This article is Part VI of the Musings on Contracts series by Glenn D. West, which explores the unique contract law issues the author has been contemplating, some focused on the specifics of M&A practice, and some just random.
An asset purchase agreement (“APA”) contains the following survival clause:
Survival. Subject to the limitations and other provisions of this Agreement, the representation and warranties contained herein shall survive the Closing Date and shall remain in full force and effect until the date that is twelve (12) months from the Closing Date. None of the covenants or other agreements contained in this Agreement shall survive the Closing Date other than those which by their terms contemplate performance after the Closing Date, and each such surviving covenant and agreement shall survive the Closing for the period contemplated by its terms. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any claims asserted in good faith with reasonable specificity (to the extent known at such time) and in writing by notice from the non-breaching party to the breaching party prior to the expiration date of the applicable survival period shall not thereafter be barred by the expiration of such survival period and such claims shall survive until finally resolved.
Questions:
- Assuming the buyer failed to provide notice of a claim prior to the closing, does this clause preclude the buyer from asserting a claim against the seller based upon an alleged breach by the seller of the preclosing covenant to conduct the target business in the ordinary course?
- Assuming the buyer failed to give notice of a claim within twelve months after the closing, does this clause preclude the buyer from asserting a claim against the seller based upon an alleged breach of the seller’s contractual representation regarding the financial statements of the target business?
On its face the answer to both questions should be yes, right? Obviously, the preclosing covenant regarding operation of the target business did not contemplate performance by the seller after the closing date. If the financial statement representation only survived the closing for twelve months and no notice of an alleged breach had been given before that time, doesn’t that mean the seller is home free?
Well, if Delaware law applied, that may well be the correct answer (although best practices would still be to make the clause a lot clearer). But this particular APA was governed by Ohio law, not Delaware law—and a recent decision by a federal district court applying Ohio law, Bidwell Family Corp. v. Shape Corp., declared that the answer to these questions was a definitive no!
Survival: Specificity Important to Get the Result You Want
Why? Well it’s pretty simple, really. Saying a covenant, representation, or warranty “survives” the closing for some specified period assumes that it would otherwise die absent that declaration of survival (and, more importantly, that the death of the covenant, representation, or warranty would also preclude bringing any remedies for its breach after that death even though the breach occurred while it was still alive). While there is Delaware law indicating that “[a]bsent contract language providing to the contrary, pre-closing representations about the acquired property interest become ineffective post-closing under the same rationale that causes representations about real property to merge with a warranty deed,” I am not sure I would place much reliance on that. Instead, if you want to be certain that all representations and warranties do not survive (and any attendant remedies for their prior breach are unavailable post-closing), I suggest saying so in unequivocal language, even in Delaware.
But when you do want certain representations and warranties (and perhaps covenants) not only to survive but also to restrict the available period during which an action can be commenced for their breach (to a period shorter than the otherwise applicable statute of limitations), does simply saying that they “survive” for a specific period do the trick?
Bidwell: “Unequivocal Language” Required to Create Contractual Statute of Limitations
In Bidwell, applying Ohio law, the court focused on the fact that the clause in question “imposed no independent time limit on when [the Buyer] could bring indemnifications claims.” According to the court, if the reference to “survival” was intended to actually constitute a “contractual statute of limitations,” then there needed to be “unequivocal language” to do so under Ohio law. Turning to the survival clause in the APA, the court said:
[T]he APA . . . lacks the “unequivocal language[]” . . . required under Ohio law to limit the time period in which [the Buyer] could make its indemnification claims. The [Sellers] argue that the APA does contain such unequivocal language, pointing to the final sentence of § 9.01 which provides that claims notified “prior to the expiration date of the applicable survival period shall not thereafter be barred by the expiration of such survival period and such claims shall survive until finally resolved.” . . . The only thing this sentence says unequivocally is that claims notified prior to expiration of the survival period will survive; while the inference could reasonably be drawn that claims not so notified will not survive, the contract does not “unequivocally” say so.
Ouch!
But none of this should be new. We were talking about the need for more explicit language in our survival provisions at least a decade ago at M&A Committee meetings of the ABA’s Business Law Section.