Current Legislative and Constitutional Approaches in the Anthropocene Era
The Indian Constitution, born in the aftermath of partition, primarily focused on human rights and national unity. While it does not explicitly enshrine animal rights, it includes provisions reflecting the cultural and religious significance of certain animals, particularly cows. Article 48 of the Directive Principles of State Policy calls for prohibiting cow slaughter, but this stems from religious reverence rather than animal rights. The Hanif Quareshi judgment underscored economic considerations in interpreting this provision, viewing cattle as vital agricultural resources. Similarly, Article 48A mandates environmental and wildlife protection but does not establish inherent animal worth. Furthermore, under the Fundamental Duties, Articles 51A(g) and (h) require compassion for living creatures yet do not confer justiciable animal rights. While appearing progressive, the constitutional provisions did not enshrine broader animal rights.
The Constituent Assembly Debates reveal that Article 48’s intent was limited to protecting cows due to their Hindu significance, not extending it to all animals. A proposal to make cow protection a Fundamental Right was rejected, as these rights were construed as exclusively human, further underscoring the Constitution’s absence of an actual animal rights paradigm. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1960 expanded upon its 1890 predecessor, broadening the definitions of ‘animals’ to “any living creature other than human beings” and ‘cruelty’ to include “willful administration of injurious substances” and “failure to keep animals adequately nourished.” However, it remained anchored in anthropocentrism. The Act’s proponents, including Rukhmini Arundale, focused on preventing “inhumane use” rather than questioning animal use altogether. This led to the problematic concept of “unnecessary pain or suffering,” exempting cruelty in scientific experimentation, education, and training under the guise of necessity.
Problematically, the Act grants broad judicial discretion to determine “unnecessary pain or suffering” case-by-case without clear guidelines to restrict human privilege. This tension was evident in People for Elimination of Stray Troubles vs. State of Goa & Ors., where euthanasia was approved for stray dog population control, though later stayed by the Supreme Court in Animal Welfare Board of India vs. People for Elimination of Stray Troubles & Ors. Enforcement remains a critical weakness. Section 11 of the Act comprehensively outlines various forms of cruelty, but penalties are disproportionately low. First offenses attract only a fifty rupee fine, while subsequent offenses within three years may incur up to a hundred rupee fine or three months imprisonment. These trivial penalties fail to create a deterrent effect, rendering the legislation largely symbolic.
This enforcement approach echoes Kantian philosophy, which grounds animal protection as a duty humans owe themselves rather than recognizing animals as rights-bearers. It excludes animals from moral consideration, protecting their interests only insofar as it serves human interests. This philosophical underpinning results in an impotent legislative framework prioritizing avoiding inconvenience to human perpetrators over meaningful animal protection.
The Judiciary’s Progressive Yet Ambiguous Overarching Principles
The Indian Judiciary has made significant strides in animal welfare jurisprudence, transcending the anthropocentrism prevalent in legislative discourse. Courts have elevated animal rights to be on par with human rights, grounding them in intrinsic worth rather than human duty. However, the judiciary has struggled to anchor these rights within a specific theoretical framework, resulting in promising but normatively weak jurisprudence.
Firstly, the Animal Welfare Board of India vs Nagaraj &Ors. shows the exact epitome. The Supreme Court, in the Nagaraj case, addressed the conflict between the traditional practice of Jallikattu and animal welfare principles. The Court banned Jallikattu, interpreting "unnecessary pain" as pain that could be reasonably minimized or avoided. It held that the infliction of pain is permissible only when it serves a legitimate purpose, such as benefiting the animal or humans, a view consistent with Cass Sunstein’s stance against causing undue suffering to animals. The Court determined that this communal tradition subjected bulls to pain and suffering that was neither necessary nor justifiable. Instead of serving a legitimate purpose, these actions—such as agitating bulls by rubbing irritants in their eyes and force-feeding them alcohol to retrieve a coin tied to the bull’s horn—were primarily driven by selfish human interests.
However, the Court struggled to establish a clear constitutional foundation for animal rights, oscillating between Fundamental Duties (Article 51A(g) and (h)) and Fundamental Rights (Article 21). Fundamental Duties position animal protection as a means to human ends, emphasizing human responsibility as a moral and civic obligation. In contrast, when extended to animals, Fundamental Rights suggest they possess inherent rights to life, dignity, and honor, viewing them as ends in themselves. This creates a paradox: while fundamental duties frame animals as instrumental to human welfare, fundamental rights grant them intrinsic value and independence from human interests, leading to conflicting premises that complicate practical implementation.
Similarly, in the Animals and Birds Charitable Trust vs Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, the Bombay High Court banned horse-drawn carriage rides in Mumbai, citing the Nagaraj precedent. The Court found these rides violated Sections 3 and 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, acknowledging the unnecessary suffering inflicted on the animals solely for recreational purposes. However, the High Court perpetuated the same ambiguity by alternating between anchoring animal rights in Article 21 and Article 51A(g) and (h). This reinforced the unresolved tension between viewing humans as trustees with duties towards animals and recognizing animals as independent right-bearers with intrinsic dignity.
Navigating Complexities: Circumventing Anthropocene Jurisprudence
This section enunciates reforms to address the gaps in India’s legislative and juridical discourse on animal rights.
Legislative Solutions: Addressing Animal Rights in Law-Making
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1960, despite its progressive intent, fails to provide adequate penalties to deter animal abuse effectively. This inadequacy stems from deeply entrenched anthropocentric views and requires multifaceted solutions:
Overcoming Speciesism: Implementing Proportionality in Legislation:
The transition from speciesism to proportionality is crucial. Speciesism, the root cause of trivial penalties, stems from public policymakers hierarchizing humans over animals. Peter Singer, a renowned animal rights scholar, advocates overcoming this entrenched speciesism by establishing a nexus between humans and non-humans based on their capacity to suffer. Singer argues that both species possess an equivalent capacity to suffer, thus commanding equal protection for their rights. This perspective aligns with Jeremy Bentham’s ideological position, which supports sentience over rationality as the criterion for protection.
To ensure animal rights are no longer subservient to human interests, proportional penalties must be incorporated. Proportionality in the criminal justice system entails fairness towards both the offender and society, as crimes are construed as being committed against society. The current penalties – a mere fifty rupees for first offenses – fail on both parameters of fairness. They are neither harsh enough to be unfair to offenders nor effective in achieving the legislation’s objective of preventing unnecessary pain or suffering to animals, as outlined in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.
Enhancing Deterrence: Strengthening Existing Penalties:
To prevent cruelty, penalties must be substantially increased to ensure proportionality to the offense’s gravity. The criminal justice system requires allocating resources with the underlying motive of precluding crime commission, hence the need for a deterrence effect. While American jurisprudence, such as California State Laws imposing fines up to $20,000 and one-year imprisonment for animal abuse, offers a reference point, direct transposition would be inappropriate given differing societal conditions. To this end, the Animal Welfare Act 2011, though not passed, could be given effect, as it proposed more substantial penalties: fines up to 25,000 rupees and two years’ imprisonment for first offenses and up to 100,000 rupees or three years imprisonment for subsequent offenses. Such increased penalties, while seemingly severe, are necessary to counter entrenched anthropocentrism and prevent recurring animal abuse.
Implementing Graduated Punishments Based on Offense Severity:
Offenses must be segregated based on gravity rather than treating all offenses under one umbrella. This approach is already prevalent in the Indian criminal justice system, as exemplified by the Indian Penal Code’s differentiation between simple hurt (Section 323), and grievous hurt (Section 325). Such categorization ensures that punishments remain proportional to the severity of the offense, avoiding situations where vastly different degrees of harm result in identical punishments.
Judicial Approaches: Evolving Animal Rights through Court Decisions
The Supreme Court in the Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja & Ors. case unequivocally accorded animals the five freedoms: freedom from pain, injury, and disease; heat stress or physical discomfort; hunger, thirst, and malnutrition; fear and distress; and freedom to manifest standard behavioral patterns. These freedoms, previously existing only in international forums like the Terrestrial Animal Health Code formulated by the World Organization for Animal Health, were thus incorporated into domestic jurisprudence.
However, despite this progressive stance, the judiciary needs to address existing vagueness and inconsistencies:
Establishing Robust Precedents: Incremental Extension of Dignity Rights:
While the Indian judiciary has progressively extended Article 21 applicability to animals, it hasn’t expounded on the limitations and nuances of this application. The judiciary has transitioned from conventional anthropocentric premises but remains irresolute in constructing an underlying normative framework. To this end, reference to comparative jurisprudence can provide instructive contrast. The Swiss Federal Court, in a case concerning animal testing, invoked dignity rights for animals but confined them to non-human primates. This approach, prioritizing genetic proximity to humans, contrasts with recognizing animals’ intrinsic worth regardless of similarity to humans. While India's Supreme Court aligns better with animal rights by not limiting rights to genetically similar animals, it creates a theory-practice paradox by granting dignity rights without defining animal dignity. Despite its flaws, the Swiss approach of gradually conferring dignity rights proves more effective than vague rhetoric that widens the gap between theory and reality.
Professor David Favre advocates conferring rights to selective animals based on prevalent socio-political considerations. An example is Nepal’s jurisprudence in Advocate Padam Bahadur Shrestha vs. Government of Nepal and Others, which selectively accorded dignity rights to cows, prohibiting their slaughter. In this regard, the Indian judiciary should cautiously extend animal dignity rights based on existing socio-economic-political consensus. This approach prevents a theory-reality gap where animals' intrinsic worth, though recognized in principle, could be easily compromised for human interests.
Defining Clear Criteria for Applying Animal Rights Frameworks:
The Nagaraja Case privileged animal rights over cultural rights but failed to articulate the underlying premise for balancing these conflicting rights. This ambiguity allows human-side proponents to utilize the precedent in other conflicting cases, potentially undermining animal rights. Indian jurisprudence entails diverse religious and cultural traditions often conflicting with other prevailing rights. This conflict becomes more critical when involving minority communities, as marginalized groups within minorities are usually seconded. Animals, unable to engage with the law to protect their rights and capabilities, are particularly vulnerable in these conflicts. Unless a normative framework is put in place, the conflict between animal rights, on the one hand, and human cultural rights, on the other, could inevitably lead towards the latter’s win.
Conclusion
In conclusion, advancing animal rights in India requires legislative and judicial reforms. Legislatively, penalties must be increased and differentiated based on offense severity to create a genuine deterrent effect. Judicially, the courts must develop a more nuanced approach to extending dignity rights to animals and establish clear standards for resolving conflicts between animal rights and cultural practices. These reforms would help bridge the gap between progressive judicial articulations and practical implementation, creating a more robust and effective animal rights regime in India.
The path forward requires a delicate balance between recognizing animals’ intrinsic worth and navigating the complex socio-cultural landscape of India. It demands a gradual but steady shift in both legal frameworks and societal attitudes, guided by principles of compassion, fairness, and respect for all sentient beings.
