May 14, 2020

Business Reports

Business Reports

A Case for Eliminating Quarterly Periodic Reporting: Addressing the Malady of Short-Termism in U.S. Markets with Real Medicine
     W. Randy Eaddy, 74(2) 387-416 (Spring 2019)
The author maintains that “short-termism” is a serious malady for which the only effective remedy is (1) elimination of quarterly periodic reporting on Form 10-Q, and the companion disclosure regime of quarterly earnings releases and conference calls, (2) conversion to annual-only periodic reporting on Form 10-K, coupled with a new annual earnings guidance requirement, and (3) retention of current interim disclosure of select material events on Form 8-K. The author reviews how the current quarterly disclosure regimes lead inevitably to short-termism behaviors, and are temptations to other problematic conduct, by corporate actors and market participants. The author contends that the proposed disclosure regime would reduce substantially such behavior and temptations, without compromising the quality of disclosures, protection of investors, or effectiveness of the capital markets system. The author argues that only such a fundamental change from the short-term timetable of the current disclosure regimes can curb short-termism, promote longer term and more strategic focus by corporate actors, and lead analysts, investors, and other market participants to focus on longer-term value propositions.

Give Me Back My Money: A Proposed Amendment to Delaware’s Prepayment System in Statutory Appraisal Cases
     R. Garrett Rice, 73(4) 1051-1092 (Fall 2018)
In 2016, the Delaware General Assembly amended section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law to provide surviving corporations with the option to prepay stockholders in appraisal cases. Specifically, the amendment gives a surviving corporation the option to pay, in advance of a trial, to determine the stock’s fair value, whatever amount per share that it chooses. Doing so cuts off the statutory interest on the prepaid amount, which theoretically should disincentivize investors from filing appraisal petitions solely to turn a profit from the statutory interest rate—a strategy known as “interest-rate arbitrage.” But in amending the statute, the General Assembly did not specify whether the petitioning stockholders must return to the corporation any amount by which the prepayment exceeds the court’s determination of fair value. The resulting ambiguity has not only caused uncertainty among litigants and costly motion practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery—a consequence, ironically, that the legislative amendment was aimed at avoiding—but has also diminished the amendment’s effect on curbing interest-rate arbitrage and, more generally, appraisal arbitrage. This article explores the history behind the prepayment amendment, including the evolution of Delaware’s appraisal statute and two Court of Chancery cases in which the Court foresaw the need for an effective prepayment system. This article also examines the legislative history of the 2016 amendment and other scholars’ suggestions for dealing with the statutory ambiguity. Finally, the article offers a new model for legislative reform, one that retains section 262’s core and advances the policy objectives that underlie Delaware’s appraisal system.