The laws included here do not by any means represent all new family law legislation from 2021. However, they reflect developing trends in the area of family law. For example, the article includes summaries of laws that strengthen preferences or adopt presumptions favoring joint custody; heighten consideration for domestic violence when determining child custody, spousal support, or property division; legalize and regulate surrogacy; recognize more than two parents; enhance representation for children in child protective proceedings; and provide for special consideration of pets in the context of property division.
This article is a new feature for the Family Law Quarterly’s annual Year in Review issue. We look forward to continuing to cover new legislation in these areas of family law in future years as the law changes over time.
I. Alimony/Maintenance
Maine—Economic abuse considered when dividing spousal property and awarding spousal support.
By Joseph Dicicco and Chloe McKinzie
Maine courts are now required to consider economic abuse as a relevant factor when making an equitable distribution of the marital property between the parties.2 “Economic abuse” occurs when one party seeks to “maintain[] control” over the other party’s finances so as to create financial dependence.3 The abuse can take various forms, including “unauthorized or coerced use of credit or property, withholding access to money or credit cards, forbidding attendance at school or employment, stealing from or defrauding of money or assets, exploiting the individual’s resources for personal gain . . . or withholding physical resources such as food, clothing, necessary medications or shelter.”4 Prior to the amendment, the statute provided for courts to consider “all relevant factors” when dividing property equitably, but only specifically listed the contributions of each spouse, the value of the property given to each spouse, and each spouse’s economic circumstances when property division became effective.5 “Economic abuse by a spouse” was added to this list of equitable distribution factors.6
Additionally, Maine courts must also consider economic abuse when awarding spousal support.7 “Economic abuse by a spouse” was added to the list of factors courts may consider when deciding whether to award spousal support or how much.8 Furthermore, economic abuse was added as a specific basis for “reimbursement support,” which is a way to obtain “an equitable result in the overall dissolution of the parties’ financial relationship in response to exceptional circumstances.”9 Previously, the statute specified two examples of “exceptional circumstances,” including a spouse’s “economic misconduct” and a spouse’s “[s]ubstantial contributions . . . towards the educational or occupational advancement of the other spouse during the marriage.”10
In support of the law, legislative sponsor Representative Laura Supica stated that “economic abuse can dramatically derail a survivor’s economic, emotional and physical well-being for years to come, even after the abuse has stopped.”11 For example, a study showed that 81% of Maine domestic abuse survivors reported it was “difficult to separate from their abuser” because of economic abuse.12 More than half of survivors indicated that their abusers “accrued debt in their name” or damaged their credit rating in other ways, making it difficult to achieve financial independence.13 The amendments were intended to provide “a real solution that gives [courts] appropriate direction to ensure survivors have access to effective justice in [Maine’s] civil courts.”14
New Hampshire—Term alimony equation modified to take recent federal tax law change into consideration.
By Reid Bloom and Chloe McKinzie
Under New Hampshire’s modified term alimony support equation, the court may determine alimony using “a formula based on 23 percent of the difference between the parties’ gross incomes”—a change from the previous amount of 30 percent.15 “Term alimony” is defined as periodic payments made from one spouse to the other “to allow both parties to maintain a reasonable standard of living.”16 The 2021 legislation also added “[t]he impact of federal tax law on the parties including the allocation of applicable tax-related benefits” as a statutory factor that could warrant adjusting the amount or duration of term alimony.17
New Hampshire is one of the few states in the United States that utilizes a statutory alimony formula.18 In most states, though there are standards or factors that a court will consider, courts have significant discretion regarding the amount and/or duration of spousal support.19 New Hampshire enacted legislation in 2018 with the original 30 percent formula for alimony to create a specific framework for courts to determine alimony and afford parties more predictability.20 Under federal tax law changes that took effect on January 1, 2019, alimony was no longer tax-deductible to the payor or considered taxable income for the payee.21 New Hampshire amended the term alimony support equation to 23 percent to reflect the change in federal tax law.22 However, “[i]f alimony becomes deductible to the payor and taxable to the payee under federal income tax law,” the original 30 percent formula should be used.23
II. Child Custody
Arkansas—New rebuttable presumption that joint physical custody is in the best interest of the child.
By Tiffany Williams and Jozefina Preci
The state of Arkansas amended their Child Custody and Visitation statute to include “a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child.”24 “Joint custody” is defined as “the approximate and reasonable equal division of time with the child by both parents individually as agreed to by the parents or as ordered by the court.”25 The statute further sets forth how the joint custody presumption may be rebutted, which includes “(1) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the best interest of the child; (2) If the parties have reached an agreement on all issues related to custody of the child; (3) If one (1) of the parties does not request sole, primary, or joint custody; or (4) If a rebuttable presumption [relating to a “pattern of domestic abuse” by a party or a party’s status as a sex offender] is established by the evidence.”26 If the presumption is rebutted, the court must issue “[a] parenting time schedule that: (i) Maximizes the amount of time that each parent has with the child; and (ii) Is consistent with the best interest of the child.”27
The statute previously “favored” joint custody.28 However, the new legislation goes beyond this preference to require that joint custody be considered and create a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the child’s best interests.29
California—In child custody disputes, courts are generally prohibited from permitting a child to address the court about their custody or visitation preferences in front of their parents.
By Stephanie Carola and Tatyana King
This new law generally restricts California courts in permitting children involved in custody disputes to address the court regarding their custody or visitation preferences in the presence of their parents.30 Courts still enjoy some discretion in this matter, albeit limited; a court may have a child communicate their custody or visitation preferences in the presence of their parents only if the court determines such a requirement to be in the child’s best interests.31 Unless the court determines and states its reasons on the record that doing so would be in the best interests of the child, courts cannot permit a child to testify about custody or visitation in front of the parties.32 A significant shift from the prior “default” of having children who wished to address the judge testify in open court,33 the new law states that courts must now provide an alternative method to discern a child’s custody or visitation preferences.34 The law also requires judges to state their reasons if they order unsupervised visitation to a person who is alleged to have committed child abuse, neglect, or domestic violence, or to have engaged in drug or alcohol abuse.35
Supporters of the law’s enactment argued that an “alarming number” of California children had “been killed as a result of . . . erroneous family court decisions.”36 The purpose of the restriction on children addressing the court in front of their parents is to enable children to speak freely and truthfully while expressing their custody or visitation preferences to the court.37 Allowing a child to decide on custody or visitation matters in front of their parents can conjure feelings of emotional distress that may impede the child’s ability to provide clear answers while addressing the court.38 Under the law, courts may provide children an alternative of testifying in closed chambers.39
Tennessee—Courts expressly precluded from considering the disability of a parent or guardian alone when making custody or termination of parental rights determinations.
By Madeleine Robinson and Tatyana King
This amendment to Tennessee’s custody determination statute expressly prohibits courts from basing custody determinations on the existence of a parent or guardian’s disability alone.40 Now, when determining child custody, a parent or guardian’s disability shall only be a factor in courts’ custody determination analyses if that disability impacts the parent or guardian’s ability to meet the needs of the child.41 Related language was also added to Tennessee’s parental and guardian rights termination statute, similarly precluding courts from considering the disability of a parent or guardian alone, either for or against their termination determinations.42 Under this statute, the court may, however, consider a disability when it impacts the parent or guardian’s ability to care for the child.43
Before Tennessee’s custody determination statute’s amendment, the disability of a parent could “not create a presumption for or against awarding custody” of the child to the parent, but the parent’s disability could “be a factor to be considered by the court.”44 In theory, under the language of the prior statute, a court could weigh the parent’s disability heavily when determining custody, despite that disability failing to impact the parent’s ability to care for their child. The amendment further reflects a potentially preventative step taken by Tennessee’s legislature in accordance with national trends. A National Council on Disability 2012 report found that disabled parents were far more likely to lose custody of their children than parents without disabilities.45 Furthermore, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 mandates equal family court access for parents with disabilities, requiring that parents with disabilities have access to custody proceedings, regardless of their disability.46 Tennessee’s enactment of further limitations on how courts consider a parent’s disability in custody determinations and terminations of parental rights attempts to combat the hardships that parents with disabilities may face in these proceedings by keeping the analysis focused on the parent’s ability to care for their child.
Utah—Courts may implement a statutory equal-parent time schedule in child custody proceedings.
By Christina Mille and Jozefina Preci
This new provision details implementing an equal parent-time schedule for Utah children with divorced, separated, or adjudicated parents.47 An equal parent-time schedule ensures that “neither parent is considered to have the child the majority of the time,” resulting in 182 overnights with one parent and 183 overnights for the other.48 The court “may order the equal parent-time schedule” if the court finds that this schedule “is in the child’s best interest,” that “each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life,” and that “each parent can effectively facilitate” the schedule.49 In determining whether each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life, the court considers a variety of factors, such as each parent’s involvement in child care and assistance with homework.50
Prior to the enactment of this law, there was no specific statutory custody schedule in Utah that gave parents an equal amount of time with their children.51 Some have argued that the legislation may address gender bias and lead to men becoming more actively involved in caregiving and domestic responsibilities.52 In other contexts, emerging evidence has shown that “positive father engagement in the lives of their children . . .is associated with a series of early child development outcomes” and improved quality of familial relationships.53
West Virginia—New rebuttable presumption that shared parenting time is in the best interests of the child.
By Kali Schlegel and Jozefina Preci
A 2021 amendment to West Virginia law included a rebuttable presumption that “shared physical custody” is in the best interests of the child.54 The law provided that “physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure a child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents.”55 Importantly, the statute provided a rebuttable presumption that shared physical custody is in the best interests of the child.56 To clarify, “‘[s]hared physical custody’ means a child has periods of residing with, and being under the supervision of, each parent. . . .”57 Additionally, “physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure a child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents. Such frequent and continuing contact with both parents is rebuttably presumed to be in the best interests of the child unless the evidence shows otherwise.”58 In other words, if there was evidence indicating that shared custody would not be what is best for the child, then shared physical custody would not be awarded.59 In addition to this provision, other amendments included three other new sections that defined different types of custodial arrangements.60
This provision including the rebuttable presumption was a part of House Bill 2363, known as the “Best Interests of the Child Protection Act of 2021.”61 The provision was meant to advocate for the best interests of the child in determining child custody arrangements.62 According to West Virginia Public Broadcasting, West Virginia senators removed from the bill a presumption of 50/50 physical custody that was previously passed by the West Virginia House of Delegates.63 Proponents of the revised version that was enacted into law intended for the bill to allow family court judges “more leeway” in deciding custody determinations, “instead of starting out with giving each parent 50 percent of a child’s time. . . .”64 This was meant to remove the “one-size-fits-all approach” and account for the best interests of the child based on each individual situation.65
In 2022, West Virginia enacted the “Best Interests of Child Protection Act of 2022,” which included a presumption favoring 50/50 custody.66
Wisconsin—Courts must enter specific findings of fact when granting physical placement of a child to a parent for less than 25% of the time.
By Yasmine Boto and Laurence Reichman
Wisconsin law now stipulates that in a contested custody case, if a court “grants physical placement to one parent for less than 25 percent of the time,” the court “shall enter specific findings of fact as to the reasons that a greater allocation of physical placement with that parent is not in the best interests of the child.”67 The new law also revises the best interest factors courts must consider when determining the custody and physical placement of a child.68 Changes include removing two factors that were previously considered: (1) “[t]he need for regularly occurring and meaningful periods of physical placement to provide predictability and stability for the child” and (2) “[t]he availability of . . . child care services.”69
The statutory list of best interest factors a court must consider when determining custody or physical placement is not “necessarily” in order of importance.70 Each factor must be considered in a court’s decision and serves as a way of maximizing the amount of time each parent has with their child while focusing on the child’s best interests.71 Requiring courts to consider these factors when making decisions about custody and placement and requiring specific findings on physical placement limitations may promote the legislative goal of ensuring that the best interests of a child are the priority in these decisions and that children may have “regularly occurring, meaningful periods of physical placement with each parent.”72
III. “Nonparent” Custody and Visitation
Kentucky—In awarding de facto custodianship, courts now must consider the aggregate time lived together with the child.
By Barbra Smith and Sivan Zak
Kentucky expanded the timeframe for courts to consider when appointing a person as “de facto custodian.”73 By allowing aggregate periods of time, the law provides people who have been children’s financial supporters and primary caregivers a greater opportunity to be appointed “de facto custodian.”74 Courts now must tally all the periods when the person and child lived together within the last two years and calculate whether it reaches the statutory minimum of six months or more for a child under three years old and one year or more if the child is three years of age or older or has been placed by the Department for Community Based Services (which handles child protection and adoption).75 This provides greater opportunities for individuals (such as grandparents) to be appointed “de facto custodian” and provides stability for children who are in their care for the requisite period.76
Prior to the amendment, a de facto custodian was defined as a person who was the “primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of” a child who lived with the person for a minimum period of time (depending on the child’s age).77 Courts interpreted the statute to require continuous or consecutive blocks of time and would not allow the aggregation of shorter blocks of time to reach the required period.78 This could prevent some children from receiving a de facto custodian because the parents could return to care for the children every few months and interrupt the statutory period of time the children had to live with the person to be considered de facto custodian.79 The statute changes the consecutive time requirement that was applied in these cases.80 Briefly visiting or caring for the child every so often will not restart the calculation for the statutory period.81
Missouri—Relatives given priority over other third parties for nonparent custody determinations.
By Yehuda Poll and Nidah Sheikh
When a parent in a custody proceeding is found to be unfit, Missouri courts are directed to prioritize relatives over other third parties when awarding custody to someone other than the parent provided that the custody award is in the child’s best interests.82 Where no relatives are willing to accept custody, courts may grant custody to a nonrelative in these circumstances where it is in the best interest of the child.83 Relatives in this context can be related by blood or affinity.84
The previous statute was intended to create an “alternative consideration to parental custody” and specifically as “a means for non-biological parents to bring an action seeking child custody or visitation.”85 However, the statutory language did not distinguish between nonrelatives and relatives.86 Missouri legislation created an alternative statutory ground for grandparents to petition for visitation; however, it did not grant any relatives priority in custody proceedings.87 The amended statute seeks to fix this shortcoming by allowing relatives priority in custody and visitation, when in the best interest of the child.88
Virginia—Evidence of a deceased or incapacitated parent’s wishes considered when awarding grandparent visitation.
By Marly Meus and Nidah Sheikh
Virginia courts must consider evidence of what a deceased or incapacitated parent’s wishes were when determining whether to award visitation to a grandparent who is related to that parent.89 Under the law, if the grandparent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the deceased or incapacitated parent consented to the grandparent having visitation with the child, the court then may proceed to decide whether visitation is in the child’s best interests.90 That is, visitation is not automatic when the grandparent shows consent; there is still a best interests determination.91 In this context, an “incapacitated person” means an adult who has been found by a court to be incapable of performing regular day-to-day functions to such an extent that the individual lacks the capacity to care for themselves without the help of another person.92
Grandparent visitation was allowed previously in some circumstances. What the new law does is make it easier for grandparents whose children are deceased or incapacitated to seek visitation when their children had consented to visitation.93 For example, this law could make it easier for a grandmother to see her grandson again after his mother cut ties with the family following the untimely passing of his father, the grandmother’s son.94
Prior to the enactment of this law, there was no statutory requirement for courts to consider evidence brought in by the grandparent of their deceased child’s wishes.95 Grandparents could be required to show that the absence of a relationship with their grandchild would cause actual harm to the child or children.96 This law makes it easier for the grandparent and child to obtain visitation in these circumstances.
IV. Child Representation and Child Welfare Proceedings
Arizona—Appointment of counsel required for all children involved in child protective proceedings.
By Dylan Havlak and Vlad Goldfarb
Arizona now requires an attorney to be appointed to a child in all termination of parental rights, delinquency, or dependency proceedings involving the youth97 unless they waive counsel.98 The new law also allows, but does not require, an individual to be appointed by the court as a guardian ad litem in dependency proceedings where there are allegations of abuse or neglect.99 Additionally, the guardian ad litem must be an attorney who protects the youth’s best interests but cannot be the child’s representing attorney.100
Prior to the enactment of this law, there were only limited circumstances in which a court was required to appoint an attorney to children who were involved in dependency proceedings, including children in foster care.101 The court was required to appoint a guardian ad litem in dependency proceedings with allegations of child abuse or neglect, but the guardian ad litem did not need to be an attorney.102 The policy significance and intent of this senate bill, which was passed unanimously,103 was to provide attorneys to children who have suffered from abuse or neglect or are residing in foster care.104 A nonprofit organization based in Arizona and focused on child advocacy released an article stating that children who have an attorney to represent them leave foster care “up to 3.5 times faster” than those who do not have an attorney.105 Arizona children will now be provided an attorney who will advocate on their behalf and protect their individual rights while involved in dependency proceedings.106
Colorado—To provide support for youth transitioning out of foster care, guardian ad litem’s role changes to client-directed representation when youth turns 18.
By Gurpartap Singh and Sivan Zak
In 2021, Colorado required a guardian ad litem (GAL) for a child in dependency or neglect proceedings to “begin acting as counsel and providing client-directed representation” to the youth when the youth turns 18.107 While a GAL is required to be an attorney in Colorado, the GAL is charged with representing the child’s best interests, which may involve making decisions for their client using their own judgment.108 In contrast, client-directed representation shifts the decision-making responsibilities to the client, as a traditional attorney-client relationship.109 Under the 2021 law, when the child turns 18, the GAL is required to act as client-directed counsel unless the case is dismissed, another attorney is appointed, or the youth is determined to be incapacitated.110 Further, the court is required to present the youth with options regarding whether to have a new attorney appointed as counsel or have the same GAL continue as counsel.111
These legislative changes were part of a larger bill, the Foster Youth in Transition Program, that was enacted to provide youth in foster care with various forms of continued support on a voluntary basis generally from age 18 to 21.112 The supports include assistance with enrolling in Medicaid and obtaining appropriate housing, and case management services to help with obtaining employment, education, critical documents and records, and/or other resources.113 The goal of this legislation is to address the issues that youth aged 18 to 21 face when they leave foster care.114 The legislation impacts youth in foster care by extending services and protections, allowing eligible youth to reenter foster care, and providing client-directed legal representation through the transitionary stage for the youth coming out of foster care.115 The Colorado legislature determined that “by establishing a voluntary transitional foster care program, allowing youth to reenter the state’s foster care system through a foster youth in transition program, and ensuring equitable access to less restrictive supports in the community, the state can better meet the needs of those youth who are making the transition from foster care to successful adulthood.”116
North Dakota—State strengthens children’s right to counsel in child protective proceedings.
By Tiffany Sabal and Vlad Goldfarb
North Dakota now requires the court to provide counsel for children in child protective proceedings “if the child is of sufficient age and competency to assist counsel.”117 The law also requires the court to seek reimbursement for counsel from a person with “legal care, custody, or control of the child,” subject to ability to pay.118
Before the enactment of this law, in child protective proceedings, counsel was only provided to a child in limited circumstances.119 Those who supported the new legislation highlighted the need for an attorney for a child in all child welfare proceedings given the “power imbalance” between the state, which always has its own counsel, and the child.120 Advocates testified that appointing counsel for the child separate from the parent was important because an attorney for the child would “have a confidential relationship with the child and [could] assess and properly advocate a child’s changing positions on important decisions. . . .”121 Establishing a right to counsel for children in child protective proceedings reflects a growing concern over the lasting negative impact that juvenile court decisions can have on children.122
Oklahoma—Permitting a child to engage in “independent activities” generally does not constitute parental neglect.
By Nathalia Carneiro and Tatyana King
To assess alleged parental neglect, courts in Oklahoma must now consider what neglect is not.123 This statute established that “‘[n]eglect’ shall not mean a child who engages in independent activities, except if the person responsible for the child’s health, safety or welfare willfully disregards any harm or threatened harm to the child, given the child’s level of maturity, physical condition or mental abilities.”124 “[I]ndependent activities include but are not limited to: (1) traveling to or from school including by walking, running or bicycling, (2) traveling to or from nearby commercial or recreational facilities, (3) engaging in outdoor play, (4) remaining at home unattended for a reasonable amount of time, (5) remaining in a vehicle if the temperature inside the vehicle is not or will not become dangerously hot or cold . . . or (6) engaging in similar activities alone or with other children.”125
According to House Bill sponsor Representative Chad Caldwell, “overprotective” parents can limit children’s experiences and development.126 To Caldwell, Oklahoma’s new provision to the law allows children to develop “coping skills they need to overcome ordinary, everyday hardships.”127 The legislation reinforces that parents must not “willfully disregard” harms or threatened harms to their children from independent activities.128 The law also provides a standard for neglect based on a failure of supervision; neglect for this reason is limited to situations where parents fail “to protect the child from harm or threatened harm of which any reasonable and prudent person responsible for the child’s health, safety or welfare would be aware. . . .”129 However, Caldwell stated that it does not require that parents protect their children from harms that were “‘speculative’ or improbable.”130 The legislation’s supporters aim to protect children while allowing parents more leeway in controlling the upbringing of their children and allowing children to have more freedom.131
Texas—A guardian ad litem may be appointed for a “dual-status” child for both their child welfare and juvenile justice proceedings.
By Victoria Wilton and Carolina Abdullah
Texas courts may appoint a guardian ad litem who would support a “dual-status” child’s interests in both child welfare proceedings and juvenile justice proceedings.132 Children who are involved in both the child welfare system and the juvenile justice system before age 18 are referred to as “dual-system” children, while children who are involved in both systems at the same time are referred to as “dual-status” children.133 The amended law authorizes the court to appoint the same guardian ad litem for a dual-status child for both the child welfare and juvenile justice matters, and to provide written reports for the court’s consideration in the juvenile justice proceedings.134 It also restricts a nonattorney guardian ad litem appointed in the delinquency case from investigating pending charges or “offer[ing] testimony concerning the guilt or innocence of a dual-status child.”135
Texas law already required appointment of a guardian ad litem when the government seeks “appointment of a conservator for a child” or termination of parental rights.136 The law also required appointment of counsel for the child; the guardian ad litem could be an additional person, or could be the child’s counsel serving in a dual role.137 For juvenile justice proceedings, where appointment of counsel was also required,138 appointment of a guardian ad litem “to protect the interests of the child” was required if the child “appear[ed] before the juvenile court without a parent or guardian,” and permitted if it “appear[ed] to the juvenile court that the child’s parent or guardian [was] incapable or unwilling to make decisions in the best interest of the child. . . .”139 The child’s attorney could serve as the child’s guardian ad litem but this was not required.140
The amended legislation seeks to provide dual-status children with adequate representation since they tend to face greater risks, including “higher risks for mental health and education challenges, as well as higher rates of recidivism and longer stays in detention.”141 The Texas legislature implemented this change after the Dual Status Task Force (DSTF), created by the Supreme Court of Texas Children’s Commission, identified the importance of dual-status children being represented by both an attorney and a guardian ad litem so as to “ensure [their] wishes and best interests are represented in court.”142 This new legislation is significant since guardians ad litem can act as a “bridge between systems” in such cases, allowing for improved advocacy for dual-status children.143
Virginia—Amendment addresses sexual exploitation and refusal of medical treatment in abuse or neglect cases.
By Elsie Tan and Andreina Mendez
This legislation conforms the definition of “abused or neglected child” in the law concerning Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts to the definition that already appeared in Virginia law concerning Social Services.144 Under Virginia law, it is not considered a “refusal to provide necessary care” to a child when a parent or person with legal authority over the child “refuses a particular medical treatment for a child with a life-threatening condition” if “(i) such decision is made jointly by the parents or other person with legal authority and the child; (ii) the child has reached 14 years of age and is sufficiently mature to have an informed opinion on the subject of his medical treatment; (iii) the parents or other person with legal authority and the child have considered alternative treatment options; and (iv) the parents or other person with legal authority and the child believe in good faith that such decision is in the child’s best interest.”145 The legislation further expands the definition of “abused or neglected child” to include any act of “sexual exploitation” that the parent allows to be committed or commits against the child.146
Prior to the enactment of this law, section 16.1-228(2) defined “abused or neglected” child to include circumstances in which a parent neglected or refused to provide necessary health care to a child.147 The statute also stated that “no child who in good faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination” would be considered an abused or neglected child “for that reason alone. . . .”148 Furthermore, the statute before the amended language defined “abused or neglected” child to include when a parent committed a sexual act or allowed a sexual act to be committed against the child, but did not specifically include acts of “sexual exploitation.”149 The new legislation conforms the definitions of “abused or neglected child” and enhances protections against sexual exploitation.150
Washington—Child’s right to counsel increased and access to records expanded in dependency proceedings.
By Caroline Shea and Andreina Mendez
This statute requires that the children of Washington have increased access to an attorney and that the attorney have access to vital documents.151 The law states that children have a right to counsel “[a]t all stages” of dependency proceedings; but providing counsel paid for with public funds is subject to a phase-in schedule that extends until 2027, with paid counsel required for children ages 8 to 17 “at or before the commencement of the shelter care hearing” and for younger children “upon the filing of a termination petition.”152 The statute also requires that department records be provided to the child or the child’s attorney before shelter care hearings.153
Previously, Washington was criticized by the First Star Institute and the Children’s Advocacy Institute.154 Appointment of counsel for the child was required only if the court granted a petition for termination of a child-parent relationship,155 and not for appeals of termination decisions.156 Under the amended statute, once the phase-in is complete, children ages 8 to 17 will have a right to publicly funded court-appointed counsel in dependency proceedings, and younger children will have a right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings.157 The court also retains discretionary authority to appoint counsel for children in other circumstances.158
V. Property Division
Maine—Economic abuse considered when dividing spousal property and awarding spousal support.159
Maine—“Pet Custody”: Companion animal’s interests are now considered by courts when awarding ownership to a spouse following divorce proceedings.
By Caitlyn Kelly and Chloe McKinzie
Maine now requires the court to award a companion animal to “only one party” upon the deterioration of a marriage.160 “Companion animal” is defined to include dogs, cats, and other pets “kept primarily for companionship. . . .”161 Factors when determining which party the animal will live with include but are not limited to “[t]he well-being and basic daily needs of the companion animal,” “[t]he ability of a party to continue to own, support and provide adequate care for the companion animal,” “[t]he emotional attachment of a party to the companion animal,” “[t]he emotional attachment of any child in the household to the companion animal and the benefit to the child of the companion animal’s remaining in the primary residence of the child,” and the existence of domestic violence involving the parties.162
Prior to this law, there was no statutory requirement that judges consider the interests of a pet when determining which spouse should be awarded sole custody of the pet.163 Under traditional property analysis, some courts have interpreted companion animals as tangible property, “like furniture or other material assets. . . .”164 This new law creates factors for judges to utilize when determining with which household the animal will be best suited.165 With designated language in the law like references to the “well-being” and “care” of the animal, the new addition to the law makes clear that animals have a unique interest that should be considered when awarding placement with only one of the spouses.166 Lastly, the law also safeguards against pet custody automatically being awarded to the spouse who has a pet registered solely in their name.167
New York—“Pet Custody”: Courts must now consider pets’ best interests when awarding pets as property at divorce.
By Carolina Abdullah
New York now requires the court to consider what is in the best interest of a “companion animal” when determining which spouse to award it to at the time of divorce.168 The law applies for pets that are acquired during the marriage or are otherwise considered “marital property.”169
Prior to the enactment of this law, there was no statutory requirement for judges to consider the best interests of the pet when determining which spouse should be awarded the pet.170 In New York divorce proceedings, pets were generally awarded in the same manner as other items of personal property—cars, furnishings, artwork—although some courts developed a different approach.171 However, supporters of the legislation noted that many families view pets as more than just property.172 Requiring the court to base its decision on the best interest of the pet—the same standard that is used when determining child custody—when determining who should be awarded the pet upon divorce reflects the notion that household pets are more akin to children than to furnishings and should be given additional consideration.173 Several other states have passed similar legislation, although the approach varies by state.174
VI. Child Support
Kentucky—Courts must now account for the time the child spends with each parent when determining child support.
By Rachel List and Michael Torres
This Kentucky law establishes a new approach that takes into account how much time the child spends with each parent when calculating child support.175 Courts will now determine the amount of child support that is required of each parent based on their time-sharing conditions, taking different approaches for “equal” and “unequal” shared parenting time.176 When parenting time is unequal, the child support determination is based in part on “the percentage of overnight stays the child spends with each parent on an annual basis” as set forth in the parties’ parenting time order or agreement.177 The new law provides a definition for “overnight stays” that considers food, entertainment, transportation, and other costs that may be incurred by a parent.178
Before this new law, “child support in shared parenting cases [was] often set at the discretion of the county court,” which resulted in “variation and uncertainty.”179 This is an entirely new section in Kentucky law that creates a new method for child support calculations by accounting for overnight stays and time-sharing agreements between parents.180 The law became effective in March of 2022.181
New York—Child support extended to adults with developmental disabilities until age 26.
By N. Delali Madison and Michael Torres
New York now permits a court to award child support until the age of 26 for adult children with developmental disabilities who are cared for by a parent or kinship caregiver.182 Previously, the law provided for monetary support until the child turned 21.183 The legislation provides that when a court determines that an adult has a developmental disability as defined under New York law, and the determination is supported by a diagnostic report of a practicing and licensed professional such as a social worker or physician, a parent or kinship caregiver who is the primary caretaker of that adult may receive child support up until the age of 26 to ensure that both parents cover expenses.184 The legislation provides for consideration of the child support guidelines and also the financial burden of the parent who is the primary caretaker of the adult with a developmental disability.185
Supporters of the legislation noted that the need for support with people with developmental disabilities does not end once the minor becomes an adult.186 “[M]ost children aren’t moving out of the home when they turn 21, and . . . the transition can be even more difficult when there is a developmental disability. . . .”187 Furthermore, “[t]here is also a disproportionately high rate of divorce among parents who are raising children with a disability.”188 The lack of financial support may cause the primary caretaker to be financially stretched thin.189 According to the introducer’s Memorandum of Support for this legislation, 40 other states had “provisions allowing custodial parents to pursue child support after age 21 for their adult children with disabilities.”190 The new legislation aims to share the financial responsibility between both parents of the adult and help provide a better life for young persons with disabilities as they transition to adulthood.191
VII. Parentage
Arkansas—Courts now permit post-adoption contact agreements; however, the agreements are not judicially enforceable.
By Alexia Senkiw and Nidah Sheikh
This new Arkansas law allows for prospective adoptive parents and birth parents of children who are not in Department of Human Services custody to enter a post-adoption contact agreement.192 Post-adoption contact agreements are negotiated pre-adoption between the adoptive and birth parents.193 The agreement explains the relationship in terms of type and frequency of contact between birth parents and the child once the adoption is finalized.194 The agreement is available if the birth parent consents to the adoption or relinquishes their rights, parental rights have not been terminated, and the adoption has not been finalized.195 A post-adoption agreement may address sharing information, communication, or visitation; however, it cannot address custody.196 The agreement must include information like the frequency of interactions, supervision, and reasons for termination of the agreement.197 Only one adoptive parent is needed to terminate the agreement and the agreement cannot be a condition of the birth parents’ consent to adoption.198 The agreement must be in writing, signed by both adoptive and birth parents, notarized, and an “independent contract.”199 A court will review and approve the agreement, but it is not enforceable by the courts.200 If necessary, a mediator can be used when the parties disagree; however, it is ultimately the final decision of the adoptive parents.201
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, there were no Arkansas statutes authorizing post-adoption contact agreements. Some states allow for enforceable agreements while others, like Arkansas, adopt a nonenforceable law.202 Nonenforceable means the court will approve the post-adoption agreement; however, in the event of a disagreement after it takes effect, the parties will need to seek out a mediator certified by the Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission rather than turning to the courts for a solution.203 Supporters of enforceable agreements have argued that the interests of birth parents are not fairly weighed against the interests of adoptive parents or the best interests of the child.204 However, others have argued that enforceable agreements that restrict adoptive parents’ ability to make decisions in the best interest of their child, unlike the deference afforded to biological parents, may create a stigma that adoptive families are inferior.205
Colorado—Adoption legislation amended to authorize enforceable post-adoption contact agreements.
By Kayla Brooks and Shannon Bartlett
This new Colorado law authorizes enforceable post-adoption contact agreements and sets out the requirements for open adoption contact agreements.206 These agreements can be requested only by an adoptive parent and allow for contact between a child and their birth parents, other relatives, or a Native American tribe of which the child is a member and can “include provisions for contact, visitation, or” information exchange.207 The law considers the best interest of the child and the child’s wishes and requires consent from the child if they are 12 years of age or older.208 This law also sets out how agreements become binding by requiring agreements to be “submitted to the court on a standardized affidavit form” that includes specific warning language for the parties.209 Additionally, the parties must agree that the adoption cannot be set aside due to any party’s failure to follow the terms of the agreement or any later modifications of the agreement.210 Finally, any disagreement over the enforcement or termination of the agreement “does not affect the validity of the adoption. . . .”211
Prior to the enactment of this law, there were no regulations for post-adoption contact agreements in Colorado.212 Generally, the shift to post-adoption contact policies is consistent with changing attitudes towards open adoption.213 The primary focus of these agreements should be the best interest of the child.214 The purposes of these agreements can include to ease the concerns of birth parents who are separated from their child and to provide a means for ensuring that adoptive parents comply with the terms of the agreement.215
Colorado—Colorado enacts comprehensive surrogacy legislation.
By Paulina Marino and Shannon Bartlett
Colorado has enacted comprehensive legislation governing the enforceability of surrogacy agreements.216 The new statute provides details regarding surrogacy agreements, including “[p]rocess requirements” and “[r]equired contents” for a surrogacy agreement.217 The statute also includes definitions and eligibility requirements for surrogacy agreements.218 Additionally, the statute addresses the processes for terminating a surrogacy agreement, the effect of a change in marital status, the establishment of a parent-child relationship, the death of an intended parent, judicial proceedings, enforceability, and duty of support.219 In order to be a surrogate under the amended law, a woman must (1) be at least 21 years old, (2) have previously given birth, (3) have completed a medical evaluation and a mental health consultation, and (4) have independent legal representation.220 The law does not require that an intended parent be married or genetically related to the child.221
Although the focus of many states’ surrogacy legislation is “gestational surrogacy,” the Colorado law addresses genetic (traditional) surrogacy.222 The statute defines a genetic surrogate as “an individual who is not an intended parent and who agrees to become pregnant through assisted reproduction using their own donated gametes. . . .”223A “gestational surrogate” is defined as “an individual who is not an intended parent and who agrees to become pregnant through assisted reproduction using gametes that are not their own. . . .”224
Prior to the enactment of this law, there was no legislation regarding surrogacy in the state of Colorado.225 This law follows other states in the passage of surrogacy laws.226 The law allows LGBTQ families to participate in the surrogacy process and incentivizes people to go through the surrogacy process in Colorado instead of going out of state.227
Maine—Voluntary acknowledgment of parentage now available to parents of any gender.
By Claudia Toth and Sivan Zak
Maine law listing the requirements for executing a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage has been updated to use gender-neutral language; the law now allows parents of any gender to voluntarily acknowledge parentage of a child.228 An acknowledgment of parentage allows a person to voluntarily be recorded as the child’s parent229 and is equivalent to a court determination of the child’s parentage provided that the statutory requirements are met.230 For an acknowledgment to be properly executed, it must contain certain provisions and be in the form of a signed writing.231 Persons who may establish parentage by executing an acknowledgment of parentage are the woman who gave birth to the child, an “[a]lleged genetic parent,” a “presumed parent,” or an “intended parent.”232
Previously, the language of the statute was gendered, and allowed only for acknowledgment of paternity by the biological father.233 The revised statute does not change who can be considered a parent in Maine; parentage rights are defined separately under the Maine Parentage Act.234 Instead, it makes the process of voluntary acknowledgment of parentage available more inclusively to people who would already have parentage rights under Maine law.235
The update to the law makes this route to establishing parentage available to parents other than biological fathers, such as the child’s genetic parent of any gender, the partner or spouse of the parent giving birth, and parents who have children via assisted reproductive technology.236 According to GLBTQ Legal Advocates and Defenders, prior to the amendment of this law, some of these parents would have had to go through court proceedings to establish legal parentage of their children.237 However, under the new law, these parents need only complete and properly execute the voluntary acknowledgment of parentage.238 The new law makes the parentage process more equitable by making it easier for LGBTQ parents to establish parentage and allowing them to establish parentage soon after their child’s birth.239
Nevada—Adoption law amendments allow for more than two people to be recognized as legal parents to a child.
By Lilmary Madrigal and Laurence Reichman
This legislation changes Nevada adoption law and amends the definition of a “parent and child relationship,” permitting a court to determine that a child has legal parent and child relationships with more than two people.240 Specifically, unmarried adults may petition together for adoption.241 Furthermore, one or more individuals seeking to adopt a child may petition together with legal parents of the child who consent to the adoption and seek to retain their parental rights.242 If an individual seeking adoption of a child is “related to the child within the third degree of consanguinity,” the court has the discretion to waive the hearing on the adoption petition.243 Courts may also determine a child “has a legal relationship with more than two persons who petition for the adoption of the child” under the new law.244 Consent to the adoption from each living legal parent and legal guardian of the child is required unless the parent’s rights have been terminated by a court.245
When more than two people have been recognized by a court as having a parent and child relationship with a child, statutory references to a child’s parents generally “must be interpreted to include any person whom a court has determined to be a parent of the child.”246 Because the changes now permit multiparent adoptions and the recognition of more than two parents to be the legal guardians of a child, the legislation has broadened the opportunities for many individuals to be considered legal parents, including same-sex couples, stepparents, extended family, and other individuals who have not always been considered to be members of “traditional” families.247 The role of a parent is different in every household, and this law aims to help diverse families have the legal rights necessary to ensure “stable and safe environments for children.”248
VIII. Domestic Violence
California—California becomes the first state to include a restriction on “reproductive coercion” in domestic violence orders of protection.
By Rian Sirkus and Julia Porzio
California became the first state to provide that orders of protection in domestic violence proceedings may include a restriction on “reproductive coercion.”249 “Reproductive coercion” is defined as “control over the reproductive autonomy of another through force, threat of force, or intimidation. . . .”250 The new law includes the following examples of “reproductive coercion”: “unreasonably pressuring the other party to become pregnant, deliberately interfering with contraception use or access to reproductive health information, or using coercive tactics to control, or attempt to control, pregnancy outcomes.”251
Prior to the enactment of this law, orders of protection in domestic violence proceedings did not include any restrictions on “reproductive coercion.”252 A legislative analysis concerning the restriction cited a multitude of evidence and several studies conducted over the past two decades.253 The analysis stated that “[m]ost forms of behavior used to maintain power and control in a relationship impacting reproductive health disproportionately affect females.”254 Other evidence collected from “a survey of 3,000 callers to the National Domestic Violence Hotline” found that “25 percent of the callers reported having experienced reproductive coercion: their partners would either prohibit them from using birth control or sabotage their birth control methods.”255 In addition, the analysis stated that “[r]ecent research conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health, University of California at Davis School of Medicine, and Futures indicates that a significant portion of women and adolescent girls seeking reproductive health care services have experienced some form of [intimate partner violence (‘IPV’)] and/or reproductive and sexual coercion. In family planning clinics, 15 percent of female patients with a history of physical and/or sexual IPV reported birth control sabotage.”256 The new law follows 2020 California legislation that made “coercive control” subject to protective order restrictions; “reproductive coercion” is identified as a form of “coercive control.”257
Connecticut—“Jennifer’s Law”: Definitions for “domestic violence” and “coercive control” added to protect survivors of domestic violence and their children.
By Toni-Ann Kreisberg and Laurence Reichman
This Connecticut law provides a new definition for “domestic violence” that includes “coercive control.”258 The purpose of the new law, known as “Jennifer’s Law,” is to protect survivors of domestic violence and their children in family and criminal proceedings.259 “Domestic violence” is defined as “[a] continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury,” “stalking,” “a pattern of threatening,” or “coercive control,” when applied against a family or household member.260 “Coercive control” is defined as “a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty” and includes, but is not limited to, isolating a person from others; depriving a person of necessities; controlling another’s personal information; compelling a person by “force, threat or intimidation”; committing or threatening to commit harm to animals; or “[f]orced sex acts, or threats of a sexual nature” including “threats to release sexual images.”261 Additionally, the new law adds “[t]he physical and emotional safety of the child” and a specific reference to the new “domestic violence” definition to the list of best interests of the child factors for courts to consider when determining custody or modifying a custody order.262
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, Connecticut law provided for orders of protection for a family or household member who had “been subjected to a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury, stalking or a pattern of threatening,” but did not address “coercive control.”263 These additions are intended to help protect survivors of domestic violence and their families in family law proceedings.264 Survivors of coercive control are now eligible for restraining orders.265
District of Columbia—Domestic violence survivors can seek to include pets in civil protection orders.
By Emma Theis and Julia Porzio
The District of Columbia added new protections for survivors of intrafamily offenses who have pets.266 Courts can now order the respondents in a civil order of protection proceeding “to stay away from the [petitioner’s] animal and refrain from possessing, controlling, harming or threatening to harm, or otherwise disposing of the animal.”267 The law also added “cruelty to animals” against a domestic violence survivor’s pet as a basis for seeking a civil order of protection.268
D.C. domestic violence petitioners now can seek a civil protection order based on animal cruelty and can also seek a “stay away” provision in a protection order that includes pets.269 The legislation aims to provide better access to safety from abusers who use the threat of animal abuse as a tactic to keep victims under their control.270
Endnotes
1. See Charts 2021: Family Law in the Fifty States, D.C. and Puerto Rico, 55 Fam. L. Q. 513 (2021-22).
2. 2021 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 122 (H.P. 703) (L.D. 947) (West); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 953(1)(D) (West).
3. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 4002(3-B).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 953(1)(A)–(C).
6. Id. § 953(1) (providing that the court “shall set apart to each spouse the spouse’s property and shall divide the marital property in proportions the court considers just after considering all relevant factors, including: A. The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker; B. The value of the property set apart to each spouse; C. The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live in the home for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of the children; and D. Economic abuse by a spouse. For the purposes of this paragraph, ‘economic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 4002, subsection 3-B.”).
7. Id. § 951-A(2)(C)(3), (5)(M-1).
8. Id. § 951-A(2), (5)(M-1).
9. Id. § 951-A(2)(C).
10. Id. § 951-A(2)(C)(1)–(2).
11. Introducing LD 947, “An Act to Address the Long-term Impact of Economic Abuse by a Spouse,” Before the Joint Standing Committee on Judiciary, 130th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. Apr. 6, 2021), http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getTestimonyDoc.asp?id=149841 (statement of Laura Supica).
12. Id.; see Me. Coal. to End Domestic Violence, A Report on the Impact of Economic Abuse on Survivors of Domestic Violence in Maine 13 (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.mcedv.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Economic-Abuse-Report_FINAL.pdf.
13. Statement of Laura Supica, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. 2021 N.H. Laws ch. 113 (S.B. 16); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:19-a(II)(a). When the parties dispute alimony, alimony is awarded only in specified circumstances considering the needs of the parties. Id. § 458:19-a(I). When the court determines term alimony should be awarded, “The amount of a term alimony order shall be the lesser of the payee’s reasonable need, or a formula based on 23 percent of the difference between the parties’ gross incomes at the time the order is created, unless the court finds that justice requires an adjustment.” Id. § 458:19-a(II)(a).
16. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:19-a(IV)(j).
17. Id. §§ 458:19(XV), 458:19-a(I).
18. See J. Thomas Oldham, An Overview of the Rules in the USA Regarding the Award of Post-Divorce Spousal Support in 2019, 41 Hous. J. Int’l L. 525, 536–39 (2019) (discussing spousal support guidelines generally).
19. Id. at 526–36.
20. The legislation took effect January 1, 2019. 2018 N.H. Laws ch. 310 (S.B. 71); see James V. Ferro Jr., New Law Will Change Alimony Landscape in NH, NH Bus. Rev. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nhbr.com/new-law-will-change-alimony-landscape-in-nh/.
21. Ferro, supra note 20; CLARIFICATION: Changes to Deduction for Certain Alimony Payments Effective in 2019, IRS (last reviewed or updated Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/clarification-changes-to-deduction-for-certain-alimony-payments-effective-in-2019#:~:text=Beginning%20Jan.,31%2C%202018.
22. 2021 N.H. Laws ch. 113 (S.B. 16) (“AN ACT amending the alimony statute due to changes in federal tax law”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:19-a(II)(c) (“The formula percentage . . . of 23 percent is based on alimony not being deductible to the payor and taxable to the payee under federal income tax law.”).
23. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:19-a(II)(c).
24. 2021 Ark. Laws Act 604 (S.B. 18); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(a) (West).
25. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(5).
26. Id. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(b); id. § 9-13-101(c)(2) (domestic abuse presumption), (d)(2) (sex offender presumption).
27. Id. § 9-13-101(b)(3)(B).
28. Id. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iii); Pace v. Pace, 595 S.W.3d 347, 352–53 (Ark. 2020); Remington Miller, Arkansas Child Custody Law Undergoes Major Facelift in 2021 Legislation, Backers and Critics Differ on Impact, Daily Rec. (Aug. 30–Sept. 5, 2021), https://www.dailyrecord.us/arkansas-child-custody-law-undergoes-major-facelift-in-2021-legislation-backers-and-critics-differ-on-impact.
29. 2021 Ark. Laws Act 604 (S.B. 18); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(b), (b)(1)(A)(ii); Miller, supra note 28.
30. 2021 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 768 (S.B. 654) (West); Cal. Fam. Code § 3042(f)(1) (“Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall not permit a child addressing the court regarding custody or visitation to do so in the presence of the parties.”).
31. Cal. Fam. Code § 3042(f)(2). “In determining the child’s best interest . . . the court shall consider whether addressing the court regarding custody or visitation in the presence of the parties is likely to be detrimental to the child.” Id.
32. Id. In other words, even if the child expresses a preference to testify in front of the parties, the court would not allow it unless it finds that testifying in such a manner would be in the child’s best interests. Id.
33. Brooke Staggs, Proposed Law Would Make It Tough for Abusive Parents to Get Unsupervised Visits with Their Kids, Orange Cnty. Reg. (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.ocregister.com/2021/08/27/proposed-law-would-make-it-tough-for-abusive-parents-to-get-unsupervised-visits-with-their-kids/ (“Senate Bill 654 . . . change[s] the default in custody cases from having kids testify in open court, in front of both parents, to having kids testify in closed chambers unless a judge finds good reason to make the testimony public.”).
34. Cal. Fam. Code § 3042(f)(1) (“The court shall provide an alternative to having the child address the court in the presence of the parties in order to obtain input directly from the child.”); see Staggs, supra note 33.
35. Cal. Fam. Code § 3011(a)(5)(A).
36. Report, Cal. Senate Rules Comm., Off. of Senate Floor Analyses, S.B. 654, Sept. 3, 2021.
37. Id.; Staggs, supra note 33; Cathie Anderson, New California Law Expands Visitation, Testimony Protections for Children in Family Court, Sacramento Bee (Oct. 19, 2021), https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/article254964802.html.
38. See Report, Cal. Senate Rules Comm., supra note 36.
39. Staggs, supra note 33.
40. 2021 Tenn. Laws Pub. ch. 235 (H.B. 1168); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(e) (West).
41. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(e) (“The disability of a parent alone shall not be considered for or against awarding custody to such a party unless the disability impacts the parent’s ability to meet the needs of the child.”).
42. Id. § 36-1-113(r) (“The disability of a parent or guardian alone shall not be considered for or against termination of parental or guardian rights unless the disability impacts the parent’s ability to care for the physical or psychological welfare of the child.”).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 36-6-106(e) (2016), amended by 2021 Tenn. Laws Pub. ch. 235 (H.B. 1168).
45. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Protecting the Rights of Parents and Prospective Parents with Disabilities: Technical Assistance for State and Local Child Welfare Agencies and Courts under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Aug. 2015), https://www.ada.gov/doj_hhs_ta/child_welfare_ta.html (citing Nat’l Council on Disability, Rocking the Cradle: Ensuring the Rights of Parents with Disabilities and Their Children (2012), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/NCD_Parenting_508_0.pdf).
46. Id.
47. 2021 Utah Laws ch. 399 (S.B. 122); Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-34(1)(b), 30-3-35.2; see also id. § 30-3-32(a) (“‘Child’ means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parents.”).
48. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35.2(2)(b)–(c).
49. Id. § 30-3-35.2(1)(a).
50. Id. § 30-3-35.2(1)(b) (in determining “whether each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life, the court shall consider: (i) each parent’s demonstrated responsibility in caring for the child; (ii) each parent’s involvement in child care; (iii) each parent’s presence or volunteer efforts in the child’s school and at extracurricular activities; (iv) each parent’s assistance with the child’s homework; (v) each parent’s involvement in preparation of meals, bath time, and bedtime for the child; (vi) each parent’s bond with the child; and (vii) any other factor the court considers relevant”).
51. See 2021 Utah Laws ch. 399 (S.B. 122). Utah previously had (and still has) “advisory guidelines” concerning parenting time (Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-33) and other statutory parent-time schedule options including a “minimum schedule” that may apply in the absence of an agreement (id. §§ 30-3-35, 30-3-35.5) and an “optional schedule” providing for 145 overnights for a noncustodial parent of a child aged 5 to 18 (id. § 30-3-35.1).
52. See Divorce Utah, S.B. 122 Just Passed! So What? Joint Equal Physical Custody., Utah Fam. Law LC (Mar. 6, 2021), https://www.divorceutah.com/2021/03/06/s-b-122-4th-substitute-passed-who-should-care-why/.
53. See Clara Alemann, Aapta Garg & Kristina Vlahovicova, The Role of Fathers in Parenting for Gender Equality, Promundo (2020), https://www.equimundo.org/resources/the-role-of-fathers-in-parenting-for-gender-equality/.
54. 2021 W. Va. Laws ch. 93 (H.B. 2363); W. Va. Code § 48-1-241a.
55. W. Va. Code § 48-1-241a.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 2021 W. Va. Laws ch. 93 (H.B. 2363); W. Va. Code §§ 48-1-239a (“Shared legal custody”), 48-1-239b (“Sole legal custody”), 48-1-241b (“Sole physical custody”).
61. Emily Allen, Senate Judiciary Removes 50-50 Custody from “Best Interests of the Child Protection Act,” W. Va. Pub. Broad. (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.wvpublic.org/government/2021-04-08/senate-judiciary-removes-50-50-custody-from-best-interests-of-the-child-protection-act.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 2021 W. Va. Laws ch. 88 (S.B. 463); W. Va. Code § 48-9-102a (“There shall be a presumption, rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence, that equal (50-50) custodial allocation is in the best interest of the child. If the presumption is rebutted, the court shall, absent an agreement between the parents as to all matters related to custodial allocation, construct a parenting time schedule which maximizes the time each parent has with the child and is consistent with ensuring the child’s welfare.”); Lacie Pierson, W. Va.’s 50-50 Custody Law Now in Effect, Herald-Dispatch (June 11, 2022), https://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/w-va-s-50-50-custody-law-now-in-effect/article_02b6cf4d-80e5-5f0d-b348-e3c24480cf98.html.
67. 2021–22 Wis. Legis. Serv. Act 37 (S.B. 112) (West); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.41(6)(a).
68. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.41(5)(am).
69. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.41(5)(am)(8), (9) (version in effect from Apr. 5, 2018, until Dec. 1, 2021); 2021–22 Wis. Legis. Serv. Act 37 (S.B. 112); Wis. Legis. Council Act Memo, 2021 Wis. Act 37 (June 16, 2021).
70. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.41(5)(am) (“[T]he court shall consider all of the following factors, which are not necessarily listed in order of importance, in making its determination. . . .”).
71. Id.
72. See Wis. Legis. Council Act Memo, 2021 Wis. Act 37.
73. 2021 Ky. Laws ch. 132 (SB 32), § 1; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270(1)(a) (West) (“‘[D]e facto custodian’ means a person who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who within the last two (2) years has resided with the person for an aggregate period of six (6) months or more if the child is under three (3) years of age and for an aggregate period of one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years of age or older or has been placed by the Department for Community Based Services.”).
74. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270(1)(a).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 2021 Ky. Laws ch. 132 (SB 32), § 1; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270(1)(a) (statute effective July 14, 2018, to June 28, 2021) (“‘[D]e facto custodian’ means a person who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for a period of six (6) months or more if the child is under three (3) years of age and for a period of one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years of age or older or has been placed by the Department for Community Based Services.”).
78. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270(1)(a); Garvin v. Krieger, 601 S.W.3d 481, 486–87 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020); Meinders v. Middleton, 572 S.W.3d 52, 56–57 (Ky. 2019).
79. Meinders, 572 S.W.3d at 63–64 (Minton, C.J., concurring in result).
80. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270(1)(a); Meinders, 572 S.W.3d at 56–57; Garvin, 601 S.W.3d at 486.
81. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270(1)(a).
82. 2021 Mo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 429 (Vernon’s) (West’s No. 2); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.375.5(5)(a) (West) (“When the court finds that each parent is unfit, unsuitable, or unable to be a custodian, or the welfare of the child requires, and it is in the best interests of the child, then custody, temporary custody or visitation may be awarded a person related by consanguinity or affinity to the child. If no person related to the child by consanguinity or affinity is willing to accept custody, then the court may award custody to any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable and able to provide an adequate and stable environment for the child.”) (emphasis is for new statutory language).
83. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.375.5(5)(a).
84. Id.
85. A.A.B. v. A.D.L., 572 S.W.3d 562, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019) (citations omitted); see Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 616 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
86. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.375.5(5)(a) (version in effect from Aug. 28, 2018, until Aug. 27, 2021).
87. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.402; see Robert C. Paden Jr., Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Parents v. Grandparents, 52 J. Mo. B. 156, 158 (1996).
88. During the legislative session discussing House Bill 429, Rep. Hannah Kelly noted that the purpose of the changes to section 452.375.5(5)(a) was to ensure “close family connections if at all possible” by necessitating that courts consider relatives before other third parties. 2021 Legislative Session—Day Fifty-One—Monday, April 12 (Apr. 12, 2021 2:00 PM–7:42 PM), https://house.mo.gov/MediaCenter.
89. 2021 Va. Laws 1st Sp. Sess. ch. 253 (S.B. 1325); Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.2(B2).
90. Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.2(B2).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 64.2-2000. Specifically: “‘Incapacitated person’ means an adult who has been found by a court to be incapable of receiving and evaluating information effectively or responding to people, events, or environments to such an extent that the individual lacks the capacity to (i) meet the essential requirements for his health, care, safety, or therapeutic needs without the assistance or protection of a guardian or (ii) manage property or financial affairs or provide for his support or for the support of his legal dependents without the assistance or protection of a conservator. A finding that the individual displays poor judgment alone shall not be considered sufficient evidence that the individual is an incapacitated person within the meaning of this definition.” Id.
93. Id. § 20-124.2(B2).
94. Pheben Kassahun, Wise County Grandmother Denied Seeing Grandson After Son Passes Away, Hopes New Virginia Bill Will Allow Visitation Rights, WJHL News (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.wjhl.com/news/local/wise-county-grandmother-denied-seeing-grandson-after-son-passes-away-hopes-new-virginia-bill-will-allow-visitation-rights/.
95. 2021 Virginia Laws 1st Sp. Sess. ch. 253 (S.B. 1325).
96. Kassahun, supra note 94.
97. 2021 Ariz. Legis. Serv. ch. 228 (S.B. 1391) (West); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-221(A) (“The court shall appoint an attorney for a child in all delinquency, dependency or termination of parental rights proceedings. . . . The court shall appoint the attorney before the first hearing. The attorney shall represent the child at all stages of the proceedings and, in a dependency proceeding, through permanency.”).
98. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-221(B) (“If a juvenile, parent or guardian is found to be indigent and entitled to counsel, the juvenile court shall appoint an attorney to represent the person or persons unless the person knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives counsel.”).
99. Id. § 8-221(G) (“In all juvenile court proceedings in which the dependency petition includes an allegation that the juvenile is abused or neglected, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the juvenile’s best interests.”).
100. Id. (“[T]he court may appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the juvenile’s best interests . . . [who] shall be an attorney . . . [but] is not the child’s attorney.”).
101. Id. § 8-221(B)–(C) (version in effect from July 29, 2010, until Sept. 28, 2021) (“In all proceedings involving offenses, dependency or termination of parental rights that are conducted pursuant to this title and that may result in detention, a juvenile has the right to be represented by counsel. B. If a juvenile, parent or guardian is found to be indigent and entitled to counsel, the juvenile court shall appoint an attorney to represent the person or persons unless counsel for the juvenile is waived by both the juvenile and the parent or guardian. C. Before any court appearance which may result in institutionalization or mental health hospitalization of a juvenile, the court shall appoint counsel for the juvenile if counsel has not been retained by or for the juvenile, unless counsel is waived by both the juvenile and a parent or guardian with whom the juvenile resides or resided prior to the filing of a petition.”).
102. Id. § 8-221(I) (version in effect from July 29, 2010, until Sept. 28, 2021).
103. See Shelby Trahan, Gov. Ducey Signs Law Appointing Lawyers to Every Child in Foster Care, KOLD News 13 (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.kold.com/2021/04/15/gov-ducey-signs-law-appointing-lawyers-every-child-foster-care/.
104. Id.; Arizona Governor Doug Ducey Signs Historic Law to Appoint an Attorney to Every Child in Foster Care, Gen Justice (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.genjustice.org/post/arizona-governor-doug-ducey-signs-historic-law-to-appoint-an-attorney-to-every-child-in-foster-care.
105. Arizona Governor Doug Ducey Signs Historic Law to Appoint an Attorney to Every Child in Foster Care, supra note 104.
106. Id.
107. 2021 Colo. Legis. Serv. ch. 340 (H.B. 21-1094) (West); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-3-203(4). In 2022, Colorado further expanded client-directed representation for children ages 12 and older. See 2022 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 92 (H.B. 22-1038) (West). These changes are not discussed in this summary of the 2021 legislation.
108. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-3-203 (1), (3), (4); see Nat’l Ass’n of Counsel for Children (NACC), Recommendations for Legal Representation of Children and Youth in Neglect and Abuse Proceedings 5 (2021), https://naccchildlaw.app.box.com/s/vsg6w5g2i8je6jrut3ae0zjt2fvgltsn.
109. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-3-203(4); NACC, supra note 108, at 4–5.
110. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-3-203(4); see also id. §§ 19-3-704, 15-14-102(5) (defining “incapacitated”).
111. Id. § 19-3-203(5).
112. 2021 Colo. Legis. Serv. ch. 340 (H.B. 21-1094); Bill Summary, HB21-1094 (Colo. 73d Gen. Assembly, 2021 Reg. Sess.), https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hb21-1094; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 19-7-301, 19-7-303.
113. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-7-305.
114. Id. § 19-7-301.
115. Id. §§ 19-3-203(4), 19-7-301, 19-7-308.
116. Id. § 19-7-301(2).
117. 2021 N.D. Laws ch. 245 (H.B. 1035); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20.2-12(1)(c). The legislation also enacted changes to juvenile justice and other laws that are not addressed here. 2021 N.D. Laws ch. 245 (H.B. 1035).
118. N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20.2-12(3) (“The court shall require payment for reimbursement of counsel appointed pursuant to this section from a person that has legal care, custody, or control of the child.”), 27-20.2-19.
119. Id. § 27-20-26(1) (version in effect Jan. 1, 2012, until June 30, 2021) (“Counsel must be provided for a child who is under the age of eighteen years and is not represented by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian at custodial, post-petition, and informal adjustment stages of proceedings under this chapter. If the interests of two or more parties conflict, separate counsel must be provided for each of them.”), repealed by 2021 N.D. Laws ch. 245 (H.B. 1035), and replaced by N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20.2-12.
120. Written Testimony of John Pollock, Coordinator, Nat’l Coal. for a Civ. Right to Counsel, Supporting House Bill No. 1035, Mar. 22, 2021, at 2, https://www.ndlegis.gov/assembly/67-2021/testimony/SJUD-1035-20210323-10381-F-POLLOCK_JOHN.pdf.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. 2021 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 392 (H.B. 2565) (West).
124. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A, § 1-1-105(49)(b).
125. Id.
126. Let Grow Staff, Oklahoma “Reasonable Childhood Independence Bill” Signed into Law!, Let Grow, https://letgrow.org/oklahoma-reasonable-childhood-independence-bill-signed-into-law/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
127. Id.
128. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A, § 1-1-105(49)(b).
129. Id.
130. Let Grow Staff, supra note 126.
131. See generally id.
132. 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 971 (S.B. 2049) (Vernon’s); Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. §§ 51.11(d), 107.011(e) (West).
133. Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. §§ 51.11(a)(1) (“‘Dual-system child’ means a child who, at any time before the child’s 18th birthday, was referred to the juvenile justice system and was involved in the child welfare system. . . .”), 51.11(a)(2) (“‘Dual-status child’ means a dual-system child who is involved with both the child welfare and juvenile justice systems at the same time.”).
134. Id. §§ 51.11(d), 54.01(c), 54.02(e), 54.04(b), 54.05(e), 54.11(d), 107.011(e).
135. Id. § 51.11(e).
136. Id. § 107.011(a).
137. Id. §§ 107.012, 107.0125.
138. Id. §§ 51.10, 51.101.
139. Id. § 51.11(a-1), (b).
140. Id. § 51.11(c).
141. Author’s/Sponsor’s Statement of Intent, S.B. 2049 (Tex. June 7, 2021), https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/87R/analysis/html/SB02049F.htm; see also Is There an Effective Practice Model for Serving Crossover Youth?, Casey Fam. Programs (May 29, 2018), https://www.casey.org/crossover-youth-resource-list/.
142. See Tex. Ct. Appointed Special Advocates, HB 3895 & SB 2049: Improving Support for Youth in Dual Status Cases: Clarifying the Role of Guardians Ad Litem 2 (2021), https://texascasa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GAL-Role-in-Dual-Status-Cases.pdf.
143. Id.
144. 2021 Virginia Laws 1st Sp. Sess. ch. 310 (S.B. 1168); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228; see id. § 63.2-100(2) (language added in 2007 by 2007 Virginia Laws ch. 597 (S.B. 905)).
145. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228(2).
146. Id. § 16.1-228(4).
147. See 2021 Virginia Laws 1st Sp. Sess. ch. 310 (S.B. 1168); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228(2).
148. See 2021 Virginia Laws 1st Sp. Sess. ch. 310 (S.B. 1168); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228(2) (version in effect Jan. 1, 2021, to June 30, 2021).
149. See 2021 Virginia Laws 1st Sp. Sess. ch. 310 (S.B. 1168); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228(4) (version in effect Jan. 1, 2021, to June 30, 2021).
150. 2021 Virginia Laws 1st Sp. Sess. ch. 310 (S.B. 1168).
151. 2021 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 210 (S.S.H.B. 1219) (West); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.34.090, 13.34.100.
152. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.34.090(3), 13.34.212(3)(a), (c).
153. Id. § 13.34.090(5).
154. Noy Davis et al., A Child’s Right to Counsel: A National Report Card on Legal Representation for Abused & Neglected Children 24–25, 149–50 (4th ed. 2019), http://www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/RTC4.pdf.
155. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.100(6)(a) (version effective July 28, 2019, to July 24, 2021) (“The court must appoint an attorney for a child in a dependency proceeding six months after granting a petition to terminate the parent and child relationship . . . and when there is no remaining parent with parental rights.”).
156. Id. § 13.34.100(6)(b) (version effective July 28, 2019, to July 24, 2021) (“Legal services provided by an attorney appointed pursuant to (a) of this subsection do not include representation of the child in any appellate proceedings relative to the termination of the parent and child relationship.”).
157. Id. § 13.34.090(3); see Final Bill Report, 2SHB 1219 (Wash. 2021), https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2021-22/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/1219-S2%20HBR%20FBR%2021.pdf?q=20220705094107.
158. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.212(2), (3)(a)(i).
159. See supra at 476.
160. 2021 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 285 (S.P. 222) (L.D. 535) (West); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 953(1), (2), (10) (West).
161. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 953(10) (“‘[C]ompanion animal’ means an animal kept primarily for companionship rather than as a working animal, service animal or farm animal kept for profit.”).
162. Id.
163. See 2021 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 285 (S.P. 222) (L.D. 535).
164. Creating a Companion Animal Custody Law (Maine), Animal Legal Def. Fund (June 20, 2021), https://aldf.org/project/creating-a-companion-animal-custody-law-maine/.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 2021 Sess. Law News of N.Y. ch. 509 (S. 4248); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(5)(d)(15) (“In determining an equitable disposition of [marital] property . . . the court shall consider: . . . (15) in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal.”).
169. N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 350(5) (defining “companion animal”); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(1)(c) (defining “marital property”), (5)(c)–(d) (providing for equitable distribution of marital property).
170. See N.Y.S. Senate Introducer’s Mem. in Support, S. 4248, 244th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021) [hereinafter Mem. in Support].
171. See, e.g., Travis v. Murray, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 628–31 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2013); see also Mem. in Support, supra note 170; Lisa Zeiderman, New York Courts May Soon Be Raining Cats, Dogs and Perhaps Parakeets, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2021/10/29/new-york-courts-may-soon-be-raining-cats-dogs-and-perhaps-parakeets/.
172. See Mem. in Support, supra note 170.
173. See id. (“For many families, pets are the equivalent of children and must be granted more consideration by courts to ensure that they will be properly cared for after a divorce.”).
174. See Jared Sanders, Who Gets the Pet in the Divorce? Examining a Standard for the New York Legislature to Adopt, 37 Touro L. Rev. 499, 515–18 (2021) (discussing laws enacted by Alaska, California, and Illinois).
175. 2021 Ky. Laws ch. 47 (HB 404), § 3; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.2121 (West 2021). The law also made other changes to Kentucky’s child support laws, including establishing a self-support reserve. See 2021 Ky. Rev. Stat & R. Serv. ch. 47 (HB 404); Matt Hancock, Changes Are Coming to Kentucky’s Child Support System. Here’s How They Help, Courier J. (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/2022/02/09/opinion-helpful-changes-coming-to-kentuckys-child-support-system/6703020001/.
176. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.2121(1)(a)–(b).
177. Id. § 403.2121(1)(b)(2).
178. Id. § 403.2121(2) (“[A]n ‘overnight stay’ shall include the costs associated with feeding and transporting the child, entertainment, attending to school work, athletic events, extracurricular activities, or other expenses that transfer with the child as they move from one parent to the other. Merely providing a child with a place to sleep in order to obtain an adjustment in a child support obligation shall not constitute an overnight stay under this section.”).
179. Schaffner Law, Sweeping Reforms for Kentucky Child Support Laws (July 21, 2021), https://schaffnerfamilylaw.com/sweeping-reforms-for-kentucky-child-support-laws/ (discussing the impact of HB 404).
180. See 2021 Ky. Laws ch. 47 (HB 404), § 3; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.2121.
181. 2021 Ky. Laws ch. 47 (HB 404), § 8.
182. 2021 Sess. Law News of N.Y. ch. 437 (A. 898-B) (McKinney); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240-d (McKinney); N.Y Fam. Ct. Act § 413-b (McKinney).
183. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240(1-b)(2); N.Y Fam. Ct. Act § 413(1)(b)(2).
184. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240-d(1)–(2); N.Y Fam. Ct. Act § 413-b(1)–(2).
185. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240-d(2); N.Y Fam. Ct. Act § 413-b(2).
186. David Lombardo, Push to Fund the Needs of Aging Children with Developmental Disabilities, Times Union (updated Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Push-to-require-support-payments-for-aging-New-13705807.php.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. N.Y.S. Assembly Mem. in Support of Legis., A898B, 244th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
191. Id.
192. 2021 Ark. Laws Act 838 (H.B. 1388); Ark. Code. Ann. § 9-9-225(a). For discussion of post-adoption contact agreements generally, see Lisa A. Tucker, From Contract Rights to Contact Rights: Rethinking the Paradigm for Post-Adoption Contact Agreements, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 2317 (2020) (discussing post-adoption contact agreements generally and the relationship between birth parents and the child once the adoption is final).
193. Ark. Code. Ann. § 9-9-225(a).
194. Id. § 9-9-225(b)(3)(F)(i).
195. Id. § 9-9-225(a).
196. Id. § 9-9-225(b)(1)–(2).
197. Id. § 9-9-225(b)(3)(F).
198. Id. § 9-9-225(b)(3)(G)(iii), (H).
199. Id. § 9-9-225(b)(3).
200. Id. § 9-9-225(c)(1), (e)(1).
201. Id. § 9-9-225(e)(2).
202. Tucker, supra note 192, at 2321 (“[A]bout half of the states hold [post-adoption contact agreements] to be unenforceable if the adoptive parents refuse to perform. . . .”).
203. Ark. Code. Ann. § 9-9-225(e)(2)(A).
204. Tucker, supra note 192, at 2360–61, 2364.
205. Eric Freeby & Heidi Bruegel Cox, Post-Adoption Contact Agreements: To Promote Court-Enforceability or Not?, Nat’l Council for Adoption (Aug. 1, 2018), https://adoptioncouncil.org/publications/adoption-advocate-no-122/.
206. 2021 Colo. Legis. Serv. ch. 481 (H.B. 21-1101) (West); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 19-5-208(4.5), 19-5-217.
207. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-5-208(4.5)(b).
208. Id. § 19-5-208(4.5)(c)–(d).
209. Id. § 19-5-208(4.5)(f).
210. Id. § 19-5-208(4.5)(f)(I).
211. Id. § 19-5-208(4.5)(f)(II).
212. See 2021 Colo. Legis. Serv. ch. 481 (H.B. 21-1101) (West).
213. Jennie Bergal, With Push from Adoptees, States Open Access to Birth Records, Pew (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/08/12/with-push-from-adoptees-states-open-access-to-birth-records.
214. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-5-208(4.5)(d); see Freeby & Cox, supra note 205.
215. See Freeby & Cox, supra note 205.
216. 2021 Colo. Legis. Serv. ch. 103 (H.B. 21-1022) (West); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 19-4.5-101 to 19-4.5-114.
217. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 19-4.5-105, 19-4.5-106.
218. Id. §§ 19-4.5-103, 19-4.5-104.
219. Id. §§ 19-4.5-107 to 19-4.5-113.
220. Id. § 19-4.5-104(1).
221. Id. §§ 19-4.5-103(10), 19-4.5-104(2).
222. Richard Vaughn, Colorado Passes State’s First Surrogacy Law, Int’l Fertility Law Grp. (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.iflg.net/colorado-passes-first-surrogacy-law/.
223. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-4.5-103(8).
224. Id. § 19-4.5-103(9).
225. Vaughn, supra note 222.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 2021 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 141 (H.P. 157) (L.D. 222) (West); Me. Stat. tit. 19-A, §§ 1861–1872.
229. Me. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1861.
230. Id. §§ 1862(1)(F), 1865.
231. Id. § 1862(1).
232. Id. § 1861.
233. Id. (version in effect from July 1, 2016, to Sept. 30, 2021).
234. Testimony in Support of LD 222, An Act to Update the Maine Parentage Act, by Debby Willis, Advisor to Me. Fam. L. Advisory Comm’n, 130th Leg. 1st Spec. Sess. (Me. Feb. 18, 2021), https://legislature.maine.gov/testimony/resources/JUD20210218Willis132579794330449909.pdf.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Testimony in Support of LD 222, An Update to the Maine Parentage Act, by Mary L. Bonauto, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, at 2, 130th Leg. 1st Spec. Sess. (Me. Feb. 18, 2021), http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getTestimonyDoc.asp?id=143269.
238. Id.; see Me Stat. tit. 19-A, §§ 1861–62.
239. GLAD Applauds Update to Maine Law Allowing Expanded Access to Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage, GLBTQ Legal Advoc. & Def. (June 11, 2021), https://www.glad.org/post/glad-applauds-update-to-maine-parentage-law/.
240. 2021 Nevada Laws ch. 512 (A.B. 115); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126.021(3) (West) (“‘Parent and child relationship’ means the legal relationship existing between a child and his or her natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship. This subsection does not preclude a determination by a court that a child has such a legal relationship with more than two persons.”).
241. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.020(1)(a), 127.030(1).
242. Id. § 127.030(1) (“One or more adults may petition the district court of any county in this state for leave to adopt a child. Each prospective adopting adult and each consenting legal parent seeking to retain his or her parental rights must be a joint petitioner.”).
243. Id. § 127.030(6).
244. Id. § 127.030(7).
245. Id. §§ 127.040, 127.090.
246. Id. § 0.027.
247. John Sadler, For Nevada Family, Measure to Allow Multiparent Adoption Hits Home, Las Vegas Sun (Mar. 28, 2021), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2021/mar/28/nevada-family-bill-multiple-parents-adopt-child/; Kelsey Penrose, Nevada Assembly Judiciary Committee Passes Multi-parent Adoption Bill, Allowing for Step-parent, Multiple Parent Adoption, CarsonNOW.org (Mar. 12, 2021), https://carsonnow.org/story/03/12/2021/nevada-assembly-judiciary-committee-passes-multi-parent-adoption-bill-allowing-step?page=845&fbclid=IwAR1jgFyrasWcPV65rhK8PyazdXfrTrR6dMPVnP7mcxr15jD8xA1Ygb7WbEE.
248. Penrose, supra note 247.
249. 2021 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 135 (S.B. 374); Senator Dave Min’s Domestic Violence Survivors’ Justice Bill Signed by Governor, Sen. Dave Min (July 26, 2021), https://sd37.senate.ca.gov/news/senator-dave-mins-domestic-violence-survivors-justice-bill-signed-governor; Cal. Fam. Code §§ 6320(c)(5), 6340(a)(1).
250. Cal. Fam. Code § 6320(c)(5).
251. Id.
252. See 2021 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 135 (S.B. 374).
253. Cal. Bill Analysis, Assembly Comm., 2021–2022 Reg. Sess., S.B. 374 (June 8, 2021). The Bill Analysis contains links to several studies. Id.
254. Id. (quoting Linda Chamberlain & Rebecca Levenson, Addressing Intimate Partner Violence Reproductive and Sexual Coercion: A Guide for Obstetric, Gynecologic, Reproductive Health Care Settings 6 (3d ed. 2013), https://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/HealthCare/Reproductive%20Health%20Guidelines.pdf).
255. Id. (citing 1 in 4 Callers to the National Domestic Violence Hotline Reported Birth Control Sabotage and Pregnancy Coercion, Nat’l Domestic Violence Hotline (Feb. 15, 2011), https://www.thehotline.org/news/1-in-4-callers-to-the-national-domestic-violence-hotline-report-birth-control-sabotage-and-pregnancy-coercion/).
256. Id. (citing Elizabeth Miller et al., Pregnancy Coercion, Intimate Partner Violence, and Unintended Pregnancy, 81 Contraception 316 (2010), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20227548/).
257. 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 248 (S.B. 1141) (West); Cal. Fam. Code § 6320(c) (defining “coercive control” as “a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty” and listing examples, including reproductive coercion).
258. 2021 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 21-78 (S.B. 1091) (West); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-1(b) (West).
259. See David McGrath, “Jennifer’s Law” Marks Shift in Response to Domestic Abuse, Conn. L. Trib. (July 12, 2021), https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/2021/07/12/jennifers-law-marks-shift-in-response-to-domestic-abuse/.
260. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-1(b) (West).
261. Id. § 46b-1(b)(4)(A)–(F) (“‘Coercive control’ includes, but is not limited to, unreasonably engaging in any of the following: (A) Isolating the family or household member from friends, relatives or other sources of support; (B) Depriving the family or household member of basic necessities; (C) Controlling, regulating or monitoring the family or household member’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources or access to services; (D) Compelling the family or household member by force, threat or intimidation, including, but not limited to, threats based on actual or suspected immigration status, to (i) engage in conduct from which such family or household member has a right to abstain, or (ii) abstain from conduct that such family or household member has a right to pursue; (E) Committing or threatening to commit cruelty to animals that intimidates the family or household member; or (F) Forced sex acts, or threats of a sexual nature, including, but not limited to, threatened acts of sexual conduct, threats based on a person’s sexuality or threats to release sexual images.”).
262. Id. § 46b-56(c)(1), (15).
263. 2021 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 21-78 (S.B. 1091), § 2.
264. McGrath, supra note 259.
265. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-15.
266. 2020 D.C. Laws 23-275 (Act 23-571). The amended law also made other significant changes, including addressing the scope of what makes an “intimate partner,” changing provisions concerning petitions for minors, clarifying definitions for key terms, and creating “anti-stalking orders.” Id.; Comm. on the Judiciary & Public Safety, Report on Bill 23-0181, the Intrafamily Offenses and Anti-Stalking Orders Amendment Act of 2020, Nov. 23, 2020, at https://lims.dccouncil.us/downloads/LIMS/42010/Committee_Report/B23-0181-Committee_Report1.pdf [hereinafter Report on Bill 23-0181].
267. D.C. Code § 16-1005(c)(10A) (“In connection with an animal owned, possessed, or controlled by the petitioner,” a civil protection order may “(A) Direct[] the ownership, possession, or control of the animal; or (B) Order[] the respondent to stay away from the animal and refrain from possessing, controlling, harming or threatening to harm, or otherwise disposing of the animal.”).
268. Id. § 16-1001(8)(B) (definition of “intrafamily offense” includes “[a]n offense punishable as cruelty to animals . . . against an animal that an intimate partner, family member, or household member owns, possesses, or controls”).
269. See Representing Domestic Violence Survivors with Pets in the District of Columbia, Animal Welfare Inst., https://awionline.org/content/representing-domestic-violence-survivors-pets-district-columbia#_edn5.
270. See id.; see also Report on Bill 23-0181, supra note 266, at 2 (citing “the widely understood link between animal abuse and domestic violence”).