“Have you been financially impacted by newer cars saving consumers hundreds of dollars at the gas pump? Have you lost profits due to healthier air quality standards for communities? If you or any fuel producers you know have been affected by consumer savings and improved air quality, you may be entitled to compensation!”
Although fighting against consumer savings and cleaner air may sound bizarre, this paragraph illustrates one of the latest challenges against electric vehicles and clean transportation standards at the U.S. Supreme Court. In Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC, et al. v. EPA, petitioners Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC and fuel producers (collectively, Diamond) are challenging an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) waiver allowing California’s standards requiring automakers to improve fuel efficiency in newer cars and increase electric vehicle (EV) market penetration. California’s standards, the Advanced Clean Cars (ACC) program, also require automakers to make less polluting cars, which will improve air quality for communities and tackle transportation greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), the most polluting sector in the United States. Diamond argues that California’s policies prompt automakers to make and sell more EVs, thereby lowering gas consumption nationwide and impacting fuel producers’ profits.
The challenge may seem like an easy win for the respondents EPA, California, environmental groups). The laws that Diamond is challenging have prompted the development of more fuel-efficient and less polluting vehicles, saving consumers money at the gas pump and lowering transportation pollution that harms respiratory health—particularly for youth in environmental justice communities. However, this case is rooted in issues of federal standing law, a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review that has prevented successful climate change litigation in federal courts. On the one hand, if respondents prevail, the ACC will continue prompting automakers to make cleaner and more fuel-efficient vehicles, a win for both environmental and climate-change plaintiffs. But if Diamond prevails, federal standing law may be broadened, which may bode favorably for environmental plaintiffs in climate change lawsuits, such as the intergenerational climate equity case Juliana v. United States. The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied Juliana’s petition for certiorari challenging a court of appeals decision dismissing the case on standing grounds.
In light of a Roberts Court that is often dismissive of—even hostile toward—climate action, how do we square a ruling that may have conflicting implications for the fight against the climate crisis?
To establish Article III standing, the plaintiff must demonstrate an 1. injury in fact, that is 2. caused by the defendant, and which is 3. likely to be redressed by the requested judicial relief. Redressability is the central issue in climate litigation such as Diamond, Juliana, and the seminal climate standing case, Massachusetts v. EPA. The redressability prong asks whether a court can remedy the action that caused the harm. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that because a favorable judicial decision requiring EPA to regulate GHG emissions would remedy—even incrementally—harms caused by climate change (e.g., land erosion), Massachusetts satisfied the redressability prong of the analysis. Conversely, in Juliana, the Ninth Circuit held that a favorable ruling would not redress alleged violations of the plaintiffs’ substantive rights (e.g., life, liberty, and property) caused by climate change through the plaintiffs’ requested relief for a national climate plan because the judiciary lacks authority to adopt a comprehensive scheme to decrease fossil fuel emissions and combat climate change. Combatting climate change, the Court argues, requires complex policy decisions entrusted to the executive and legislative branches. While seemingly alike, in Massachusetts the Court found that EPA has both the constitutional power to regulate transportation GHG emissions and the ability to remedy the injury through transportation mandates lowering domestic GHG emissions. Conversely, in Juliana, the 9th Circuit found that while a national climate plan may remedy some of the plaintiffs’ injuries, the court did not have the constitutional power to mandate such a plan as it would infringe on the Separation of Powers. Accordingly, redressability refers both to the plausibility that a court’s action can remedy the injury (à la Massachusetts v. EPA), and a court’s constitutional power to redress an injury (à la Juliana).
In Diamond, the D.C. Circuit dismissed most of the claims for lack of standing, holding that challengers had not shown that their injuries were redressable by a favorable decision. The court reasoned that, were it to vacate EPA’s grant of a waiver to California, that would not necessarily prompt automakers to produce more liquid fuel–consuming cars—the source of Diamond’s alleged economic injury. In their appeal, fuel producers disputed the argument that courts could not redress the injury given that eliminating the waiver might result in automakers producing more vehicles that run on liquid fuel.
Diamond’s central argument, however, relies on one mistaken assumption: that courts can reverse domestic and international trends toward EV adoption. Petitioners ask the courts to ignore the fact that EVs and hybrids will render many internal combustion engine cars obsolete. Diamond also asks the courts to ignore consumers’ preference to spend less on gasoline by purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles—even if they do not purchase EVs—irrespective of any decisions by EPA or California. Finally, petitioners ignore that existing federal Fuel Economy Standards finalized in 2024—similar to California’s—affect model years 2027–31. It can take up to six years to design new vehicles, so automakers may have started the process to comply with such regulations.
Ultimately, unlike in Massachusetts, where lowering U.S. transportation emissions could have tangible impacts on global GHG emissions (U.S. transportation emissions alone contributed to nearly 6 percent of GHG emissions in 2007, the year of the Massachusetts ruling), revoking the EPA waiver allowing California to set its own improve fuel efficiency and EV adoption standards may neither reverse global market trends, car design and production, nor change consumer preferences. Therefore, unlike in Massachusetts, it is uncertain if a court ruling could remedy the petitioner’s alleged harm.
As we await the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond, I am hopeful that California will prevail as the Court may not be able to redress the alleged injuries. Although expanding Article III standing seems enticing for some reasons, doing so may not necessarily lead to positive climate litigation outcomes. A party may lose a case strictly due to standing, but it may not win a case solely on standing grounds—it still must prevail on the merits. Further, Supreme Court precedent upholding climate laws adopted by a state government will be more helpful to the overall fight against the climate crisis as States face increased scrutiny and attacks against their climate policies under the second Trump administration.
