May 14, 2020

Bonds

Bonds

Reforming the Unbargained Contract: Avoiding Bondholder Claims for Surprise Par Calls
      Robert S. Blanc and Randy D. Gordon, 55(1): 317–49 (Nov. 1999)
Until the last couple of decades, interest rates remained relatively stable, thus providing little incentive for corporate borrowers to seek novel ways of redeeming purportedly noncallable bonds at par. But with the advent of junk bonds and periods of great interest rate volatility, issuers have been provided with powerful incentives to explore the relatively uncharted waters of par calls. This Article examines the authority for and legality of such par calls and ultimately proposes a redefinition of the issuer-bondholder relationship. This redefinition accounts for the realities of the marketplace and should lead a return to more settled expectations in both issuer and investor camps. Along the way, the redefinition suggests a principled framework within which to litigate disputes when they arise without resort to artificial constructs based upon bargaining that does not actually take place or unsatisfactory "contort" theories.

Model Negotiated Covenants and Related Definitions
     committee on Trust Indentures and Indenture Trustees, ABA Section of Business Law, 61(4):1439-1540 (August 2006)

United We Stand: Antitrust Aspects of Collaboration Among Corporate Bondholders
      Ali M. Stoeppelwerth, 67(2): 393 - 404 (February 2012)
Many observers over the years have commented on the various tactics employed by issuers of corporate debt seeking to restructure or repurchase their securities and the potentially coercive effects of these actions on bondholders. In response to issuer actions of this sort, large bondholders of a particular security often band together in groups or committees to try and negotiate collectively with the issuer and obtain more favorable terms. In some circumstances, these collaborations bring together firms that may be considered competitors in some aspects of their businesses and have on occasion been challenged as unlawful price-fixing agreements or group boycotts under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. This article reviews the opinions in those cases and discusses the antitrust implications of collective action by bondholders or their representatives in dealings with a common issuer.

Massey Prize for Research in Law, Innovation, and Capital Markets Symposium—Foreword
     70(2): 319-320 (Spring 2015)

Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The Evolution of Decoupling and Transparency
     Henry T. C. Hu; 70(2): 347-406 (Spring 2015)
Financial innovation has fundamental implications for the key substantive and information-based mechanisms of corporate governance. “Decoupling” undermines classic understandings of the allocation of voting rights among shareholders (via, e.g., “empty voting”), the control rights of debtholders (via, e.g., “empty crediting” and “hidden interests”/ “hidden non-interests”), and of takeover practices (via, e.g., “morphable ownership” to avoid section 13(d) disclosure and to avoid triggering certain poison pills). Stock-based compensation, the monitoring of managerial performance, the market for corporate control, and other governance mechanisms dependent on a robust informational predicate and market efficiency are undermined by the transparency challenges posed by financial innovation. The basic approach to information that the SEC has always used—the “descriptive mode,” which relies on “intermediary depictions” of objective reality—is manifestly insufficient to capture highly complex objective realities, such as the realities of major banks heavily involved with derivatives. Ironically, the primary governmental response to such transparency challenges—a new system for public disclosure that became effective in 2013, the first since the establishment of the SEC—also creates difficulties. This new parallel public disclosure system, developed by bank regulators and applicable to major financial institutions, is not directed primarily at the familiar transparency ends of investor protection and market efficiency.

As starting points, this Article offers brief overviews of: (1) the analytical framework developed in 2006−2008 for “decoupling” and its calls for reform; and (2) the analytical framework developed in 2012−2014 reconceptualizing “information” in terms of three “modes” and addressing the two parallel disclosure universes.

As to decoupling, the Article proceeds to analyze some key post- 2008 developments (including the status of efforts at reform) and the road ahead. A detailed analysis is offered as to the landmark December 2012 TELUS opinion in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, involving perhaps the most complicated public example of decoupling to date. The Article discusses recent actions on the part of the Delaware judiciary and legislature, the European Union, and bankruptcy courts—and the pressing need for more action by the SEC. At the time the debt decoupling research was introduced, available evidence as to the phenomenon’s significance was limited. This Article helps address that gap.

As to information, the Article begins by outlining the calls for reform associated with the 2012−2014 analytical framework. With revolutionary advances in computer- and web-related technologies, regulators need no longer rely almost exclusively on the descriptive mode rooted in intermediary depictions. Regulators must also begin to systematically deploy the “transfer mode” rooted in “pure information” and the “hybrid mode” rooted in “moderately pure information.” The Article then shows some of the key ways that the new analytical framework can contribute to the SEC’s comprehensive and long-needed new initiative to address “disclosure effectiveness,” including in “depiction-difficult” contexts completely unrelated to financial innovation (e.g., pension disclosures and high technology companies). The Article concludes with a concise version of the analytical framework’s thesis that the new morphology of public information—consisting of two parallel regulatory universes with divergent ends and means—is unsustainable in the long run and involve certain matters that need statutory resolution. However, certain steps involving coordination among the SEC, the Federal Reserve, and others can be taken in the interim.

Simple Insolvency Detection for Publicly Traded Firms
      J.B. Heaton, 74(3) 723-734 (Summer 2019)
This article addresses current limitations of financial-market-based solvency tests by proposing a simple balance-sheet solvency test for publicly traded firms. This test is derived from an elementary algebraic relation among the inputs to the balance-sheet solvency calculation. The solvency test requires only the assumption that the market value of assets equals the sum of the market value of the firm’s debt plus the market value of the firm’s equity. The solvency test is a generated upper bound on the total amount of debt the firm can have and still be solvent or, alternatively, the minimum amount of stock-market capitalization the firm must have if it is solvent at current debt prices. The virtue of the method—apart from its ease of implementation—is that it makes possible the detection of balance-sheet insolvent firms notwithstanding the possibility that not all of the firm’s liabilities—including hard-to-quantify contingent liabilities—can be identified. As a result, the method allows for the detection of balance-sheet insolvent firms that otherwise might escape detection. The method proposed here can identify insolvent firms that should be retaining assets and not paying them out to shareholders as dividends or repurchases, identify stocks that brokers and investment advisers should treat as out-of-the-money call options that may be unsuitable investments, and can help auditors identify publicly traded firms that are candidates for going-concern qualifications and other disclosures.