Recent Decisions
Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP
Oral argument date: October 11, 2023
Decided on: May 23, 2024
Facts: After the 2020 Census, South Carolina’s Republican-controlled legislature developed a new congressional map that moved tens of thousands of Black voters to a different congressional district. The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP sued, and a three-judge panel ruled that the district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. State legislators appealed and claimed that the map was a political gerrymander that solely had a racial effect in practice.
Issue: Does the South Carolina legislature’s redistricting map constitute impermissible racial gerrymandering, even if the legislators claim the intent was political gerrymandering?
Holding: The district court erroneously found that race predominated the design of the contested congressional district. The two doctrines guiding the distinction between racial and political gerrymandering are that (1) the party challenging the map’s constitutionality must “disentangle race and politics,” and (2) when assessing a legislature’s work, the court must presume that the legislature acted in good faith.
Significance: 2021 marks the first redistricting cycle since the Court invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder in 2013. Without the once-required formula for determining whether changes to a state’s voting procedure need to be federally reviewed, South Carolina no longer had to submit redistricting plans for approval to a federal court or the Department of Justice to ensure that the maps did not dilute the voting power of Black voters or other voters of color. Now, without the protection of this critical section of the Voting Rights Act, voters must sue in federal court to challenge racial discrimination in redistricting and meet the demanding burden of proving that the state legislature “‘subordinated’ race-neutral districting criteria such as compactness, contiguity, and core preservation to ‘racial considerations’” through a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. This case highlights the growing burden on plaintiffs in racial gerrymandering cases and the continuing threats to voters’ rights.
Thornell v. Jones
Oral argument date: April 17, 2024
Decided on: May 30, 2024
Facts: In 1992, Jones was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder in Arizona. At sentencing, testimony exposed Jones’s traumatic childhood. A forensic psychiatrist assessed Jones and noted a history of substantive abuse, potential mood disorders, and susceptibility to aggression due to drug use. The judge ultimately sentenced Jones to death despite his request for a continuance for further psychological testing. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld Jones's conviction. Jones then filed a federal petition for habeas relief but was dismissed by the district court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and concluded that Jones’s counsel was ineffective based on his failure to obtain a mental health expert and his failure to present additional mitigating evidence.
Issue: What is the proper standard for assessing prejudice when determining an ineffective assistance of counsel claim?
Holding: When a capital defendant claims a prejudiced sentence due to their counsel’s inability to present available mitigating evidence, the court must decide whether it is reasonably likely that the additional evidence would have avoided a death sentence. To determine whether a change of sentencing outcome was reasonably probable, the court should evaluate the strength of all the evidence and compare the aggravating and mitigating factors.
Significance: The Court clarified that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Jones had to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudiced the outcome, indicating a reasonable probability that additional evidence would have changed the sentencing outcome. This case raised the significant question of the value of post-conviction mitigation evidence concerning intellectual disabilities, mental disorders, and psychological trauma in capital cases. The Court majority reweighed the evidence and concluded that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously reversed Jones’s sentence. The Court's reasoning also illustrated the importance of state-specific sentencing practices and precedents in noting how Arizona law gives significant weight to aggravating circumstances such as multiple homicides and financial motivation.
Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe
Oral argument date: March 20, 2024
Decided on: June 6, 2024
Facts: The Indian Health Service (IHS) administers health care programs for Native American tribes and gets most of its funding from the federal government; the IHS also bills Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurance companies for its services. Passed in 1975, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) empowered tribes to run their own healthcare programs under self-determination contracts instead of using IHS programs. To account for the lack of bureaucratic infrastructure and slow billing processes, Congress enacted 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(2)(3), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1641(d)(1), (d)(2)(A), and 5325(m), requiring IHS to provide “contract support costs” to cover additional administrative expenses and allowing tribes to bill private insurance directly. The third-party revenue — also known as program income, from the direct billing of insurance companies — must go to providing healthcare services. The San Carlos Apache Tribe sued, alleging that IHS had to pay contract support costs for healthcare services that the tribe administered using third-party revenue from 2011 to 2013.
Issue: Does the Indian Health Service (IHS) need to pay “contract support costs” to support both IHS-funded activities and the tribe’s expenditure of income collected from third parties?
Holding: The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) requires the Indian Health Service to pay contract support costs for all activities tribes carry under self-determination contracts, including fees from collecting and spending program income from third-party payers like Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers.
Significance: The Court concluded that the various administrative and overhead costs from collecting and spending third-party program income fall within “contract support costs” that must be reimbursed by the IHS. Significantly, this decision helps to ensure that Tribal Nation healthcare programs function on equal footing with IHS-run programs, as envisioned by ISDA. A victory for tribal self-determination and tribal sovereignty, this ruling helps to assure that Tribal Nations administering healthcare services to their communities are not burdened by additional administrative costs and receive the full funding they are entitled to under federal law. The Court honored Congress’s commitment to Tribal Nations’ rights of self-determination in designing and implementing their own healthcare programs.
Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
Oral argument date: March 26, 2024
Decided on: June 13, 2024
Facts: Over half of all U.S. abortions use mifepristone with the two-drug regimen of medication abortion. Initially approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2000, the distribution of mifepristone remained restricted under additional safety procedures. In 2016 and 2021, the FDA expanded mifepristone access by extending the permissible usage period in pregnancy, allowing healthcare practitioners to prescribe the medication, and approving distribution via mail and pick-up at approved pharmacies. The Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine challenged the FDA’s current regulatory scheme of mifepristone, claiming that the FDA's actions lacked adequate safety studies and jeopardized patient and healthcare provider safety. A federal district court judge ruled in favor of the petitioners and suspended the distribution of mifepristone. Then, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the initial approval and struck down the regulatory changes in 2016 that expanded mifepristone access.
Issues:
- Were the FDA’s modifications to the usage conditions of mifepristone adequate and within their authority?
- Did the federal district court properly grant preliminary relief in suspending the FDA’s approval?
- Do respondents have Article III standing to challenge the FDA’s actions?
Holding: Respondents lacked Article III standing to challenge the FDA’s regulatory actions regarding mifepristone’s approved conditions of use. Despite respondents’ legitimate legal, ideological, and policy concerns regarding abortion, they did not have Article III standing to sue in federal court since these doctors and medical associations did not prescribe or use mifepristone or allege direct monetary or physical injuries from the FDA’s actions.
Significance: In the aftermath of the overturn of Roe v. Wade and the elimination of the constitutional right to abortion, many states and various anti-abortion groups have tried to restrict access to medication abortion. In this unanimous decision by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court ruled that under Article III of the Constitution, “a plaintiff ’s desire to make a drug less available for others does not establish standing to sue.” Thus, even though this decision upheld the current regulatory scheme of mifepristone, the Court has left the door open for future challenges to access to medication abortion as states continue to restrict access to reproductive care, including imposing more in-person visit requirements and limiting mail distribution. However, the Court set the important precedent that simply wanting a medication to be less accessible for others because of one’s moral and ideological objections does not satisfy the requirements for establishing standing when the petitioners do not prescribe nor use the drug and the FDA is not requiring them to do or refrain from doing anything.
U.S. v. Rahimi
Oral argument date: November 7, 2023
Decided on: June 21, 2024
Facts: Petitioner Zackey Rahimi was involved in multiple violent incidents in Texas when he was subject to a civil protective order for alleged assault against his ex-girlfriend, which explicitly prohibited him from possessing firearms. Rahimi was indicted for violating federal law 8 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) after law enforcement found a rifle and a pistol at his home. Rahimi’s initial constitutional challenge was denied. When the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen in 2022, Rahimi posited that 922(g)(8) was unconstitutional under Bruen. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Rahimi and reversed its initial decision.
Issue: Does the federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders from possessing firearms, violate the Second Amendment?
Holding: When a court has found that an individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of another, temporary disarmament is consistent with the Second Amendment.
Significance: In reversing the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court held that since the founding of the U.S., firearm laws have consistently included provisions that prevent people who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms; since Section 922(g)(8) fits within this tradition, it is consistent with the Second Amendment. In applying the historical tradition standard for firearm regulations established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Court found that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is “relevantly similar” to firearm regulations during the founding era. This case clarified that the Bruen test does not require the challenged statute to have an identical historical firearm regulation law to be constitutional. Significantly, upholding the decision of the lower court would have undermined the state’s authority to regulate gun possession to historical periods when governments disregarded many forms of violence against women, Black people, Indigenous communities, and other marginalized groups. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) has been in effect for almost 30 years and protects abuse victims and survivors; finding it unconstitutional would have likely increased domestic gun violence and put numerous lives at risk. The Court upheld a critical law that protects domestic abuse victims and survivors and established that firearm regulations consistent with the country's historical tradition of disarming people deemed to pose a danger to society and others are constitutional.
Murthy v. Missouri
Oral argument date: March 18, 2024
Decided on: June 26, 2024
Facts: Petitioners asserted that respondents, including federal agencies and officials, have engaged in censorship by targeting conservative-leaning speech on topics such as the 2020 presidential election and attempting to compel social media platforms to suppress particular types of content through public statements and threats of regulatory action, thereby violating the First Amendment. The district court granted the petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the federal government from meeting with social media companies or other means of influencing their content-moderation policies. The Supreme Court granted the government’s motion for an emergency stay.
Issue: Does the federal government’s challenged conduct transform private social media companies’ content-moderation decisions into state action and violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights?
Holding: Plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing because they failed to demonstrate that they were directly harmed by the communication between federal officials and social media platforms nor that the social media companies’ decisions to remove particular posts were traceable to the government.
Significance: This case examined the proper role of government officials in communicating with social media companies regarding the development and implementation of content moderation policies. Writing for the majority, Justice Barett highlighted how even though the records reflected that government officials played a role in some of the social media platforms’ content-moderation choices, they had “independent incentives to moderate content and often exercised their own judgment.” The Court emphasized how the overly broad assertion that the government engaged in a pressure campaign to pressure social media platforms to suppress certain viewpoints was insufficient. The Court was tasked with shaping how government officials interact with social media platforms and communicate with the public online. Critics argue that by focusing on standing, the Court failed to draw a clear line between “legitimate government persuasion” and “illegal government coercion.” However, the Court has set the important precedent that linkage between a social media platform’s content restrictions and the government’s communications with the platform is necessary to establish standing for a First Amendment challenge.