Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate FinanceÂ-Based Theory of Loss Causation
Jay W. Eisenhofer, Geoffrey C. Jarvis, and James R. Banko, 59(4): 1419–45
Some recent decisions in securities cases and articles addressing the concept of "loss causation" have deviated from basic principles of corporate finance. In particular, certain courts and commentators have concluded that a stock drop following the disclosure of fraudulent activity is essential to establish loss causation and, hence, is a sine qua non for a plaintiff to prevail on the merits and ultimately recover damages. This article takes the position that those decisions and commentators are either incorrect or over-broad in their statements and should not be followed. Under sound principles of corporate finance, where expectations of future cash flow have been artificially inflated because of fraud, then the resulting stock price also is artificially inflated by fraud. Under such circumstances, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that he or she overpaid for the stock as a result of the fraud, and the price of the stock declined as a result of an explicit (or implicit) disclosure of diminished future cash flow expectations, such a showing should be sufficient to meet the loss causation requirement, even if the share price decline was prior to any explicit disclosure of the fraud.
The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b–5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
Allen Ferrell and Atanu Saha, 63(1): 163–186 (November 2007)
In order to have recoverable damages in a Rule 10b–5 action, plaintiffs must establish loss causation, i.e., that the actionable misconduct was the cause of economic losses to the plaintiffs. The requirement of loss causation has come to the fore as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo. We address in this Article a number of loss causation issues in light of Dura, including the proper use of event studies to establish recoverable damages, the requirement that there be a corrective disclosure, what types of disclosure should count as a corrective disclosure, post–corrective disclosure stock price movements, the distinction between the class period and the damage period, collateral damage caused by a corrective disclosure, and forward–casting estimates of recoverable damages.
Reassessing the "Consequences" of Consequential Damage Waivers in Acquisition Agreements
Glenn D. West and Sara G. Duran, 63(3): 777–808 (May 2008)
Consequential damage waivers are a frequent part of merger and acquisition agreements involving private company targets. Although these waivers are heavily negotiated, the authors believe that few deal professionals understand the concept of consequential damages and, as a result, the inclusion of such waivers may have an unexpected impact on both buyers and sellers. The authors believe that this Article is the first attempt to define "consequential damages," as well as some of the other terms used as purported synonyms, in the merger and acquisition context. After tracing the historical derivation of the term and its current use by the courts, this Article considers the impact of such waivers in a hypothetical business acquisition and proposes some specific guidelines for the negotiation of these waivers.
Applying Stoneridge to Restrict Secondary Actor Liability Under Rule 10b-5
Todd G. Cosenza, 64(1): 59-78 (November 2008)
Although the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., was widely viewed as a sweeping rebuke of the application of "scheme" liability to secondary actors, the Court's decision also raised some questions regarding the precise scope of secondary actor liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. There is an obvious tension between the Court's holding that the secondary actors in Stoneridge could not be held liable because their "deceptive acts, which were not disclosed to the investing public, [were] too remote to satisfy the element of reliance" and its pronouncement that "[c]onduct itself can be deceptive" and could therefore satisfy a Rule 10b-5 claim. In particular, the question of what type of conduct satisfies the element of reliance in a claim against a secondary actor who assists in the drafting of a company's public disclosures remains open to interpretation.
This Article first discusses the general standards of section 10(b) liability and the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. The next part of the Article compares the judicial standards of secondary actor liability under Rule 10b-5(b)—the bright line, substantial participation, and creator standards—that emerged in the post- Central Bank era. It then discusses Stoneridge and the Court's recent rejection of secondary actor "scheme" liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c). Finally, it reviews recent applications of Stoneridge and analyzes the implications of these decisions going forward.
Consequential Damages Redux: An Updated Study of the Ubiquitous and Problematic “Excluded Losses” Provision in Private Company Acquisition Agreements
Glenn D. West; 70(4): 971-1006 (Fall 2015)
An “excluded losses” provision is standard fare as an exception to the scope of indemnification otherwise available for the seller’s breach of representations and warranties in private company acquisition agreements. Sellers’ counsel defend these provisions on the basis of their being “market” and necessary to protect sellers from unreasonable and extraordinary post-closing indemnification claims by buyers. Buyers’ counsel accept such provisions either without much thought or on the basis that the deal dynamics are such that they have little choice but to accept these provisions, notwithstanding serious questions about whether such provisions effectively eviscerate the very benefits of the indemnification (with the negotiated caps and deductibles) otherwise bargained for by buyers. For buyers’ counsel who have given little thought to (or who need better responses to the insistent sellers’ counsel regarding) the potential impact of the exclusion from indemnifiable losses of “consequential” or “special” damages, “diminution in value,” “incidental” damages, “multiples of earnings,” “lost profits,” and the like, this article is intended to update and supplement (from a practitioner’s perspective) the legal scholarship on these various types of damages in the specific context of the indemnification provisions of private company acquisition agreements.