Environmental justice is a broad concept with many definitions, but at its core is based on the recognition that certain communities, like Indigenous communities, communities of color, and low-income communities historically have disproportionately borne the brunt of adverse environmental impacts. In an attempt to address environmental injustice, President Clinton established Executive Order 12898, which requires federal agencies to make achieving environmental justice a part of their missions “by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of [their] programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations.” Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Fed. 16, 1994).
This mandate has been openly ignored by federal agencies operating in Guam, where military priorities consistently override environmental protections and Indigenous rights. This article primarily examines the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2006 military realignment in the Pacific, analyzing how environmental justice requirements fare when confronted with national defense interests. Through a detailed examination of DOD’s environmental impact statements and related litigation, supplemented by additional examples of environmental degradation—from toxic dumps to whale strandings, from contaminated fishing grounds to ancient cultural sites—Guam’s experience demonstrates how federal environmental laws can be systematically weakened or circumvented when they conflict with military objectives.
DOD’s Pacific Pivot: New Plans, Familiar Patterns
In 2006, the DOD and the government of Japan announced a “roadmap” to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa. The announcement came ten years after U.S. service members violently raped a twelve-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl sparking outrage and protests Okinawa and a call to remove the Marines from the island. Yuri Kageyama, Why Okinawa’s Governor Says US Marine Air Base Should Move after Referendum Rejection Associated Press, Mar. 4, 2019. Under the 2006 Roadmap, the DOD would close Futenma and move Marines to Henoko, another area of Okinawa; Darwin, Australia; and Guam.
This expansion into Guam, part of the broader U.S. “Pacific Pivot” strategy, would profoundly impact an island already shaped by centuries of colonial control. Guam is part of the Marianas, an island chain located in the Pacific. A seven-hour flight from Honolulu and about a four-hour flight from Tokyo, Manila, and Seoul, Guam occupies a unique position in the Pacific. Chamorros, the Indigenous people of the Marianas, established their civilization here over three thousand years ago. Magellan “discovered” Guam in 1521, leading to Spain’s formal claim of the Marianas decades later, and the islands would remain under Spanish control for centuries until the turn of the twentieth century.
The United States acquired Guam in 1898 as one of the spoils of the Spanish American War. Since then, Guam has been an unincorporated territory. The U.S. Navy controlled Guam for 42 years, which was interrupted by the Japanese occupation of Guam during World War II. The Department of Interior then governed Guam for over 22 years until Guam elected its first governor in 1970. Throughout these political transitions, the Chamorro people have maintained their presence on the island, today comprising over 40% of the population of Guam.
Despite the formation of a civilian government, the U.S. federal government still wields considerable political and economic influence on Guam today. The U.S. military presence, centered at Andersen Air Force Base in the north and Naval Base Guam in the south, dominates the island’s economy alongside tourism.
When DOD proposed adding a new Marine Corps base as part of the 2006 Roadmap, it issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in November 2009. I have reviewed thousands of pages of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis connected to the buildup in Guam and across Micronesia in private practice and as the attorney general of Guam from 2019 to 2023, but I always return to one sentence when I summarize the federal government’s approach, or more specifically the DOD’s approach, to environmental justice in the Marianas: “The impact would not be considered disproportional as all of Tinian is considered a minority and low-income area.” CNMI Joint Military Training Draft Environmental Impact Statement, ch. 4 at 4–450.
The Guam Buildup and the Pågat Proposal
A few days after the Draft EIS was released I sent a short email to a friend: “You finished reading it yet?” Since the announced move of Marines from Okinawa to Guam, many people were expecting the release of the Draft EIS, but most did not anticipate that it would be roughly 8,000 pages long or that our community would only have 90 days to review and submit comments on it.
To say that our community was unprepared and overwhelmed by the sheer amount of information would be an understatement. Most were unfamiliar with the NEPA process or requirements. Instead of hiring experts to assist in a technical review of the Draft EIS, our local government hired a consultant to prepare a compatibility sustainability study. Local government agencies who assisted in the preparation of the Draft EIS could not publicly comment on its contents or their work because they reportedly were required to sign non-disclosure agreements. This gap in resources and information forced community members to work together to analyze the Draft EIS, share reliable information with the public, and coordinate a response.
There was also a gap in legal help. There were no law firms in Guam actively practicing in the area of local or federal environmental law or willing to commit resources to review the Draft EIS. A small group of young Indigenous professionals with legal expertise took on the task of facilitating the community review and response. Four years out of law school, I was the most senior of our group. None of us had studied NEPA or the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). We relied heavily on a treatise on NEPA litigation from the University of Hawai’i Richardson School of Law library that the law student in our group borrowed and shipped to Guam for a few months (it was returned on time).
A review of the Draft EIS revealed that the projected impacts included an increase in population of up to 45%, or roughly 79,000 people, over a four-year period, the destruction of over 70 acres of coral reef, and a shortfall of water for the local community. As more and more information came out, concern started to mount. In particular, DOD’s proposal to construct a firing range complex over Pågat Village, an ancient Chamorro village and burial site, sparked widespread community opposition.
DOD’s proposal to construct a firing range complex atop an ancient Indigenous village site sparked widespread opposition, particularly given the federal government’s already substantial land holdings of nearly one-third of Guam’s territory as of 2009. In the Draft EIS, DOD dismissed all potential alternatives that would have located the firing range complex within existing federal lands, instead insisting on acquiring additional territory. In the Draft EIS, DOD presented two alternatives that both involved acquiring land at Pågat Village, with the only difference being the amount of private and local government territory to be taken. Both alternatives proposed building a live firing range complex at this culturally significant site.
As NEPA novices, our legal team decided that the most controversial part of the DOD’s proposal—constructing a firing range complex on an ancient Indigenous village site—presented the strongest argument for challenging the legal insufficiency of the Draft EIS. We crafted strategic comments on the Draft EIS to establish a robust legal foundation, preserving our arguments for potential future litigation. We also did our best to cobble together a complaint based on cases we could find anticipating that DOD would not back down. Fortunately for us, help was on the way.
The Guam Preservation Trust and the National Trust for Historic Preservation both were also deeply concerned about the impacts of Pågat Village, with the National Trust emphasizing its significance by naming it one of America’s eleven most endangered historic places. These groups were ultimately able to secure pro bono representation from a large law firm based in San Francisco with significant experience in NEPA litigation. Their legal team was instrumental in empowering our community throughout the NEPA process and NHPA consultation.
DOD’s Response
DOD attempted to address mounting opposition to the Pågat Village firing range complex by modifying its original proposal. While DOD promised to maintain public access to Pågat Village by keeping the main trail open, this concession created unacceptable safety risks: the trail would run directly alongside an area where stray bullets could land, while military personnel conducted live-fire exercises with .50 caliber machine guns from the bluffs above.
To address concerns about its land acquisition, DOD proposed a “net zero” plan, promising to return excess lands, i.e., lands that it had taken from Indigenous people that were no longer needed for military purposes. These proposals were part of what a retired general would describe as “sweeteners” meant to build pressure on local elected officials into agreeing to the firing range complex at Pågat and isolate groups opposing the plans. Email from David Bice to John Scorby and Joe Ludovici (Sept. 27, 2019, 10:33 AM) (on file with the author).
Despite widespread opposition to the firing range complex at Pågat Village, DOD issued its Final EIS in July 2010 and Record of Decision (ROD) in September 2010 with no significant changes from the Draft EIS. Following the release of the ROD, the Guam Preservation Trust, National Trust for Historic Preservation, and other individuals and groups sued DOD in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawai’i. Guam Preservation Trust v. Gregory, 1:10-CV-00677 (D. Haw.) The lawsuit alleged that DOD violated NEPA by not adequately evaluating locations other than Pågat Village for its proposed firing range complex. Id. This lawsuit marked the first legal challenge to DOD’s actions in Guam alleging violations of federal environmental laws.
During the litigation, DOD informed the court that it could have used a different method for determining the surface danger zone, potentially reducing the land area needed for the firing range. This revelation opened the possibility of considering sites other than Pågat Village as viable alternatives. A little less than a year after the lawsuit was filed, DOD notified the court of its intent to prepare a Supplemental EIS (SEIS). This SEIS, released in September of 2015, would include a comprehensive re-evaluation of potential locations for the firing range complex.
In a striking reversal, DOD’s new preferred alternative in the SEIS proposed constructing the firing range complex at the Ritidian Wildlife Refuge—a location DOD had previously rejected specifically because of potential environmental impacts.
The Ritidian Wildlife Refuge itself is a subject of controversy. While the federal government currently controls the area, original landowners continue to assert a right to reclaim their ancestral property. Despite these ongoing disputes, the Refuge plays a crucial ecological role. It serves as a sanctuary for the last remaining populations of several endangered and endemic native tree and bird species that can only be found in Guam and Rota.
The ecological significance of the Refuge is further emphasized by Guam’s tragic environmental history. The island’s bird population was decimated following the inadvertent introduction of the brown tree snake by a DOD ship. In response, several hundred acres of the Refuge have been designated critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), with the aim of potentially reintroducing these now rare bird species.
Anticipating legal challenges over impacts to the Refuge, DOD chose not to seek an alternative location but instead took preemptive action to modify the Refuge’s operational framework—effectively rewriting the rules governing this protected area.
DOD’s strategy mirrored its previous response to environmental litigation. After Earthjustice successfully challenged DOD’s bombing exercises on Farallon de Medinilla for violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (see Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2002)), DOD again sought to circumvent environmental protections through legislation. Working through Guam’s congressional delegate, DOD secured a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that authorized an agreement with the Secretary of Interior to establish a surface danger zone over the Refuge—effectively bypassing standard National Wildlife Refuge System protections. Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, 113 P.L. 291, § 2822, 128 Stat. 3292 (2014).
Environmental experts immediately recognized the provision’s devastating implications. Jim Kirth, chief of the National Wildlife Refuge System testified against the provision stating that it would “substantially and materially interfere with the Refuge’s ability to meet its purposes and mission.” See Testimony of Jim Kurth, Chief, Nat’l Wildlife Refuge Sys., Legislative Hearing on H.R. 4402, Guam Military Training and Readiness Act of 2014, April 29, 2014. It required no technical or scientific expertise to recognize that operation of machine guns would likely not be compatible with the recovery of endangered native birds, bats, and trees. Notwithstanding, the provision was passed into law and DOD proceeded with its plan.