Backdoor dealings and corrupt government employees. Illicit cash payments. Soliciting cases of expensive wine and paid-for furniture and $130,000 worth of personal house remodeling and construction services. This may sound like an episode of The Sopranos, but this story needs no fictional spin because it is true. One character in this story, a California Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”) contract manager, Keith Yong, was introduced to co-conspirator contractor Bill Miller by another Caltrans employee who told Yong that he could make money through bribes and bid rigging with Miller. The agreement was simple: Yong would steer Caltrans construction contracts to Miller and other co-conspirators’ companies and in exchange, Miller and the other co-conspirators would give Yong 10% of the value of the contracts in the form of cash payments, construction work on Yong’s house, cases of wine, and furniture. Miller’s long-time friend William Opp joined the conspiracy to help Miller bid on more Caltrans projects and bribe Yong. Thus began the four-year conspiracy involving over $8,000,000 worth of publicly funded contracts and nearly $1,000,000 in illegal kickbacks.
Public corruption and kickbacks to government officials provide a narrative that hits news headlines all too often. What makes this story different, and relevant to antitrust practitioners, is the charged bid-rigging conspiracy present here, a violation of the Sherman Act. A bid-rigging conspiracy is an agreement or mutual understanding among competitors about the amount of a bid, who should make the low bid, who should make the high bid, who should make an intentionally losing bid, who should not make a bid at all, or any other agreement that limits competition between them in the bidding process. Contractors engage in bid-rigging conspiracies because when competition is removed, there is potential to win contracts at inflated prices. This article offers insights for antitrust practitioners into federal and state bid-rigging deterrence and enforcement efforts, explains how one can identify signs of bid rigging and other antitrust criminal offenses, and highlights agency policies that incentivize effective corporate compliance programs and the voluntary self-disclosure of antitrust violations through federal and state leniency programs.
In 2019, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) formed the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF). The purpose of PCSF is to root out the type of corrosive conduct found in the Caltrans case, as well as to mitigate the significant threats that target public procurements, such as undermined confidence in government and the estimated billions of dollars in inflated costs borne by American taxpayers. The PCSF harnesses the combined capacity and expertise of prosecutors from the DOJ Antitrust Division’s criminal offices and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, along with investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and various Offices of the Inspector General (OIGs), to combat collusion, corruption, fraud, and other schemes that target government spending on goods and services at levels of government. With teams of law enforcement agents and prosecutors in 25 judicial districts, the PCSF uses its collective resources and skills to fulfill its mission of deterring, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting crimes that undermine competition in publicly funded procurement and projects. In addition to its district-based model, PCSF has two targeted initiatives: (1) the Data Analytics Project, the goal of which is to develop and use data analytics to identify signs of potential collusion in government procurement data for further investigation; and (2) PCSF: Global, which seeks to deter misconduct impacting U.S. taxpayer dollars spent overseas, to generate and prosecute international cartel cases impacting U.S. government interests overseas, and to continue to strengthen relationships with key competition agencies around the world. The PCSF’s statistics reflect the scope of the threat. Since 2019, the PCSF and the Antitrust Division have opened over 170 criminal investigations and obtained over 70 convictions for crimes involving over $575 million worth of government contracts and kickbacks.
State attorneys general occupy a unique position in antitrust enforcement in the United States. In addition to their ability to bring civil actions under the federal antitrust laws, attorneys general possess both statutory and common law powers under state law to protect competition in their respective state economies. This includes the ability to protect taxpayer dollars by enforcing laws against collusion, bid rigging, and other restraints on the competitive process related to public contracts awarded by local and state government entities. As the Ohio Supreme Court described it, “[t]he intent of competitive bidding . . . is ‘to provide for open and honest competition in bidding for public contracts and to save the public harmless, as well as bidders themselves, from any kind of favoritism or fraud in its varied forms.’” Similar to the PCSF, state attorneys general work to protect the integrity of public procurement processes and educate procurement officials on detecting and reporting suspected instances of bid rigging.
While most criminal antitrust cases are brought in federal court by the DOJ, the states have a history of evolving criminal statutes and enforcement that includes cases involving public procurement. For instance, in 2012, the Ohio Attorney General’s Office, along with the Ohio Inspector General and Hamilton County Prosecutor, brought criminal charges against a vendor and sales manager related to a scheme to manipulate the bidding process for traffic control devices sold to the Ohio Department of Transportation. And in 2018, the New York Attorney General secured guilty pleas and civil settlements from two waste hauling companies, the companies’ owners, and several employees for a conspiracy to rig bids on various municipal and private contracts in Broome County, NY.
State attorneys general frequently work together on enforcement and education efforts through the Antitrust Task Force of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). While most state antitrust enforcement tends to be through civil litigation, states have placed a renewed focus on criminal antitrust enforcement, particularly in the area of procurement. Recently, the NAAG Antitrust Task Force formed the Bid Rigging and Criminal Enforcement Committee for states to coordinate on best practices and education efforts related to criminal antitrust enforcement and detecting and preventing bid rigging.
PCSF’s enforcement purview includes the criminal antitrust offenses of price-fixing, bid rigging, market allocation, and monopolization, including conspiracies and attempts to monopolize, which are prosecuted under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. PCSF teams will investigate and prosecute other fraud and related offenses where the evidence supports it. In the Caltrans case, the charged defendants pleaded guilty to participating in a bid-rigging conspiracy in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1 and bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a). Additional crimes PCSF may investigate include mail or wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit either; conspiracy to defraud the United States; major fraud against the United States; criminal false claims; bribery of a federal official; kickbacks by private contractors; money laundering; false statements; and violations of the Procurement Integrity Act. Deliberately falsifying a certificate of independent price determination required by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.203-2, which is typically included in a vendor’s standard representations and certifications when a vendor registers through the Systems for Award Management (SAM), or other misstatements to the government also can lead to allegations of fraud or false statements.
Violating the Sherman Act is a federal felony. Individuals face a prison term of up to 10 years, criminal fines of up to $1 million, and the consequences of a felony conviction. Corporate defendants face a fine of up to $100 million, civil damages, and possible debarment. Under some circumstances, the maximum potential fine may be increased above the Sherman Act maximums to twice the gain or loss involved. A convicted defendant may be ordered to make restitution to the victims for all overcharges. When the federal government is a victim of antitrust violations, the DOJ can obtain treble damages under Section 4A of the Clayton Act, as can state and local governments and other private plaintiffs. The federal government also can recover civil penalties and triple damages under the False Claims Act. Conviction for antitrust offenses can result in debarment under FAR 9.406-2(a)(2), which provides for debarment from federal contracting for convictions of federal antitrust statutes “relating to the submission of offers.”
As for Yong, Miller, and Opp, after pleading guilty, they each were sentenced to custodial prison sentences. Combined, their sentences totaled over 14 years’ incarceration with nearly $1,000,000 in joint restitution and fines.
State antitrust statutes both incorporate aspects of the federal antitrust laws and sometimes go further in proscribing specific conduct deemed to be anticompetitive. The variance in state statutes affects the investigative powers, remedies, and criminal enforcement authority of each state’s attorney general. State statutes vary widely in their language and enforcement mechanisms, including a state’s ability to bring criminal antitrust charges and the potential sentences for antitrust convictions. Many state laws have language that follows Section 1 of the Sherman Act in outlawing agreements or combinations in restraint of trade, with some state statutes directing courts to interpret the statute in accord with federal court decisions interpreting the Sherman Act. There are also states that have a mix of federal law equivalents, such as monopolization language similar to Section 2 of the Sherman Act and language regarding mergers that substantially lessen competition.
State statutes providing for criminal enforcement that mirror the language of the Sherman Act encompass many of the same antitrust violations that are the focus of criminal enforcement by the PCSF. However, state antitrust statutes can have provisions related to specific industries that reflect attempts by state legislatures to address competitive concerns arising at various points throughout a state’s history. Ohio’s Valentine Act provides an example. A now-repealed section of the Ohio Revised Code previously outlawed combinations seeking to control prices in various food industries, a felony offense. In 1983, the Ohio Attorney General and Portage County Prosecutor used this provision to prosecute a 78-count indictment against two produce companies and one of their owners for price fixing related to produce sales to Kent State University. Another provision prohibits certain practices for those “engaged in the business of buying milk, cream, or butter fat.” A law enacted in 1981 granted the Ohio Attorney General the authority to challenge mergers in the petroleum products market, a law that was passed in response to Mobil Corporation’s bid to take over Marathon Oil Corporation, which was headquartered in Findlay, OH. In 2017, the Ohio Legislature expanded the definition of “trust” to include not just collusion among bidders on public contracts but also agreements between a bidder and a “person affiliated with a public office” restraining competition for public contracts. This provision treats agreements between procurement officials and bidders for public contracts the same as horizontal collusion among bidders, and other states also prosecute this kind of arrangement related to public procurement.
Although state statutes generally encompass the same conduct as outlawed by the federal antitrust laws, the above examples illustrate how state antitrust laws often go beyond the conduct proscribed under federal law and how state legislatures can use those statutes to address specific issues affecting a state’s economy. As noted above, criminal penalties under state law can range from no state criminal enforcement to significant fines and potential incarceration. Within state penalty statutes, the level of violation and potential consequences can vary based on the conduct involved. For example, most violations of Ohio’s antitrust law are fifth-degree felonies, but the violation is a fourth-degree felony when the conduct involves amounts greater than $7,500 and the conspiracy relates to transactions with or funding from a governmental entity. The Ohio traffic-control device case described above ended with guilty pleas to one felony and three misdemeanor violations of Ohio’s antitrust statute and one felony count of attempting to engage in a pattern of corrupt activity, resulting in more than $37,000 in restitution and $11,500 in costs paid to the state of Ohio.
In additional to criminal penalties, states generally have the power to bring civil suits under both state and federal antitrust laws seeking injunctive relief and damages. Other tools available to state attorneys general can include civil penalties or forfeiture, dissolution of the corporate charter of organizations that violate antitrust laws, and the ability to directly represent political subdivisions that are harmed by antitrust violations. The New York waste hauling case, for example, resulted in pleas to Class E felony and Class A misdemeanor violations of New York’s antitrust statute, the Donnelly Act, more than $900,000 in criminal penalties, and more than $500,000 in civil penalties.
Bid rigging takes several forms. These forms include bid rotation, where competitors agree to take turns winning bids; complementary or “cover” bidding, where competitors agree to submit intentionally high, or otherwise unacceptable, bids; and bid suppression, where competitors agree to refrain from bidding, giving a competitor a deliberate advantage. Competitors engaged in bid rigging could also conspire to split up public contracts through a market-allocation conspiracy or could agree to divide contracts in certain geographic areas or for certain customers and products.
Certain red flags could signal potential bid rigging or other collusion and fraud in public procurements. While no one red flag is conclusive evidence of vendor collusion, these red flags help illustrate the various indicators that bid-rigging activity may be present in a procurement process. These red flags include the same companies winning and losing awards over time; companies submitting bids only in certain geographic areas or for certain projects despite being qualified and able to bid on others; company bids that are much higher than government estimates; sudden increases in bid prices that cannot be explained by increased costs; large price differences between the winning and losing bids; or winning companies subcontracting to losing bidders. When a bidder that frequently submits bids or is expected to bid on a contract declines to bid or uses suspicious language about the customer being out of its territory, this could be a red flag of potential customer allocation. The Federal Acquisition Regulation and other public resources outline several patterns and schemes that remain suspicious, such as the existence of a “collusive price estimating system” and the filing of a “joint bid by . . . competitors when at least one of the competitors has sufficient technical capability and productive capacity for contract performance.”
Certain conditions may make bid rigging more likely. For instance, for certain public projects, there may be relatively few eligible bidders, and it may be difficult for new competitors to enter the market. For many public projects, repetitive and regularly scheduled purchases, as well as the regular public solicitation announcements, can make upcoming government procurement needs predictable. Rush or emergency projects are also at higher risk for criminal collusion. A market is particularly susceptible to a bid-rigging scheme when there is homogeneity in the product that is being procured. When a product market is homogenous and competitors are offering essentially the same product to a customer, there is less subjectivity in the purchasing decision, and the main factor becomes price. In these situations, colluding vendors that control the price of bids submitted can control which vendor submits the lowest bid, thereby winning the contract. For example, when a school district purchases milk for school lunches or a public water system purchases a water treatment chemical for its operation, the lack of significant differences in the product offered by competing bidders can make it easier for competitors to control the outcome of the contract award through collusion on bid prices.
In the Caltrans case, Caltrans’ bidding process required that it obtain at least two bids from qualified bidders before awarding the contract to the lowest bidder. Yong was responsible for compiling a list of eligible companies who would be invited to bid on certain Caltrans contracts. Yong communicated with Miller, Opp, and others about which companies should be invited to bid so that bids would be submitted only by co-conspirators. Once selected to bid, the co-conspirators then colluded to determine who would submit a non-competitive bid so that Miller’s company or another co-conspirator’s company, like Opp’s, would win the contract. In addition to the bid-rigged contracts, Yong also directed several no-bid contracts to be awarded on an emergency basis to Miller and his co-conspirator’s companies. Of the over $8 million in contracts part of the conspiracy, the vast majority were awarded directly to Miller’s sole proprietorship and to Opp’s company.
The red flags of collusion relevant to the Sherman Act are also relevant to state and local governments in their public procurement processes. Close relationships and frequent communication among competing companies can result in fabricated “cover” bids, bid rotation, and territory/customer allocation, all of which can cause taxpayers to overpay for goods and services. In the Ohio traffic devices case, conspiring vendors submitted falsified quotes and quotes from affiliated entities in an attempt to fabricate the appearance of competition in the bidding process. These companies coordinated through faxed and emailed instructions regarding quote and mark-up amounts for submission. The conspirators in the New York waste hauling prosecution protected their allocated territory by submitting intentional inflated “cover” bids or refusing to bid on a contract for a competitor’s allocated customer. To accomplish the scheme, the companies allocated territory in the waste hauling and recycling markets and used text messages, phone calls, and meetings to coordinate price increases and arrange inflated bids for submission. These “cover” bids allowed incumbent companies to maintain their contract with their allocated customer while making the market appear competitive.
Other red flags could signal suspicious relationships or affiliations between supposed competitors. Companies may be affiliated in some way with common identifiers such as physical addresses, phone or fax numbers, and email or IP addresses. There may be similar physical markings or handwriting on physical bids or similar metadata on electronically submitted bids that indicate that the supposedly competing bids originated from the same source. Company executives and employees may have a friendly or familial relationship. Affiliation could also be indicative of potential opaque or shell company ownership. For example, Miller successfully encouraged his long-time friend Opp, to return to the United States from China to help Miller bid on more Caltrans projects, organize the work, and bribe Yong. Despite being publicly associated with Miller’s company, Opp formed a separate construction company and placed his wife as the nominal president to conceal from Caltrans that he was behind it. Miller’s cousin owned one of the companies that early in the conspiracy submitted intentionally high bids so Miller would win the contracts managed by Yong.
Evidence of profit sharing among competitors and kickbacks to procurement personnel are also red flags of bid rigging. Miller and Opp agreed to split the profits generated by their work on Caltrans projects. Yong was paid nearly $1 million by Miller and Opps for participating in the bid-rigging conspiracy, to include multiple large cash payments from Miller and Opp. Miller’s employees performed $130,000 worth of remodeling and construction work on Yong’s house. Over email, Yong solicited bribes of expensive wines, which he referred to as a “donat[ion],” and instructed Opp to “pass the commission” (kickback) to Miller to pay Yong’s wife.
The PCSF receives case leads through a variety of channels. Many leads come directly from law enforcement agents who have received reports of suspected antitrust procurement collusion or have identified suspicious activity in government procurement processes. The public can submit complaints directly to the PCSF and the Antitrust Division through an online form. As explained below, the Division’s Leniency Policy incentivizes participants in an antitrust conspiracy to come forward in exchange for the promise of nonprosecution. Other case generation avenues include complaints by disgruntled employee or non-colluding competitors, news reporting, public audits and reports prepared by federal, state, and local governments, and civil lawsuits.
The PCSF takes a proactive approach to case generation through outreach and training. Indeed, the first objective of the PCSF’s mission is to deter antitrust and related crimes on the front end of the procurement process through outreach and training so procurement officials, government contractors, investigators, auditors, and data scientists can recognize and report antitrust risks and potential wrongdoing in the procurement process. When potential illegal conduct is identified, prosecutors and agents from the PCSF’s partner agencies will jointly investigate and prosecute these crimes. The PCSF’s district-based outreach model and its emphasis on increased district collaboration demonstrates its grassroots strategy to offset the risks of localized and federal grant allocations that are distributed state and local governments. PCSF’s training participation has increased exponentially in the last five and a half years as it has trained over 41,000 government and private sector employees, averaging approximately 7,500 individuals/year.
To proactively identify criminal collusion, PCSF continues to foster government-wide awareness and capacity with its Data Analytics Project. Formed to facilitate collaboration across the US law enforcement community in developing and using data analytics to identify signs of potential criminal anticompetitive collusion in government procurement data, the PCSF trains government employees, advises data scientists, advocates for collection and retention of pre-award data, and collaborates with international competition authorities. While a recent DOT OIG audit report highlights machine learning and econometric tools used to estimate the scope and cost of potential complementary bidding on highway procurements, some Data Analytics Project efforts have focused on exposing the heightened risks of procurement data gaps. For example, in March 2024, the EPA OIG issued a public report, “The EPA Has Insufficient Internal Controls for Detection and Prevention of Procurement Collusion,” which highlighted EPA’s lack of organized procurement data and internal controls, placing its 3,500 competitively bid contracts worth over $2 billion for goods and services at risk of procurement collusion which may “may lead to increased prices of goods and services that the [EPA] needs to complete its mission.” In April 2024, the AMTRAK OIG issued a report, “Additional Insights on Fraud Risks as the Company Increases Its Contracts and Procurements” which highlights the need to centralize procurement data, collect procurement data elements, and actively analyze data to identify contract and procurement fraud schemes, including bid rigging.
States generate case leads in a variety of ways. Some cases come from referrals from the DOJ or other federal agencies, which occur most often with cases that are local in nature and may not affect interstate commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act. Similarly, state attorneys general collaborate on multistate matters, with much of the coordination happening through the NAAG Antitrust Task Force. States also receive cases through citizens informing the attorney general of potential anticompetitive activity. For example, Ohio has a bid-rigging hotline where citizens can submit complaints regarding potential collusion affecting government bidding processes. Cases can also be referred by local or state entities that suspect their procurement processes may be the victim of collusive activity.
Similar to the PCSF’s model, state attorneys general educate public entities in detecting and reporting potential bid rigging activity through frequent training sessions with public procurement officials to familiarize them with the red flags of collusion discussed above. Procurement professionals play a key role in the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of antitrust crimes because they are best positioned to spot red flags and report them. In Ohio, some of this training includes a bid-rigging simulation where attendees play the role of municipal procurement officials reviewing bids for several products and services, with the goal being to detect any red flags in the bidding process and determine which product or service market is the victim of a bid rigging scheme. In addition to training state procurement officers to spot these red flags, training also focuses on best practices that can help deter bid rigging and collusive activity. These best practices include measures like requiring non-collusion affidavits with bid submissions. Non-collusion affidavits serve multiple purposes, including educating bidders on the antitrust laws and deterring potential collusive activity in a bidding process. Another preventive measure for public entities is keeping bidder lists, internal cost estimates, and bid materials confidential, to the extent allowed by law, until after a bid is awarded to avoid providing potential colluding vendors with a roadmap on how to rig the bidding process. In Ohio, materials submitted in a competitive solicitation process do not become public records until after the award of the contract. Through training procurement officials on preventing and detecting bid rigging, state attorneys general work to protect government entities and the taxpayers they serve from collusion and bid rigging in the procurement process.
At the DOJ, substantial policy changes have been announced and implemented over the last year, with the goal of encouraging both companies and individuals to promptly report corporate misconduct. Recently announced voluntary self-disclosure programs share a common principle that “[a]bsent aggravating factors, the [DOJ] will not seek a guilty plea where a corporation is determined to have met the requirements of the applicable voluntary self-disclosure policy, fully cooperated, and timely and appropriately remediated the criminal conduct.” The Safe Harbor Policy for voluntary self-disclosure also establishes a safe harbor period for acquiring companies that disclose criminal misconduct promptly and voluntarily. Coupled with the DOJ-run whistleblower-rewards pilot program that was formally launched by the DOJ Criminal Division and several U.S. Attorney’s Offices in 2024, these new incentives encourage companies and individuals to report corporate misconduct as soon as they know about it.
The Antitrust Division’s Leniency Policy, a pillar of the Division’s enforcement efforts, has long encouraged self-reporting of antitrust crimes. Leniency incentivizes corporations and individuals involved in wrongdoing to self-report participation in an anticompetitive criminal conspiracy in violation of Section 1 or Section 3(a) of the Sherman Act. Under the Antitrust Division’s Leniency Policy, corporations and individuals who are the first to self-report, with “candor and completeness,” their participation in an antitrust conspiracy; who provide “timely, truthful, continuing, and complete” cooperation in the Antitrust Division’s investigation of that conspiracy; and who otherwise meets the program’s requirements can avoid criminal conviction, fines, and prison sentences. To qualify for leniency, a company must promptly self-report after discovering its wrongful conduct; the Antitrust Division makes a “prompt” reporting assessment based on the facts and circumstances of the illegal activity and the size and complexity of a corporate applicant’s operations. The applicant bears the burden of proving that its self-reporting was “prompt.”
An effective compliance program should enable a company to swiftly detect and address potential antitrust issues that may arise within a company, which will maximize the company’s chance of qualifying for the Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy. Early detection and self-policing are also relevant at the charging stage of an investigation. The DOJ “encourages such corporate self-policing, including voluntary disclosures to the government of any problems that a corporation discovers on its own.” The factors prosecutors are directed to consider when evaluating the effectiveness of an antitrust compliance program include: (1) the design and comprehensiveness of the program; (2) the culture of compliance within the company; (3) responsibility for, and resources dedicated to, antitrust compliance; (4) antitrust risk assessment techniques; (5) compliance training and communication to employees; (6) monitoring and auditing techniques, including continued review, evaluation, and revision of the antitrust compliance program; (7) reporting mechanisms; (8) compliance incentives and discipline; and (9) remediation methods. These factors are explained in further detail within the Division’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations.
Once a company or individual uncovers some information or evidence indicating that it has engaged in a criminal antitrust violation, obtaining a “marker” allows the company or individual to hold its place in line for leniency consideration. While one applicant has a marker, no other applicant can obtain a marker for the same conspiracy. To obtain a marker, an applicant must report the general nature of the conduct discovered, the client, and must specifically identify the industry, product, or service involved. An applicant can obtain a conditional grant of leniency with a conditional leniency letter once the applicant has provided sufficient information to perfect the leniency marker. The conditional leniency letter outlines specific applicant eligibility criteria and cooperation obligations, as well as the Division’s conditional nonprosecution agreement. An applicant will receive a final leniency letter after it satisfies its obligations under the conditional leniency letter and the Division verifies the applicant’s representations regarding eligibility. Normally, this occurs after the completion of the investigation and any resulting prosecutions.
While cooperation with antitrust investigations is always encouraged, formal leniency programs are rare at the state level. In 2013, the Ohio Attorney General (Ohio AG) introduced a leniency policy for violations of the state’s antitrust, consumer protection, and charitable organization laws, and this remains one of the only formal state leniency policies. To qualify for leniency for antitrust law violations in Ohio before an investigation has begun, businesses or organizations must meet six requirements: (1) disclosure of information prior to the Ohio AG receiving information about the activity from another source; (2) prompt termination of the organization’s involvement in the activity; (3) full cooperation with the Ohio AG’s investigation; (4) admission by the organization as a whole rather than just individuals involved; (5) restitution to victims; and (6) the organization must not have been the instigator of the illegal activity. If an organization cannot meet these six requirements, an alternative path for leniency is provided, regardless of whether the Ohio AG is already investigating the conduct, that mainly overlaps with the six requirements for pre-investigation disclosure. This alternative path includes a seventh requirement that granting leniency to a disclosing organization would not be “unfair to others.” Factors that will be considered when determining the fairness of a grant of leniency include the promptness of the disclosure, whether the disclosing organization was the instigator of the illegal activity, and the timing of the organization’s disclosure.
If an organization is granted leniency under the Ohio AG’s policy, the office will not seek criminal charges, civil litigation, civil penalties or forfeiture, or debarment against the disclosing organization. For organizations that are granted leniency, officers and employees of the organization that admit involvement in the activity and cooperate with the Ohio AG’s investigation are similarly granted leniency under the policy. When an organization does not apply for leniency, individuals who disclose involvement in illegal activity to the Ohio AG can receive leniency even in the absence of a grant of leniency to the organization. The steps for leniency under Ohio’s charitable organization and consumer protection laws are similar to the steps for leniency in an antitrust investigation. Through this leniency policy, the Ohio Attorney General seeks to promote “early and effective resolution and remediation” of violations by businesses and organizations that harm Ohioans and the economy.
Whether it is a purchase made by a small town or a multi-million-dollar contract with a federal agency, bid rigging and procurement collusion raise costs for taxpayers and can erode the public’s confidence in government. Taxpayers deserve governments that seek the best returns on their investments through competitive processes free of corrosive self-dealing like that in the Caltrans case. Educating stakeholders on the red flags of big rigging and other collusion, encouraging law enforcement cooperation with leniency programs and self-policing with compliance programs, and prosecuting bid rigging and other antitrust crimes, help to deter potential wrongdoers and compensate those harmed by antitrust offenses. Through the work of the PCSF and state attorneys general, bid rigging enforcement helps to preserve the integrity of the competitive process, provide fair prices to taxpayers, and protect economic opportunity for law-abiding companies.
The views expressed are not purported to reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice or the Ohio Attorney General’s Office.
