To address this problem, Boyd offers a multipart solution. First, treat federal forests as federal facilities—as other federal property is treated under other environmental statutes—for climate liability purposes. Second, impose strict liability for all carbon emissions arising from wildfires on federal lands. To avoid distorting incentives surrounding important prescribed burning activities, Boyd recommends limiting liability to unplanned wildfires. Further, all other liability related to wildfires should remain undisturbed by the introduction of emissions liability. And finally, to assess the damages associated with the emissions, Professor Boyd suggests using the federal government’s social cost of carbon estimate. Any funds raised through the imposition of climate liability would be paid directly from the U.S. Treasury into a specific fund created for a particular purpose. In this case, that purpose would be funding “on-the-ground restoration and resilience activities” on federal lands.
According to Boyd: “For too long, forests have been discounted in climate policy, given the obvious and understandable attention to the energy sector. But as the forest fires in Canada this summer and the current fires in Indonesia and Brazil make clear, forests and land use may well turn out to be the hardest part of the climate crisis. It is time to find ways to use climate policy to make the necessary investments in forest restoration and resilience, rather than treating forests as a source of cheap offsets for the energy and industrial sectors.”
Aware of the political and practical considerations that could sink his policy proposal, Professor Boyd offers several responses to address these concerns. First, strict liability regimes are easy to administer, even more so here because damages are calculated using the government’s own social cost of carbon. Creation of a dedicated fund with a sort of automatic allocation mechanism also insulates the funds and underlying activities from annual squabbles over agency appropriations and budgets. Perhaps the largest political hurdle the policy faces is the fact that some would equate the strict liability regime proposed with a carbon tax applied to wildfire emissions. In addressing this critique, Boyd observes that a liability framing is more appropriate because it “recognizes that there are actual harms associated with wildfire emissions that should be compensated.”
He further explains: “By framing this in the context of liability and obligations rather than fees and taxes, we remind people that the federal government, and other landowners, have a responsibility to manage their forests in a manner that does not impose massive harms to public health and the environment.”