be required to file their first reports in May 2024.
Finally, several trade disputes involving Canada came to a head, including ones respecting dairy and vehicles. The longest Canada-U.S. trade dispute in history—that with respect to softwood lumber—also continued largely unabated in 2023. Despite such rifts, Canada continued, albeit slowly, to expand connections in the Indo-Pacific and to conclude a new free trade agreement (FTA) with the United Kingdom (UK). Canada also continued the process of modernizing the existing FTA with Ukraine and concluded negotiations on a foreign investment promotion and protection agreement with Taiwan.
In August 2023, the CBSA again delayed the next implementation phase of its Assessment and Revenue Management (CARM) project (known as “Release 2”). CARM is a multi-year initiative to replace certain existing customs and enforcement systems with a modernized online solution for the accounting, payment, and collection of duties for certain taxes. Release 2 was originally expected in January 2023, then in October 2023, but has now been postponed until at least May 2024. Release 2 will be an important milestone because it will open the online system to all trade community participants, i.e., not just brokers and consultants, and it will permit the submission of electronic commercial accounting declarations, including the ability to make corrections when duties are owing and adjustments when refunds are owed.
In May 2023, the CBSA proposed to amend the Value for Duty Regulations to alter which sale in a series of sales transactions results in the importation of goods into Canada and would therefore be the basis upon which to determine value for duty. The changes would create a type of “last sale” rule for valuing goods. However, the amendments propose to consider any type of agreement, understanding, or arrangement as the last “sale” and not necessarily only a sale or an agreement to sell. The changes will undoubtedly result in an increase in the value for duty of imported goods and therefore the amount of customs duty and tax. While these changes are described by the CBSA as simply seeking to “level the playing field” between Canadian and Non-Resident Importers—the latter of whom, the CBSA asserts, can unfairly declare their lower acquisition costs—the changes would, in fact, affect any importer that resells goods in Canada. The proposal would radically depart from existing law and practice in Canada and is arguably offside Canada’s obligations under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Customs Valuation Agreement. The CBSA received near-universal opposition to these changes during its conspicuously short consultation process and will likely face continued pushback in 2024.
The CBSA initiated only one new AD/CVD investigation (with respect to wind towers from China); five country-wide re-investigations (respecting corrosion-resistant steel sheet, copper pipe fittings, line pipe, heavy plate, and fasteners); and nine expiry reviews. The CBSA also initiated eleven normal value and export price reviews.
The CBSA made its first-ever “particular market situation” finding in a re-investigation of rebar from Turkey. In that case, the CBSA determined that the Turkish rebar market did not permit a proper comparison with sales of rebar to importers in Canada because of alleged distortions in the Turkish market caused by large volumes of low-priced Russian steel billet (available in part because of economic sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine) and the effects of Turkey’s hyperinflation. The practical result of this finding was significantly higher normal values for Turkish rebar exporters.
While the pace of AD/CVD new investigations and reviews slowed somewhat in 2023, the CBSA’s enforcement of existing orders increased. Notably, the CBSA has begun making routine retroactive reassessments of anti-dumping duties against Canadian importers. This is a marked departure from Canada’s “prospective” normal value system, and nearly all of these decisions are under appeal, either before the CBSA or the Canadian Federal Courts.
Finally, several judicial reviews of both CBSA and Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) decisions, including some lingering from pandemic-induced court slowdowns, were finally concluded. Notably, in Canadian Hardwood Plywood and Veneer Association v. Canada (Attorney General), the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) upheld the CITT’s no injury and no threat of injury determinations. In doing so, the FCA somewhat narrowed the scope for an injury or threat of injury determination. Respecting the former, the court upheld the CITT’s decision that injury must crystallize during the period of inquiry. That is, allegations of injury arising from a period before the one under review by the CITT could not justify an injury finding. Respecting threat of injury, the FCA upheld the CITT’s decision that to make a threat finding there must be a “change in circumstances” from those that existed during the CITT’s period of review where it found no injury. Lastly, the FCA confirmed the CITT’s findings that even if there is only one single class of goods, not all the goods in that class necessarily compete, and the lack of competition may break the alleged causal link between the dumped goods and injury to domestic producers.
In 2023, Canada continued its response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, sanctioning dozens of additional Russian individuals, companies, and other entities, such as the Wagner private military company, under the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations. These regulations impose a broad-based dealings ban, asset freeze, and financial prohibitions against listed individuals and entities. Canada also expanded other trade restrictive measures to, for example, prohibit the import of aluminum and steel products originating in Russia.
Canada continues to be unique in pursuing the seizure and forfeiture of assets owned by sanctioned individuals and entities in Canada. However, despite government rhetoric, Canada’s seizure and forfeiture regime continues to be relatively unused and untested. The only physical asset seized by the government, an Antonov cargo plane seized in June, remains the subject of ongoing disputes and, at the time of this writing, continues to sit on a tarmac in Toronto.
While Canada has moved quickly to sanction additional individuals and entities, it has so far failed to provide any guidance on the interpretation and operationalization of its sanctions. This continues to be in stark contrast to partners, such as the United States, UK, and European Union (EU), all of which have provided ongoing timely guidance. Moreover, a dearth of enforcement action means there is virtually no jurisprudence on the interpretation of Canada’s Russia-related sanctions. An October 2022 ruling from the Court of King’s Bench in Alberta remains the only significant judicial consideration of the Russia-related sanctions. The Court’s dictum was largely obiter, limiting its interpretive value.
Canada also made significant changes to the Special Economic Measures Act, under which the Russia regulations are promulgated, and its Magnitsky Act. These amended acts establish threshold criteria that would “deem” a sanctioned person to be the owner of an entity’s property when that sanctioned person is considered to “control” that entity. Control will be deemed to exist when at least one of three enumerated criteria is satisfied. While these changes appear, at least superficially, to align with other similar approaches taken by the United States, UK, and EU, in reality, these changes may result in a far stricter but potentially more ambiguous application of Canadian sanctions. Indeed, it was the view of the Canadian Bar Association, expressed in a rare submission to Canada’s Parliament, that the amendments “do not increase the predictability and certainty of Canada’s sanctions regime. Rather, they cause further confusion and compliance challenges.”
Canada has also shown an increasing willingness to turn to economic sanctions, whether multilateral or unilateral, to respond to other foreign policy issues, especially when there are significant affected diaspora populations located in Canada. In 2023, Canada implemented a new sanctions regime in respect of Sri Lanka and sanctioned many new individuals related to the deteriorating situation in Haiti. While sanctions in Haiti were initially implemented at the end of 2022, they were substantially expanded in 2023. In both cases, Canada imposed many of the sanctions unilaterally in the absence of similar action by its allies.
Despite a longstanding lack of enforcement of its existing efforts to combat modern slavery, Canada pressed forward in 2023 with a new law, the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act (the Modern Slavery Act). The law creates reporting requirements, including reporting on efforts to combat child and forced labour, for companies of a certain size with a business nexus to Canada. The Modern Slavery Act comes into force on January 1, 2024, and reports must be made public and filed with the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness by May 2024. These public reports may serve as an information-gathering tool for CBSA to help inform its eventual enforcement activities.
The Modern Slavery Act also amended Canada’s existing customs import ban on goods produced in whole or in part by forced labour to update the definition of “forced labour” and to specifically cover and define “child labour” regardless of coercion. The changes adopted and expanded upon the definitions found in several International Labour Organization conventions and arguably expand the scope of activity that is subject to the import ban.
Canada is in the process of introducing or modernizing FTAs with the UK, Ukraine, Indonesia, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Canada also concluded negotiations on a foreign investment promotion and protection agreement with Taiwan, the first based on Canada’s new model agreement.
Canada’s negotiations with the UK toward a new FTA continued in 2023. The existing Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement will expire at the end of 2023. Despite the parties completing a sixth round of negotiations in June 2023 and a commitment to conclude negotiations, the prospect of a conclusion by the end of 2023 is increasingly unlikely.
Canada is also in the process of negotiating an FTA with the ASEAN bloc; the parties completed their fifth round of negotiations in October 2023 and aim to conclude negotiations by 2025. Canada continues negotiating an FTA with Indonesia and held a sixth round of negotiations in October 2023; a seventh round is anticipated to take place in early 2024. The negotiation of these two agreements forms part of Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy.
Finally, Canada and Ukraine agreed to modernize their existing FTA.
Two dairy-related disputes came to a head in 2023. First, in November 2023, the second United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA/CUSMA) panel to consider a dairy-related dispute between Canada and the United States released its report rejecting, in majority, the United States complaint that Canada continued violating its market access commitments despite revising its dairy quota system for processors. Canada made these updates in response to a 2021 panel decision that sided with the United States. Second, a panel established in response to a similar dairy-related challenge by New Zealand brought under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) released its report in September concluding that Canada’s practice regarding its allocation of dairy quota to processors violated its commitments under the CPTPP.
Additionally, the softwood lumber dispute—the longest-running Canada-U.S. trade dispute—continued in 2023. In July, the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) released its final determinations in its fourth administrative review; the fifth administrative review is ongoing. In October, a legacy North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) panel released its report on Canada’s challenge to the USDOC’s original dumping determination, nearly six years after Canada first requested the panel. The NAFTA panel agreed with Canada that certain elements of the dumping determination were inconsistent with U.S. law and directed the USDOC to review its determination. Nevertheless, seven other active NAFTA and USMCA/CUSMA reviews remain outstanding. The operation of these panels has been stalled by U.S. actions to prevent the selection and appointment of panel members.
Finally, early in 2023, a USMCA/CUSMA panel released its report on one of the first disputes arising under the agreement respecting Canada’s and Mexico’s challenge to U.S. interpretations of regional value content for automotive goods. The crux of that dispute was whether non-originating inputs used to make certain core automotive parts could be “rolled up” and counted as originating in the final vehicle. The United States argued such a roll-up was not permitted, thus making it more difficult for certain vehicles to benefit from the agreement. The panel rejected the Unites States’ interpretation.
Ontario is Canada’s largest province by population and had a provincial budget of almost $205 billion in 2023. This budget included public procurement, which refers to buying goods and services from domestic and U.S. (and other international) suppliers. According to government publications, “[e]very year, Ontario spends about $29 billion on goods and services ranging from pacemakers and bandages, to computer and IT hardware.”
Many of Canada’s trade agreements have opened procurement opportunities to foreign suppliers by containing government procurement obligations. These obligations dictate that government bodies must abide by certain rules when procuring goods or services. Notably, however, the USMCA/CUSMA does not contain government procurement obligations that apply to Canada. Instead, Canada and the United States have agreed to abide by the procurement rules set out in the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).
The GPA allows U.S. businesses to bid for contracts tendered by certain Canadian government entities, including procurements by the Ontario government. The GPA also imposes obligations on procuring entities when running a procurement. The key obligation is that of non-discrimination: the Ontario government must treat U.S. suppliers “no less favourable” than any supplier from Canada. Ontario must also not discriminate against domestic suppliers based on the degree of foreign affiliation or ownership by Canada’s trading partners. Further, the GPA sets forth obligations with respect to transparency and procedural fairness.
The GPA obligations apply only to procurements valued over defined thresholds, and the threshold values are subject to two-year periodic updates. Through 2023, the thresholds applicable to the Ontario government were $651,000 for contracts for goods or services and $9,100,000 for contracts for construction services. The thresholds in effect from January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2023, are scheduled to increase for 2024.
Ontario is one of the largest public buyers in Canada. Many of its purchases are governed by the rules set out in the GPA. According to Canada’s most recent notification to the WTO, in 2019 Ontario had 274 contracts with a combined value of over $4 billion that were subject to the GPA. These contracts represent a significant opportunity for U.S. suppliers. However, two notable issues should be concerning for U.S. suppliers doing business in the province: the recent “Buy Ontario” initiative and the fact that Ontario still lacks an independent bid challenge authority.
The province’s “Buy Ontario” initiative is outlined in the Building Ontario Businesses Initiative Act, 2022 (BOBI). Once in force, BOBI and its proposed accompanying regulations will require public sector entities to give preference to Ontario businesses when conducting procurements for goods and services. While BOBI was tabled in 2022, Ontario released its proposed approach for regulations in 2023. Based on these proposals, the preferences would be afforded only in procurements of prescribed values falling below minimum thresholds under the Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), an intergovernmental agreement between Canada’s provincial, territorial, and federal governments to reduce barriers to trade within Canada. The values are set out in the table below.
Potential Entity Type |
Entity Group Under CFTA |
Sector |
Proposed Threshold |
Government Entities under Ontario’s Supply Chain Management Act |
Departments, ministries, agencies, boards, councils, committees, commissions, and similar agencies of a Party |
Goods |
Below $30,300 |
Services |
Below $121,200 |
||
Construction |
Below $121,200 |
||
Crown corporations, government enterprises, and other entities that are owned or controlled by a Party through ownership interests |
Goods |
Below $605,600 |
|
Services |
Below $605,600 |
||
Construction |
Below $6,056,100 |
||
Designated Broader Public Sector Organizations |
School boards, and publicly- funded academic, health, and social service entities as well as any corporation or entity owned or controlled by one or more of the preceding entities |
Goods |
Below $121,200 |
Services |
Below $121,200 |
||
Construction |
Below $302,900 |
These thresholds are also below the thresholds of the GPA, therefore, the proposed “Buy Ontario” requirement is not in direct breach of the GPA. However, advantages provided to Ontario businesses could have a significant impact. By Ontario’s estimate, it could result in $3 billion in contracts awarded to Ontario businesses annually by 2026. By natural extension, because Ontario businesses will be given preference in these procurements, U.S. suppliers will not be considered or will be disadvantaged in bidding for these contracts. Because the relevant regulations have not yet been finalized, key questions remain such as which businesses will qualify as “Ontario businesses” and what mechanism will be used to give “preference.” Not only will the stated preference for Ontario suppliers disadvantage U.S. suppliers, it may also lead to procurements that are inconsistent with Canada’s trade agreements, including the GPA. For instance, where an Ontario procuring entity wishes to award a contract to an Ontario business, it may split what is technically one contract into smaller parts in order to circumvent the value thresholds that trigger the application of trade agreements and their corresponding procurement-related obligations. Additionally, the mechanism that is defined to give “preference” to Ontario businesses may result in procuring entities using undisclosed evaluation criteria to favour Ontario suppliers over other qualified suppliers, which would also breach the GPA.
An Ontario initiative that is conspicuously absent is the development of an independent bid challenge authority. Currently, when bidders have a complaint concerning an Ontario government procurement, they can file the complaint with the Ministry of Public and Business Service Delivery, which will then launch a formal review. In contrast, suppliers looking to challenge a federal procurement can file a complaint with the CITT, an independent quasi-judicial body. The New West Partnership Trade Agreement, an agreement between the Governments of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, arguably contains an independent bid protest mechanism. Finally, the Québec Autorité des marchés publics is an independent public body that oversees public procurements in Quebec.
While not all other provinces currently have a separate review body, the absence of an independent bid challenge authority for Ontario leaves suppliers, including subsidiaries and joint venture partners of U.S.-based businesses, without a dedicated forum to bring procurement challenges against one of Canada’s largest public purchasers. Moreover, the Canada-European Union Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), Canada’s trade agreement with the EU, and the CFTA require Ontario to have an independent bid challenge authority for covered procurements. For example, the CFTA’s specific language provides for an “appeal [of] the initial decision to an impartial administrative or judicial authority that is independent of the procuring entity.”
Ontario’s process of filing a procurement complaint with the Ministry of Public and Business Service Delivery was recently challenged as a breach of the CETA and CFTA in Thales DIS Canada Inc. v. Ontario. The concurring judgment of Justice Corbett of the Ontario Divisional Court made pointed comments on this deficiency: Ontario is in breach of [the CETA] in two ways. First, in failing “to designate at least one impartial administrative or judicial authority that is independent of its procuring entities” and second, by failing “to ensure the supplier may appeal” a decision of the decision-maker.
In other words, Justice Corbett objected to the absence of an independent tribunal to review internal bid dispute decisions via an appeal route (which, in his view, the various trade agreements require), as opposed to an application for judicial review to the Ontario courts. Thus, as a result of trade obligations and court decisions, Ontario may be required to establish a bid challenge review body that is more independent than a review by a governmental department.
Notably, unlike the GPA, the procurement chapters of both the CFTA and CETA apply to Ontario’s MASH entities (Municipalities, Academic Institutions, Schools, and Hospitals). Therefore, suppliers of these entities, including U.S. suppliers, may be similarly affected by not having an independent provincial-level authority to which complaints may be filed.
Significant gaps exist in Ontario’s public procurement rules, and significant changes are foreseeable for the province’s procurement landscape. Some of these initiatives have already been announced and are in development, while others await the outcome of litigation and government policy planning and decision-making. U.S. suppliers wishing to do business with the Ontario government and related entities should closely monitor these developments.
Canada continues to navigate the complex regulatory landscape of carbon pricing alongside its global counterparts. While the EU implemented the world’s first border adjustment mechanism—an import tariff that will implicate importers and exporters of carbon-intensive goods globally—Canada’s domestic carbon pricing regime is also taking shape. As the European Commission acknowledged, its environmental ambitions “will not be achieved by Europe acting alone.” Canada has indeed taken steps to contribute. This section provides an update on Canada’s carbon pricing initiatives, examining the proposed border carbon adjustment (BCA) and how it compares with other frameworks, particularly the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
Since 2019, every Canadian province and territory has had a price on carbon. Canadian jurisdictions have a choice: adopt the federal pricing system, or establish a local carbon pricing regime that meets or exceeds the stringency requirements under the federal system (the “federal backstop”).
In 2021, Canada proposed a BCA as part of its Climate Plan to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and reach net-zero emissions by 2050. BCAs impose a tariff on goods based on their carbon content. The goal of a BCA in Canada would be to ensure fair competition in the market while protecting the environment.
But the Canadian BCA has yet to be implemented. Carbon emissions in Canada are currently priced using the two-part federal pricing system established under the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act. This system includes a regulatory “fuel charge” on fossil fuels and an “output-based pricing system” (OBPS), setting a federal GHG emissions benchmark on certain industries. When emitters exceed their OBPS limit, they are required to pay the relevant carbon price.
As indicated, the provinces and territories of Canada can choose to implement the federal system, a local system, or a mix of both. Manitoba, Nunavut, Prince Edward Island, and Yukon have implemented both the fuel charge and the OBPS under the federal system. As of July 1, 2023, Ontario, Alberta, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan have adopted the federal fuel charge with local carbon pricing systems; however, Saskatchewan is transitioning to a local OBPS for covered industries. British Columbia, Quebec, and the Northwest Territories are the only jurisdictions with local carbon pricing systems. British Columbia has announced plans to transition to a provincial carbon tax and provincial OBPS in April 2024.
On November 21, 2023, the Canadian Government announced in the 2023 Fall Economic Statement (FES) that it is designating up to $7 billion of the $15 billion Canada Growth Fund to carbon contracts for difference (CFDs). Carbon CFDs will provide some guarantee that companies who invest in green projects and investments will not be disadvantaged should the government abolish the carbon price in the future—effectively creating a contract on the future price of carbon. To entirely abolish the carbon price in the wake of such contracts would be to expose the federal government to monetary liability. According to the FES, some of these contracts are already being negotiated. The proposed carbon CFDs are important in the current political context of the Canadian Conservative Party’s longstanding promise to abolish the carbon pricing regime should it form a government.
While Canada is still in the proposal stage of carbon adjustments, several other countries have implemented carbon pricing regimes to meet carbon emission reduction goals under the Paris Agreement. Most notably, the EU’s CBAM aims to reduce carbon emissions and carbon leakage by pricing carbon emitted by certain sectors: iron and steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizer, electricity, and hydrogen. In the decade leading up to the CBAM’s proposal, the EU maintained a cap-and-trade Emissions Trading System (ETS) on the EU carbon market that granted free allowances to certain “at-risk” sectors, including aviation, maritime transport, and industry to discourage carbon leakage. The free allowances will be phased out by 2030. Thus, the European Commission proposed that the CBAM’s obligations enter into force incrementally as part of the “European Green Deal” to cover the sectors that received allowances under the ETS and reduce the risk of carbon leakage.
Meanwhile, the EU has prescribed new reporting obligations on importers of carbon-intensive goods under the CBAM’s Implementing Regulation. These reporting obligations began on October 1, 2023, when the CBAM entered its “transitional period,” and will continue quarterly until December 31, 2025. The carbon price will not be charged to emitters until January 1, 2026, which will mark the start of the CBAM’s definitive period.
The Implementing Regulation does not directly subject exporters outside the EU to reporting compliance. But practically, EU importers will be relying on their foreign exporting counterparts, including Canadian exporters, to implement monitoring and reporting schemes to ensure importers accurately report embedded emissions and maintain trading relationships. The Implementing Regulation prescribes penalties on EU importers for non-compliance and incorrect or incomplete reports during the transitional period. This is significant, as it is likely that importers will seek ways to transfer such responsibilities, and risks to their exporting counterparts, who will ultimately possess embedded emissions data and production information.
Beyond the EU, other countries have also taken steps to implement carbon pricing regimes. China operates the world’s largest ETS for covered emissions, a national ETS that prices emissions from its power sector. South Korea also operates a nationwide ETS that covers 74 percent of GHG emissions from its power, industry, domestic aviation, building, waste, and transport sectors. Rather than implement a federal carbon “tax,” the United States subsidizes decarbonization and green technology efforts under its Inflation Reduction Act. Certain U.S. states have also opted to implement carbon pricing systems at the state level.
Certain carbon pricing regimes have begun to raise red flags concerning WTO compliance, and similar concerns will likely apply to Canada’s proposed BCA. For example, experts have questioned whether U.S. tax credits and subsidies with local content requirements conflict with WTO rules against discriminatory treatment of imports by triggering a “subsidy race to the bottom.” Similar concerns are being raised surrounding the CBAM and whether it will violate WTO national treatment (ensuring imported products are not discriminated against compared to domestic products) and most-favoured nation rules (prohibiting treating certain countries’ products more favourable than the same products of other countries) that require Member States to treat trading partners equally.
Similar concerns surrounding WTO compliance and discriminatory measures may be raised regarding Canada’s proposed BCA once it enters into force. A Canadian BCA would have to satisfy the WTO’s national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment obligations. Presently, most concerns surrounding Canada’s carbon pricing regime appear to be coming from within Canada. The Angus Reid Institute recently published a study that suggests nearly half of Canadians want to completely abolish the carbon tax. In addition, as noted above, the Conservative Party has been against the carbon pricing regime for years. Thus, there are domestic hurdles to first clear before Canada’s carbon pricing regime comes into fruition and reaches a stage at which WTO compliance can be challenged.
It is yet to be seen whether countries will bring these and similar measures in front of the WTO once they enter into force or whether countries will potentially modify their existing legislation to bring it into conformity with WTO law. As the United States continues to block appointments to the WTO Appellate Body, the WTO may not present a viable option for countries seeking to address unfair trade concerns within a reasonable time frame.
The global carbon pricing landscape has evolved quickly, including in Canada. Many Canadian producers and exporters will be impacted by these regimes as well as those applicable in Canada, whether it be a provincial or federal scheme. Canadian exporters will want to ensure they understand the carbon pricing mechanism applicable to them and the impact it has on compliance with requirements in the jurisdictions in which they do business, such as the carbon cost that the EU will begin to collect in 2026. Additionally, industry and governments alike will want to remain updated on WTO compliance issues surrounding jurisdictional carbon pricing regimes.
Committee Editor: Philip Kariam. Authors in order of appearance: Jacob Mantle and Chelsea Rubin; Peter Jarosz, Tayler Farrell, Yazhi Zheng, and Brigid Martin.
