In Syria’s example, the involvement of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, Turkey, and the United States, each with its own political interests and motivation to effect a political change in Syria, has arguably led to today’s status. Such interests have been growing over several decades, leading to indirect intervention because the international community and existing international law were not equipped to address such interests.
Unfortunately, too often, state interests come at too high a price, where lives are placed second behind those interests. In Syria’s example, it appears that the countries initially involved, Turkey for example, either failed to recognize or chose to ignore opposing interests of other states, including those of Iran and Russia. Such actions led to a response, predictably, from the states with opposing interests, a response that eventually became a proxy war between regional and global powers, and is resulting in violations of human rights at multiple levels.
Two questions arise. First, whether it is the role of international law, and the international community, to more directly address politically conflicting interests. And, second, whether mechanisms of international law can in fact address such interests and avert such conflicts.
Because of the intersection of the multi-faceted interests of various states, any conflict, including that of Syria, cannot be resolved without compromises addressing those conflicting interests. For instance, on May 29, 2016, Al Jazeera, citing a Lebanese daily newspaper, reported that a Russian-led approach towards achieving a compromise in Syria includes a plan to remove powers from the current regime. This is difficult to imagine without Russia maintaining a connection to any new regime, to meet its interests in the region; after all, Syria is Russia’s last strong ally in the Middle East. On the other hand, a compromise is a must if the international community considers the cost of resulting conflicts.
While it is difficult to imagine a compromise between polarized interests – in Syria’s case, those of the regime, Iran, and Russia on one end, and the Sunni population, Turkey, Saudi, Israel, and the U.S. on the other – the resulting cost of failure to compromise is simply too great given that instability creates opportunities for extremists and, in turn, directly and adversely affects the global community.
Perhaps the ultimate lesson from the Syrian conflict is that of exposing yet again how international law and international structures are not yet equipped to address and handle conflicting political interests, and that such structures are necessary if we are to avert collective violations against populations and human rights.
