Recently, the Supreme Court has offered two distinct characterizations of the MQD. Justice Gorsuch’s clear-statement cannon sets forth a two-prong framework: 1. Is the agency action unheralded (i.e., “major”)? And, if so, 2. Did Congress provide clear authorization to the agency to exercise such authority? West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2614–16 (2022). In applying Gorsuch’s two-prong interpretation of the MQD, the Supreme Court determined the Environmental Protection Agency lacked statutory authority under the Clean Air Act to set emission caps for the purpose of generation shifting. Meanwhile, Justice Barrett’s semantic cannon employs the MQD as an “interpretive tool” as opposed to a formalized two-prong analysis. Justice Barrett characterizes MQD as a sliding scale, proffering that authorization might be more or less specific to overcome a more or less unlikely delegation from Congress. Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring).
Unsurprisingly, the SEC’s final Climate Rules were immediately met with legal challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Petitioners sought to vacate the Climate Rules under the MQD, arguing that it would have vast economic and political significance and thus goes beyond the SEC’s legal authority. Other challengers contend the Climate Rules are a First Amendment violation because it impermissibly compels speech. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, No. 24-707 (2d Cir. filed Mar. 12, 2024); Liberty Energy Inc. v. SEC, No. 24-60109 (5th Cir. filed Mar. 6, 2024); Louisiana v. SEC, No. 24-60109 (5th Cir. filed Mar. 7, 2024); Tex. All. of Energy Producers v. SEC, No. 24-60109 (5th Cir. filed Mar. 11, 2024); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. of Am. v. SEC, No. 24-60109 (5th Cir. filed Mar. 14, 2024); Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp. v. SEC, No. 24-3220 (6th Cir. filed Mar. 13, 2024); Iowa v. SEC, No. 24-1522 (8th Cir. filed Mar. 12, 2024); West Virginia v. SEC, No. 24-10679 (11th Cir. filed Mar. 6, 2024); Sierra Club v. SEC, No. 24-1067 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 13, 2024). The Judicial Panel on Multicircuit Litigation consolidated the petitions for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3). The lead case is now Iowa v. SEC, No. 24-1522 (8th Cir. filed Mar. 12, 2024). Thereafter, on April 4, 2024, the SEC exercised its discretion to voluntarily stay the Climate Rules pending the adjudication of the Eighth Circuit petitions.
On June 28, 2024, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___ (2024), the Supreme Court put an end to Chevron deference, the doctrine that allowed federal agencies to fill the gaps in ambiguous provisions of congressional statutes, if delegation was implied and the traditional tools of statutory interpretation failed, based on their specialized expertise. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron step one, the court asks, “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If it is determined that the meaning of the statute is “unambiguously expressed,” then “that is the end of the matter[.]” If the court continues to Chevron step two, and “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court then asks, “whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” In Loper, the Court held that, under the APA, courts must “exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions,” even ambiguous ones. This decision significantly lessens the ability of agencies to promulgate rules and regulations without direct, clear, and detailed marching orders from Congress and empowers courts to supply their own interpretations. According to the Supreme Court, there is a “best reading” of each statute, based on relevant interpretive tools.
On August 5, 2024, the SEC filed its brief in Iowa v. SEC, maintaining that the SEC has statutory authority to promulgate the Climate Rules after both West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency and Loper. The Commission clarifies that the intent of the Climate Rules is “not to influence companies’ approaches to climate-related risks or to protect the environment, but to advance traditional securities-law objectives of facilitating informed investment and voting decisions.” Much of the Climate Rules disclosures are accompanied by a materiality qualifier. In the seminal 1976 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that “an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 US 438, 449 (1976). The brief posits that the Climates Rules approach to materiality is consistent with the Commission’s statutory authority.
The SEC’s defense of the Climate Rules is much less tenable without the ability to rely on the Chevron justification that the Commission, with 90 years of experience overseeing securities exchanges, securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors, and mutual funds, is best equipped to interpret the Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act as it relates to what requirements are necessary or appropriate necessary in the public interest or for the protection of investors.