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SCOTUS Update: January 2025

Randi Wright, Quinn Truong, and Allison Wong

SCOTUS Update: January 2025
Mike Kline / Notkalvin Photography via Getty Images

Recent Decisions

TikTok, Inc. v. Garland

Oral argument date: January 10, 2025
Decision date: January 17, 2025

Facts: The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act was signed into law on April 24th, 2024 with the intention to regulate foreign applications and platforms. The petitioners, TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd., argue that the Act violates the First Amendment. Under the Act, countries including China are identified as foreign adversaries and therefore subjected to more extensive control regarding the distribution, maintenance, and use of platforms like TikTok. The Act would require that ByteDance sell the TikTok platform to an approved buyer, specifying a timeframe before effective ban. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia previously denied the petition, concluding that the Act was not only constitutional, but crucial for government interests in national security.

Issue(s): Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to TikTok, violates the First Amendment.

Holding: Application of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act does not violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights. The effective ban on TikTok is upheld.

Significance: The decision in TikTok, Inc. v. Garland has far-reaching implications on the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, application of First Amendment civil liberties to foreign-based companies, and regulation of widely-distributed platforms such as TikTok and other social media. Upholding application of the Act to TikTok may make it unlawful for U.S. app stores to promote, distribute, maintain, or update the platform if ByteDance cannot or is unwilling to sell the platform to an approved buyer.

Bouarfa v. Mayorkas 

Oral Argument Date: October 15, 2024
Decision Date: December 10, 2024

Facts: In 2014, Petitioner Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, filed a Form I-130 visa petition for her husband, Ala’a Hamayel, which United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) initially approved. Later, the Secretary notified Bouarfa of intent to revoke the approval, citing Hamayel's prior marriage as a "sham marriage" under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c). Ms. Bouarfa’s appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals were denied. They found that there was “good and sufficient cause” for revocation under § 1154. Ms. Bouarfa challenged the agency’s revocation in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming the officials’ actions were arbitrary and capricious. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that under §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)–a provision barring federal courts of jurisdiction from reviewing certain discretionary agency decisions–the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue(s): May a visa petitioner obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria?

Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary of Homeland Security is a discretionary decision that falls within 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review such actions.

Significance: This decision underscores the broad discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security in immigration proceedings, particularly concerning visa petition revocations. It clarifies that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review these discretionary decisions, even when they involve non-discretionary criteria. The decision has significant implications for noncitizens and their families, as it limits the avenues for judicial recourse against visa petition revocations.

Cases on the Docket From October to December 2024

Glossip v. Oklahoma

Oral Argument Date: October 9, 2024

Facts: Richard Glossip was sentenced to death for the 1997 murder of Barry Van Tresse, allegedly hiring Justin Sneed to commit the crime. A court overturned Mr. Glossip’s original conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Later, in 2004, Mr. Glossip was retried and sentenced to death largely based on Mr. Sneed’s testimony, who claimed Glossip paid him $10,000 to kill Mr. Van Tresse. Years later, evidence emerged that Mr. Sneed had given false testimony regarding his mental health and psychiatric treatment, and prosecutors har failed to disclose this information. Additionally, evidence suggested that Mr. Sneed intended to recant his testimony. An independent investigation by the Oklahoma Attorney General found procedural misconduct that undermined the confidence in Glossip’s conviction, prompting the Attorney General filing a motion support Mr. Glossip’s case.

In 2023, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied Mr. Glossip’s motion to vacate his conviction, and the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board rejected his clemency request. Although Mr. Glossip was scheduled for execution in May 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court granted him a stay of execution, with Oklahoma filing a response in support of the stay. 

Issue(s):

  1. Whether the state’s suppression of the key prosecution witness’ admission that he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness’ false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois;

  2. whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when assessing the materiality of Brady and Napue claims;

  3. whether due process of law requires reversal where a capital conviction is so infected with errors that the state no longer seeks to defend it; and 

  4. whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' holding that the Oklahoma Post-Conviction Procedure Act precluded post-conviction relief is an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment.

Significance: This case has significant implications for prosecutorial misconduct, wrongful convictions, and the death penalty. The U.S. Supreme Court’s eventual ruling could have a lasting impact on how such issues are addressed in capital cases. It could strengthen safeguards against wrongful executions, impacting not only Richard Glossip but the broader legal and ethical framework surrounding the death penalty in the United States. 

City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency

Oral Argument Date: October 16, 2024

Facts: The city of San Francisco operates a combined sewer that collects both sewage and rainwater runoff, which can release pollutants into the Pacific Ocean during heavy rainfall.

Under the Clean Water Act, cities are required to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to regulate such discharges. In 2019, the Enviormental Protection Agency (EPA) and California Regional Quality Control Board issued the city’s NPDES permit. The city later contested the permit, claiming that the EPA overstepped its authority under the Clean Water Act by imposing vague prohibitions that could hold individual permitholders responsible for the overall water quality of receiving bodies rather than individual contributions. The EPA Enviormental Appeals Board rejected San Francisco’s appeal, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld this decision, ruling that the Clean Water Act grants the EPA the authority to include the challenged provisions in the permit.

Issue(s): Whether the Clean Water Act allows the Environmental Protection Agency (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits that subject permit-holders to enforcement for violating water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform.

Significance: This case highlights questions of statutory interpretation, administrative, and environmental law, particulary in the wake of the overturning of Chevron. This case may clarify how the U.S. Supreme Court anticipates agency deference to act after Chevron, and the ability for courts to make textual determinations and trump agency deferral and expertise. 

United States v. Skrmetti

Oral Argument Date: December 4, 2024

Facts: In 2023, Tennessee passed laws restricting certain medical gender-affirming treatments for transgender minors. These laws prohibit healthcare providers from administering puberty blockers, hormone therapy, and sex-transition surgeries to minors for the purpose validating their gender identity when inconsistent with their biological sex. The law would also require transgender youth to cease receiving gender-affirming care within nine months of the law’s effective date. It establishes a private right of action against medical providers providing gender-affirming treatment to minors.

Issue(s): Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1, which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow “a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or to treat “purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity,” violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

Significance:The court’s holding could have significant implications for transgender youth across the United States. Recently, district courts blocked similar bans in Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee, but the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have allowed these bans to take effect. If the U.S. Supreme Court finds the Tennesee bill constitutional, it may affect the outcome of cases across the United States.

Cases Set for Argument in January and February 2025

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services

Oral argument date: February 26, 2025

Facts: Petitioner Marlean Ames claims that her employer, the Ohio Department of Youth Services, engaged in reverse discrimination. In 2017, Ames was placed under supervisor Ginine Trim, who is a gay woman. Two years later, Ames was demoted and replaced by a gay man. Under these circumstances, Ames alleges personnel changes favoring LBGTQ+ candidates. Her suit is under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Sixth Circuit denied the petition, claiming that background information is necessary in order to suggest that the Department discriminated against heterosexual women as a majority group.

Issue(s): Whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires a majority-group plaintiff to provide background circumstances in support of the defendant acting as an employer discriminating against the majority as an element of an employment discrimination claim.

Significance: The decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services will be foundational in majority-group discrimination cases in the U.S. A requirement of background circumstances to make a prima facie case for discrimination will increase the complexity of reverse discrimination Title VII claims. The case could affect hiring policies and discrimination litigation for both employers and employees in the future. Currently, U.S. Circuit courts vary in using the background circumstances requirement for reverse discrimination cases, so the Ames decision would instill further uniformity for plaintiffs. Establishing different criteria for majority and minority groups under Title VII may also trigger future litigation over how Title VII should be applied in discrimination cases. 

Cases Not Yet Set for Argument

Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Board

Facts: The Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission determined that Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. and its four sub-entities did not operate primarily for religious purposes, and were therefore not exempt from the state’s unemployment tax. Catholic Charities petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which sided with the Labor and Industry Review Commission. The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that for an entity to operate “primarily for religious purposes,” courts must exaime both its motivations and activities. The Court decided that Catholic Charities’ activities were charitable and secular. When making this determination, the Court stressed that Catholic Charities did not imbue programs with the Catholic faith or supply religious materials to program participants. Religious activities, in the Court’s view, included holding worship services or providing religious education—not hosting job training programs or food pantries.

Catholic Charities contends that this decision violates the First Amendment. They argue that the Court’s decision asks them to second-guess the religious dogma of organizations and their own affairs. Catholic Charities stated that they believe in “[serving] those in need without proselytizing,” and that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling violates their religious freedom.

Issue(s): Whether a state violates the First Amendment’s religion clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state’s criteria for religious behavior.

Significance: The court’s ruling could have significant implications for the application of the First Amendment protections to religious organizations and their interactions with state regulatory frameworks. The case will clarify how courts determine whether an organization’s activities are “primarily religious” or “secular” for the purposes of legal exemptions. A decision could either reinforce states’ ability to regulate these organizations or limit their power to do so, depending on how the U.S. Supreme Court tests the limits of religious freedom protections.

Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization

Facts: In 2004, plaintiffs, a group of U.S. citizens injured during terrorist attacks in Israel, filed a lawsuit against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authroity (PA). Initially, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found jurisidction and the jury found the PLO and PA liable for six terrorist attacks and awarded the victims relief. The following year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the verdict, ruling the court lacked jurisdiction due insufficient U.S. contacts. In response, congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019, which deemed the PLO and PA as having consented to U.S. court jurisdiction if they made payments to terrorist families or conducted U.S. activities.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit again rejected the jurisdiction, argueing that the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act was unconsitutional. In response, the plaintiffs and federal government appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the lower court’s decision could hamstring Congress’ ability to regulate international affairs and set a dangerous precedent. The defense argued that the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act violated the Fifth Amendment by including a “deemed consent” provision inconsistent with the due process clause.

Issue(s): Whether the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Significance: The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the extent to which Congress can legislate personal jurisdiction over foreign entities in U.S. courts. The case will impact the application of the Anti-Terrorism Act and the broader principles of due process in the context of international law and foreign relations. The Court’s ruling will also substantially impact the interpretation of the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and its ability to hold individuals accountable. 

Sources

TikTok, Inc. v. Garland

Bouarfa v. Mayorkas 

Glossip v. Oklahoma

City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency

United States v. Skrmetti

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services

Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Board

Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization

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