Implications for FCPA Matters
As OIG has observed with respect to domestic arrangements, such as new businesses and joint ventures between healthcare entities and HCPs, they can raise significant corruption concerns if structured inappropriately overseas. Joint-venture relationships with HCPs figured prominently in Fresenius’s resolution with DOJ. In its NPA, Fresenius acknowledged that it offered shares in Fresenius’s local subsidiary (a joint venture) to an Angolan Armed Forces Medical Services Division official and a prominent Angolan HCP. According to the NPA’s agreed-upon statement of facts, Fresenius offered these foreign officials 15 percent stakes in the joint venture in an effort to secure business. The SEC further alleged that Fresenius transferred the stakes to the Angolan officials “without their having paid anything in exchange and without any due diligence conducted on the transaction.”
Similarly, Fresenius admitted that it established joint ventures with public HCPs in Turkey, investment stakes which resulted in significant profits for at least one HCP (when Fresenius bought back his shares). According to the SEC, “[b]etween 2005 and 2014, [Fresenius’s Turkish subsidiary] entered into four separate joint ventures with publicly employed doctors in exchange for those doctors directing business from their public employer to [Fresenius] clinics,” while the HCPs “did not provide any capital in exchange for their shares.” For example, the SEC alleged that Fresenius conferred an investment stake on a “professor with ties to the Turkish Minister of Health, for referring patients from the university’s clinics.” The SEC asserted that the professor did not contribute capital to the joint venture, but ultimately “was paid $323,000 for his 40% stake despite having an outstanding $1,553,000 receivable.”
Discounts
Domestic Safe Harbor and Related Arrangements
Domestically, the discount and rebate safe harbor to the AKS encourages life sciences and healthcare companies to implement policies and procedures relating to discounts and rebates.
By statute, prohibited “remuneration” does not include “a discount or other reduction in price . . . if the reduction in price is properly disclosed and appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by the provider” that received the discount or price reduction. The discount safe harbor promulgated by the Secretary of HHS adds a series of additional strictures (purportedly to clarify the statutory exception). The safe harbor, for example, expressly protects “arms-length” price reductions unless, for example, they are in cash or cash equivalents (except for certain rebates by check), they are provided to one payor but not to federal payors, or they are provided on one good or service “to induce the purchase of a different good or service” (except in circumstances where the different goods or services are reimbursed under the same federal healthcare program methodology and the reductions are disclosed to the program). Further, the safe harbor details the disclosure obligations on sellers, buyers, and discount offerors (all intended to ensure that discounts/rebates inure to the benefit of federal healthcare programs as appropriate).
Discounts and rebates are fundamental features of the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain. Generally speaking, manufacturers enter into a range of discount and/or rebate arrangements with wholesalers, pharmacies (including specialty pharmacies), and pharmacy benefits managers. Device and diagnostic companies also enter into discount and/or rebate arrangements with HCPs or payors that directly purchase devices, reagents, or testing kits. Indeed, payors such as Medicare “expect[] providers to take advantage of available discounts,” including “cash, trade and quantity [purchase] discounts.”
Implications for FCPA Matters
Absent policies and procedures relating to discounts and rebates that apply internationally, companies can run into significant corruption-related risks. DOJ and the SEC routinely have pursued companies for providing purportedly inflated discounts to third-party distributors that enabled the distributors to make improper payments to public HCPs. For example, in a 2018 enforcement action, the SEC alleged that managers of a multinational pharmaceutical company’s Kazakh subsidiary schemed with distributors to “corruptly influence the award of tenders at public institutions” via funds generated from “20-30 percent discount[s] to the distributors.” According to the SEC, the company “had no standardized commercial policy for distributor discounts and did not review the discounts provided by local management.” The SEC asserted that the Kazakh subsidiary and its distributors would secure public tenders and then, after doing so, agree on a “sale price between [the company] and the distributor [that] included a pre-determined discount or credit note from the sale price between the distributor and the public institution.” That discount allowed the distributor to “designate a portion as the fund which [it] used to bribe Kazakh officials.” Thus — at least according to the SEC — the company failed to either compensate its distributor based on the fair market value of its services (as the personal services safe harbor would require) or transparently disclose the discount to the ultimate payor (as the discount safe harbor would require).
Similar fact patterns appear in a slew of SEC FCPA enforcement actions, such as:
- In 2019, the SEC alleged that Fresenius converted a relationship with a West African sales agent into a distributor relationship and then provided that distributor “a significant margin on sales to the Ministry of Health” of Gabon and several public hospitals “to fund the payments to HCPs.” Fresenius also positioned an Angolan distributor to make sales to a large customer and structured the arrangement to “create[] a significant margin, approximately 60% of sales, that was provided to the government officials on over $433,000 in sales.”
- In 2017, the SEC alleged that Orthofix’s Brazil subsidiary “provided a high discount ranging in certain instances of up to 70% to the distributors, who then used part of the profit generated by that discount to make improper payments to certain doctors.” According to the SEC, the distributors “openly discussed the improper payments in person with certain” employees of the subsidiary in an effort to secure “higher discounts from the company to facilitate the payments.”
- In 2014, the SEC targeted Bio-Rad for securing sales to public institutions in Vietnam by bribing public HCPs. Bio-Rad’s Singaporean subsidiary purportedly sold “products to a Vietnamese distributor at a deep discount, which the distributor would then resell to government customers at full price, and pass through a portion of it as bribes.”
Product Samples/Free Goods
Domestic Legal Protections and Related Activities
Under the PDMA, pharmaceutical companies may distribute prescription drug samples to HCPs to promote their products, so long as the recipient is a licensed practitioner who has requested the samples in writing and the distributing company has a system to track the samples (and ensure that they are free from contamination or adulteration). Further, pharmaceutical companies must implement measures to ensure that recipient HCPs do not sell the samples or bill payors for them. Unlike other transfers of value to domestic HCPs, pharmaceutical companies are not required to report drug samples pursuant to the Physician Payment Sunshine Act.
Implications for FCPA Matters
Absent the PDMA’s protections, product sampling overseas can draw unwelcome scrutiny under the FCPA, which does not delineate specifically how to manage samples compliantly. This is so even when the circumstances do not evince any effort by the receiving HCP to benefit personally from the samples.
In 2018, for instance, the SEC alleged that Sanofi violated the FCPA’s accounting provisions based on, in part, a subsidiary entity’s purported provision of product samples to an HCP in Jordan. According to the SEC, an HCP affiliated with a “large public hospital in Jordan” requested samples of an expensive cancer drug as a “[f]avor.” The SEC asserted that “no justification was provided” for the sampling and claimed that the HCP who requested the samples was a key opinion leader and a tender committee member at the hospital.
The SEC’s allegations in that resolution parallel similar assertions in the agency’s earlier action against Wyeth for conduct in Indonesia. According to the SEC, Wyeth Indonesia provided free-of-charge “nutritional products to employees of Indonesian government-owned hospitals, including doctors employed by the Indonesian government.” The company purportedly instructed its in-country distributors “to generate invoices and to deliver the products, but to then charge back the value of the goods” to the company. By providing the products for free, Wyeth Indonesia allegedly induced HCPs to recommend the company’s nutritional products, make those products available to new mothers, and secure data for marketing purposes.
Compliance Takeaways
AKS safe harbors and the PDMA requirements are intended to promote transparency in HCP relationships and mitigate undue influence on HCPs’ medical decision-making. As the OIG Compliance Program Guidance explains, “[i]n light of the obvious risks inherent in [relationships with HCPs and other persons and entities in a position to make or influence referrals], whenever possible prudent manufacturers and their agents should structure relationships with physicians to fit in an available safe harbor[.]”
Structuring overseas arrangements with HCPs, third-party business partners, and customers to fall within the prescriptive requirements of AKS safe harbors is no panacea to potential FCPA exposure. The SEC, in particular, may question even well-documented, bona fide personal services agreements with public HCPs operating overseas, investment arrangements, and/or discounts provided to distributors. But just as entities in the United States routinely mitigate risk by structuring relationships to satisfy some of a safe harbor or multiple safe harbors’ requirements, companies with international operations can use safe harbor elements to enhance their existing anti-corruption compliance programs. For example, subject to their particularized risk profile and tolerance, healthcare companies should consider the following compliance priorities:
Documenting HCP Relationships
As the DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement actions described above underscore, carefully documenting financial relationships with HCPs can lessen the risk not only of an FCPA violation but also the risk of a full-blown investigation by U.S. regulators. By analogizing to the personal services safe harbor’s elements and implementing associated compliance controls overseas, companies can ensure that they have written contracts for services provided by HCPs (e.g., consulting or speaking services), that those contracts transparently and accurately describe the work to be performed (and the capabilities of the HCP to provide those services), that the company retains evidence of the work performed by the HCP for the compensation provided, that the engagement is reasonably related to a company commercial objective (other than product usage by that particular HCP), and that the HCP understands that the company is not seeking to improperly influence prescribing or product use decisions.
Focusing on Fair Market Value
By tying a variety of different financial relationships directly to fair market value, companies can mitigate the risk that skeptical regulators will second-guess the relationship. Coverage under the personal services safe harbor expressly hinges, in part, on compensation that is set at fair market value and independent of the value or volume of referrals. Similar principles underlie the investment interests safe harbor: the terms of an HCP’s investment opportunity should reflect the fair market value of services contributed (independent of referrals) and be commensurate with the capital invested by the HCP. As the Fresenius NPA makes clear, arrangements that fall short of the standards of the investment interest safe harbor can trigger significant scrutiny under the FCPA. For example, deals with terms favorable to public-institution HCPs who have the ability to refer business will invariably raise suspicions — particularly if those terms result in investment returns disproportionate to the HCP’s investment. And loaning such HCPs the funds to invest can spark even more skepticism.
In auditing or monitoring consulting agreements, speakers’ fees, royalties paid to HCPs, and joint ventures with HCPs, companies should focus on the extent to which commercial, medical affairs, and/or other company functions have sought to calibrate compensation that the company pays to an HCP to the market value of the corresponding services or investments by the HCP.
The same holds true for discount arrangements and other pricing terms that the company has struck with third-party business partners. If the margins afforded an agent or distributor vary from fair market value for the agent or distributor’s services, then they will be particularly susceptible to scrutiny by U.S. regulators.
Avoiding Improper Return-on-Investment Analyses
The AKS safe harbors and associated OIG guidance stress the importance of separating the value or volume of potential referrals from the terms of a company’s financial relationship with HCPs. In structuring financial relationships with overseas HCP customers who also happen to provide services or investment capital, companies should be especially careful not to tie the relationship’s value to the volume or value of referrals from that particular HCP customer. U.S. regulators have, in recent domestic and international anti-kickback and anti-corruption enforcement actions, leveraged companies’ analyses of the return on their investment in a particular HCP relationship to show a willful intent to induce (under the AKS and FCA) and corrupt intent (under the FCPA).
Controlling Product Samples
Free pharmaceutical or device products can be valuable to HCPs and their patients. Domestically, the PDMA makes clear that prescription drug samples can be provided appropriately (so long as the HCP does not sell or bill for the samples). Internationally, the FCPA’s affirmative defense for bona fideand reasonable expenditures associated with product demonstration may provide companies some coverage. But companies should be especially careful to document their rationales for providing samples, inform the government entity that employs the HCP who receives the samples of the samples, and, of course, adhere to local product sampling laws and regulations. By controlling the flow of samples, recording the justification for providing them, and clarifying that they are being provided to a government entity (or informing the government entity that they are being provided to the entity’s HCPs), companies can mitigate the risk that samples distributed for salutary purposes (e.g., HCP education and/or patient assistance) are deemed suspicious by U.S. regulators.
Safe Harbors and Enforcement of the FCPA
As described above, the FCPA currently only includes one exception and two affirmative defenses — and these provisions do not cover the full scope of conduct protected by the AKS safe harbors. Because Congress and HHS rightly recognized the value of the common arrangements protected by the AKS exceptions and safe harbors, DOJ and the SEC can, and should, incorporate the core principles underlying the safe harbors into their enforcement approach to the FCPA and their associated policy statements.
To provide clarity on their approach to activities like those covered by the AKS safe harbors and PDMA, DOJ and the SEC could supplement the FCPA Resource Guide that they jointly publish, which provides “detailed information about the statutory requirements of the [FCPA] while also providing insight into DOJ and SEC enforcement practices.” In particular, DOJ and the SEC could use hypotheticals in the FCPA Resource Guide to emphasize that beneficial practices by life sciences and healthcare companies, like those protected by the AKS safe harbors and PDMA, are unlikely to result in any FCPA enforcement action. A hypothetical applying the FCPA’s exception for reasonable and bona fide product promotion to pharmaceutical sampling and demonstration devices, for example, would provide welcome comfort to life sciences companies operating overseas.
DOJ also could update its FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy to delineate specific requirements that a company should follow when considering engaging in a relationship with an HCP — and incentivize compliant arrangements by providing some comfort regarding the likelihood of enforcement. Alternatively, the Fraud Section could also issue a memorandum, similar to those previously issued, laying out revisions to its FCPA enforcement strategy and discretion, and specific requirements and guidance to companies regarding how best to comply with DOJ’s expectations.
The SEC has offered less enforcement guidance related to the FCPA than DOJ. Nevertheless, when evaluating whether a company has violated the FCPA’s internal controls provisions, the SEC could consider implementing a presumption similar to that discussed above: if a company takes all necessary steps required under guidelines that mirrored the AKS safe harbors or the PDMA requirements, then the SEC would presume that the company’s internal controls are sufficient with respect to that proposed arrangement.
Conclusion
Key gaps between domestic fraud and abuse laws and the FCPA can give rise to a mismatch between life sciences and healthcare companies’ commercial operations and compliance programs, on the one hand, and DOJ and the SEC’s expectations with respect to international anti-corruption compliance, on the other. The exacting standards set by the AKS safe harbors and the PDMA offer no protection for interactions with foreign HCPs. But principles underlying the safe harbors and the PDMA — and companies’ associated compliance controls — can help drug, device, and healthcare companies mitigate international anti-corruption risks. By leveraging these domestic controls to enhance international compliance programs, drug, device, and healthcare companies can meaningfully mitigate core corruption risks.