The 2020 Stark final rule made many changes, mostly in the form of welcome flexibilities for the healthcare industry. However, the 2020 final rule also presents some negative consequences for regulated parties, some of which may have not been intended or fully appreciated when proposed and finalized. An example of such negative consequences is the rule’s provisions on whether and to what extent parties fall out of compliance with an exception due to an error in the execution (not the formation) of a compliant compensation arrangement. In this regard, the 2020 final rule’s policy may be ultra vires and internally inconsistent. It also is unnecessary because there is a better alternative.
The "Period of Disallowance" Explained
CMS finalized certain policies on the “period of disallowance.” but for the fact that neither the lease nor any other writing sufficiently described the premises. On June 1, the error was discovered and rectified. In this situation, the period of disallowance would be from March 1 through May 31.
The 2020 Final Rule's Changes
The focus of this article is on CMS’s policy concerning the ability of parties to correct errors, unintentional or intentional, in the execution (as opposed to the design) of an arrangement. The policy at issue is codified at section 411.353(h)(1), which provides:
No later than 90 consecutive calendar days following the expiration or termination of a compensation arrangement, the entity and the physician (or immediate family member of a physician) that are parties to the compensation arrangement [may] reconcile all discrepancies in payments under the arrangement such that, following the reconciliation, the entire amount of remuneration for items or services has been paid as required under the terms and conditions of the arrangement[.]
The text above and the preamble in the final rule are clear that if there is an “operational error” that is not corrected (irrespective of whether it is discovered) within the allotted 90-day period, there is a new or modified arrangement. In many or most cases, this will result in a non-compliant arrangement.
gave the hypothetical example of a personal services arrangement between an entity and a physician under which, and according to the written agreement, the physician is to be paid $140 per hour. We are told to assume that this rate is fair market value, that the arrangement otherwise fully complies with an applicable exception, and that, for a six-month period, the physician is paid $150 per hour. The proposed rule then states:
If the $150 per hour payment is due to an administrative or other operational error—that is, the discrepancy was unintended—the parties may, while the arrangement is ongoing during the term initially anticipated (in this example, during the year of the arrangement), correct the error….
However, if the parties fail to identify the error during the term of the arrangement as anticipated… they cannot simply “unring the bell” by correcting it at some date after the termination of the arrangement.
Under the proposal, an error that was discovered 240 days into a year-long arrangement could be cured, whereas one that was discovered five days after the termination of a month-long arrangement could not. However, in response to comments pointing out the arbitrariness of using the end date of the underlying arrangement as the deadline for which one can correct an error in the execution of the arrangement, CMS changed its proposed policy, and now, through section 411.353(h)(1), gives the parties up to 90 days following the termination of the arrangement.
Note also that under CMS’s policy, it is not enough for a party that discovers it has overpaid another party to make a good faith effort to collect the shortfall, but it instead must collect the entire amount (even if the other party deliberately and unreasonably withholds payment) or else a new or modified arrangement results.
The Policy is Contrary to the Plain Meaning of the Statute
At the root of section 411.353(h)(1) is CMS’s belief that an operational error creates a new or modified arrangement. It is submitted that this position is contrary to the plain language of the Stark Law.
This article is concerned only with compensation arrangements.
In the 2020 Stark final rule, CMS has adopted the position that a compensation arrangement can be formed without the intention or knowledge of a party, or even against the will of the party. As discussed below, this position has important ramifications where there are errors in the execution of an arrangement, including an intentional departure from the arrangement by one party.
In the Fiscal Year 2009 (hospital) Inpatient Prospective Payment System final rule (FY 2009 IPPS Final Rule), CMS expressed its view that a compensation arrangement must meet all of the requirements of an exception at the time a referral is made or else the physician’s referral of DHS to the entity with which he or she has the compensation arrangement is tainted:
we believe that the most natural reading of the statute is that all of the requirements of the exception must be met at the time the referral is made.
However, in neither the FY 2009 IPPS Final Rule, nor anywhere else, did CMS say (until the 2019 proposed rule) that a compensation arrangement can be created without regard to the intent of the parties. The term “compensation arrangement” is defined in both the statute and regulations.Thus, both the statute and the regulations define “compensation arrangement” as an “arrangement” involving remuneration, but do not define “arrangement.” If parties agree to compensation at $140 per hour, that is the arrangement between them. If one party mistakenly pays the other $150 or $130 per hour, that does not change the basic fact that the arrangement was for $140 per hour. Likewise, if the parties discover the error and do not take appropriate action, that may result in a new arrangement (again, based on the intent of the parties), but the mere fact, standing alone, that a mistake is made in the execution of the arrangement does not result in a new or modified arrangement.
The fact that Stark is a strict liability statute, meaning that no intent to violate the statute is necessary for liability to attach, does not mean that no intent is required to implicate the statute in the first place. CMS may be within its rights to claim that, upon evidence of additional remuneration, the burden of production has shifted to the parties to an arrangement to show that a new or modified compensation arrangement has not taken place because there was no intent to create one; however, it cannot, consistent with the statute, conclusively presume that a new or modified compensation arrangement has been created, irrespective of the intent of the parties, simply because of a deviation from the terms of a written agreement.
The Policy is Internally Inconsistent
The proposed and final rules offer a confusing and inconsistent explication of what constitutes a modified or new arrangement based on an unintentional or intentional mistaken payment, as well as what, if any, steps can be taken to maintain compliance with Stark.
The preamble to the 2020 final rule repeatedly uses the term “actual arrangement” (emphasis in the original) to refer to the mistaken payment amount in an attempt to bolster CMS’s position that remuneration paid or received is what counts, not what the parties intended. However, CMS’s policy, that mistaken payments create a new or modified arrangement despite the parties’ intentions, not only is contrary to the plain language of the statute, it is internally inconsistent.Why not? If, under CMS’s policy, a unilateral, unintentional deviation from the agreed-upon arrangement does not prevent a new or modified “actual arrangement” from springing to life, why does a unilateral, intentional deviation in the form of theft not create a new or modified arrangement? Either way, remuneration is transferred. And who and what determines, short of a criminal conviction by a judge or jury, that theft has occurred? There is a long distance between run-of-the-mill intentional breaches of contracts and criminal behavior. Further, an intentional deviation from the terms of an agreement, involving remuneration, may be neither theft nor a breach of the agreement. For example, the lessee of a lease arrangement between a physician and a DHS entity may pay less rent than called for in the agreement, and believe that the lessor had agreed to cover the cost of trash pickup and medical waste disposal, which belief is disputed by the lessor. And why say theft “generally” does not create a new compensation arrangement? Under what circumstances does theft create a new compensation arrangement?
Note also that, whereas the proposed and final rules generally take the position that even an unintentional incorrect payment creates a modified or new compensation arrangement and that parties are time-limited in their right to cure the effects of the incorrect payment, elsewhere the final rule may suggest that only an intentional failure to collect money owed results in a new or modified compensation arrangement.So far, by referencing the language in the proposed rule (and giving the Federal Register page cite to the proposed rule) the final rule appears to adopt the proposed rule’s “no questions asked” approach to a modified or new compensation arrangement—if a mistaken payment is made, parties have to deal with it, period. But the final rule then immediately adds:
In such circumstances, because forgiveness of an obligation or debt may constitute remuneration for purposes of the physician self-referral law, the parties may conclude that the only means to avoid noncompliance with the physician self-referral law is to recoup the amount owed under the arrangement. Turning back to the previous example, and assuming that the hospital corrected the error beginning in month 7 but did not collect the excess compensation from the physician, the relevant inquiry is whether the uncorrected payment errors during months 1 through 6—that is, the additional $10 per hour paid to the physician—
is created only by the demonstrated intent of the party owed the remuneration to confer a gift or interest-free loan to the other party, or whether CMS would presume or conclusively determine that a gift or interest-free loan has been made simply by the failure to collect the excess remuneration owed to it. It would be comforting to think that a modified or new compensation springs into being only upon the intent of the party owed the remuneration to confer a gift or interest-free loan to the other party, but elsewhere in the final rule, CMS throws a large amount of cold water on that idea:
we do not believe that “reasonable efforts” to recover excess payments or collect amounts due are equivalent to the reconciliation of payment discrepancies.Moreover, we do not believe that the mere undertaking of “reasonable efforts”
The language quoted above raises the question of why CMS bothered to bring up the subject of a gift or interest-free loan in the first place. Perhaps CMS’s point is that making a gift or an interest-free loan, for which there may not be an applicable exception, could create a knowing Stark violation, which carries enhanced penalties (such as False Claims Act liability and/or civil monetary penalties). But if so, this is not articulated in the final rule. And whereas CMS claims that a policy requiring that the parties make “reasonable efforts” to prevent a new financial relationship from springing to life “would present compliance and enforcement challenges, and would not provide for the certainty that reduces burden on stakeholders,” a party will need to make reasonable efforts to collect a mistaken payment or to recover remuneration wrongly taken from it in order to prevent a knowing Stark violation from occurring.
If the transfer of remuneration is what determines the “actual arrangement,” how is it that transfers of certain amounts do create a new or modified arrangement and transfers of other amounts do not? And what is and what is not “slight”?
The Policy is Unfair
The policy punishes innocent parties because they may be unaware, despite their diligence, until past the 90-day deadline in 411.353(h)(1), that remuneration has been taken or paid outside the terms of the arrangement.but that is unrealistic. The error may be slight and/or difficult to determine, or one party may be affirmatively hiding it from the other party.
Collecting money owed is easier said than done (or else there would be a lot fewer lawsuits than there are). For example, suppose a hospital leases office space on a one-year term to a physician group practice that has several physician owners. Nine-plus months into the lease, the group practice believes (mistakenly) that the hospital has breached a condition in the lease and refuses to pay any further rent. The hospital notices right away that rent for month 10 is not paid and contacts the group but believes (mistakenly) it will be able resolve the matter amicably. Instead, negotiations break down after a month, the group refuses to pay rent for month 11 and vacates the premises early in month 12. The hospital sends two demand letters to the group, which go unanswered, and the hospital decides it is not cost effective to sue because less than $5,000 is at issue. Or, to change the facts slightly, more than $20,000 is at issue, so the hospital brings suit and is awarded damages for the full amount, but the group dissolves its professional corporation (PC) and the hospital is unable to collect a dime. In both scenarios described above, the hospital acted diligently and made reasonable efforts under the circumstances to collect what was owed but was unsuccessful.
The Policy Creates Perverse Incentives
A physician who owes money to the DHS entity, and is aware of the requirement that the DHS entity must collect the money or else risk having a non-compliant and non-curable compensation arrangement, can extract concessions from the entity in exchange for repaying what they owe. For example, a physician who has been overpaid under a medical director agreement could leverage the DHS entity into executing a new agreement and at a higher rate of compensation as the price for repaying money owed to the entity.
CMS Attempts to Provide Relief Outside of New §411.353(h)(1) is Either Internally Inconsistent with Stark Rules or at Best is Confusing
The final rule attempts to reduce the effect of its policy by pointing out that if there is an unintended change in the compensation but the “actual arrangement” stays within fair market value, the supposed new or modified arrangement simply can be memorialized in writing. It returns to the medical directorship example that was given in the proposed rule and says that “if the operational error—payments of $150 per hour instead of the agreed upon $140 per hour—The final rule suggests that the parties could protect the excess compensation ($10 per hour) through the new exception for limited remuneration to a physician at 411.357(z), and then, if necessary, the parties:
could rely on the special rule for writing and signature requirements finalized at § 411.354(e)(3), coupled with the clarification of the writing requirement at § 411.354(e)(2), to establish that the actual amount of compensation provided under the arrangement was set forth in writing within 90 consecutive calendar days of the commencement of the arrangement via a collection of documents, including documents evidencing the course of conduct between the parties. The 90-day clock would begin when the parties could no longer use (or were no longer using) the exception at § 411.357(z). Thus, while the parties are relying on the exception at § 411.357(z) and for up to 90 consecutive calendar days after, they would likely be developing the documentation necessary to evidence their arrangement for medical director services under which the physician is paid $150 per hour.
Beyond the obvious faulty assumption that both parties necessarily are willing to resolve the error through executing a new, signed agreement, there are a few problems with CMS’s reasoning. First and foremost, CMS’ use of “actual compensation arrangement” and “actual arrangement” (emphases in the original) indicates that CMS believes that the excess compensation at most modifies the original arrangement and does not create a new, separate arrangement. If that is so, even if the parties take CMS’s suggestion and paper the so-called “actual arrangement” following the use of the new exception at 411.357(z), that will not avoid non-compliance in most scenarios, including in the example given in the final rule.) By definition, compensation is not “set in advance” notwithstanding that it is specified in the agreed-upon arrangement if the “actual arrangement” encompasses compensation that was not specified but rather paid or unpaid but through an error in the execution of the agreed-upon arrangement. To use the medical directorship example in the proposed and final rule, if the parties enter into a written agreement for $140 per hour, and later, compensation is mistakenly paid at $150 per hour and such payment has now modified the original agreement, it is not set in advance. Upon discovery of the mistaken payment, the parties could amend the written agreement to specify $150 per hour (assuming that such sum is consistent with fair market value),
To illustrate further, suppose that the medical directorship is entered on January 1, and the payment of $150 per hour is made as a matter of course beginning February 1. If CMS takes the position that $150 per hour represents the actual arrangement, that would suggest that the “actual arrangement” relates back to January 1. That view would be consistent with the preamble discussion in that part of the 2020 final rule pertaining to the exception at 411.357(z),If that is so, and if, by the time the discrepancy in the per hour rate is discovered, more than $5,000 in medical directorship fees has been paid since January 1, the exception at § 411.357(z) will not protect the “actual arrangement” from its inception (January 1).
If, however, CMS’s policy is that it is only necessary that the modified compensation (here, $10 per hour) not exceed $5,000 so that it can be protected by the exception at § 411.357(z) (notwithstanding CMS’s repeated use of “actual arrangement,” which suggests that the deviation from the stated compensation relates back to day one), CMS has opened up a huge loophole in the set in advance requirement, as well as in other requirements, in various exceptions. If section 411.357(z) can be used to protect unintentional, not agreed-upon deviations in the compensation of an existing arrangement, there is no reason why it cannot be used to protect intentional, agreed-upon deviations.institute an oral modification resulting in increased compensation, give it retroactive effect, and choose to protect the modification under 411.357(z) (provided the modification did not result in more than $5,000 in the calendar year).
But even assuming the new exception at 411.357(z) can be used to protect a supposed new or modified arrangement arising out of a mistake in the execution of an arrangement, there is also a problem with the fair market value requirement of the exception at 411.357(z). If excess compensation is mistakenly paid for a medical directorship and the entity paying the compensation has not discovered it in time to take advantage of 411.353(h)(1), how does the excess compensation meet the fair market value requirement? Fair market value is defined asThere is no “arm’s length transaction” with respect to excess compensation that was paid or taken as a result of inadvertence or deliberate behavior by a party.
The use of the new exception at 411.357(z), which is titled “limited remuneration to a physician,” also will not work in two other scenarios—where the mistake in the execution of the arrangement runs against the interest of the physician (which, admittedly is usually not the case), such as where an entity underpays a physician lessor or physician employee, or where the mistake in execution of the arrangement involves more than $5,000.
The Policy is Unnecessary Because There is a Better Alternative
CMS has a legitimate interest in ensuring that parties to a Stark “financial relationship” are complying with the requirements of an applicable exception, and should not have to simply take a physician’s or DHS entity’s word that remuneration that passed between the parties was unintended by the physician and/or the DHS entity. However, CMS can achieve that goal without exceeding its statutory authority, without causing unwarranted overpayment liability, and without putting the Medicare program at risk. CMS could allow parties to correct the deviation from the arrangement (by ensuring that any overpayment in the remuneration is collected or any shortfall is paid) within 90 days of termination of the arrangement, but if they are not able to do that (either because the deviation has not been discovered during that time or the parties cannot resolve a dispute as to the proper amount of remuneration owed by one party to another), the entity that has furnished the DHS potentially at issue would be required to prove, upon appropriate demand, that the deviation did not result in a modified or new arrangement (or that if it did, there is no non-compliance). For example, if a hospital was shorted on the rent owed by a physician and did not discover it until after 90 days following the termination of the lease, it would be required to prove, in any enforcement action, that it did not agree to a modification of the rent. Further, if the hospital was unsuccessful in collecting all the rent owed, it would be required to demonstrate that it expended efforts that were reasonable under the circumstances and that it did not intend to confer a gift upon the physician.
In conclusion, where possible, practitioners whose clients discover a deviation from the terms of an arrangement should take advantage of the new special rule at §411.353(h)(1), and possibly the new exception at §411.357(z). But given the limited relief they offer, combined with CMS’s insistence that all excess compensation be repaid regardless of a party’s efforts to recover it, practitioners should consider whether CMS’s period of disallowance policy and its attendant definition of “arrangement” is contrary to the plain language of the statute and decide, in certain circumstances, whether there is any noncompliance with an exception in the first place.