Introduction: Contesting Personhood
The plain meaning of words can get mangled in the hands of a clever lawyer. One word that is heavily contested in the American legal context is “person”—and by extension—who counts as a member of “we the people.” For instance, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney had a case before him in 1857 where a man was trying to claim his status as a free man because he had long lived in a free territory of the United States. In Chief Justice Taney’s hands, Mr. Scott was not a person at all. He was property to be bought, sold, and inherited, and the only rights Chief Justice Taney would protect were the property rights of his owner. In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court concluded that African Americans were not included in “we the people” in the preamble of the U.S. Constitution. The Court concluded that blacks “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. . . .”
This racist conclusion of the Supreme Court fencing out African Americans from counting as “persons” was controversial in its day. In response to Dred Scott, ex-slave Frederick Douglass gave a speech before the American Anti-Slavery Society. He said of the U.S. Constitution’s preamble, the text says,
“We, the people”—not we, the white people—not we, the citizens, or the legal voters—not we, the privileged class, and excluding all other classes but we, the people; not we, the horses and cattle, but we the people—the men and women, the human inhabitants of the United States. . . .
Thus, Douglass reasoned “we the people” included African Americans as well.
Courts continue to this day to wrestle with the basic question of who or what counts as a person with protectable rights. Flash forward to 2010 when the Supreme Court ruled in Citizens United v. FEC that corporations have First Amendment political rights to buy ads in all American elections. If the logical flaw in Dred Scott was mistaking a person (Mr. Scott) for a piece of property, the blunder in Citizens United was mistaking a piece of property (a corporation) for a person. (For a longer analysis of the Scott decision, see Crooms-Robinson’s article that begins on page 2.)
Through Article V amendments to the Constitution, the American people decided that individuals who had long been excluded from being considered part of “we the people,” like African Americans and women, were, in fact, full members of the body politic. But now counter-majoritarian courts are taking the lead in shoehorning corporations into roles that previously only American citizens occupied. Corporations do not have coequal constitutional rights as living, breathing human citizens, but they are making claims on more rights that, until relatively recently, were only asserted by real people.
The Evolution of the Corporate Form
I wrote about the bizarre U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding corporations in my book Corporate Citizen? An Argument for the Separation of Corporation and State. In a nutshell, in my book I argue that the Supreme Court is allowing for vastly expanded corporate rights, while at the same time the same Court is excusing corporations from a growing list of responsibilities. As I demonstrate in my book, corporate lawyers have a long history of arguing for expanded notions of corporate personhood in America. In fact, early American lawyers were only carrying on a tradition that started centuries ago across the sea in Europe. The idea of anthropomorphizing corporations through “corporate personhood” dates back to a medieval pope who was also a lawyer. The idea of corporate personhood spread across Europe, jumped to England, and landed in America along with the British colonists.
Corporations have evolved radically since America became a nation at the end of the eighteenth century. Justice Louis Brandeis, in his famous dissent in Liggett, 288 U.S. at 554–56, Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee (1933), explained the historical path of the expansion of corporations from single-purpose entities with limited terms of existence into the multipurpose, immortal behemoths we have today. As Justice Brandeis wrote:
Limitations upon the scope of a business corporation’s powers and activity were also long universal. At first, corporations could be formed under the general laws only for a limited number of purposes—usually those which required a relatively large fixed capital, like transportation, banking, and insurance, and mechanical, mining, and manufacturing enterprises. Permission to incorporate for “any lawful purpose” was not common until 1875; . . . All, or a majority, of the incorporators or directors, or both, were required to be residents of the incorporating state. The powers which the corporation might exercise in carrying out its purposes were sparingly conferred and strictly construed.
As Justice Brandeis noted, the purposes of corporations were once narrow and are now incredibly broad.
One of the big changes from the founding to today is that, at the founding, only a special legislative act could create a corporation. By contrast, now, under general incorporation statutes, incorporators can file a few administrative papers, pay a few fees, and be the proud owner of their very own corporation. And many take advantage of this ease and convenience. Approximately 2 million corporations are incorporated annually in the United States. Delaware has clearly won the race for corporate charters, as the majority of U.S. corporations are incorporated in Delaware, America’s second smallest state.
Additionally, at the founding, corporations were created for a limited purpose, like building a road from point A to point B. Now, while incorporators could limit the purpose of a corporation in its articles of incorporation, few do. Rather, the norm presently is for entrepreneurs to establish corporations for “any lawful purpose.” This allows modern firms to do multiple lines of business as well as assert the ability to act in non-business fora.
After Citizens United was decided in 2010, bumper stickers appeared stating: “I’ll believe a corporation is a person when Texas executes one.” What this clever catchphrase captures is the fact that corporations are not corporeal. Contemporary corporations, unlike their human counterparts, can exist in perpetuity, hence why they are sometimes referred to as being “immortal.” Cryogenics aside, although Walt Disney the man died, the Walt Disney Company shows no signs of going anywhere anytime soon.
This wasn’t always the case. Until 1875, corporate franchises were for a limited term of years. But eventually, as states competed in a race to the bottom for corporate charters, they all eventually allowed corporations to continue in perpetuity. So now, anyone can incorporate a corporation, and those corporations do not have to be for a limited purpose, or for a limited time. This, of course, could be changed if state laws, like those in Delaware, were changed to require corporations only for limited terms.
Today, immortality is a feature of modern corporations, not a bug. But this may be why granting corporations the same rights as individuals doesn’t always make sense. As the Supreme Court once concluded, “[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike[.]” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 97–98 (1976). And this seems particularly apt, when corporations and humans are being balanced on the scales of justice.
As corporations themselves grew, simultaneously the diffusion of stock ownership grew dramatically. At the founding, the owners of a corporation would typically be a small circle of people. As such, a small group of investors could easily keep an eye on how their investments were being managed. But with the modern publicly traded corporation, millions of people may own stock in a single firm. Shareholders are geographically dispersed, and because each one typically owns only a fraction of a percent of the firm, the incentive to keep a watchful eye over management is diminished. In the 1930s, Professors Berle and Means worried that this separation of management from control would prove troublesome. And time has shown that Berle’s and Means’s instincts were correct. Whether the issue is executive compensation or other aspects of corporate governance, shareholders have collective action problems that inhibit the coordination of large numbers of investors, and they also have a rational disinterest in not monitoring corporate insiders on a regular basis. Corporate managers, thus, may act in undisciplined and self-serving ways at the expense of shareholders, like helping themselves to generous retirement packages or the use of perks like corporate jets.
This is known as an agency problem—corporate managers are the shareholders’ agents within the firm, and the managers have a fiduciary duty to act in the shareholders’ best interest, but because the shareholders are not continually monitoring the behavior of managers, the managers may produce suboptimal returns for investors because of self-serving behaviors like enjoying expensive perks on the company’s dime. The worries raised by the agency theory become more acute as firms become larger and the temptation for managers to tap corporate resources for personal reasons—like backing a favorite political cause at shareholder expense—grows.
At the same time that statutory powers of corporations expanded, the Supreme Court also decided which constitutional rights could attach to the corporate form. The Supreme Court’s approach to the rights for corporations can be divided into two distinct strains of case law. Interestingly, while the Court has concluded that corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has been quite reticent to concede that corporations are “citizens” for the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.