CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980)
CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
Lewis M. Barr, 45(3): 923–1001 (May 1990)
Over the past ten years, the courts have reached a consensus on most of the issues presented under CERCLA. As the issues have grown more sophisticated, certain splits of authority have emerged, some of which may need congressional clarification. In general, most courts have interpreted CERCLA to accomplish the results Congress apparently intended.
Application of the Abnormally Dangerous Activities Doctrine to Environmental Cleanups
Jim C. Chen and Kyle E. McSlarrow, 47(3): 1031–52 (May 1992)
The common law tort doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities is emerging as a key element of the law of hazardous substance regulation, which has been dominated by CERCLA. Recent applications of the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine have shown the doctrine's formidable potential for expansion. Together with the related torts of nuisance and trespass, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities have already begun to complement CERCLA's scheme for allocating the costs of cleaning hazardous waste sites. The authors also explore how the revitalized application of the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine to environmental cleanups will affect insurance coverage.
EPA's Final Rule on Lender Liability: Lenders Beware
Roger D. Staton, 49(1): 163–86 (Nov. 1993)
The Article explores the recent history of court decisions establishing lender liability under CERCLA. Comment is made on proposed EPA rules pending in 1992, congressional legislation proposed to remedy interpretive problems, the final rule as passed by the EPA in April 1992, and recent judicial interpretations of that rule.
Post-Dissolution Liability of Corporations and Their Shareholders Under CERCLA
Joel R. Burcat and Craig P. Wilson, 50(4): 1273–92 (Aug. 1995)
Is there life after death for a corporation or its shareholders under CERCLA? In view of the broad remedial purposes of the act, many courts are answering this question in the affirmative and disregarding, as preempted, state laws of corporate capacity that would otherwise govern. The central factual issues that have emerged in the majority of these cases are whether the corporation has been dissolved and its assets have been distributed, i.e., whether the corporation is "dead and buried."
Further Progress in Defining Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Damages and Other Monetary Punishments
George Clemon Freeman, Jr. and Makram B. Jaber, 61(2):517—568 (February 2006)
This article updates an earlier article by Freeman that was published in the February 2002 issue of The Business Lawyer on the status of the United States Supreme CourtÂ's rapidly evolving jurisprudence on constitutional constraints on punitive damage awards. Since then, the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell reinterpreted and revised the three factors set forth earlier in BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore for determining whether a punitive damages award was "grossly excessive" and therefore constitutionally prohibited. This article describes State Farm's new guidance, examines how lower federal and state courts have responded to it, and suggests possible areas where further guidance by the Court may be needed. The 2002 article also discussed the potential applicability of due process constraints, particularly the requirement of fair notice and the prohibition of "grossly excessive" punishment, to other monetary punishments authorized or imposed by state or federal government. In that broader context this article discusses several opinions dealing with due process challenges to statutory or administrative prohibitions or other limitations on timely judicial review of EPA administrative orders under the Clean Air Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).