Child Custody - Relocation – Best Interests of the Child
Raber v. Raber, No. 52309 (Idaho Supreme Court, March 12, 2025):
In child relocation cases, courts consider parents' motives for relocating or opposing relocation; quality of relationship between both parents and child; child's attachment to both parents; negative impact of child's exposure to continued hostility between parents; extent the move would enhance the economic, emotional, and educational well‑being of the custodial parent and the child; quality of child's lifestyle if the relocation was allowed or denied; effect of move on child's relationship with extended family members; and likelihood that suitable visitation arrangements could preserve child's relationship with the non‑custodial parent. Here, the Magistrate court abused its discretion when it outlined two different custody plans it was considering with no determination that either plan was in child's best interests, and court essentially left it up to wife to decide which plan would become the final judgment based on whether she decided to relocate to Texas. It also abused its discretion when, after wife relocated to Texas, it entered judgment based on second custody plan, thereby requiring child to fly between Idaho and Texas every two weeks; magistrate court made no findings regarding what custody schedule was in child's best interests or impact of traveling 2,000 miles between parents every two weeks, and magistrate court failed to consider how the custody schedule would impact child even before she started formal schooling because court did not make any findings regarding need to promote continuity and stability in child's life.
Child Support – Duty of Support - De Facto Parent
McMorrow v. King, No. 875, Sept. Term, 2024 (Maryland Appellate Court, March 5, 2025):
Child's paternal grandfather, who was adjudicated de facto parent with rights to visitation, owed corresponding duty to provide child support. Here, the grandfather had done far more than merely agree to care for child while mother attended school and had affirmatively sought parental rights, including custody of child, in prior action in which he sued for, and won, de facto parent rights, which put him on equal footing with child's legal parent. He also he asserted his de facto parent status to object to child's adoption by mother's husband, and while grandfather did not choose to conceive child or hold child out as his own, he chose to develop parent‑like bond with child, to exercise his de facto parent rights when he sued for custody or visitation in prior action, and to exercise his de facto parent rights when he objected to husband's adoption of child, which effectively blocked adoption from proceeding forward.
Child Support - Income - Adoption Credits
May v. Petersen, No. S‑18642 (Alaska Supreme Court, March 14, 2025):
Every state that has addressed the issue, and the legislative history of the adoption subsidy, has held that adoption subsidies are not income to the parents; Alaska so held in 2013. But in this case, the court apportioned the subsidies between the parents, and then credited the husband with the payments received by the mother, in the same manner as social security benefits.
Child Support - Income - Imputed Income
Carter v. Carter, No. ED 112335 (Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two, March 4, 2025):
Evidence was sufficient to support finding in court‑tried marriage dissolution case that, based on four‑year average, income of $574,469 per year should be imputed to husband when determining husband's child support obligation, despite husband's federally reported wages for latter two of the years as $130,023 and $113,577.18 from husband's company. Husband was in control of the distributions, and he had not made a single one in those two years, even though his company earned almost two and a half times more gross revenue. Further, the husband lent the company $180,000 from marital funds around same time, and the husband historically earned income of approximately $500,000 to $600,000 more in the two years preceding husband's starting of company.
Parentage - Default Judgment - Due Process
Poppinga v. Wallace, No. 121,217, 2025 OK 17 (Oklahoma Supreme Court, March 4, 2025):
A parent's right to a relationship with his/her child is a fundamental, constitutionally protected right that cannot be altered without due process. Therefore, the entry of a default judgment against a mother on a father's petition to establish paternity, and for custody of the child and child support, together with the denial of the mother's motion to vacate the default judgment, violated the mother's right to due process. The father's service by publication in the local newspaper was riddled with defects: the published notice misspelled the names of both the mother and the father and identified the action as one for divorce that sought distribution of marital estate, and not an action for paternity where custody of child and visitation would be determined. These errors were fatal to the trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the mother. Moreover, the father failed to complete service by publication within 180 days of filing of petition and provide good cause for delay, and the trial court failed to inquire into whether the father “made a distinct and meaningful search of all reasonably available sources to ascertain [mother's] whereabouts.” Reversed and remanded.
Parentage ‑ Assisted Reproduction ‑ Intent Based Parentage
Glover v. Junior, No. 9 EAP 2024 (Pennsylvania Supreme Court, March 20, 2025):
While divorce proceedings were pending between same‑sex couple, spouse of pregnant biological mother of child conceived via assistive reproductive technology filed petition for special relief for pre‑birth establishment of parentage and an emergency petition for the same. Held: Supreme Court would not uphold lower courts' determination of parentage and parental rights of same‑sex spouse of pregnant biological mother on basis of equitable estoppel, where lower courts did not engage in analysis of the best interests of the child, as required in order to apply parentage by estoppel, and it would have been difficult to do so, since litigation was commenced before child was born and spouse had opportunity to build a relationship with child. However, parentage may be established by proof of intent shared by two parties to use assistive reproductive technology to conceive and co‑parent a child together, even without meeting all the formalities of contract law. Here, the biological mother and her same‑sex spouse mutually intended to conceive child through assistive reproductive technology and raise child together, thus establishing spouse's parentage and parental rights under intent‑based parentage analysis. The parties jointly entered into multiple contracts pertaining to conception and birth of child, spouse was listed as "co‑intended parent" in cryobank contract, spouse played active role in selecting sperm donor, parties chose donor based on his similarities to spouse, spouse shared equally in costs of conceiving child, spouse assisted biological mother with in vitro fertilization process by administering injections and attending medical appointments, parties planned baby shower and picked out name for child together, and parties signed affidavits stating their intentions plainly.
Miles v. Gernstein, No. C099438 (California Court of Appeal, Third District, March 28, 2025):
Pre‑conception oral traditional surrogacy agreement between birth mother and single genetic father was enforceable, such that birth mother was not a “parent” of child under Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) despite having given birth to child. The parties always intended that the child would have only one parent, they acted in accordance with that intention for many years before birth mother sought to assert parental rights, and there was no threat that public would need to support child.
Parentage - Equitable Estoppel
Jonathan M. v. Jessica N., 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 01482 (New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, March 14, 2025):
Biological father petitioned to establish paternity of the subject child. After a hearing, the Family Court dismissed the petition based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Held: The biological father acquiesced in the development of father‑daughter bond between child and man who signed acknowledgement of paternity and was listed on child's birth certificate. Although mother of child told biological father that child was not his, biological father was aware of possibility that he could be child's father because of his sexual relations with mother but nonetheless waited nearly four years after child's birth before commencing paternity proceeding, during which time strong, positive father‑daughter relationship between child and man developed, of which biological father was aware.
Property Division - Premarital Property - Joint Title Gift Presumption
Henry v. Henry, No. CV‑23‑752, 2025 Ark. App. 149 (Arkansas Court of Appeals, Division IV, March 5, 2025):
Once property is placed in the names of both husband and wife without specifying the manner in which they take, such property is presumed to be held by them as tenants by the entirety. In order to rebut presumption that husband and wife hold property as tenants by the entirety, the party claiming the property as separate property must present clear and convincing evidence that there was no intent to make a gift of the property to the spouse. Land, which was part of husband's premarital cattle‑farming operation, was not gifted to wife by husband through quitclaim deed that included both parties' names on the title, and thus, was husband's nonmarital property that was not subject to equitable distribution. Husband's execution of quitclaim deed was part of an estate‑planning strategy and he did not intend to give wife a beneficial interest of land at any point short of his death.
Spousal Support - Termination - Cohabitation
In re Marriage of Culm, No. 1‑24‑0566, 2025 IL App (1st) 240566 (Illinois Appellate Court, First District, March 4, 2025):
Former husband petitioned to terminate agreed spousal maintenance obligation to former wife, on the ground that wife and her paramour were in a de facto marriage. Held: Courts consider six non-exhaustive factors to help determine whether a recipient of spousal maintenance is in a de facto marriage, so as to warrant termination of the maintenance obligation, including: (1) the relationship's length, (2) the amount of time the couple spends together, (3) the nature of the activities they engage in, (4) the interrelation of their personal affairs, (5) their vacations together, and (6) whether they spend holidays together. Here, although wife's intimate relationship with paramour lasted seven or eight years from beginning to end, it was inconsistent and non‑monogamous, in that it was an exclusive relationship for only two years, before pausing for a year, and paramour dated at least three other women in the years following the pause. Further, wife and paramour's social activities were limited, in that, although they had dinner or coffee about once per week, and occasionally cooked together, socialized with other couples, or attended concerts and sporting events, they did not attend parties or work functions together, and there was little evidence that they shared household chores, aside from taking care of each other's pets at separate residences, as paramour did not help with renovation of wife's residence or provide more than minimal assistance during her moves. No de facto marriage.
Spousal Support - Termination - Retirement
Voynick v. Voynick, No. A‑1264‑23 (New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, March 5, 2025):
A property settlement agreement which stated that husband's obligation to pay alimony would continue until the “first happening of the death of either the husband or wife; or the remarriage of the wife” did not limit the circumstances in which husband's support obligation could be terminated or modified to the two specifically delineated instances of death or wife's remarriage. Thus, his retirement could be a reason for termination of alimony. As to his retirement, the subsection of the statute governing modification or termination of alimony obligation based on obligor's actual or prospective retirement which provides that full retirement age is deemed a good faith retirement age eliminates an obligor's affirmative burden to show that their retirement was made in good faith and was not voluntary by the obligor reaching a “good faith retirement age” under the definition set forth in the Social Security Act. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that ex‑husband failed to make a prima facie showing that his income and assets were insufficient to continue paying his permanent alimony obligation or that his retirement impaired his ability to support himself based on the standard of living he had during the marriage.
Torts – Interference with Parental Relations - Government Contractor
Padre v. MVM, Inc., No. 24cv1265 DMS (AHG) (S.D. Cal. March 3, 2025):
Cal. Civ. Code § 49 provides: The rights of personal relations forbid: (a) The abduction or enticement of a child from a parent, or from a guardian entitled to its custody; (b) The seduction of a person under the age of legal consent; (c) Any injury to a servant which affects his ability to serve his master, other than seduction, abduction or criminal conversation. In this case, a parent and child were separated, the child was transferred into custody of two employees of government contractor that was hired to transport detained migrant children. Those employees then falsely promised the child that they were being brought to his parents, the employees boarded an aircraft with the child without telling him their destination, and the employees were actually transporting the child across the country. The parents brought a complaint against the federal contractor hired by the United States alleging violations of safe conduct under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), enforced disappearance under the ATS, torture under the ATS, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (“CIDT”) under the ATS, civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, failure to prevent civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, child abduction under California Civil Code section 49(a), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Held: the allegations were sufficient to allege that contractor was engaged in the unlawful withholding of minor children from the custody of the parents, as required to state a claim for child abduction under California law.
Law Review Articles of Interest
James G. Dwyer, Mired in Meyer's Mischief a Century after Fabrication of Constitutional Parents' Rights, 26 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 107 (2025)
Bethany Nelson, Family Violence and the Potential for New Remedies, 58 UIC L. Rev. 813 (Spring 2025)
Jeffrey A. Parness, Evaporating Natural Parent Childcare Liberties under New Parentage Laws, 77 Ark. L. Rev. 643 (2025)
Ram Rivlin, Shahar Lifshitz, Reimagining Marital Property at Death, 32 Elder L.J. 353 (2025)
News Items of Interest
Stephanie H. Murray, The New Marriage of Unequals (The Atlantic, March 31, 2025): Women are now more likely to marry a less-educated man than men are to marry a less-educated woman. (Women marrying down is termed hypogamy.)
Suzanne Blake, Couples are More Likely to Get Divorce if Woman is Breadwinner (Newsweek, March 27, 2025): Couples where the woman was the primary earner were two to three times more likely to get divorced.
