In September, the California Supreme Court left in place a lower-court decision holding that bees are fish—at least for the purpose of protecting them under California’s endangered species law. Public-interest environmental lawyers, including the clinical students I teach at Stanford Law School, are accustomed to working in the shadows behind the clients and causes we serve. But this case, on which many of my students tirelessly worked, has stolen the spotlight. Celebrated in the environmental community, criticized by industry, dissected by legal scholars, and alternately lauded and ridiculed in social media posts, the decision that bumble bees and other terrestrial invertebrates may be listed as “threatened” or “endangered” under the California Endangered Species Act seems like a sea change in environmental law.
It is and it isn’t. Let’s start with how it isn’t, which means starting with the decision itself (-- Cal. Rptr. 3d --,2022 WL 437847 (May 31, 2022)). When California’s Third District Court of Appeal ruled in Almond Alliance v. California Fish & Game Commission in May of this year, the press and the public seized on the obvious, and admittedly amusing, storyline that “bees are fish,” often followed by various versions of “only in California . . . .” But the Almond Alliance decision doesn’t actually say that. In fact, it rejects that notion—that whether state law protects terrestrial invertebrates like bumble bees turns on common or even scientific understandings of “bees” or “fish.” The decision instead explains that whether the four species of California native bumble bees at issue in the case should be listed as “endangered” turns on what the law says. The California Endangered Species Act, passed in its current form in 1984, protects any native “bird, mammal, fish, amphibian, reptile, or plant” that is at risk of extinction. Cal. Fish & Game Code §§ 2062, 2067, 2068. And California law defines “fish” to mean “a wild fish, mollusk, crustacean, invertebrate, amphibian, or part, spawn, or ovum of any of those animals.” Id. § 45. Accordingly, the California Endangered Species Act protects “invertebrates” as “fish.”
I’ll be the first to admit that protecting “bees” as “fish” is not a legislature legislating at its finest. When the California Supreme Court declined to take the case, the chief justice and two associate justices took note of the “clear disconnect” between the Court of Appeal’s legal conclusion and “common knowledge.” Moreover, some legal scholars point out that the other kinds of animals protected under the definition of “fish” are often associated with aquatic environments. (There are good responses to these and other points, and the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal discuss many of them in their decisions.) In any event, the California Supreme Court thought the case was unworthy of review; the Court of Appeal employed long-settled legal doctrines to fairly interpret a single provision in a single law.