chevron-down Created with Sketch Beta.

The International Lawyer

The International Lawyer, Volume 57, Number 1, 2024

Race and Corporate Governance in Brazilian Public Companies

Carlos Portugal Gouvêa

Summary

  • The hypothesis of this paper is that the corporate governance of Brazilian public companies reinforces the patriarchal and racist characteristics of the country’s social structure.
  • These traits have been deeply embedded in the social fabric since the country’s transition from a nineteenth-century slavery economy to a modern one.
  • The resulting legal regime led to a caste system not based on legally enforced segregation, as seen in the United States of America until the eruption of the Civil Rights Movement or in South Africa during apartheid.
Race and Corporate Governance in Brazilian Public Companies
luoman via Getty Images

Jump to:

Introduction

The hypothesis of this paper is that the corporate governance of Brazilian public companies reinforces the patriarchal and racist characteristics of the country’s social structure. These traits have been deeply embedded in the social fabric since the country’s transition from a nineteenth-century slavery economy to a modern one. Such historical link lies in a series of laws enacted in 1850 to reform public and private law in preparation for the end of slavery, namely, the Eusébio de Queiroz Law, the Land Registration Law, and the Commercial Code of 1850. The resulting legal regime led to a caste system not based on legally enforced segregation, as seen in the United States of America until the eruption of the Civil Rights Movement or in South Africa during apartheid. In contrast, the segregation regime in Brazil was much more subtle. It mainly used private law, in general, and the control of large companies, in particular, to consolidate a lasting system of economic and racial segregation.

To test our hypothesis, we developed a method to identify the skin color or race of executive and financial directors and members of the board of directors of Brazilian public companies. This research was based on a survey sent to all the publicly traded companies in the Brazilian securities market, presenting specific questions regarding the diversity of their board and senior management. Our research showed that all the executive directors of Brazilian public companies who answered the questionnaire were white, although over half of the total Brazilian population is black. The results obtained based on our methodology also proved to be statistically relevant. Bluntly put, the best-paying jobs in Brazil are closed off to black people, which lays one of the foundations for a caste-based society. Such characteristics may explain the persistence of economic inequality in Brazil and the instability of democratic institutions. In this sense, this article also asks, reviewing the literature on racism and class structure as pillars of economic inequality and democratic instability, whether these findings regarding Brazilian society support universal claims to deal with the growing threat posed by racism to democratic regimes across the world.

During the survey period between January and May 2021, we obtained detailed responses from approximately fifteen percent of the total sample. In order to test the statistical significance of the results, we applied an evaluative test to board members and senior managers of all other publicly held companies, using the same methodology as the one applied to identify fraudulent enrollment in affirmative action programs at Brazilian universities. This analysis was based on the method of heteroidentification through the phenotypic characteristics of the surveyed people. This was carried out mostly from materials sourced online. The data was subsequently submitted for validation by the companies themselves, ensuring the predominance of self-declaratory categorization of those surveyed. This method is similar to the one deployed by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), in which the data are based on self-declaration. Such a comparison of samples showed statistically robust results and disconcerting conclusions. We identified that zero percent of the board member positions surveyed were occupied by people who identify as black, and only 1.05 percent of such positions were occupied by people who identify as brown (pessoas pardas). When expressed mathematically, the results demonstrate that white people are fifty-eight times more likely to occupy the best-paying jobs in Brazil than non-whites.

Drawing from Gunnar Myrdal’s pioneering study on patterns of discrimination in the United States of America (U.S.) during the racial segregation period, we observed that certain characteristics of Brazilian society—revealed by access to the best-paying positions in Brazil, in the country’s largest companies—support the understanding that a caste system similar to the one Myrdal described for the U.S. exists in Brazil The survey confirms that the corporate governance of Brazilian public companies follow a “clan” regime, marked by a tendency to favor appointments to the board of directors and executive and financial directors positions based on hereditary criteria and excluding women and black people from leadership positions and higher-paying jobs. Such findings provide a firm grounding for the assertion that the Brazilian corporate governance model is predominantly patriarchal.

To make the transition to a truly democratic society possible, such positions must be open to all, regardless of gender or race. Thus, the adoption of a public policy for mandatory affirmative action in Brazilian public companies would be commendable in order to effectively make these positions available to individuals from underrepresented communities. Finally, we hope that this study might instigate further research in partnership with academics from other jurisdictions and encourage them to undergo a comparative analysis of the application of our methodology and the creation of an international database on the topic of corporate governance and racial diversity.

This paper is divided into three main parts. First, we revisit the contemporary literature on the relationship between corporate governance and diversity while paying close attention to race. Subsequently, we present in greater detail the methodology and results of our survey of racial diversity in Brazilian public companies. This debate will be complemented by a reflection on whether the research results reinforce the patriarchal model identified by the scholars considered classic references in the field who have focused on the roots of social inequality in Brazil.

I. Corporate Governance, Diversity, and Racism

Diversity has increasingly gained prominence in debates over corporate governance for the last few decades. Diversity was one of the Millennium Goals and, for that reason, it was incorporated into the social dimension of environmental social governance (ESG) programs. Also, diversity issues have always been stressed in business and human rights policies. After the year 2020, with public attention on the Black Lives Matter movement following the shocking murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, debates centered on diversity and corporate governance gained a sense of urgency. At the same time, large companies started to employ diversity practices that are different from the typical ESG and business and human rights policies, which are characterized by a focus on metrics in the first case and dealing with violations in the second. The change is the focus on the adoption of affirmative actions to increase diversity in corporate governance.

Racial inequality in Brazil is closely linked to the development of commercial law in general and corporate law in particular. The Eusébio de Queiroz Law, the Land Registration Law, and the Commercial Code of 1850 were elements of the same social and legislative process as a result of the pressure from the British government to end the slave trade in Brazil. Both the reactive character of the reforms and the relatively weak commitment to the liberal principles that inspired equivalent legislation in Great Britain and continental Europe at the time led to very selective implementation in Brazil. This method of implementation effectuated (i) the “whitening” of the industrial workforce through prolonging legal slavery, (ii) the gradual transition of capital from the acquisition of slaves to commercial and industrial activity, and (iii) the preservation of agrarian concentration all possible at the same time.

The current Brazilian corporate governance system may, to a large extent, have its roots in that process of reaction against the pressure from the British government to abolish the slave trade, one whose main objective was to preserve the existing class structure in the face of international pressure to change it. Thus, the deficits in the implementation of the corporate model that prevented the Financial Revolution effects identified in the central economies of capitalism from taking place in Brazil in the 19th Century remain embedded to the present day in Brazilian social reality, preventing the country’s economic model from advancing. Given this situation, understanding the relationship between corporate governance and racial issues in Brazil is essential to overcome these centuries-old limitations.

From the perspective of what is called structural racism, the exclusion of minority groups from spaces of power takes place systematically due to a project of discrimination and social domination. In this sense, the exclusion of black people from the central management structures of Brazilian companies is not just a reflection of other forms of exclusion but is part of such a system of maintenance of structural racism. Pursuant to Adilson Moreira, the social systems operate from the interests of “majoritarian” individuals—men and whites, for example, in Brazil’s case—in order to maintain social hierarchies. The corporate environment is part of these social systems and is regulated not only by the market’s economic logic, but also by cultural and political relations. From this observation, according to which companies are not in a market vacuum, it is inferred that the social system of exclusion of minorities—women and non-whites—is also reproduced within the companies’ own structures. Also, according to Moreira, companies, as social subjects, “act as agents of reproduction of oppression systems in their daily practices,” and the business environment should be seen as a “racialized system.”

Studying the composition of boards of directors in Canada, Aaron Dhir called it a culture of widespread homogeneity of its members and highlighted two possible reasons for this: (i) the pool problem; and (ii) the implicit cognitive biases. The pool problem is presented as an explanation for the lack of qualified and diversified candidates to occupy positions on the boards of directors, which would generate a lack of diversity. Dhir understands that the perpetuation of board homogeneity can best be explained by psychological science through the impact of implicit biases.

In the Canadian case, companies explained the low levels of representation on their boards of directors and in management positions as the product of “a shortage of qualified women” and “the lack qualified visible minority candidates.” In other words, the reasons given by the companies for the preservation of inequalities were, systematically, linked to the argument of the pool problem. At the time of the survey, in 2010, it was found that less than half of minority people who were qualified for management positions held those positions. Thus, despite their availability in the market, minority candidates were prevented from occupying such positions, thus constituting a matter of perception rather than reality.

Such impediments or barriers to entry into the highest echelons of the labor market can be explained by “implicit social cognitions,” understood as moral judgments that occur automatically in an instinctive and unintentional way, which give rise to prejudiced conduct. One example pointed out by Dhir was that being white was seen as a leadership trait. Consequently, white people are considered to have the greatest leadership potential and decision makers are more likely to prefer selecting white people as leaders. On the other hand, racial minorities are perceived in an implicitly negative way by most people, which would explain, in part, stereotypes and prejudices.

Such findings are reflected in studies that show favoritism in the business environment. Thus, members of the board of directors who are male and white tend to perpetuate predominantly male and white boards, resulting in the continued disenfranchisement of racial minorities in the business sphere. Considering that there is a human tendency to favor similar identities within any group, the prospects of this homogeneity changing organically are small. Furthermore, the legal culture and practice that shape business activity facilitate board homogeneity, undermining diversification efforts. In the fight against discrimination and for inclusion, companies can, despite their structures, “play an essential role.” Such participation can take place through affirmative actions, such as the establishment of quotas or the employees’ co-participation in boards of directors.

Affirmative actions contribute to “promoting the diversification of spaces of power” and aim to create a reality in which the body of institutions, also private, represents and reflects social pluralism. According to Flávia Piovesan, affirmative actions work as special and temporary measures that seek to remedy past discriminatory acts and aim to “accelerate the process with the achievement of substantive equality on the part of vulnerable groups, such as ethnic and racial minorities, and women, among other groups.” For Cynthia Estlund, concern for social justice also plays a role in the commitment to increase minority representation within organizations. More than repairing the mistakes of the historical past, the objective is “to build a society in which people from different social groups are adequately represented in positions of power.”

The change in the logic of affirmative action began with “the perception that the performance of private companies depends on their ability to respond to the demands of pluralism at the national and international level.” Diversity came to be seen as a “strategy that can bring considerable gains to the institutions that employ it.” The benefits for companies arising from diversity can be considered a competitive advantage, which is expressed in a company’s ability to “increase creativity and the ability to solve problems that arise from the obstacles present in a capitalist economy based on competitiveness.”

But in this quest to make diversity “an aspect of a company’s institutional identity,” an issue to which attention should be paid is symbolic representation. This means that the presence of representatives of minority groups in decision-making spaces of the company could reinforce an idea of “tokenism,” where they would symbolically represent a group that differs from the “superior,” male, white, and dominant. The idea of “tokenism” comes from the criticism first presented by Martin Luther King when he identified that, in the case of racial inclusion policies, the practice in the United States of America had been to create some symbolic situations of integration, which, instead of representing structural changes, preserved the discriminatory process. Companies that seek leaders of other races only at a symbolic level will not produce performance gains or greater protection against reputational damage or market overshoot, as it is necessary to reach a critical mass so that the added value by these individuals is realized.

The argument that diversity would have positive economic consequences is attractive and, in the case of racial diversity, is in line with the theory of convergence of interests. According to such a theory, it is necessary to align the interests of the racially oppressed with those who have the power to reform for meaningful change to occur. Steven Ramirez further argues that, in the context of corporate governance, the pursuit of race-based reform must embrace the favorable openings that exist in political capitalism and coordinate its agendas with the agendas of the dominant power.

In this sense, the movement for inclusion and integration of diversity places companies as “agents of social transformation,” as they include socially vulnerable groups. For Moreira, this process would create the “objective conditions of parity of participation: instruments for individuals to have the material means to be recognized as competent social actors.” The challenges to be faced by promoting diversity in companies are not few, but questioning implicit cognitive associations will have implications for corporate governance. For Dhir, the cognitive biases of the predominantly white and male class of board members can be mitigated as they become familiar with candidates who fall outside this “pattern.”

In addition to the effects on the boards of directors, those that occur in the economic and financial performance of companies cannot be ignored. Additionally, it is the increasingly growing impacts on the companies’ performance that have made the financial sector finally align itself to demand greater adherence from publicly held companies to diversity policies. At the same time, the misalignment of society and, consequently, of Brazilian companies with such movements can reinforce, in the long term, the peripheral character of the national productive system.

In this sense, the increase in heterogeneity in companies is combined with multiple potential benefits, and it is currently possible to identify a set of data that can both explain and prove whether there is a cause and effect relationship between such factors. The correlation between profitability and diversity in the leadership of companies has been studied for years, and there is a growing literature indicating evidence that the increase in diversity generates an increase in the economic performance of companies.

Two aspects of performance surveys reinforce the concept of an empathic ethics: the diversity of the board of directors can make the company more sensitive to the interests of consumers and employees—increasingly diverse groups—and reduce the cost of non-diversity by improving institutional image, reducing social and economic costs of discrimination, and enabling the boards to identify broader market opportunities.

In this sense, as the McKinsey & Company 2020 report shows, the greater the representation, the greater the likelihood that the company will outperform its less diverse peers. The survey, which considered a dataset of fifteen countries and more than 1,000 companies, showed in its results a twenty-five percent probability that companies with greater gender diversity in executive leadership have above-average profitability than those with less diversity. The performance gap between the most gender-diverse companies (thirty percent or more) and the least diverse (less than ten percent) companies is forty-eight percent. In the case of ethnic and cultural diversity, the data also points to outperformance for the most diverse companies compared to the least diverse, surpassing them in profitability by thirty-six percent. It is noteworthy that the probability of superior performance is greater for diversity in ethnicity than for gender.

A study examining venture capital funds exposes a new view on the issue. Venture capitalism is an area that presents fewer institutional barriers since every investor is a decision maker and the choices have clear commercial consequences. According to Paul Gompers and Silpa Kovvali, it is clear that diversity significantly improves the financial performance of venture capital funds on measures such as profitable investments at the company’s portfolio level and overall fund returns.

Such studies make it possible to concretely verify the existence of a causal relationship between the degree of diversity in the leadership of companies and their financial profitability. As investors are increasingly including diversity among their decision-making criteria regardless of whether investee companies have good diversity practices, and as concrete data on these practices becomes available, the natural tendency is for the cost of capital to decrease to companies that adopt diversity policies and therefore produce good results and increase for companies that do not. In other words, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Companies with best practices will have better financial performance, as their cost of capital will be lower, necessarily increasing the investment or profit margin. In the opposite direction, the less diverse companies will be less and less competitive and relegated to secondary and low profitability markets. Again, there is no guarantee that such favorable conditions will last. The increasing data demonstrating that more diversity increases the financial performance of corporations presents more of an opportunity than a justification for diversity policies.

This transformation has an impact even on development theory itself. Originally, development theory focused only on capital formation, later migrating to attention to technological investment and, more recently, to human capital. The contemporary trend is towards an in-depth analysis of the behavior of companies. Such a tendency to analyze social behavior as a predictor of economic performance is something that Gunnar Myrdal had already highlighted as being a determining factor for development, which is the overcoming of retrograde values that impede the operation of the economic system.

A concrete example that corroborates this thesis is the case of the Federal Reserve System of the United States of America. In research conducted by Brian D. Feinstein, Peter Conti-Brown, and Kaleb Nygaard, it was shown that the increased diversity in the composition of the boards of directors of the twelve banks that make up the Federal Reserve System, entities responsible for evaluating commercial bank loans to disadvantaged and historically marginalized communities, is associated with the approval of larger loans to these communities. According to the results, the analyzed institutions whose corporate governance bodies had Hispanic or Black members in their composition were linked to higher scores of their member banks in the performance evaluation of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, a statute created to require that the agencies’ federal financial system regulators encourage financial institutions to meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered.

This experience with companies focused on financing minorities makes it possible to identify the correlation between the implementation of diversity policies within the scope of the institutions’ corporate governance and the promotion of the social development of the affected communities. This demonstrates that the benefits of diversity policies in the corporate governance of companies cannot be measured only through their financial performance. There are other more profound benefits, such as increasing the perception of fairness and justice in society, which have the capacity of strengthening support for the operation of democratic systems.

II. The Corporate Governance and Racial Diversity Survey in Brazil

The main feature of Brazilian economic inequality is the overlapping of racial and gender issues. According to the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), in 2009 the black population represented only twenty-four percent of the richest ten percent in the country, but a total of seventy-two percent of the poorest ten percent, reflecting the fact that the average income of Brazilian white men was R$1,491.00 in the period, compared to an average income of black women of R$544.40. In the same year, the unemployment rate for white men was 5.3 percent, while for black women the rate was 12.5 percent. Recent studies have already shown a process of worsening the situation and widening of inequalities as we approach higher income levels. As an Oxfam report found, based on an analysis of data from the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD), among the richest ten percent, whites earned BRL 11,026.36 a month in 2016 while blacks earned BRL 5,384.0073, that is, less than half (or about forty-nine percent of their income). In 2017, this proportion regressed even further, with whites earning BRL 13,753.63 compared to BRL 6,186.01 per month on average, in the case of blacks, which is equivalent to forty-five percent of what the white population in this decile earned. Between 2016 and 2017, blacks from the richest decile increased their incomes by 8.10 percent, less than half of the gains of the white population, which were 17.35 percent.

Considering this situation, an important step is to measure the capacity of Brazilian companies to implement an empathic corporate ethics system, that is, one capable of maximizing the efficiency of economic activity in order to reach a maximum number of potential customers. To measure such capacity, the most appropriate concept seems to us to be the one prevalent in the socio-environmental governance methodology, both for environmental policy issues and for human rights, anti-corruption, and diversity issues, which sets the tone at the top—with the tone referring to the sense of adherence to such policies, at the highest levels of the corporate governance structure.

In view of this, it seems appropriate to identify the racial profile in the main positions of Brazilian public companies, namely, the positions of member of the board of directors, executive director (chief executive officer—CEO), and financial director (chief financial officer—CFO). Surprisingly, we did not identify any research on the topic, on the initiative of public and private organizations, both in Brazil and internationally. This fact alone reveals the depth of the problem. In the multiple decades in which corporate governance has been the object of studies by academics, associations, specialized consultancies, regulatory bodies, international organizations, and other agents, it has not been possible to identify, so far, a survey of the racial profile of the management of companies.

To fill this gap, the author carried out a survey on racial diversity in Brazilian public companies, the main results of which are presented below.

Between January and May 2021, a survey was carried out with all Brazilian publicly traded corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) and listed on B3 to identify the racial profile of their executive directors, financial directors, and members of the board of directors. management. The final objective was to compare the statistical data found with the general indices of the Brazilian population, in order to verify whether the degree of racial diversity within the scope of the analyzed corporate governance bodies would be in accordance with the proportional distribution followed by the total population of the country, and if it was not proportional, to determine the degree of mismatch between society and publicly-held companies.

The data examined were collected by consulting company documents made available to the market through the stock exchange portals, the CVM and their own websites, in which it was possible to identify the names of the directors corresponding to each position. The analysis methodology for defining the racial profile of administrators was based on the method of heteroidentification based on their phenotypic characteristics, and was carried out through photos found publicly on the Internet. It is noteworthy that this classification method is the same used to verify the self-declaration in selective processes and public contests with reservation of vacancies or similar affirmative actions for candidates belonging to ethnic-racial minorities.

In all, 442 companies and 3,561 positions were surveyed, including 449 executive directors, 407 financial directors, and 2,705 effective members of the board of directors.

The data collected in this first moment of the research were submitted for validation by the companies themselves, in order to guarantee the predominance of the self-declaration of those evaluated—as is done in the demographic surveys carried out by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), whose data are computed based on the self-declaration criterion. For the results, only the data confirmed by the companies were taken into account, because they consider not only the criterion of phenotypic heteroidentification, which may present flaws, but also the criterion of self-declaration given by the individuals occupying the positions surveyed.

Thus, of the 442 companies contacted, confirmation of racial data was received from sixty-nine of them, or 15.61 percent of the total, allowing a robust analysis from a statistical point of view. As a result, of the 727 confirmed positions, 712 white people, nine Asian/indigenous people, six brown, and zero black people were identified.

The data extracted from the racial profile of the management of publicly held companies were then compared with data from the 2019 National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) in order to identify the difference between the profile of the management of companies and the Brazilian social reality. Considering that the PNAD is a survey that seeks to identify demographic trends in a statistical way in periods shorter than those of the national censuses, the choice of the most recent Brazilian demographic data for such comparison seems appropriate. According to the aforementioned survey, the data on ethnic-rational diversity found at the national level are as follows:

 

Image 1 – Data of the Continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNDA) 2012-2019

Image 1 – Data of the Continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNDA) 2012-2019

Image 1 – Data of the Continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNDA) 2012-2019

Source: BRAZILIAN INSTITUTE OF GEOGRAPHY AND STATISTICS – IBGE. Continuous National Household Sample Survey 2012-2019. Available at: https://educa.ibge.gov.br/jovens/conheca-o-brasil/populacao/18319-cor-ou-raca.html. Access on: 30 jul. 2021.

 

We will present the main results of the corporate governance and racial diversity (PDR) survey divided by type of position:

 

Table 1 – Comparison between data from the PDR with the PNAD data for the position of member of a board of directors

Ethnicity or Race

PDR

PNAD

Difference

Asian/Indigenous

1,22%

1,1%

0,12%

White

97,73%

42,7%

55,03%

Brown

1,05%

46,8%

-45,75%

Black

0,00%

9,4%

-9,40%

Source: Author.

*Although the category of indigenous people was included in the research (as in the PNAD), no indigenous person was identified among the positions surveyed. However, considering that the PNAD group Asian and indigenous people together, (both categories are included under the same percentage of 1.1%) it was decided to adopt the same reference for comparative purposes, even though the total number of identified indigenous people has been null.

 

Image 2 – Comparison between data from the PDR with the PNAD data

Image 2 –  Comparison between data from the PDR with the PNAD data 
for the position of member of a board of directors

Source: Author

Image 2 – Comparison between data from the PDR with the PNAD data for the position of member of a board of directors

 

Table 2 - Comparison between the data from the racial diversity survey with the PNAD for the CEO position

Race or Ethnicity

PDR

PNAD

Difference

Asian/Indigenous

0,00%

1,1%

-1,10%

White

100,00%

42,7%

57,30%

Brown

0,00%

46,8%

-46,80%

Black

0,00%

9,4%

-9,40%

Source: Author.

 

Image 3 – Comparison between data from the PDR with the PNAD data for the position of CEO

Image 3 – Comparison between data from the PDR with the PNAD data for the position of CEO

Source: Author

Image 3 – Comparison between data from the PDR with the PNAD data for the position of CEO

 

Table 3 - Comparison between the data from the racial diversity survey with the PNAD for the position of CFO

Race/Ethnicity

PDR

PNAD

Difference

Asian/Indigenous

2,82%

1,1%

1,72%

White

97,18%

42,7%

54,48%

Brown

0,00%

46,8%

-46,80%

Black

0,00%

9,4%

-9,40%

Source: Author.

 

Image 4 – Comparison between data from the PDR with the PNAD data for the position of CFO

Image 4 – Comparison between data from the PDR with the PNAD data for the position of CFO

Source: Author

Image 4 – Comparison between data from the PDR with the PNAD data for the position of CFO

 

The results of the racial diversity survey show an enormous advantage enjoyed by white people, and white men in particular, to occupy the positions of the main corporate governance structures of publicly-held companies in Brazil. The survey indicated that the chances of a white person occupying a senior management position in companies listed on the B3 is almost fifty-eight times greater compared to the expected chance according to the distribution of color and race obtained by the PNAD. More than a mere advantage, the results show latent racial segregation. The differences with the racial distribution in society are abysmal and denote the interference of structural racism in the process of selecting members of the board of directors, executive directors and financial directors.

In the case of executive directors, the survey indicated a percentage of favoring white people of 57.3 percent in relation to the number of white people in Brazilian society, and a loss for black people in relation to the social standard of 46.8 percent, because such positions are held exclusively by white people. Following John Rawls’ terminology, this fact indicates that these social positions are not open to black people, which would challenge their own criterion of justice in democratic societies. Graph 4 below highlights the seriousness of the situation identified, in which 100 percent of the executive directors of the responding companies, that is, the position with the highest remuneration, are white.

 

Image 5 – PDR’s confirmed data for the position of CEO

Image 5 – PDR’s confirmed data for the position of CEO

Source: Author

Image 5 – PDR’s confirmed data for the position of CEO

The situation is particularly serious considering that the top management positions of Brazilian public companies represent the positions with the highest remuneration of all jobs in the country (at least for which public information is available). A survey carried out by consultant Renato Chaves with seventy public companies, based on detailed data on minimum and maximum compensation made available to the CVM for the year 2019, indicated an average annual compensation for the position of executive director of BRL 11.1 million. According to the study, the remuneration of executive directors is, in some Brazilian public companies, 600 times higher than that of the average company employee. Not surprisingly, the Brazilian numbers are higher than the numbers identified on developed countries, indicating that such variations may follow the level of social inequality in each society. Thus, among industrialized countries, the United States of America has the highest multiples, 320 times in 2019, according to the Economic Policy Institute. This would be justified by the fact that the United States of America also presents the highest levels of economic inequality among developed industrialized countries. Nonetheless, such multiples are much lower than Brazil, which also has the highest levels of economic inequality, but among developing countries.

In Brazil’s case, such positions are not open to people, especially black women, which reinforces the racial divide that characterizes our pattern of inequality with racial segregation. Structural racism, according to Adilson Moreira, would be identifiable in situations in which “the activities of members of different racial groups cannot occupy the same functions; those that are most valued must be performed by members of the dominant racial group.”

In order to analyze whether there would be differences between privately-held companies and mixed capital corporations, we segregated the information to verify whether state control, or even the co-participation mechanism established by Law No. 12.353/2010 minority groups in their administrative bodies. As can be seen from Table 4 below, no relevant differences were identified in relation to the members of the boards of directors, except for a positive difference of 3.40 percent in the number of people identified as brown. Regarding executive directors, considering that all the companies that responded to the survey had white people in that position, no variation was identified.

 

Table 4 - Comparison between confirmed data from Mixed Economy Corporations (SAEM)* and Privately Controlled Corporations (SACP) for the position of Board of Directors

Race/Ethnicity

SAEM*

SAEM* (%)

SACP

SACP (%)

Difference %

Asian/

Indigenous

0

0,00%

7

1,33%

-1,33%

White

46

95,83%

514

97,90%

-2,07%

Brown

2

4,17%

4

0,76%

3,40%

Black

0

0,00%

0

0,00%

0,00%

Totals

48

100,00%

525

100,00%

 

Source: Author.

*The terminology of Joint-Stock Company of Mixed Economy (SAEM) was adopted in accordance with the provisions of Art. 235 of Law No. 6,404/1976 (Corporate Law), to the detriment of the terminology adopted by Law No. 13,303/2016.

 

The data presented here demonstrates the urgent need to implement affirmative action programs for the composition of the boards and directors of Brazilian public companies as a necessary condition for the achievement of democracy and the fight against structural racism and social inequalities in the country. As already formulated by Fábio Konder Comparato in his work on the power of control in corporations, companies also depend on social legitimacy. In this case, racial segregation in the corporate governance of Brazilian public companies was an inconvenient truth that this research sought to document. A legislative change in this sense is urgent, as it could be an important remedy for the potential crystallization of structural racism in Brazilian companies in the years to come.

III. The Patriarchalist Model of Corporate Governance

The traditional Weberian methods of power are gerontocracy, patriarchy and patrimonialism. Such methods are distinguished by the use or not of a personal administration, and (i) gerontocracy is characterized by the choice of leaders by traditional means, such as age; (ii) patriarchy is characterized by the selection of leadership based on hereditary rules; and (iii) patrimonialism is characterized by the use of an organized administrative structure, but without the rigid separation between public and private patrimony.

Eduardo Munhoz proposed an approximation between Weber’s models of legitimate power and the Brazilian societal system, arguing that such a system would be patrimonial. This analysis is in line with Sérgio Lazzarini’s argument in a study demonstrating that the Brazilian privatization process from the 1990s onwards would have resulted in the maintenance of a co-investment relationship in privatized companies between Brazilian families controlling large economic groups and the Brazilian State itself, which would characterize Brazilian capitalism as a “capitalism of bonds.” Sérgio Lazzarini’s study was also based on the thesis of Raymundo Faoro, in his Os donos do Poder (translated literally as “The Owners of Power”) that Brazilian society would be marked by a patrimonial regime that prevented the separation between the public patrimony of the State and the personal patrimony of the members of the group, dominant social group, which Faoro called “estamento,” resulting in what he identified as a network of investments involving private and governmental groups.

In the Brazilian case, corporate control, outside the scope of mixed capital corporations, has always been characterized by its family structure. We believe that it would be possible to take another step in such an analysis to qualify the Brazilian societal model, based on Weberian definitions, as patriarchal and not merely patrimonial. Such a characteristic would result from its inherently hereditary nature and from the existence of a model of trust between controller and administrator, feasible due to a weak regime of protection of fiduciary duties and an effective use of the power of control to direct and guide the administration. Therefore, this understanding requires the problematization of Faoro’s own thesis, according to which the estate would not be a closed social class, as in the caste system, therefore being permeable to individuals from other origins. The application of Weber’s model of social stratification to Brazilian reality by Faoro is marked by the illusion of the inexistence of racism in Brazilian society, as it does not denote a profound rigidity in the formation of its ruling class, which did not allow the economic integration of the black people resident at that time in Brazil to the economic process initiated after the 1850 legislative reforms described above.

Faoro’s mistake was to transport the form of organization of Portuguese society to Brazil as a continuity, without considering the fact that the process of enslavement profoundly altered the social structure. Fábio Konder Comparato, in his analysis of the same process, corrected this error by identifying two stagnant social groups formed in colonial Brazil: on the one hand, the economically dominant group, and, on the other, the poor class, which also owed to the impossibility of social ascension the destitution of access to legal resources. As seen, this class of the poor has always had a racial profile, that is, hereditary.

Another important correction made by Fábio Konder Comparato in Faoro’s analysis was in relation to the image, present in Faoro, of a strong state that would be able to confront economic power. Comparato correctly describes the fragility of the imperial regime, constantly depending on the exchange of favors, with a limited bureaucracy, reflecting the exclusively patriarchal character of the regime. All the difficulty identified in the Second Empire in dealing with the growing power of an incipient business class would reveal the fragility of the regime, which only served as a shield for the interests of the agrarian class and its arm of commissioners dependent on the export of agricultural products.

Faoro seemed to believe in the existence of a dominant status group, open to the eventual social ascension of those who adapted their behavior to the standard demanded by the status. But such ascension was only allowed to people with a certain hereditary characteristic, that is, to be considered a white person, of European origin.

For the Brazilian reality, it seems to us more appropriate to recognize our society as a society of castes, perpetuated through structural racism. Such an interpretation is based on the similarity between the current Brazilian reality and that of the United States of America in the 1940s, as described by Gunnar Myrdal in his renowned study on the economic bases of racism. After interviewing several white men to uncover the essence of social discrimination, Myrdal identified the following hierarchical order of discrimination: (i) restrictions on interracial marriage and sexual relations, (ii) restrictions on social etiquette and behavior, (iii) segregation of use of public spaces, (iv) restrictions on the exercise of political power, (v) discrimination in access to justice and, finally, (vi) economic discrimination, in commercial and employment relationships, and in access to social programs. But Myrdal’s greatest contribution was to reveal that this order was reversed. In other words, the most relevant discrimination was economic, and the other forms of discrimination were exclusively instrumental in maintaining the black community in a social condition analogous to slavery. The precision of such a conception was affirmed throughout the last century, in which the legal restrictions present in items (i) to (v) were gradually eliminated. But even without legal support, such discrimination is maintained through the instruments of structural racism, guaranteeing racially based social inequality. According to Myrdal, a vicious cycle of economic exclusion is formed, legitimizing the very behavioral elements of discrimination, which again impact black people by closing off opportunities for economic progress.

Applying these concepts to the Brazilian corporate governance model, according to the portrait brought by our research on racial diversity in the top management of publicly-held companies, we realize that, if it is possible to imagine Brazilian society as a pyramid reflecting social inequality, at the base of pyramid we would have the poorest groups, which would be made up mostly of black people, with a predominance of women. As one went up the pyramid, this profile would gradually transmute into a predominance of white men. At the top of the pyramid, we would have the highest percentile, reinforcing the trend of concentration, and in a very small percentage, the set of the best paid positions in the country, that is, those of executive director of publicly-held companies, with a profile of 100 percent white men. Graph 5, below, reproduces this image based on 2019 PNAD data and our research.

 

Image 6 – Pyramid of social and racial inequality in Brazil with illustration of the position of corporate governance structures

Image 6 – Pyramid of social and racial inequality in Brazil with illustration of the position of corporate governance structures

Source: Author, based

Image 6 – Pyramid of social and racial inequality in Brazil with illustration of the position of corporate governance structures

 

Such a patriarchal model is inherently reflected in the type of Brazilian corporate control. This model Fernando Henrique Cardoso called “clan companies,” in a study on the Brazilian industrial business that was the subject of his thesis of professorship at the University of São Paulo. The author’s background in sociology made it possible to identify the markedly patriarchal traits in the governance pattern of large Brazilian companies still in 1964. This trait of family control as the dominant regime has been preserved in our corporate governance model until the present time. But this patriarchal structure has a deep historical basis. Gilberto Freyre mentioned in the preface to the first edition of his work better known then as the Casa-Grande, “although associated particularly with the sugarcane mill, with northern patriarchy, it should not be considered an exclusive expression of sugar, but of the slave and landowner monoculture in general: coffee was created in the South as Brazilian as sugar in the North.”

It should be noted that the farmhouse was not limited to the North, as it was not limited to the farmhouse itself and to agrarian activity The legislative reforms of 1850, with the Land Law, the Eusébio de Queiroz Law and the Commercial Code, created the basis for the transfer of capital from the slave economy to industry, maintaining the essential characteristics of patriarchy. The depth of this link demands a deeper and more constant study, of which the present research on racial diversity within large Brazilian companies is just a first step.

This image reinforces the understanding that corporate governance structures are not only influenced by the society in which they are found, but that they also influence society in a decisive way. Large companies are in a strategic economic position in society to produce emulation behaviors, which is in line with Veblen’s analysis. This is because the modern economic organization, initially based on analog machines and currently on digital machines, depends on the creation of patterns of behavior. This perception reinforces the conclusion that the absence of racial diversity in the management of large companies leads to the need to implement a quota policy on the boards of directors and directors of large companies as a measure of structural reform of Brazilian corporate governance.

Conclusion

Nowadays, there is a clear demand from society for companies to take an active role in social transformation beyond just their contribution to the economic activity in which they are specialized. Such a demand goes beyond the mere regulation of negative externalities, corporate social responsibility or philanthropy. It is a demand for an ideological engagement with social issues, so that investors, workers and consumers only want to have a relationship with companies that present some kind of identity with their personal values. Such a demand places corporate ethics as the main issue of corporate governance in the 20th century, requiring empathic behavior from companies, especially in terms of human rights.

In the Brazilian case, following the logic identified by Myrdal as the basis for discriminatory conduct, a static view of the model would lead us to believe that companies do not have black people in senior management due, for example, to the country’s educational problems. But the cyclical model proposed by Myrdal would lead us to identify that it is public companies failure to hire black people for senior management that leads to the perpetuation of a discriminatory educational regime. Because the example set by the large companies ends up being socially reproduced, other economic agents to emulate such behavior and also fail to hire black people for high-paying positions. This practice is repeated all the way to the social base, in which black families fail to invest in the education of their daughters and sons with the purpose that they come to occupy leadership positions in the business world, because they believe that such positions are closed to people who do not belong to a particular race. White families, on the other hand, disproportionately invest in the education of their children to occupy such positions, causing untalented people to ascend to a position of leadership based on inherited cultural privileges. As a result, a deep and vicious cycle is formed, from which, without structural remedies to combat discrimination and social inequality, it is difficult to break free.

Without efforts such as those proposed here, of structural reform of corporate governance through the insertion of black people in the top management of public companies, we will have the preservation, in the Brazilian case, of a model of corporate governance that is not only patrimonial in its structure, but that it is constantly flirting with the shifting of its control towards a dogmatic totalitarian regime. In a regime like this, the legal instruments of diffuse control would lose all their effectiveness, preventing the development of the economic system itself, keeping society at a level of permanent low development, as experienced in recent decades in Brazil. Therefore, failing in such a project will inexorably represent a profound distancing of Brazilian companies from the reality of their competitors in the central countries of capitalism, with the immanent risk of increasing international and domestic social inequality to the detriment of Brazilian society.