Attorneys' Fees

Attorneys' Fees

In Search of Bargained-For Fees for Class Action Plaintiffs' Lawyers: The Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel
      Andrew K. Niebler, 54(2):763–834 (Feb. 1999)
This Article examines the economic fundamentals of auctions held for the purpose of selecting lead counsel in class action lawsuits. As presently implemented, these auctions sometimes exacerbate the agency costs inherent in the relationship between class counsel and class plaintiffs. Redesigning the auction utilizing option principles can help produce a more optimal resolution of the class claim through a reduction of agency costs.

Attorneys' Fees in Arbitration
      Henry F. Minnerop and Kimberly A. Johns, 61(2):589—606 (February 2006)
It is a long–standing principle of American law, the American Rule, that a prevailing party in a litigation is not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees except (i) where authorized by statute, (ii) where the parties have agreed that the prevailing party should be awarded attorneys' fees, or (iii) where the court concludes that one of the litigants has acted in bad faith. Although this principle is well established and applied with consistency in court actions, it is often stretched, modified, or ignored in arbitration proceedings. This article focuses on the vagaries of attorneys' fees awards in arbitration proceedings and the decidedly hesitant review of such awards by the courts under the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law. The authors conclude with a number of recommendations aimed at avoiding the issuance of unintended attorneys' fees awards in arbitration proceedings.

From Regulation to Prosecution to Cooperation: Trends in Corporate White Collar Crime Enforcement and the Evolving Role of the White Collar Criminal Defense Attorney
     Robert S. Bennett, Hilary Holt LoCicero, and Brooks M. Hanner; 68(2): 411-438 (February 2013)
This article traces the steady growth of criminal law into fields that had previously been addressed by civil statutes, particularly in relation to the concept of corporate criminal liability. The article also describes the means through which the federal government has encouraged cooperation between corporations that are being investigated and their investigators. This fundamental shift in how corporate misconduct is treated by the federal government has reframed the role of a criminal defense attorney who defends corporations and executives. Any lawyer facing such a task must be willing to incorporate new strategies into daily practice while also evaluating the theoretical considerations governing what it means to “bet the company.”