Creation of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program
To wage this war, the United States recruited Afghan interpreters, translators, and other on-the-ground allies through two major programs. The first program was created by Section 1059 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This provision allowed for up to 50 Afghan nationals who had worked directly for U.S. Armed Forces for at least one year as translators, in addition to their spouses and children, to obtain lawful permanent resident (LPR) status per year. The provision was expanded in 2007 to allow for interpreters to qualify for the same program.
The second program targeted Afghan nationals employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan. It was established by Title VI of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 with an initial cap of 1,500 principal aliens per year from FY’09 until FY’13. Subsequent legislation added visas to this program, including the 2017 NDAA which provided an additional 8,500 visas. The FY’20 NDAA placed a numerical cap of 22,500 on the number of principal aliens who could receive special immigrant visas after December 18, 2014. However, the Emergency Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 expanded the cap to 34,500 since December 19, 2014.
Afghan SIV Program Post-Withdrawal
Prior to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, estimates ranged between approximately 50,000 to 100,000 individuals who would benefit from these immigration programs, including the family members of principal applicants. In withdrawing from Afghanistan, the U.S. airlifted 65,000 Afghans to the United States, U.S. military bases abroad, and foreign countries, where many await SIV processing. Yet, according to an unnamed senior State Department official, a majority of SIV-eligible individuals may have been left behind when the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan. If history is any guide, anyone who aided the U.S. that remains in Afghanistan is likely to be a top target for Taliban attacks. In response to the chaotic American retreat, the State Department Inspector General announced that it will be investigating the agency’s role in withdrawing from Afghanistan. The result of this investigation remains to be seen.
Conclusion
With the U.S. having already withdrawn from Afghanistan, it is uncertain what more, if anything, can be done to fulfill the promise made to Afghans who aided the U.S. government during the war. At a minimum, it is essential that special immigrant visa applications be processed as expeditiously as possible. Civil society groups and Congress have a strong role to play in ensuring that the Administration processes them in a timely manner and that all approved applicants are effectively resettled in the United States. It is also worth considering whether military or clandestine activities may be justified to save at least some individuals who remain in Afghanistan. However, this is a risky endeavor that could lead to suboptimal results. Regardless, the United States has a responsibility to do everything in its power to ensure that SIV status is granted to the maximum number of qualifying applicants without delay. We owe our allies no less.