May 14, 2020

Public Companies

Public Companies

Consents to Trouble
      Leo Herzel, Scott J. Davis, and Daniel Harris, 42(1): 135–44 (Nov. 1986)
This Article discusses the ambiguities and difficulties encountered by public companies under the Delaware statute governing action by stockholder consent. The Article criticizes the statute as a well-intentioned mistake and suggests some simple amendments to solve the problem.

Action by Written Consent: A Reply to Messrs. Herzel, Davis, and Harris
      Jesse A. Finkelstein and Gregory V. Varallo, 42(4): 1075–86 (Aug. 1987)
Stockholder action by written consent is often an expedient alternative to action at a stockholders' meeting. The authors respond to Consents to Trouble and discuss a pending bill that would amend the Delaware written consent procedure. See Leo Herzel et al., Consents to Trouble , 42 BUS. LAW. 135 (1986).

Negotiated Acquisitions: The Impact of Competition in the United States
      Leo Herzel and Richard W. Shepro, 44(2): 301–22 (Feb. 1989)
This Article analyzes the legal rules governing acquisitions of publicly held companies and concludes that they strongly encourage competing offers. This conclusion is consistent with the statistical evidence. The benefits from acquisitions go to the stockholders of acquired corporations. The stockholders of acquiring corporations are probably, on the average, losers.

"The Metaphysics of Time": A Radical Corporate Vision
      Trevor S. Norwitz, 46(2): 377–90 (Feb. 1991)
The Delaware Supreme Court decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc ., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), represents a significant shift in emphasis away from the maximization of shareholders value toward the recognition of other stakeholders' interests. In drawing a distinction between the corporate entity and the shareholders themselves, Justice Horsey has opened the door for a new vision of the corporation in the takeover situation and beyond.

Two Models of Corporate Governance
      Michael P. Dooley, 47(2): 461–527 (Feb. 1992)
This Article describes the basic elements that must be included in any model for the governance of publicly held corporations. It argues that the ALI's proposed Corporate Governance Project differs so fundamentally from the model represented by existing law as to constitute a wholly new model of corporate governance. It then describes the differences in outcomes that can be expected from applying each of these competing models to four pivotal areas of corporation law. The Article concludes that the ALI model imposes excessive costs on corporate decisionmaking and predicts that the Governance Project will not make a lasting impression on U.S. corporation law.

The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance
      Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, 54(3): 921–63 (May 1999)
The authors survey the evidence on the relationship between board composition and firm performance. Boards of directors of U.S. public companies that have a majority of independent directors behave differently, in a number of ways, than boards without such a majority. Some of these differences appear to increase firm value; others may decrease firm value. Overall, within the range of board compositions present today in large public companies, there is no convincing evidence that greater board independence correlates with greater firm profitability or faster growth. In particular, there is no empirical support for current proposals that firms should have "supermajority- independent boards" with only one or two inside directors. To the contrary, there is some evidence that firms with supermajority-independent boards are less profitable than other firms. This suggests that it may be useful for firms to have a moderate number of inside directors (say three to five on an average-sized eleven member board). The authors offer some possible explanations for these results, based upon board dynamics, the informational advantages possessed by inside (and, often, affiliated) directors, and the value of interaction between different types of directors who bring different strengths to the board.

Modeling the Conversion Decisions of Preferred Stock
     Timothy J. Harris, 58(2): 587 (Feb. 2003)
Regardless of the complexity of the capital structure of a company, the decision of a venture capital investor as to whether to convert its preferred stock to common stock in the event of an acquisition is driven by comparing the amount of acquisition proceeds that the venture capital investor would receive as a preferred shareholder to the amount of acquisition proceeds that the venture capital investor would receive as a common shareholder. In the case of participating preferred stock subject to a cap, the amount of acquisition proceeds that a venture capital investor would receive depends in part upon the conversion decisions of other preferred shareholders. This Article outlines the methodology for modeling conversion decisions using any of the widely available spreadsheet software programs. From these models, companies and venture capital investors can predict the acquisition prices at which preferred shareholders will convert to common stock.

The New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and the Public Corporation Model
      Henry T. C. Hu, 60(4):1303—1367 (August 2005)
The Securities and Exchange Commission's disclosure philosophy has largely focused on a single model: the publicly held corporation. From its inception, the SEC's disclosure framework for mutual funds has been a relative backwater and based largely on the disclosure framework for publicly held corporations. This situation is untenable. The use of the public corporation model leads to fundamental flaws in the SEC's fund disclosure system. The inherent differences between a public corporation and a mutual fund and the markets for their respective shares are significant and have manifold implications for disclosure. Moreover, the stakes have changed: far more households own stock funds than own stocks. Ours has become a portfolio society, a society in which household investments will largely define retirement well—being. This Article proceeds to outline a new SEC fund disclosure framework. One element in this new framework is the adoption of investor education as a supplemental principle for guiding disclosure requirements; this departure from the disclosure philosophy found in the public corporation context in fact furthers classic SEC regulatory tenets. In addition, the new framework contemplates moving away from the fund—specific focus of the current framework, a carryover from the firm—specific focus of the public corporation model. In most situations, a fund should instead be viewed primarily as the asset class or asset classes in which it invests, coupled with a managerial overlay. The implications of such a reconceptualization are set out in respect of the three key elements that together will largely determine how a typical fund will perform over the long run: asset class returns net of deadweight costs comprehensively defined, asset class risks, and the locus of asset class decisionmaking. The longstanding SEC fund disclosure framework not only has the potential for misleading investors as to risks and returns but can result in the very absence of rational decisionmaking as to the surprisingly important matter of asset class choice. A new fund disclosure framework can play a role in helping a massively unprepared public.

Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms
     Henry T. C. Hu and Bernard Black, 61(3):1011–1070 (May 2006)
Most American publicly held corporations have a one-share, one-vote structure, in which voting power is proportional to economic ownership. This structure gives shareholders economic incentives to exercise their voting power well and helps to legitimate managers' exercise of authority over property the managers do not own. Berle-Means' "separation of ownership and control" suggests that shareholders face large collective action problems in overseeing managers. Even so, mechanisms rooted in the shareholder vote, including proxy fights and takeover bids, constrain managers from straying too far from the goal of shareholder wealth maximization.

In the past few years, the derivatives revolution, hedge fund growth, and other capital market developments have come to threaten this familiar pattern throughout the world. Both outside investors and corporate insiders can now readily decouple economic ownership of shares from voting rights to those shares. This decoupling—which we call "the new vote buying"—is often hidden from public view and is largely untouched by current law and regulation. Hedge funds, sophisticated and largely unfettered by legal rules or conflicts of interest, have been especially aggressive in decoupling. Sometimes they hold more votes than economic ownership, a pattern we call "empty voting." That is, they may have substantial voting power while having limited, zero, or even negative economic ownership. In the extreme situation of negative economic ownership, the empty voter has an incentive to vote in ways that reduce the company's share price. Sometimes hedge funds hold more economic ownership than votes, though often with "morphable" voting rights—the de facto ability to acquire the votes if needed. We call this "hidden (morphable) ownership" because under current disclosure rules, the economic ownership and (de facto) voting ownership are often not disclosed. Corporate insiders, too, can use new vote buying techniques.

This article analyzes the new vote buying and its corporate governance implications. We propose a taxonomy of the new vote buying that unpacks its functional elements. We discuss the implications of decoupling for control contests and other forms of shareholder oversight, and the circumstances in which decoupling could be beneficial or harmful to corporate governance. We also propose a near-term disclosure-based response and sketch longer-term regulatory possibilities. Our disclosure proposal would simplify and partially integrate five existing, inconsistent share-ownership disclosure regimes, and is worth considering independent of its value with respect to decoupling. In the longer term, other responses may be needed; we briefly discuss possible strategies focused on voting rights, voting architecture, and supply and demand forces in the markets on which the new vote buying relies.

Cross–Border Tender Offers and Other Business Combination Transactions and the U.S. Federal Securities Laws: An Overview
      Jeffrey W. Rubin, John M. Basnage, and William J. Curtin, III, 61(3):1071—1134 (May 2006)
In structuring cross–border tender offers and other business combination transactions, parties must consider carefully the potential application of U.S. federal securities laws and regulations to their transaction. By understanding the extent to which a proposed transaction will be subject to the provisions of U.S. federal securities laws and regulations, parties may be able to structure their transaction in a manner that avoids the imposition of unanticipated or burdensome disclosure and procedural requirements and also may be able to minimize potential conflicts between U.S. laws and regulations and foreign legal or market requirements. This article provides a broad overview of U.S. federal securities laws and regulations applicable to cross–border tender offers and other business combination transactions, including a detailed discussion of Regulations 14D and 14E under the Securities Exchange Act and the principal accommodations afforded to foreign private issuers thereunder.

Internal Investigations and the Defense of Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era
     Robert S. Bennett, Alan Kriegel, Carl S. Rauh, and Charles F. Walker, 62(1): 55–88 (Nov. 2006)
Internal investigations long have been an integral part of the successful defense of corporations against charges of misconduct, as well as an important board and management tool for assessing questionable practices. With the heightened standards of conduct and increased exposure created by Sarbanes-Oxley, this essential instrument for safeguarding corporate interests has become even more crucial in identifying and managing risk in the enforcement arena. This article examines from a practitioner's standpoint when and how internal investigations should be conducted in order to protect the corporation in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings. Particular attention is paid to the issues created by a concurrent government investigation and in dealing with employees and former employees in the course of an investigation. The article also addresses the role of the Audit Committee under Sarbanes-Oxley, and the important issue of reporting the findings of the investigation to appropriate corporate officials. The subject of self-reporting by the Company to enforcement authorities is considered as well. In this context, the article explores the SEC's position on crediting self-reporting and cooperation as set forth in the Seaboard report; Department of Justice policy as embodied in the Thompson Memorandum; and the impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations.

Go-shops vs. No–Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications
     Guhan Subramanian, 63(3): 729–760 (May 2008)
Go-shop provisions have changed the way in which private equity firms execute public–company buyouts. While there has been considerable practitioner commentary on Go-shops over the past three years, this Article presents the first systematic empirical evidence on the effect of this new dealmaking technology on deal pricing and deal process. Contrary to the claims of prior commentators, I find that: (1) Go-shops yield more search in aggregate (pre– and post–signing) than the traditional no–shop route; (2) "pure" Go-shop deals, in which there is no pre–signing canvass of the marketplace, yield a higher bidder 17 percent of the time; and (3) target shareholders receive approximately 5 percent higher returns through the pure Go-shop process relative to the no-shop route. I also find no post–signing competition in Go-shop management buyouts ("MBOs"), consistent with practitioner wisdom that MBOs give incumbent managers a significant advantage over other potential buyers. Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that the Delaware courts should generally permit Go-shops as a means of satisfying a sell–side board's Revlon duties but should pay close attention to their structure, particularly in the context of Go-shop MBOs.

How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors
     E. Norman Veasey and Christine T. Di Guglielmo, 63(3): 761–776 (May 2008)
As business trends change and capital markets evolve, directors may face factual situations that raise new questions about the contours of directors' fiduciary duties. One increasingly common situation that presents tensions for a growing number of directors is the allegiances by individuals elected to the board by, and who may seemingly "represent," particular constituencies of the public corporation. Such "constituency directors" or "representative directors" may include, for example, directors designated by creditors, venture capitalists, labor unions, controlling or other substantial stockholders, or preferred stockholders; directors elected by a particular class of stockholders; or directors placed on the board by or at the behest of other constituencies.

We raise several questions. When a particular constituency causes one or more directors to be elected to the board, to whom or to what is that director loyal or beholden? The corporation? All the stockholders? If "yes" as to the corporation and all the stockholders, may the director give some "priority" to the views of the constituency that caused him or her to be placed on the board? Since the board must act collectively and the majority might not favor the outcome desired by the particular constituency, are these questions largely academic?

In this Article, we suggest that the existing standards of liability for breach of fiduciary duty should not change in order to account for changing circumstances. The existing standards of conduct and liability incorporate the necessary flexibility to balance the potentially competing duties of constituency directors with protection of the interests of various corporate constituencies. And if the fiduciary duty standards in corporation law are not sufficiently flexible to accommodate particular circumstances, constituents may wish to invest in an alternative entity (such as a limited liability company) governed by other law that will accommodate their needs. Or perhaps the investor may be able to effect a legally authorized change in the certificate of incorporation of the corporation to permit it to be governed more to the investor's liking.

Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward
     Leo E. Strine, Jr., 63(4): 1079–1108 (August 2008)

The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to Keep the Corporate House Clean
      Rachael E. Schwartz, 64(1): 1-36 (November 2008)
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, passed in the wake of corporate scandals involving misstated financial reports, included a provision for certain compensation and profits from the sale of company stock to be "clawed back" from chief executive officers and chief financial officers of companies that are required to restate their financials, due to material non-compliance with any financial reporting requirement of the securities laws as a result of misconduct. Courts have determined that only the Securities and Exchange Commission may sue to enforce this clawback provision. In the six years following passage of the law, there have been Sarbanes-Oxley clawbacks in only a small number of cases, each one an options backdating case involving allegations that the officer affected personally committed fraud. This Article takes the position that the clawback provision has no scienter requirement and its application should not be limited to officers who have personally engaged in misconduct. Rather, the wording of Sarbanes-Oxley, its legislative history, and the policies it serves call for the clawback to be applied to the chief executive officers and chief financial officers of companies that are required to restate their financials due to material non-compliance with any financial reporting requirement of the securities laws as a result of misconduct, regardless of whether those officers actively participated in the wrongdoing, knew of and failed to correct the wrongdoing, or were oblivious to wrongdoing by employees subject to their control. This general rule can be made subject to an exemption for circumstances involving certain misconduct by non-management employees.

Revisiting Consolidated Edison—A Second Look at the Case that Has Many Questioning Traditional Assumptions Regarding the Availability of Shareholder Damages in Public Company Mergers
    
Ryan D. Thomas and Russell E. Stair, 64(2): 329-358 (February 2009)
In October 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison, Inc. v. Northeast Utilities ("Con Ed") ruled that electric utility company Northeast Utilities ("NU") and its shareholders were not entitled to recover the $1.2 billion merger premium as damages after NU's suitor, Consolidated Edison, refused to complete an acquisition of NU. This case surprised many M&A practitioners who believed that the shareholder premium (or at least some measure of shareholder damages) would be recoverable in a suit against a buyer that wrongfully terminated or breached a merger agreement. If Con Ed proves to have established a general rule precluding the recovery of shareholder damages for a buyer's breach of a merger agreement, the potential consequences to targets in merger transactions would be substantial—shifting the balance of leverage in any MAC, renegotiation, or settlement discussions decidedly to the buyer and effectively making every deal an "option" deal. This ruling, therefore, has left some target counsel struggling to find a way to ensure that the merger agreement allows for the possibility of shareholder damages while also avoiding the adverse consequences of giving shareholders individual enforcement rights as express third-party beneficiaries of the agreement.

The Con Ed case, however, merits a second look. This Article revisits the Con Ed decision and challenges the conclusion of some observers that the court in Con Ed established a general precedent denying the availability of shareholder damages. This Article also discusses how the holding of Con Ed may very well be confined to the facts and the specific language of the merger agreement at issue in the case. Notwithstanding, the uncertainty surrounding how any particular court may approach the issues raised in Con Ed, this Article proposes model contract language that a target might employ to avoid creating a " Con Ed issue" and to minimize the risk of a result that was not intended by the parties.

Disclosure Obligations Under the Federal Securities Laws in Government Investigations
      David M. Stuart and David A. Wilson, 64(4): 973-998 (August 2009)
With the prevalence of government investigations into corporate conduct, public companies frequently face decisions about whether, when, how, and where to disclose to investors the existence of such investigations and the facts learned in the course of, or as a result of, those investigations. While the federal securities laws (and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder) require disclosure of specific events that may arise during an investigation, neither those laws nor the courts that have interpreted them provide clear guidance for many of the disclosure decisions that must be made over the course of an investigation. As a result, counsel must carefully analyze numerous facts and circumstances, understand the company's previous disclosures, make "materiality" assessments, and determine whether to make disclosure in a current report or wait until the next periodic filing. This Article seeks to present, through an analysis of precedent disclosures, caselaw, rules, and practical ramifications, the considerations counsel must take into account in evaluating disclosure decisions in the context of an investigation. These considerations can help counsel avoid having a disclosure decision worsen the already difficult circumstances posed by the investigation itself.

Caveat Auditor: Back to First Principles
      David R. Herwitz, 65(1): 95–106 (November 2009)
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") substantially revised the rules governing auditors of public companies, in an effort to counter the auditing weaknesses exposed in the Enron, WorldCom, and similar fiascos. Among the most important changes were a substantial upgrade in the role and responsibility of corporate audit committees, and the creation of a new agency, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), to take complete charge of overseeing auditors and all aspects of the auditing process. Some commentators have expressed disappointment in the SOX efforts to reform public company auditing, and this subject is likely to receive renewed attention in view of the U.S. Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, a case challenging the constitutionality of the PCAOB. This Article takes the position that rather than focusing on audit committees, effective reform of auditing lies in a significant step-up in the responsibility of auditors, by returning to the original purpose of an audit: to provide as fair and meaningful a picture as possible of a company's financial performance. The Article argues that in applying this high standard to a company's proposed financial statements, the auditor should express its "present fairly" opinion without any limitation based upon GAAP; in addition, whenever there are reasonable alternatives to any of the accounting treatments utilized in the company's financial statements, the auditor's report should disclose the reason for the choice made, as well as whether the auditor would have made the same choice if deciding on its own.

Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate
      Lucian A. Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, 65(2): 329–360 (February 2010)
This Article examines two "meta" issues raised by opponents of the SEC's proposal to provide shareholders with rights to place director candidates on the company's proxy materials. First, opponents argue that, even assuming proxy access is desirable in many circumstances, the existing no-access default should be retained and the adoption of proxy access arrangements should be left to opting out of this default on a company-by-company basis. This Article, however, identifies strong reasons against retaining no-access as the default. There is substantial empirical evidence indicating that director insulation from removal is associated with lower firm value and worse performance. Furthermore, when opting out from a default arrangement serves shareholder interests, a switch is more likely to occur when it is favored by the board than when disfavored by the board. We analyze the impediments to shareholders' obtaining opt-outs that they favor but the board does not, and we present evidence indicating that such impediments are substantial. The asymmetry in the reversibility of defaults highlighted in this Article should play an important role in default selection.

Second, opponents of the SEC's proposed reforms argue that, if the SEC adopts a proxy access regime, shareholders should be free to opt out of this regime. We point out the tensions between advocating such opting out and the past positions of many of the opponents, as well as tensions between opting out and the general approach of the proxy rules. Nonetheless, we support allowing shareholders to opt out of a federal proxy access regime, provided that the opt-out process includes necessary safeguards. Opting out should require majority approval by shareholders in a vote where the benefits to shareholders of proxy access are adequately disclosed, and shareholders should be able to reverse past opt-out decisions by a majority vote at any time.

The implications of our analysis extend beyond proxy access to the choice of default rules for corporate elections, and to the ways in which shareholders should be able to opt out of election defaults. In particular, the current plurality voting default should be replaced with a majority voting default, and existing impediments to the ability of shareholders to opt out of arrangements that make it difficult to replace directors should be re-examined.

The SEC's Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law
      Joseph A. Grundfest, 65(2): 361–394 (February 2010)
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed proxy rules that would mandate shareholder access under conditions that could be modified by a shareholder majority to make proxy access easier, but not more difficult. From a legal perspective, this Mandatory Minimum Access Regime is so riddled with internal contradictions that it is unlikely to withstand review under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. In contrast, a fully enabling opt-in proxy access rule is consistent with the administrative record developed to date and can be implemented with little delay.

From a political perspective, and consistent with the agency capture literature, the Proposed Rules are easily explained as an effort to generate benefits for constituencies allied with currently dominant political forces, even against the will of the shareholder majority. Viewed from this perspective, the Proposed Rules have nothing to do with shareholder wealth maximization or optimal corporate governance, but instead reflect a traditional contest for economic rent common to political brawls in Washington, D.C.

From an economic perspective, if the Commission decides to implement an opt-out approach to proxy access, it will then confront the difficult problem of defining the optimal proxy access default rule. The administrative record, however, currently contains no information that would allow the Commission objectively to assess the preferences of the shareholder majority regarding proxy access at any publicly traded corporation. To address this gap in the record, the Commission could conduct a stratified random sample of the shareholder base, and rely on the survey's results to set appropriate default proxy access rules. The Commission's powers of introspection are insufficient to divine the value-maximizing will of the different shareholder majorities at each corporation subject to the agency's authority.

Attacking the Classified Board of Directors: Shaky Foundations for Shareholder Zeal
      Michael E. Murphy, 65(2): 441–486 (February 2010)
The practice of dividing the corporate board into classes, with each class up for election in successive years, has venerable roots in corporate practice. However, it has recently come under concerted attack by institutional shareholders that fear its misuse as a takeover defense. Examining the issue from several perspectives, this Article argues that the possible misuse of the classified board as a takeover defense justifies no more than case-by-case consideration. A separate concern is that the classified board may constitute a barrier to a minority shareholder voice. While this concern has some merit, this Article argues that the classified board is a redundant barrier to a minority shareholder voice that has importance only if preceded by other reforms to enfranchise minority shareholders.

Is Delaware's Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence from 1988–2008
      Guhan Subramanian, Steven Herscovici, and Brian Barbetta, 65(3): 685–752 (May 2010)
Delaware's antitakeover statute, codified in Section 203 of the Delaware corporate code, is by far the most important antitakeover statute in the United States. When it was enacted in 1988, three bidders challenged its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. All three federal district court decisions upheld the constitutionality of Section 203 at the time, relying on evidence indicating that Section 203 gave bidders a "meaningful opportunity for success," but leaving open the possibility that future evidence might change this constitutional conclusion. This Article presents the first systematic empirical evidence since 1988 on whether Section 203 gives bidders a meaningful opportunity for success. The question has become more important in recent years because Section 203's substantive bite has increased, as Exelon's recent hostile bid for NRG illustrates. Using a new sample of all hostile takeover bids against Delaware targets that were announced between 1988 and 2008 and were subject to Section 203 (n=60), we find that no hostile bidder in the past nineteen years has been able to avoid the restrictions imposed by Section 203 by going from less than 15% to more than 85% in its tender offer. At the very least, this finding indicates that the empirical proposition that the federal courts relied upon to uphold Section 203's constitutionality is no longer valid. While it remains possible that courts would nevertheless uphold Section 203's constitutionality on different grounds, the evidence would seem to suggest that the constitutionality of Section 203 is up for grabs. This Article offers specific changes to the Delaware statute that would preempt the constitutional challenge. If instead Section 203 were to fall on constitutional grounds, as Delaware's prior antitakeover statute did in 1987, it would also have implications for similar antitakeover statutes in thirty-two other U.S. states, which along with Delaware collectively cover 92% of all U.S. corporations

A Timely Look at DGCL Section 203
      Eileen T. Nugent, 65(3): 753–760 (May 2010)

A Practical Response to a Hypothetical Analysis of Section 203's Constitutionality
      Stephen P. Lamb and Jeffrey M. Gorris , 65(3): 771–778 (May 2010)

A Trip Down Memory Lane: Reflections on Section 203 and Subramanian, Herscovici, and Barbetta
      Gregg A. Jarrell, 65(3): 779–788 (May 2010)

Preemption as Micromanagement
      Larry Ribstein, 65(3): 789–798 (May 2010)

Is Delaware's Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Further Analysis and a Reply to Symposium Participants
      Guhan Subramanian, Steven Herscovici, and Brian Barbetta, 65(3): 799–808 (May 2010)

One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?
      Leo E. Strine, Jr., 66(1): 1–26 (November 2010)
This essay poses the question of how corporations can be managed to promote long–term growth if their stockholders do not act and think with the long term in mind. To that end, the essay highlights the underlying facts regarding how short a time most stockholders, including institutional investors, hold their shares, the tension between the institutional investors' incentive to think short term and the best interests of not only the corporations in which these investors buy stock, but also with the best interests of the institutional investors' own clients, who are saving to pay for college for their kids and for their own retirement. Although the primary purpose of the essay is to highlight this fundamental and too long ignored tension in current corporate governance, the essay also identifies some modest moves to better align the incentives of institutional investors with those of the people whose money they manage, in an effort to better focus all those with power within the corporation—i.e., the directors, the managers, and the stockholders—on the creation of durable, long–term wealth through the sale of useful products and services.

From Regulation to Prosecution to Cooperation: Trends in Corporate White Collar Crime Enforcement and the Evolving Role of the White Collar Criminal Defense Attorney
     Robert S. Bennett, Hilary Holt LoCicero, and Brooks M. Hanner; 68(2): 411-438 (February 2013)
This article traces the steady growth of criminal law into fields that had previously been addressed by civil statutes, particularly in relation to the concept of corporate criminal liability. The article also describes the means through which the federal government has encouraged cooperation between corporations that are being investigated and their investigators. This fundamental shift in how corporate misconduct is treated by the federal government has reframed the role of a criminal defense attorney who defends corporations and executives. Any lawyer facing such a task must be willing to incorporate new strategies into daily practice while also evaluating the theoretical considerations governing what it means to “bet the company.”

SEC Enforcement Actions and Issuer Litigation in the Context of a "Short Attack"
     Charles F. Walker and Colin D. Forbes; 68(3): 687-738 (July 2013)
Issuers faced with a short attack—short selling of the issuer’s stock combined with the spread of negative rumors—may contemplate defensive strategies such as litigation and contacting government regulators, in addition to the investor and public relations efforts that are typically utilized in the wake of negative media coverage. Precedent calls for caution in these circumstances, as the record shows that the results of such strategies are mixed, with the SEC often turning its investigative focus to the issuer, and with costly litigation frequently resulting in compromise. This article begins with a discussion of the recent history of regulatory and legislative efforts to address concerns around short attacks and “naked” short selling. It then turns to a discussion of the SEC enforcement cases and private litigation relating to short attacks, and concludes that the SEC has appropriately brought enforcement cases only in clear-cut instances of fraud, while policing the margins through enforcement of the technical requirements of Regulation SHO. The article shows that the SEC enforcement record in this area, and the proof issues generally attendant to these cases, present important considerations for issuers who perceive themselves under siege in a short attack.

The Evolving Role of Special Committees in M&A Transactions: Seeking Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Controlling Shareholder Transactions and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest
      Scott V. Simpson and Katherine Brody, 69(4): 1117-1146 (August 2014)
Special committees of independent, disinterested directors have been widely used by corporate boards to address conflicts of interests and reinforce directors’ satisfaction of their fiduciary duties in corporate transactions since the wave of increased M&A activity in the 1980’s. In 1988, The Business Lawyer published an article titled The Emerging Role of the Special Committee by one of this article’s co-authors, examining the emerging use of special committees of independent directors in transactions involving conflicts of interest. At that time, the Delaware courts had already begun to embrace the emergent and innovative mechanism for addressing corporate conflicts. Now, after over thirty years of scrutiny by the Delaware courts, it is clear that the special committee is a judicially recognized (and encouraged) way to address director conflicts of interest and mitigate litigation risk. This article will examine the role of the special committee in the context of conflict of interest transactions, with a particular focus on transactions involving a change of control or a controlling stockholder, from a U.S. perspective (in particular, under the laws of the State of Delaware), and will briefly consider international applications of the concepts discussed. To this end, this article will examine recent case law developments and compare the special committee processes at the heart of two high-profile Delaware decisions, and, finally, provide guidance to corporate practitioners on the successful implementation of a special committee process.

Massey Prize for Research in Law, Innovation, and Capital Markets Symposium—Foreword
     70(2): 319-320 (Spring 2015)

Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The Evolution of Decoupling and Transparency
     Henry T. C. Hu; 70(2): 347-406 (Spring 2015)
Financial innovation has fundamental implications for the key substantive and information-based mechanisms of corporate governance. “Decoupling” undermines classic understandings of the allocation of voting rights among shareholders (via, e.g., “empty voting”), the control rights of debtholders (via, e.g., “empty crediting” and “hidden interests”/ “hidden non-interests”), and of takeover practices (via, e.g., “morphable ownership” to avoid section 13(d) disclosure and to avoid triggering certain poison pills). Stock-based compensation, the monitoring of managerial performance, the market for corporate control, and other governance mechanisms dependent on a robust informational predicate and market efficiency are undermined by the transparency challenges posed by financial innovation. The basic approach to information that the SEC has always used—the “descriptive mode,” which relies on “intermediary depictions” of objective reality—is manifestly insufficient to capture highly complex objective realities, such as the realities of major banks heavily involved with derivatives. Ironically, the primary governmental response to such transparency challenges—a new system for public disclosure that became effective in 2013, the first since the establishment of the SEC—also creates difficulties. This new parallel public disclosure system, developed by bank regulators and applicable to major financial institutions, is not directed primarily at the familiar transparency ends of investor protection and market efficiency.

As starting points, this Article offers brief overviews of: (1) the analytical framework developed in 2006−2008 for “decoupling” and its calls for reform; and (2) the analytical framework developed in 2012−2014 reconceptualizing “information” in terms of three “modes” and addressing the two parallel disclosure universes.

As to decoupling, the Article proceeds to analyze some key post- 2008 developments (including the status of efforts at reform) and the road ahead. A detailed analysis is offered as to the landmark December 2012 TELUS opinion in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, involving perhaps the most complicated public example of decoupling to date. The Article discusses recent actions on the part of the Delaware judiciary and legislature, the European Union, and bankruptcy courts—and the pressing need for more action by the SEC. At the time the debt decoupling research was introduced, available evidence as to the phenomenon’s significance was limited. This Article helps address that gap.

As to information, the Article begins by outlining the calls for reform associated with the 2012−2014 analytical framework. With revolutionary advances in computer- and web-related technologies, regulators need no longer rely almost exclusively on the descriptive mode rooted in intermediary depictions. Regulators must also begin to systematically deploy the “transfer mode” rooted in “pure information” and the “hybrid mode” rooted in “moderately pure information.” The Article then shows some of the key ways that the new analytical framework can contribute to the SEC’s comprehensive and long-needed new initiative to address “disclosure effectiveness,” including in “depiction-difficult” contexts completely unrelated to financial innovation (e.g., pension disclosures and high technology companies). The Article concludes with a concise version of the analytical framework’s thesis that the new morphology of public information—consisting of two parallel regulatory universes with divergent ends and means—is unsustainable in the long run and involve certain matters that need statutory resolution. However, certain steps involving coordination among the SEC, the Federal Reserve, and others can be taken in the interim.

Securing Our Nation’s Economic Future: A Sensible, Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase Long-Term Investment and Job Creation in the United States
     Leo E. Strine, Jr., 71(4): 1081-1112 (Fall 2016)
These days it has become fashionable to talk about whether the incentive system for the governance of American corporations optimally encourages long-term investment, sustainable policies, and therefore creates the most long-term economic and social benefit for American workers and investors. Many have come to the conclusion that the answer to that question is no. As these commentators note, the investment horizon of the ultimate source of most equity capital—human beings who must give their money to institutional investors to save for retirement and college for their kids—is long. That horizon is much more aligned with what it takes to run a real business than that of the direct stockholders, who are money managers and are under strong pressure to deliver immediate returns at all times. Americans want corporations that are focused on sustainable wealth and job creation. But there is too little talk accompanied by a specific policy agenda to address that incentive system.

This Article proposes a genuine, realistic agenda that would better promote a sustainable, long-term commitment to economic growth in the United States. This agenda should not divide Americans along party lines. Indeed, most of the elements have substantial bipartisan support. Nor does this agenda involve freeing corporate managers from accountability to investors for delivering profitable returns. Rather, it makes all those who represent human investors more accountable, but for delivering on what most counts for ordinary investors, which is the creation of durable wealth by socially responsible means.

The fundamental elements of this strategy to promote long-term American competitiveness include: (i) tax policy that discourages counterproductive behavior and encourages investment and work; (ii) investment policies to revitalize our infrastructure, address climate change, create jobs, and close our deficit; (iii) reforming the incentives of and enhancing the fiduciary accountability of institutional investors; (iv) reducing the focus on quarterly earnings estimates and improving the quality of information provided to investors; and (v) an American commitment to an international level playing field to reduce incentives to offshore jobs, erode the social safety net, and pollute the planet.

The Promise of Unfavorable Research: Ramifications of Regulations Separating Research and Investment Banking for IPO Issuers and Investors
     Benjamin J. Catalano; 72(1): 31-60 (Winter 2016/2017)
The trend in Securities and Exchange Commission and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority rulemaking and enforcement to insulate research from investment banking influence has led to the removal of research analysts from the underwriting process with adverse consequences for new issuers and their investors. The approach conflicts with the congressional objective under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act to incorporate research fully in public offerings for emerging growth companies, which now comprise the vast majority of IPO issuers. Faced with these competing objectives, broker-dealers should have written policies and procedures that are carefully crafted to service their underwriting and investor clients appropriately and to take advantage of the JOBS Act privileges with respect to research.

SEC Cybersecurity Guidelines: Insights into the Utility Risk Factor Disclosures for Investors
      Edward A. Morse, Vasant Raval, and John R. Wingender, Jr., 73(1): 1-34 (Winter 2017/2018)
In October 2011, the SEC issued new guidelines for disclosure of cybersecurity risks. Some firms responded to these guidelines by issuing new risk factor disclosures. This article examines the guidelines and cybersecurity disclosures in the context of existing laws governing securities regulation. It then examines empirical results from firm disclosures following the new guidelines. Evidence shows a relatively small proportion of firms chose to modify their risk factor disclosures, with most firms choosing not to disclose any specific cybersecurity risk. Moreover, disclosing firms generally experienced significant negative stock market price effects on account of making new disclosures. Rather than viewing disclosure as a positive signal of management attentiveness, investors apparently viewed it as a cautionary sign.

Interview with Marty Lipton
      Jessica C. Pearlman; 75(2): 1709-1724 (Spring 2020)
In September of 2019, after wrapping up meetings of the Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”) Committee of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), I took the train from Washington, D.C. to New York City to meet with Marty Lipton—the well-known founder of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz—in a conference room at his firm. It was perfect timing to have this conversation with Mr. Lipton, given recent developments relating to corporate views on the constituencies corporations may take into account in their decision-making.