I. Background
In contrast to many of its neighbors, Kyrgyzstan has long been recognized both internally and externally as a country with a robust civil society and vibrant free press. In recent years, however, Kyrgyzstan has seen a marked departure from these traditions. During Sadyr Japarov’s presidency, the Kyrgyz government has cracked down on independent media outlets and journalists as well as human rights defenders more broadly, as the government appears to be closing civic space and suppressing voices of dissent.
Japarov was elected President of the Central Asian country in January 2021. Upon winning the election, Japarov reportedly promised to “rule the country with an open government free of corruption.” Yet human rights defenders, activists, and lawyers expressed concerns from the beginning about “the concentration of power in the hands of one individual,” apparent “disregard towards the law, and authoritarianism.”
During Japarov’s time in office, the Kyrgyz government has received repeated criticism both internally and internationally for suppressing public discourse and waging a “campaign against free media.” Sweeping legislative reform has coincided with what has been described as a “pattern” of attacks on media outlets, individual journalists, and bloggers. Japarov’s government has reportedly engaged in information manipulation and attacks on free media and investigative journalism and stifled civic engagement more broadly. Government action taken against these news sources has ranged from raids on outlets’ premises and journalists’ homes, confiscation of media equipment, blocking websites, freezing bank accounts, sealing offices, and the arrest, detention and prosecution of journalists. The State Committee for National Security, led by Kamchybek Tashiev, has played a central role in this effort.Human rights groups have criticized President Japarov’s government specifically “for using the ‘mass unrest’ charge as a tool to muzzle dissent and impose stricter control over independent media.”
While democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan preceded the election of President Japarov, the consolidation of powers and weakening of democratic checks under Japarov, accompanied by attacks on civil society and independent media, resulted in it landing on Freedom House’s “consolidated authoritarian regime” list in 2022 and 2023. Kyrgyzstan also fell 50 places in Reporters without Border’s Press Freedom Index in 2023, now ranking 122 out of 180 countries. In December 2023, the CIVICUS Monitor downgraded the rating of Kyrgyzstan’s civic space from ‘obstructed’ to ‘repressed.’ And in March 2024, the CIVICUS Monitor included Kyrgyzstan in its “Watchlist of countries experiencing a rapid decline in civic freedoms.”
The Kyrgyz government’s conduct vis-à-vis the media has also drawn the attention of the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) government, among others. In January 2023, the U.S. Senate sent a letter to President Japarov, expressing its “deep concern over recent regressions in press freedom” in Kyrgyzstan. The U.S. Senate Letter expressed “alarm[]” at the government’s recent crackdown and highlighted specifically the case of Radio Azattyk and the use of the Law on False Information “as a means to censor or silence critical independent media outlets.” The Senate members cautioned President Japarov that the action taken against Radio Azattyk, including blocking websites and freezing its bank account, could jeopardize Kyrgyzstan’s “international reputation as a beacon of free speech in Central Asia” and urged the Kyrgyz government to lift the restrictions on the media outlet. They also called on the Kyrgyz government to “cease unlawful attacks on free and independent media,” and to “investigate all credible threats of violence against journalists.”
On 13 July 2023, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the crackdown on the media and freedom of expression in Kyrgyzstan. The resolution called on Kyrgyz authorities “to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression.” It also called on Kyrgyz authorities and members of the Kyrgyz Parliament “to revoke and withdraw the controversial law on ‘false information’ and to review the draft laws on ‘foreign representatives’[and] ‘mass media’[.]” Then in December 2023, the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, delivered a speech on the EU’s “extreme[] concern[]” about Kyrgyzstan’s “recent decisions around freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom of the media,” including the draft Law on Mass Media. In his speech, he highlighted the case of Bolot Temirov as a “serious threat[] against human rights activists and journalists” as well as the court decision to close Radio Azattyk.
In January 2024, raids on the offices of multiple news outlets and the arrest of current and former journalists sparked renewed international outcry against the government’s apparent media crackdown. On 16 January 2024, eight human rights groups – including Human Rights Watch and Civil Rights Defenders—issued a joint statement calling on Kyrgyz authorities to drop the criminal cases initiated against media outlets and journalists. The UN Human Rights Office Spokesperson also issued a statement in which she noted that “[t]hese latest actions by authorities appear to be part of a larger pattern of pressure against civil society activists, journalists and other critics of the authorities.” Two days later, the U.S. State Department issued a similar statement, calling the raids and arrests part of a “pattern of government activity that appears aimed at stifling public debate and free expression.”
The Kyrgyz government’s actions coming under fire for restricting the media and stifling free expression include sweeping constitutional and legislative changes as well as actions taken against specific outlets and individuals, including Bolot Temirov, Temirov Live, 24.kg, Radio Azattyk, Kloop Media, and bloggers. The organization Reporters Without Borders has described the crackdown as “an unprecedented danger” facing Kyrgyzstan’s independent media.
II. Constitutional and Legislative Reform
Japarov and his government laid the groundwork for suppressing media freedom through sweeping legislative and constitutional reform beginning early in his presidency. These reforms have consolidated power in the executive and increased restrictions on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and media outlets.
A. Constitutional Reform Consolidating Power
Within months of Japarov assuming office—in April 2021—voters approved a new constitution that strengthened the presidency. The constitutional amendments adopted in 2021 granted the president the power (previously held by parliament) to appoint and dismiss judges and to appoint the prosecutor general. The “overly prominent role of the President in relation to” both the prosecutor’s office and the judiciary, suggest that the raids, prosecutions, and termination of independent media outlets and journalists discussed herein are politically motivated.
During the drafting process, the U.S. Government and others expressed concerns over the potential consolidation of power enabled by the new constitution, urging the Kyrgyz government and members of parliament to take action to preserve “the balance of power among the branches of government,” remove “language that could be used to unduly restrict the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” and eliminate “provisions that could curtail civil society.” The Venice Commission and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) similarly expressed concerns about the “overly prominent role of the President” in relation to the executive branch as well as the judiciary and local administrations. And the European Parliament described the new constitution as “hastily drafted.”
The concerns highlighted in the Venice Commission and ODIHR Joint Opinion issued prior to Kyrgyzstan’s adoption of the constitutional reform included inter alia:
(i) Article 10 on the mass media.
Specifically, the Joint Opinion highlights Article 10(4)’s statement that “[i]n order to protect the younger generation, activities that contradict moral and ethical values and public consciences of the people of the Kyrgyz Republic may be restricted by law.”
The Venice Commission/ODIHR’s report recalls ICCPR Article 19’s limited reasons to restrict freedom of expression and notes that the language of Article 10(4) “appears unduly broad and vague to comply with the principle of legal certainty and should be removed entirely.”
The concerning language on mass media remains in the adopted Constitution. The language in Article 10 bears directly on the government’s current actions against independent journalists and media outlets.
(ii) Article 66(3)’s statement that the President is the “guarantor of the Constitution, human and civil rights and freedoms.”
The Venice Commission and ODIHR cautioned that referring to the President as “guarantor” of these rights and freedoms “may place him or her beyond the constitutional order.” They deemed the function of securing rights and freedoms to be a task of the judiciary, and recommended the removal of this provision.
The concerning language in Article 66 remains in the adopted Constitution.
(iii) Article 105’s designation of the role of the prosecutor’s office including the supervision of “the exact and uniform implementation of laws and other normative acts,” a supervisory model deemed “reminiscent of the old Soviet ‘prokuratura’ model.”
The Venice Commission and ODIHR called for the removal of both the Prosecutor’s role of supervision and the Prosecutor General’s power to initiate laws pursuant to Article 85.
The concerning grants of authority/power in both Article 85 and Article 105 remain in the adopted Constitution. The complaint filed against Kloop Media, discussed below, specifically refers to Article 105’s grant of authority to the Prosecutor’s Office.
B. Legislative Reform Restricting Civic Space & Media Freedom
The Kyrgyz government also passed a number of restrictive laws and initiated others since Japarov assumed the presidency. These laws—including the Law “On Protection from Inaccurate (False) Information,” the so-called “Law on Foreign Representatives,” and the draft Law “On the Mass Media”— arguably aid in suppressing critical voices and curtailing media freedom.
1. Law on Protection from Inaccurate (False ) Information
The Kyrgyzstan parliament passed the Law on Protection from Inaccurate (False) Information on 28 July 2021. President Japarov signed it into law on 24 August 2021. The law authorizes a state body to block or shut down websites containing information that it deems false or inaccurate. It may do so without a court order.
In its December 2022 Concluding Observations to Kyrgyzstan, the Human Rights Committee expressed its concern about the law, specifically the provisions “which allow executive bodies to block any Internet resource without due process and without any preceding judicial oversight.” The Committee urged the government to review the law and “ensure effective safeguards and judicial overview of all decisions on blocking media sources[.]” To date, there is no indication that the Kyrgyz government has undertaken such review.
2. Law on Foreign Representatives
In March 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed amendments to the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Non-Commercial Organizations.” Despite calls to veto the controversial bill, President Japarov signed it into law on 2 April 2024. According to critics, the law, which they have dubbed “The Law on Foreign Representatives,” closely resembles both a 2014 proposed Draft Law on “Foreign Agents” and Russia’s foreign agent legislation.
The new law complicates the rules of creation and performance of activities for civil society organizations and independent media. It classifies externally-funded media and non-profit organizations that run media outlets as “foreign representatives,” requiring special registration. The law reportedly requires organizations “designated as ‘foreign representatives’ to label their publications as being produced by a foreign representative.” The law also grants government authorities “sweeping powers of oversight” over the activities of ‘foreign representatives,’ including authority to suspend or shut down non-profits for alleged violations of the law.
The law has been heavily criticized and organizations such as the International Partnership for Human Rights have cautioned that the law enables authorities “to arbitrarily discredit and obstruct the work of foreign-funded NGOs” and poses “a direct and serious threat” to Kyrgyzstan’s civil society.
3. Law on Mass Media
According to the government’s website, a new draft mass media law published by the Presidential Administration on 14 May 2023 was developed to take into account “changes in the information and communication environment in order to form the social responsibility of journalists and legal culture in the media sphere.”
But the UN and human rights groups have a different view. Reporters without Borders criticized the draft law for its “[v]ague references to ‘abuse of freedom of expression’ and respect for ‘traditional moral values’,” which the organization contends facilitate censorship. Moreover, the government would be responsible for approving or rejecting media outlets’ registration requests and “[u]nregistered media would be regarded as illegal.”
The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression raised several concerns with the draft law, including its (i) overly broad and generalized application of the law; (ii) mandatory registration of the mass media; (iii) restrictions on foreign media, and (iv) severe restrictions on content.
According to the Special Rapporteur’s assessment, the restrictions on foreign media could “seriously impede the right of Kyrgyz citizen[s] to access information.” The Special Rapporteur also cautioned that the bill’s “one-size-fits all approach . . . risks creating overly broad and vague obligations” and diminishes legal certainty. She noted that the mandatory registration requirement imposes “undue barriers for media outlets to operate” and “disregards the diversity of the media, which also includes citizen-journalism bloggers and others. . . .” Regarding content restrictions, the Special Rapporteur stated explicitly that the draft law’s restrictions on freedom of expression “prima facie go beyond the permitted restrictions on freedom of expression[.]”
In 13 March 2024, Japarov’s administration withdrew the draft law from Parliament, reportedly following a meeting with media representatives.
III. Select Cases
“The [UN Human Rights] Committee remains concerned about reports of undue government pressure on human rights defenders, lawyers, politicians, journalists and other individuals for expressing their opinion, in particular opinions that are critical of the Government’s initiatives, including the initiation of criminal proceedings against bloggers and journalists.”
- Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of Kyrgyzstan, 9 December 2022
A. Bolot Temirov and Temirov Live
One of the most high profile cases in Kyrgyzstan’s media crackdown is that of Bolot Temirov. Mr. Temirov, a human rights defender and journalist, was born in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and held dual citizenship from Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation. He founded the non-profit organization New Media and the YouTube-based media outlet Temirov Live, a digital platform offering investigative reports on state corruption in Kyrgyzstan.
On 22 January 2022, narcotics police arrested Temirov following a raid of Temirov Live’s office in Bishkek. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists and the Northwestern Pritzer School of Law Center for International Human Rights, police “seized property far beyond the scope of the purported charges, including journalistic equipment, computers, laptops, memory cards, a mobile phone, and video recorders connected to the office’s cameras.” Police claimed that they found drugs in Mr. Temirov’s pocket during the search, an allegation that was ultimately used to arrest, detain and charge Mr. Temirov. The raid and reportedly “dubious” drug charge came just days after Temirov released a video investigation on YouTube alleging corruption by family members of Kamchybek Tashiev, head of the State Committee for National Security.
In April 2022, the Kyrgyz government filed additional charges against Mr. Temirov—for forgery of documents (a Kyrgyz passport and Kyrgyz military ID), and for repeatedly crossing the border illegally using the allegedly fraudulently obtained passport. These additional charges were filed the day after his media outlet Temirov Live reportedly released another investigative video regarding National Security head Tashiev’s family’s alleged corruption.
Mr. Temirov was ultimately “stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forcibly deported” to the Russian Federation on 23 November 2022. The arrest took place in the courtroom and Mr. Temirov was reportedly denied access to his lawyers for more than three hours. He is banned from re-entering Kyrgyzstan for five years.
Despite Mr. Temirov’s removal from the country, government authorities continue to target Temirov Live. On 16 January 2024, police conducted searches of Temirov Live’s office and the homes of 11 former and current reporters of Temirov Live. The 11 journalists were arrested on charges of “calling for disobedience and mass riots” under Criminal Code article 278(3) in connection with their reporting.
On 12 March 2024, a Kyrgyz court extended pre-trial detention for 8 of the 11 current and former journalists arrested on 16 January for an additional two months and moved three others to house arrest. Then in April, another four (former) Temirov Live journalists were released, making a total of seven journalists under house arrest or other supervision (e.g., a travel ban).
Three current and one former Temirov Live journalists/staff members remain in pretrial detention, including Bolot Temirov’s wife and Temirov Live director, Makhabat Tazhibek-kyzy. The other three remaining in custody are: investigative reporter Aike Beishekeyeva, media worker Azamat Ishenbekov, and former Temirov Live journalist Aktilek Kaparov. All 11 continue to face charges for inciting mass unrest under Article 278(3) of the criminal code, which carries a sentence of up to 8 years in jail.
The Clooney Foundation’s TrialWatch reported “numerous irregularities in the proceedings against” Makhabat Tazhibek-kyzy and her co-defendants, including arrests without showing warrants, no notice of the basis for the charges against them, and “the court’s failure to specify any reason for their detention.” In addition to these irregularities, Tazhibek-kyzy reported being physically assaulted while in detention. According to reports, the physical assault took place on 4 April 2024, leaving the journalist and human rights defender with bruises on her arms and face.
B. 24.KG
On 15 January 2024—the day before police raided Temirov Live’s office—State Committee for National Security employees searched 24.KG’s office and took the news agency’s general director and editors-in-chief for questioning in connection with a “propaganda of war” criminal case. While officially the (online) media outlet is being investigated for war propaganda in connection with an article on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, suspicions have begun to emerge that “the criminal case being built against 24.kg is merely a pretext to force it to tone down its reporting.”
The director and editors were reportedly held for interrogation for almost four hours. They were released that day, but Founder and General Director Asel Otorbaeva and editor-in-chief Makhinur Niyazova were summoned to the State Committee for National Security the next day for additional questioning. The State Committee for National Security sealed 24.KG’s office following the raid and reportedly refused to re-open the office for weeks.
In mid-March, two months after the raid, the Ministry of Justice announced a change in the media outlet’s ownership, with Founder and Director Otorbaeva leaving the outlet after 18 years. Otorbaeva has reportedly attributed her decision to step down to health and family reasons and specifically denied on social media rumors that the outlet has been “taken over by elements close to the ruling regime[.]” Around the same time, Niyazova reportedly posted on social media that she was unaware of the ownership change and was quitting her position.
On 3 April 2024, the State Committee for National Security suspended the criminal case against 24.KG.
C. Radio Azattyk
Radio Azattyk is the local affiliate of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (a broadcaster funded by the U.S. Congress). Operating out of Bishkek, it provides a source for independent news in Kyrgyzstan with reporting in Kyrgyz and Russian languages. According to its website, “Radio Azattyk has been a major media outlet in Kyrgyzstan for 70 years.” It reports on “corruption and abuse of authority,” which it contends “has led to shake-ups in the government.” The media outlet reportedly recorded 22 million combined website visits and over 112 million video views on YouTube in 2021.
On 26 October 2022, the Kyrgyz government blocked Radio Azattyk’s websites pursuant to the Law on Protection from False Information over its reporting on a border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The block came after Radio Azattyk refused to remove a video report on the border clashes, which the Ministry of Culture, Information, Sport and Youth (herein Ministry of Culture) claimed to be “‘unreliable’ and ‘contrary to the national interests of the Kyrgyz Republic.’”
Five days later, on 31 October 2022, the government reportedly froze Radio Azattyk’s bank accounts. It has been reported that the instruction to freeze the accounts was made by the State Committee on National Security. One of the banks reportedly stated in a Facebook post and letter to Radio Azattyk in early November 2022 that the account was frozen pursuant to the Law “On countering the financing of terrorist activities and the legalization (laundering) of criminal proceeds.”
In December 2022, authorities declared the website ban indefinite—until the media outlet removed the video. Then in January 2023, the Ministry of Culture applied to the courts to shut down Radio Azattyk for its reporting on the border conflict. The ministry alleged that the outlet’s reporting, which provided airtime to both the Kyrgyz and Tajik governments, “contain[ed] ‘propaganda of war, violence and cruelty’” in violation of the law “On the Mass Media.”
On 27 April 2023, a district court in Bishkek granted the Ministry’s request to terminate Radio Azattyk’s operations. However, that decision was ultimately annulled by the Bishkek City Court on 12 July 2023 after the media outlet and Ministry reached an agreement. As part of that agreement, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty changed the general protocol for storing content on its sites, as a result of which, the disputed video was no longer available for viewing.
D. Kloop Media
Just a month later—in August 2023— the Bishkek city prosecutor’s office filed a complaint against Kloop Media Public Foundation (“Kloop Media”). Kloop Media was founded in 2007 and is known for independent reporting on national and regional affairs, including reporting that is critical of the government.
The complaint alleges that Kloop Media, which runs the independent online news outlet Kloop.kg, was conducting media activity outside its charter. The case against Kloop Media reportedly stems from an allegation by the State Committee for National Security that Kloop published materials “‘aimed at sharply criticizing the polices of the current government’ and that ‘most of the publications are . . . aimed at discrediting representatives of state and municipal bodies.’” The State Committee for National Security reportedly initiated the investigation into the foundation’s activities in November 2021, “on suspicion that Kloop Media publications had violated” Kyrgyzstan’s criminal code, article 327, which criminalizes “‘making public calls for the violent seizure of power.’”
In its complaint, the Bishkek city prosecutor’s office accused Kloop Media of damaging authorities’ reputation through reports critical of the government. The prosecutor’s office was very transparent that it was taking action against Kloop Media because of reporting critical of the government and government representatives. It asserted that materials published on Kloop’s website and social media platforms “intentionally sharply criticize the policies of the current authorities” and that “a significant portion of the publications is strictly negative and aimed at discrediting representatives of state and municipal authorities.”
Headlines specifically identified as problematic in the complaint include, among others:
- “Brave election pollsters from KLOOP: Who are they?”
- “How to properly appeal election violations: a guide from KLOOP.”
- “Democrats, political scientists, and the two-faced Central Election Commission: how KLOOP analyzed election data and what came out of it”; and
- “Dear Sadyr Nurgozhoyevich…What prompted the Central Election Commission to cancel the results of the April elections?”
Kloop’s Russian language and Kyrgyz language websites were blocked in September 2023 and November 2023, respectively, “amid a government campaign to pressure the Kloop Media Public Foundation.” The Culture Ministry reportedly explained blocking the sites was due to a claim by the State Committee for National Security that the media outlet distributed false information in connection to a report appearing on Kloop’s website “about jailed opposition politician Ravshan Jeenbekov,” which included a statement Jeenbekov made about being tortured while in custody.
On 9 February 2024, the Oktyabr District Court in Bishkek ruled “to liquidate the Kloop Media Public Foundation, the main owner of the Kloop news agency[.]” On 19 March 2024, the Administrative Court of Bishkek reversed the Culture Ministry’s decision to block Kloop’s Russian-language website. However, the State Committee for National Security appealed that decision to the Bishkek City Court in April.
Liquidation proceedings against Kloop Media Public Foundation are ongoing. On 17 May 2024, the Bishkek City Court refused to consider the appeal of Kloop Media's lawyers against the decision of the Oktyabr District Court on the liquidation of Kloop Media, citing procedural violations during the filing of the appeal.
E. ‘Citizen Journalists’ and Bloggers
The government’s crackdown extends beyond formal media outlets and professional journalists, with bloggers and “citizen journalists” speaking out against the government facing prosecution and potential prison sentences. Those identified in this report are examples of such action, but certainly not exhaustive.
1. Aftandil Jorobekov
Aftandil Jorobekov is a civic activist and blogger. He administers the Bespredel.kg social media accounts, which reportedly has over 125,000 followers. On 6 December 2023, Mr. Jorobekov posted a video on Facebook in which he opposed the government’s proposed changes to the Kyrgyzstan flag. Jorobekov was detained the next day, and on 8 December, Kyrgyz authorities reportedly searched his home, confiscated laptop computers, phones, a flash drive and hard disk.
On 8 December 2023, the Sverdlovsk District Court of Bishkek issued a decision on the selection of preventive measures against Mr. Jorobekov in the form of imprisonment for two months. Mr. Jorobekov has been charged with calling for incitement to mass disorder (mass riots) in violation of Article 278 of the criminal code and calling for active disobedience to authorities’ demands. If convicted, Mr. Jorobekov could be sentenced for up to eight years in prison.
On 29 February 2024, the hearing of the criminal case began in the Lenin District Court in Bishkek. However, on 20 March 2024, the court on its own initiative appointed a commission examination and suspended the criminal proceedings for an indefinite period.
2. Egemberdiev Oljobay Shakirovich (Oljobay Shakir)
Oljobay Shakir is an opposition writer, journalist, publicist and blogger. Shakir was detained by national security authorities on 23 August 2023 under suspicion of committing a crime of calling for mass riots in violation of Article 278 part 3. On 24 August 2023, the Pervomaisky District Court of Bishkek ordered Shakir to stay in the State Committee for National Security pre-trial detention center for two months.
On the eve of his arrest, Mr. Shakir reportedly published a post in which he stated that on 31 August 2023, he intended to hold a peaceful rally against the government’s decision to transfer four resorts in the Issyk-Kul region to Uzbekistan. The State Committee for National Security alleged that Shakir made “publications of a provocative nature, containing calls for active disobedience to the legal demands of government officials and mass unrest.”
Mr. Shakir’s trial began in November 2023 in the Alamedin District Court of Bishkek; however, due to a judicial re-assignment, the case was transferred to a different judge in February and re-opened on 12 March 2024. On 14 May 2024, the Alamedin court sentenced Mr. Shakir to five years in prison on the charge of calling for mass unrest.
IV. Legal Analysis
The recent and ongoing actions taken by the Kyrgyz government against numerous media outlets and individual journalists and bloggers violate a host of international human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to freedom of expression, the right of peaceful assembly, and freedom from arbitrary detention. The analysis below focuses on the parameters of these rights as set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and provides brief application of the treaty provisions to the government’s actions.
A. Freedom of Expression
1. Kyrgyzstan’s Obligation to Protect Freedom of Expression Pursuant to ICCPR Article 19
ICCPR Article 19 guarantees that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression,” which includes the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds . . . .” The obligation to respect this right is binding on Kyrgyzstan, as a State party to the Covenant. The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, the body responsible for interpreting the ICCPR and monitoring State compliance, has emphasized repeatedly that freedom of opinion and freedom of expression “constitute the foundation stone for every free and democratic society.”
Freedom of expression is a necessary condition for transparency and accountability, which, are “essential for the promotion and protection of human rights.” The Committee recognizes that the ICCPR places a particularly high value “on uninhibited expression” of “public debate in a democratic society concerning figures in the public and political domain.” Indeed, in its recent decision in Maslova v. Kyrgyzstan, the Committee expounded that “[a]ll public figures, including those exercising the highest political authority such as heads of State, are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition.”
“All public figures, including those exercising the highest political authority such as heads of State, are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition.”
- Maslova v. Kyrgyzstan, Comm’n No. 3252/2018 (2024)
Any restriction placed upon the right to freedom of expression “constitutes a serious curtailment of human rights,” and therefore must be provided for by law and justified as necessary and proportionate. Necessity can be established based upon two grounds: (i) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; or (ii) for the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.
Even when a State party invokes a legitimate ground for a restriction on expression, the restriction imposed must not be overbroad in nature. Rather, restrictive measures must be the least intrusive means for achieving their protective function. In other words, the State must establish “a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat” for which the restriction was imposed.
In its General Comment No. 34, which elaborates on the guarantees encompassed in ICCPR Article 19, the Committee warns that Article 19(3) “may never be invoked as justification for the muzzling of any advocacy of multi-party democracy, democratic tenets and human rights.”
As discussed above, the Kyrgyz government through various legal reforms undertaken by the in recent years has placed restrictions on the right to freedom of expression. The necessity of these laws is not clear; nor do the laws appear to be proportionate. Constitution Article 10 on mass on mass media appears to be overbroad and lack legal certainty; the law on false information permits blocking internet sources without due process or judicial oversight; and the so-called law on foreign representatives is broad in nature, with no immediate connection to any perceived threat.
2. Special Emphasis on Freedom of Expression for Journalists, the Media, and Informal News Sources
The Human Rights Committee—both through its jurisprudence and in General Comment No. 34—has emphasized the importance of freedom of expression for the media in particular. In its 2021 decision in Aliya Ismagulova and Rozlana Taukina v. Kazakhstan, the Committee called specific attention to freedom of opinion and expression in the media context, stating that a free, uncensored and unhindered press (and other media) is essential in any society to ensure not only freedom of opinion and expression, but also the enjoyment of other Covenant rights. In Maslova v. Kyrgyzstan, the Committee reiterated this notion and went further, explaining that this "implies a free press and other media able to comment on public issues without censorship or restraint and to inform public opinion.”
General Comment No. 34 similarly underscores the importance of protecting the right to freedom of expression for journalists. Any government restrictions imposed “on the operation of websites, blogs or any other internet-based, electronic or other such information dissemination system” is permissible only “to the extent that they are compatible with paragraph 3 [of ICCPR Article 19].”
The Committee makes clear that in the case of journalists or media outlets, restrictions compatible with Article 19(3) are necessarily limited. For example, it cannot be deemed consistent with 19(3) to prohibit a website or an information dissemination system from publishing material solely on the basis that it may be critical of the government or the political social system espoused by the government.” Nor is it compatible with Article 19(3) to invoke laws restricting expression “to suppress or withhold from the public information of legitimate public interest that does not harm national security or to prosecute journalists. . . human rights defenders, or others, for having disseminated such information.”
Furthermore, the “penalization of a media outlet, publishers or journalists solely for being critical of the government or the political social system espoused by the government can never a necessary restriction of freedom of expression.” Indeed, the UN Human Rights Committee in its 2022 Concluding Observations to Kyrgyzstan urged the government to “[r]efrain from the use of criminal prosecution as a tool to suppress critical reporting on matters of public interest.
In light of the established parameters of ICCPR Article 19, the Kyrgyz Government’s actions against media outlets and journalists—including the blocking and/or forced shut down of independent media outlets such as Kloop, 24.KG, and Radio Azattyk—constitute violations of the right to freedom of expression. By all accounts, including that of the Kyrgyz Government, the websites are being blocked and/or media outlets are being shut down in direct response to the publication of material critical of the government or political leaders. These restrictions on expression thus appear to serve as a penalty for such speech. In line with the Human Rights Committee’s explanation of Article 19 protections, such penalization cannot be deemed a necessary restriction of freedom of expression.
Moreover, prosecutions deemed retaliatory for the work of investigative journalists or publications on media outlets’ websites that are critical of the government—such as the previous prosecution of Bolot Temirov and the ongoing prosecutions of current and former Temirov Live journalists, and bloggers Aftandil Jorobekov and Oljobay Shakir, among others—run afoul of Article 19 protections for the same reason. They appear to be efforts by government entities to penalize independent media outlets for reporting that is critical of the government and directly violate instructions from the Human Rights Committee. As established by the Committee, such penalization can never be considered a necessary restriction on the right to freedom of expression.
B. Right of Peaceful Assembly
Like the right to freedom of expression, the right of peaceful assembly—recognized in ICCPR Article 21—is fundamental and may not be restricted except under limited, proscribed circumstances. The Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 37 underscores the fundamental nature of the right of peaceful assembly, emphasizing that this right “constitutes the very foundation of a system of participatory governance based on democracy, human rights, the rule of law and pluralism.” The Committee highlights specifically the role of journalists and human rights defenders as being “of particular importance for the full enjoyment of the right of peaceful assembly” and their entitlement to protection under the treaty.
Pursuant to ICCPR Article 21, states may only place restrictions upon the right to freedom of assembly when such restrictions are deemed “necessary in a democratic society” in the interest of national security, public safety, or public order or for “the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Restrictions placed on an individual’s right of peaceful assembly must not “impair the essence of the right, or be aimed at discouraging participation in assemblies or causing a chilling effect.”
Permissible restrictions do not include those placed on journalists and human rights defenders to hinder the exercise of their journalistic activity or suppress critical voices. Indeed, the Committee felt so compelled to expound on Article 21 protections for journalists and human rights defenders that it specified within General Comment No. 37 that these groups of individuals “must not face reprisals or other harassment, and their equipment must not be confiscated or damaged.”
The Government of Kyrgyzstan violated the rights of Aftandil Jorobekov and Oljobay Shakir when government authorities confiscated equipment from their homes, arrested and detained, and prosecuted them for statements critical to the government and attempts to organize peaceful rallies in opposition to government action. The non-violent rallies called for by Jorobekov and Shakir fall squarely within the parameters of protected assembly under ICCPR Article 21. And it is unlikely that the government could put forth any genuine national security concern to justify the restrictive—and apparently retaliatory—measures taken against them.
C. Freedom from Arbitrary Detention
In addition to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly concerns, the Kyrgyz Government’s crackdown on certain journalists and bloggers has violated their right to be free from arbitrary detention. ICCPR article 9(1) guarantees everyone the right to liberty and security of person and prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention. The prohibition against arbitrary detention is non-derogable. Notably, “[a]rrest or detention as punishment for the legitimate exercise of the rights”—including freedom of opinion and expression—is considered arbitrary.
The Human Rights Committee explains in its General Comment No. 35 that authorization under domestic law does not preclude arbitrariness. Rather, to determine whether an arrest or detention is arbitrary, one must evaluate “elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law.” Furthermore, “remand in custody pursuant to lawful arrest must not only be lawful, but reasonable in all circumstances,” and detention must not last longer than absolutely necessary.
The Kyrgyz government, in its arrest and detention of Bolot Temirov in 2022 as well as the arrest and detention of 11 current and former Temirov Live journalists this year violated the rights of these journalists to be free from arbitrary detention. The evolution of Mr. Temirov’s case—beginning with drug charges following an unwarranted raid on his office and resulting in completely unrelated charges and forced expulsion from the country—suggest that his arrest, detention and trial were politically motivated and served as punishment for his investigative journalism (a legitimate exercise of his right to freedom of expression). As such, the arrest and detention was arbitrary and in violation of ICCPR Article 9.
The ongoing detention of Bolot Temirov’s wife, Makhabat Tazhibek-kyzy and three other current and former Temirov Live employees similarly appears to be politically motivated, conducted in retaliation for the outlet’s investigatory reporting regarding government officials. Such reporting, as explained in Section III.A., supra, was a legitimate exercise of the journalists’ rights to freedom of expression under ICCPR Article 19. Their arrest and detention in connection with a prosecution that appears to be direct punishment for the exercise of those rights is therefore arbitrary, in violation of ICCPR Article 9.
Finally, the detention of Aftandil Jorobekov, and Oljobay Shakir for public posts calling for peaceful assemblies similarly violates their right to be free from arbitrary detention. Their arrest and detention appear to be directly related to their legitimate exercise of their right to freedom of expression and opinion (protected by ICCPR Articles 19 and 21), and thus arbitrary. The injustice and lack of predictability related to their detention similarly suggests it is arbitrary in nature.
V. Conclusion and Recommendations
The Kyrgyz government’s ongoing actions against independent media outlets, journalists and bloggers in recent years not only constitute violations of the rights of these specific individuals, but imposes a broader chilling effect on the free speech of those critical of government actors and actions.
The authors urge the Kyrgyz Republic to uphold its obligations under international human rights law, including with respect to freedom of expression and protection of free press. In line with calls from other organizations and governments around the world, the authors urge the Kyrgyz Government to:
- Release Mahabat Tazhibek-kyzy and the other current and former Temirov Live staff members remaining in pre-trial detention in connection with the 16 January 2024 raid on Temirov Live’s offices;
- Cease prosecution and drop charges against all 11 Temirov Live-affiliated journalists and staff arrested on 16 January 12024;
- Drop criminal cases of “calls to disobedience and mass disorder” and “propaganda of war” initiated against various independent media outlets and bloggers;
- Terminate liquidation proceedings against Kloop Media Public Foundation;
- Reinstate Bolot Temirov’s Kyrgyz citizenship; and
- Undertake a comprehensive review of legislation used to target journalists and independent media, including but not limited to the Law on Protection from Inaccurate (False) Information and the Law on Non-Commercial Organizations, in light of Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international human rights law.